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Abstract 
 
Historical sources from Late Antiquity are not primarily concerned with what might be 
called ‘social history’. More often they are interested in matters of faith, war and politics, 
or the biographies of great men and women. Archaeology has allowed us great insight 
into the material culture of ordinary people during the period, but we still rely on history 
to inform us about the agency of the lower classes. Unfortunately the preoccupations of 
extant written sources make it difficult to understand how common people in Late 
Antiquity perceived their lives, and how they tried to influence their position in society. 
 
It is hoped that an investigation of lower-class violence will provide a way for us to gain 
some insight into these issues. Violence, as an extreme and relatively rare form of social 
interaction, cannot necessarily tell us about everyday concerns, but the implicit danger 
of violence means that it provides a good indicator of what issues and grievances were 
taken very seriously by common people in Late Antiquity. Moreover violence, 
especially as performed by lower-class people whose social role was non-violent, was 
one of the ways in which ordinary people in Late Antiquity caught the eye of 
contemporary writers. Consequently, though the evidence for lower-class violence in 
Late Antiquity is patchy and pejorative, it does actually exist, and occasionally in some 
detail.   
 
Therefore, violence will form the thematic thread of this investigation into the lives of 
lower-class people in Late Antiquity. It cannot hope to be an exhaustive analysis of their 
lives in general, but will hopefully provide some insight into their wants and needs, their 
experience of change and their relationships with authority. 
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Introduction: Lower-Class Violence in the late antique West.  
This project was born out a desire to investigate dissidence in the later Roman Empire 
and how that dissidence changed during the transition from Roman to non-Roman forms 
of authority and administration. I had hoped that a study of dissidence would provide a 
method of understanding the lives of people in Late Antiquity through investigation of 
how and why they expressed their grievances against authority, and how those 
interactions changed as the figures in authority did concurrently. However, it quickly 
became apparent the ‘dissidence’ was far too broad a category to investigate in a project 
such as this. Moreover, I found that many forms of what might be called dissidence, 
such as usurpation and civil wars, heresy and barbarian incursions, were both well 
studied and tended to draw focus away from the common people of the period and 
toward grand politics and issues relating to religious orthodoxy and ethnicity. Valid 
though such topics are, I perceived a lacuna in scholarship regarding dissidence among 
the common people; the vast majority of the population and the backdrop against which 
politics and religion played out. As a result I began to refine the focus of research in an 
attempt to find a more suitable and useful thematic thread, and in the end I settled on the 
label; lower-class violence in the late antique West.  
 
i. Why Lower-Class Violence? 
‘A timorous Old Man was feeding an Ass in a meadow. Frightened by a sudden alarm 
of the enemy, he tried to persuade the Ass to fly, lest they should be taken prisoners. But 
the Ass leisurely replied: “Pray, do you suppose that the conqueror will place double 
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panniers upon me?” The Old Man said, “No.” “Then” said the Ass “what matters it to 
me, so long as I have to carry my panniers, whom I serve?”’1 
This fabula, written by Phaedrus in the first century AD, might be taken as evidence for 
the passivity of the poor in the Roman Empire toward political change. Like the Ass, the 
poor apparently cared not for the identity of their masters, so long as their own situation 
did not deteriorate. Modern historians of the end of the Roman Empire have typically 
echoed this impression: studies on the relationship between barbarians and the Roman 
state and aristocracies abound, but relatively little attention has been devoted to the 
experience of the poor. Certain scholars, especially Marxists, have emphasised the role 
of the poor in the context of class struggle, but even G. E. M. De Ste. Croix, who 
interpreted this fabula as an example of class conscious rejection of loyalty toward 
authority, still saw the Ass as the passive subject of political change.2 Fortunately, 
scholarship has begun to move away from this a presumptive attitude. Biographies of 
‘great men’ and analyses of Imperial politics still appear – and rightly so – but today 
they are increasingly balanced by more diverse and inclusive studies to provide a fuller 
depiction of the ancient world. Archaeology in particular has greatly altered our 
understanding of the lives of common people, since it provides us with vital information 
about the material culture in greater detail than pure history. Even with this insight 
however, the poor can still be depicted and understood to be mere passive recipients of 
change. We now know immeasurably more about the day-to-day lives of the people of 
Pompeii because of archaeological excavation, yet when Vesuvius erupted many of 
those people had little choice but to await their fate. However, not all changes are so 
cataclysmic, and few political, social or economic changes are as inexorable as 
                                                          
1 Phaedrus, ‘Fables’, 1. 15 “The Ass and the Old Shepherd”, trans. in The comedies of Terence and the 
fables of Phaedrus, trans. Henry Thomas Riley (London: George Bell and Sons, 1877), p. 373. 
2 G. E. M. de Ste Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: from the Archaic Age to the 
Arab Conquests (London: Duckworth & Co., 1981), p. 444. 
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volcanism! Therefore I wanted to try to understand how common people reacted to 
change in their world, and if and how they were able to affect their position in society. 
Unfortunately we have very little evidence from Late Antiquity that tells us directly 
about what ordinary people thought of the world and their place in it. 
However, we can sometimes understand (or infer) detail about the perceptions of 
common people through study of their actions. From a historical perspective, violent 
action is one of the easiest and most useful categories of action or activity to analyse, 
and through which we can try to understand more about the agency of the lower classes 
in Late Antiquity. In his series of Collège de France lectures entitled ‘Society must be 
defended’, Foucault discussed the question; ‘What is power?’ One given solution was 
to see power in traditional economic terms, but for the purposes of his exercise he 
investigated two alternative hypotheses; power as ‘that which represses’ and as ‘war, 
and the continuation of war by other means.’3 Furthermore, he elucidated that his object 
was: 
‘to understand power by looking at its extremities…and especially at the points where 
this power transgresses the rules of right that organise and delineate it, oversteps those 
rules and is invested in institutions, is embodied in techniques and acquires the material 
means to intervene, sometimes in violent ways.’4 
These lines of thought are particularly relevant to the study of the lower classes in Late 
Antiquity, as we lack the necessary empirical evidence to assess quality of life in an 
objective way, and what subjective evidence we have is almost uniformly biased, 
pejorative or disinterested. This renders assessment of lower-class power in economic 
terms problematic at best. Therefore it seems sensible to use instances of lower-class 
                                                          
3 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, trans. David 
Macey (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 15. 
4 Ibid, p. 27. 
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violence as a focal point for investigating the effect of the transformation of the Roman 
world, since violence, as an ‘extremity of power’, did elicit attention from late antique 
writers. Furthermore, and exactly because it was an extreme activity, violence provides 
a particularly useful measure of human action. Inference about perceptions and thought 
from the evidence of action alone is often, at best, speculative. However, we can be fairly 
confident that people in Late Antiquity only entered into life-threatening violence with 
significant need. Therefore, even though our understanding of their motivations may be 
speculative, we can at least be sure that the matter was of great significance to them. 
This may not sound like much, but it is something, and perhaps something profound.  
It is hoped that lower-class violence will allow us to see, if imperfectly, how lower-class 
people interacted with authority and their social environment. In the specific context of 
Late Antiquity, it is hoped that it will provide another method of understanding their 
lives. This is significant, because perceptions of quality of life for common people in 
Late Antiquity varies widely. For Sir Samuel Dill in 1926 there was a stark and 
depressing contrast between the light of classical Rome, and the almost literal darkness 
of the medieval era: 
‘The Roman Peace which gave the world almost unexampled calm and prosperity, has 
vanished. As in our own days, passion, greed and bold disregard of moral tradition have 
followed great wars and triumphs of military strength. …The long tranquillity of the 
Roman sway ended in the violence and darkness of the Middle Age.’5 
This moralistic condemnation of the failure of the pax Romana was a product of previous 
generations of historical interpretation, but juxtaposition of the (relative) peace under 
Rome with the violence of the ‘Dark Ages’ is not without parallel in modern scholarship. 
                                                          
5 Samuel Dill, Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age, (London: Macmillan, 1926), pp. 306-7. 
See also Guy Halsall, ‘Introduction’ in Violence and Society the Early Medieval West, ed. by Halsall, 
(Woodbridge: Boydell, 1998), p. 4. 
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Ralph Mathisen, for example, contrasts the violent resolution of conflicts ‘characteristic’ 
of sixth-century Gaul with ‘the more peaceful methods which almost invariably resolved 
such disputes in the fifth century.’6  
At the risk of oversimplifying a complex debate, it is perhaps worthwhile noting how 
divergent opinions in scholarship can be when attempting to evaluate the quality of life 
of common people in Late Antiquity. Bryan Ward-Perkins has, for example, argued that 
the failure of the Roman economic and commercial system deprived the people of the 
products of thriving specialisation, such as specifically bred livestock and sophisticated 
pottery, and therefore resulted in a tangible decline in quality of life. However, it is also 
possible to contrast this notion with that of greater individual freedoms.  Chris Wickham 
has argued that greater peasant self-determination in the post-Roman period allowed 
them to compete more forcefully with either the state or the aristocracy. As such, a more 
violent time may actually represent a higher quality of life through political freedom, 
despite the decline in security and stability. Furthermore, ‘the peasants had to be better 
off than under the Roman Empire, because they were giving less to landowners and 
rulers.’7 Both of these studies make use of evidence that is more suitable to statistical or 
objective analysis than that which describes lower-class violence. Our sources are 
simply too patchy, biased or incomplete to make any fundamental claims about changes 
in quality of life across the West of Europe in Late Antiquity. However, we will 
                                                          
6 R. W. Mathisen, Roman Aristocrats in Barbarian Gaul (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993), p. 
142. See also Bryan Ward-Perkins, The fall of Rome: and the end of civilization (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), pp. 63-83. 
7 Ward-Perkins, The fall of Rome, pp. 87-121 and Chris Wickham, Framing the early Middle Ages: 
Europe and the Mediterranean, 400-800 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 707. It must be 
stressed that both offer far more considered and complex arguments than the juxtaposition between their 
general interpretations necessarily suggests. Wickham, for example, on p. 707 immediately goes on to 
discuss the lesser material goods available. For fuller depiction of his arguments for society in the post-
Roman period, see pp. 577-85. Ward Perkins, meanwhile, whose argument is heavily reliant on 
archaeology, acknowledges that finds associated with ‘elites’ tend to be preserved, discovered and 
analysed with greater regularity and therefore may misrepresent the actual quality of life of the majority; 
p. 139.  
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hopefully be able to understand more about what factors profoundly affected the quality 
of life of common people, and how they reacted to it in particular situations. 
Furthermore, it is hoped that by focusing on violence, a contribution can be made to an 
otherwise understudied topic. Perhaps the clearest indicator of this is the analysis of 
violence in Wickham’s Framing. This work pays particular and sustained attention to 
the lower classes and Wickham remains one of the most notable proponents of increased 
lower-class agency in the immediate post-Roman period. Nevertheless, as Brent Shaw 
notes, the book glosses over violence: ‘the causal effects of large-scale violence are 
almost wholly subordinated to the other categories of analysis; they enter the narrative 
almost as after-the-fact notices.’8 Blame should not be levelled at Wickham particularly 
though; Shaw admits that theorisation of violence is particularly difficult and that 
‘almost nothing of merit exists even now for antiquity’. This he attributes to the long 
hangover of nineteenth-century historiographical traditions.9 The following study 
cannot claim to be a fundamental theorisation of violence in Late Antiquity, but it will 
hopefully expand upon how and why violence was used in that period by ordinary 
people. 
 
ii. Terminology: Class, Legitimacy and Violence 
In addition to the condemnation of the post-Roman period as more violent than its 
predecessor, violence has a significant place in Marxist interpretations of the end of 
Empire and, indeed, in reactions to those interpretations. The significance of ‘class 
struggle’ to this methodology is crucial. As Ward-Perkins has claimed; ‘Amongst all the 
possible causes of Rome’s fall canvassed by historians, popular uprisings to throw off 
                                                          
8 Brent Shaw, ‘After Rome: Transformations of the Early Mediterranean World’, New Left Review 51, 
2008, (89-114), p. 99. 
9 Ibid, p. 99. 
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the shackles of imperial rule come a very long way down any list.’ This is reasonable 
enough, but he goes on to argue that; ‘This is hardly surprising, since… Roman rule, and 
above all Roman peace, brought levels of comfort and sophistication to the West that 
had not been seen before and that were not to be seen again for many centuries.’10 This 
justification is more contentious, as many historians, Marxist or otherwise, would argue 
that Roman ‘civilisation’ was often unpleasant or even brutal for the general populace.11 
Popular revolt did not overthrow the Empire, but cases have been made for the 
significance of popular discontentment within Roman society. G. E. M. de Ste Croix has 
argued that, such was the plight of the peasant classes, they were indifferent to the 
‘disintegration’ of the Empire and often actively participated in the process, or sought 
out the rule of barbarians as an alternative.12 Similarly E. A. Thompson and, more 
recently Neil Faulkner, have argued for the importance of revolt – particularly that of 
the Bacaudae – as an additional strain on the already heavily burdened Roman State.13 
These Marxist interpretations have, in turn, prompted forceful responses; Martin Henig 
has described Faulkner’s notion of social revolution as the cause of the End of Roman 
Britain as ‘a figment of his imagination’, whilst Raymond Van Dam regards the idea of 
peasant revolt as a relic of the Marx-inspired interpretation of late Roman society and 
that, as such, it ‘can only be maintained with the most doctrinaire perspective.’14 In this 
study I will not suggest any kind of metanarrative of the causes of the end of the Roman 
Empire. Rather, as Momigliano put it, ‘what we want is to understand the change by 
                                                          
10 Ward-Perkins, The fall of Rome, p. 176. 
11 For a cautious recognition of this brutality see Peter Brown, Through the Eye of a Needle: Wealth the 
Fall of Rome and the Making of Christianity, (Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2012), pp. 55-7. 
For a more overt criticism, see R. MacMullen, ‘Personal Power in the Roman Empire’ in Changes in the 
Roman Empire: Essays on the Ordinary (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1990), 190-97, p. 190. 
12 G. E. M. de Ste Croix, pp. 475-88. 
13 E. A. Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolts in Late Roman Gaul and Spain’, Past and Present, 2, (1952) 11-
23, passim, and Neil Faulkner, The Decline and Fall of Roman Britain, (Stroud: Tempus, 2001). 
14 Martin Henig, ‘Review: The Decline and Fall of Roman Britain by Neil Faulkner’ The English 
Historical Review, 117, No. 471 (2002) 442-443, p. 443, R. Van Dam, Leadership and Community in 
Late Antique Gaul, (London: University of California, 1985), p. 26, 37.  
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analysing it and giving due consideration to conscious decisions, deep-seated urges, and 
the interplay of disparate events.’15 Yet a study of lower-class violence, in its implicit 
recognition of the importance of class and its investigation of violence as a tool for the 
defence, maintenance or improvement of quality of life, is likely to at least overlap with 
material studied by both Marxists, and their opponents. Therefore, some assessment of 
their respective analyses of both events and trends will be desirable and necessary.  
The existence of contradictory trends in scholarship should not dissuade us from 
attempting to investigate a topic; rather, it might inform us that more needs to be said 
about it! However, because of the contentiousness of the issue, I will provide 
explanations for my usage of a couple of terms which carry a certain degree of baggage. 
It must be stressed that these are my usages of these terms; they provide definitions only 
in the context of this study and are not necessarily applicable or relevant beyond its 
confines.  
Perhaps the most important term to define, for the purposes of this thesis, is my usage 
of ‘class’. Many varied definitions of this word exist across multiple academic fields and 
cultural and individual perceptions. In his article on late Roman Social Relations in the 
New Cambridge Ancient History, Arnaldo Marcone notes that, in contrast to the 
privileged classes, exact terminology for the lower social orders is inexact and somewhat 
scarce. As a result he regards it as too broad and heterogeneous to be considered a class.16  
Nevertheless, the use of the idea of social class as a tool to understand status in the 
ancient world is a common and relatively acceptable technique.17 ‘Lower class’ will be 
used in this study as a label to indicate those who were not privileged. Where the details 
                                                          
15 Arnaldo Momigliano, ‘After Gibbon’s Decline and Fall’ in The Age of Spirituality ed. Weitzmann, 
(New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1980), p. 14.  
16 Arnaldo Marcone, ‘Late Roman Social Relations’ in The New Cambridge Ancient History XIII, ed. 
Averil Cameron and Garnsey, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 338-370 (p. 339). 
17 For example, Halsall, ‘Introduction’, p. 21 and Peter Brown, Authority and the Sacred: Aspects of the 
Christianisation of the Roman World. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 47. 
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within the sources allow and where it is valuable for analysis, further enquiry into the 
particular status of the individual or group will be undertaken. ‘Class’ in this study 
should not be taken to necessarily imply either class-consciousness or class-conflict. 
Marcone is right to stress the heterogeneity of the lower social orders within the Empire, 
and the same can be said of the successor states as well. There is, therefore, no attempt 
to apply such implications here, especially since it might distort our interpretation or 
invite criticism for anachronism. To reiterate then, the use of class herein is simply to 
draw a contrast between the wealthy and influential persons at the top of late antique 
social hierarchies and everyone else. The purpose for this specific definition is 
essentially exclusionary; as stated above, dissidence is far too broad a topic to attempt 
to discuss, and there is no space here to try to explain why generals might try to 
overthrow their Emperors. Generalisation is a dangerous business and it would be wildly 
inappropriate to try to draw comparison between Aetius’ grievance toward Valentinian 
III and the grievance of a shepherd towards his master.  
Fortunately, and for the purposes of clarity and avoiding anachronism, the Romans 
themselves applied exactly this form of hierarchical categorisation in their own society. 
The wealthy, influential, people with the right family, friends or connections were called 
honestiores. Everyone else – farmers, guild-workers, fishermen, artisans and every other 
status and occupation – fell into a bracket labelled humiliores. It is important to stress 
that this distinction was neither particularly distinct nor strict. It is not necessarily always 
clear who fitted where in the system; the technical usage of the term was to describe 
what kind of punishment a citizen might receive for a given crime. Humiliores could 
expect their punishment to be physical and public. Honestiores might still receive 
corporal punishments for more serious crimes, but were likely to receive financial 
sentences for lesser infractions. In either case, punishments of honestiores were not to 
be inflicted in a public space to avoid the shaming of the convicted party. However, if a 
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humilial citizen accumulated enough property to attain a curial or magisterial position, 
they would acquire honestiorial status with it.  The vagueness of the distinction between 
humilial and honestiorial does not harm its usefulness to this study.18 Only in very rare 
cases do we see this marker of status used in description of individuals in our sources. 
Rather, social status is marked either through other terminology or by assumed 
knowledge. Fortunately, our purpose is not to focus on a particular distinct statuses 
among many, but rather to exclude the small minority whose high position in society 
means that they were unlikely to share the same social, economic and judicial 
weaknesses and insecurities as the rest of the population. Put simply, and crudely, by 
lower class I mean the (approximately) 90-95% of people that had less wealth and power 
than the remaining 5-10%.19  
It is also worthwhile to address the problem of legitimacy. In the classic Weberian model 
the state attempts to monopolise violence in order to safeguard its authority: 
‘a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate 
use of physical force’ 
‘The state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of 
legitimate (i.e. considered to be legitimate) violence. If the state is to exist, the dominated 
must obey the authority claimed by the powers that be.’20  
This model initially fits our purposes reasonably well in that the Roman State tried to 
isolate violence to the military and judicial spheres. Thus legitimate violence can be 
                                                          
18 Valerio Neri uses similar categorisation in ‘Povertà, criminalità e disordine sociale nella tarda 
antichità’ in: Ordine e sovversione nel mondo greco e romano, PISA, edizioni ETS, 2009, pp. 193 - 206 
(atti di: Ordine e sovversione nel mondo greco e romano, Cividale del Friuli, 25-27 settembre 2008), p. 
193. 
19 For more discussion of hierarchy in Late Antiquity, and particularly for honestiores and humiliores 
see Dennis Kehoe, ‘Law and Social formation in the Roman Empire’ in The Oxford Handbook of Social 
Relations in the Roman World, ed. Michael Peachin, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); 
MacMullen, Roman Social Relations 50 B.C. to A.D. 284 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 
99; Mathisen, Roman Aristocrats, p. 15 and Marcone, pp. 359-60. 
20 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, Lecture, (1919). 
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considered that which the state sanctioned. However, even during the fourth century, 
when the central Roman state retained overwhelming violent potential, the relationship 
of secular authorities to some forms of violence, such as religious violence, could be 
more complex than simple opposition. To monopolise violence the state needed to 
control the meaning of violence.21 Ideologically, the need to maintain the pax Romana 
was sufficient justification for secular purposes. Religious violence differed because its 
religious character meant that challenging it might result in the alienation of the 
influential structures and adherents of that faith, which, of course, usually included the 
person of the Emperor.22 Defining the legitimacy of violent actions in the late antique 
West becomes even more complicated from the late fourth century onward, as external 
barbarians groups came to form separate entities of authority within the Empire and 
which eventually replaced imperial authority in those Western provinces. During the 
transition of power away from the Roman state this problematisation of legitimacy only 
widened. States were weaker and more numerous, the secular authority of the Church 
grew, aristocratic potentates wielded power in localities and some regions were 
apparently outside the rule of any state. Because there were more authorities that might 
claim to wield violence legitimately, the definition of Charles Tilly will be adopted: 
‘Legitimacy is the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of 
a given authority.’23 
This definition allows for the understanding of legitimacy as both de jure and de facto, 
and, unlike the Weberian explanation, permits a broader understanding of authority than 
just the state. For example, while we know that Roman aristocracies were not supposed 
                                                          
21 M. Gaddis, There is no crime for those who have Christ: religious violence in the Christian Roman 
Empire, (London: University of California Press, 2005), p. 10. 
22 H. A. Drake, ‘Intolerance, Religious Violence, and Political Legitimacy in Late Antiquity’ in Journal 
of the American Academy of Religion, 79, 1, 2011, (193-235), pp. 199-202.  
23 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, 
and Th. Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In, (Cambridge: University Press, 1985), 169–191, p. 
171. 
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to have armed retinues, we likewise know that the practice was often common or 
acceptable enough to be de facto legitimate, despite the violation of the state’s rhetorical 
monopoly of violence. As such, Tilly’s definition will hopefully allow us to understand 
both judicial and cultural perceptions of legitimacy of violence.  
Finally, we must consider what is meant by the term violence itself. In a recent study 
Slavoj Žižek divided the subject of violence into two distinct categories: 
‘Subjective violence is experienced as such against the background of a non-violent zero 
level. It is seen as a perturbation of the ‘normal’, peaceful state of things.’ 
‘Objective violence is precisely the violence inherent to this ‘normal’ state of things. [It] 
is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive 
something as subjectively violent.’24 
In this study the former will predominate. Because of the apparent abnormality of 
subjective violent events they are likely to attract attention, as much among ancient 
writers as modern media, and therefore source material is more readily available. 
Objective violence is often hard to discern, even today; indeed that is the primary 
message of Žižek’s argument in his Violence: Six Sideways Reflections. The relative 
paucity of the sources makes this far more difficult for historians of Late Antiquity. 
Fortunately, lower-class violence was predominantly ‘subjective’ since in Late 
Antiquity legitimate violence was theoretically confined to the military, judiciary and 
perhaps the upper classes. As we have seen, legitimacy of violence widened in the post-
Roman West, so that: ‘To medieval people in the theorization of the ordines of their 
society, aristocrats were bellatores: those of fight (or, more accurately, those who make 
war)’.25 However, despite a general broadening of violent legitimacy in the post-Roman 
                                                          
24 Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six sideways reflections, (London: Profile, 2008), p. 2. 
25 Halsall, ‘Introduction’, p. 5. 
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period, lower-class violence was never expressly legitimated and therefore seems to 
have played little part in maintaining apparent ‘non-violence.’  
It is important to be conscious of ‘objective’ violence, both as a backdrop to the activities 
that will be discussed, and because lower-class groups or individuals could use violence 
as a tool to legitimate social mobility (this form of violence – the de facto legitimate – 
will be of particular significance in chapter 5). Still, the purpose of this study is to 
investigate violence as an extremity of lower-class power, à la Foucault, and as such 
‘subjective’ violence will remain the focus.26 This emphasis on subjective violence 
should not be thought of to limit the topic to physical attack. As Gaddis pointed out, 
armed robbery is considered violent crime whether a shot is fired or otherwise, therefore 
‘a display of coercive power backed up by the threat of violence will satisfy the 
definition even if the threat is not carried out.’  Therefore we will tentatively consider 
violence as: ‘a use or display of power that others consider wrong or hurtful or that 
transgresses their ethical or moral norms.’27 
 
iii. What will be in this study, and why? 
This study takes a broad overview of lower class violence in Late Antiquity. It is 
necessary that it must do so, for the evidence that remains to us is generally too patchy 
to afford more concise study. Furthermore, a broader analysis of evidence on a thematic 
basis can allow us a greater understanding of general trends. However, it is important to 
define and explain for the reader what subjects have been chosen, and why they have 
been as opposed to others, for this study is not exhaustive.  
                                                          
26 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, p. 27. 
27 Gaddis, There is no crime, pp. 3-4. 
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I have maintained throughout this study a general focus on the Western provinces of the 
later Roman Empire and what would become the early medieval successor states. The 
reason for this was primarily to investigate how the lower-class inhabitants of these 
territories experienced that transition in authority and how they interacted with 
authorities throughout the period of Late Antiquity. I also observed that, in general, less 
attention had been paid to lower-class violence in the Western Empire than in the East, 
where social conflict, and especially violence relating to religion and sporting events, 
has been the subject of numerous academic works.28  However, while I have attempted 
to focus on the West in general, my approach has also been sculpted by a few specific 
principles and parameters. 
Firstly, Late Antiquity describes various chronological dimensions to various people. I 
have no desire to attempt to place chronological restrictions on that period here, but since 
the focus of this thesis is in observing interactions during a period of transition, it is 
necessary that the years of ‘transition’ from one authority to another must be included. 
To attempt to define the chronological range of transition in Late Antiquity would be a 
controversial business, not least because this process surely happened at different times 
and rates in different places. Perhaps, ideally, a century either side of the deposition of 
the ‘final’ Emperor, Romulus Augustulus, in 476 would be appropriate to encompass 
the transition from Roman to non-Roman authority in most regions of the former 
Western Empire. However, to hold firmly to this would seem arbitrary and would be 
deeply limiting to the possibilities provided by the source material. Therefore, where it 
seemed useful to the study, I have included evidence from earlier and later works. Most 
                                                          
28 See, for example, P. Bell, Social Conflict in the Age of Justinian: its nature, management and 
mediation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), M. Gaddis, There is no crime for those who have 
Christ: religious violence in the Christian Roman Empire, (London: University of California Press, 
2005); Alan Cameron, Circus Factions: Blues and Greens at Rome and Byzantium, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1976) and Ari Bryen, Violence in Roman Egypt: A Study in Legal Interpretation, (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013). 
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significantly, much use is made of the Histories of Gregory of Tours, who died in 594. 
However, I have also, for example, made use sources from earlier in the history of the 
Roman Empire, and indeed studies from the High Middle Ages and modern sociology.   
Secondly, it has seemed expedient to include various examples, parallels, or points of 
comparison from the Eastern Empire. These have been included in the interests of 
providing a fuller account or filling lacunae, and it is helpful to do so (when and if it is 
possible) in order to produce what I hope is a better history. However, in the interests of 
validity I have tried, where possible, to draw eastern parallels from the Balkans or 
Anatolia rather than from Syria or Egypt. This is because geographic, climatic and 
cultural differences seem to have been rather less stark, and therefore the information 
drawn from those regions is generally more valid for comparison with the Western 
provinces.  
Thirdly, whilst it might be desirable to attempt an evenly spread focus across the 
Western provinces, this is impossible due to the patchy origins, interests and 
chronologies of surviving sources. Therefore, this study will have – in general – far more 
to say about Gaul and Italy, than Britain or Iberia. This is particularly true of the post-
Roman period, where Gregory of Tours and Cassiodorus provide the majority of 
historical observations about lower class violence.   
Furthermore, as a cursory glance at the contents page will show, I have decided to focus 
on banditry (with it being the contention of this thesis to include the Bacaudae within 
that broad phenomenon), retaining and rioting as the categories of lower-class violence 
that will be subject to investigation. These categories should not be considered 
exhaustive, nor inclusive of all forms of lower-class violence in Late Antiquity. They 
were chosen because sufficient evidence for them exists to make a useful study (and 
perhaps cautious generalisation about the methods and motivations of people who 
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engaged in them), and because they are sufficiently distinct to make for interesting 
comparison and contrast. Perhaps the most obvious omission from this list is any distinct 
effort to describe patterns in what might be labelled ‘religious’ or ‘sectarian’ violence. 
This omission was made consciously, and for two reasons. Firstly, ‘religious violence’ 
as a label necessarily implies spiritual issues as a motivating factor for the violence. This 
is not necessarily false, and indeed is often accurate, but it can be illusory. For example, 
if a congregation riot in protest against the desecration of their church, is it because of 
its spiritual significance, because the church represents the social hub of the community, 
or because the distribution of wealth from charity, via the church, is of economic and 
material importance? All might be true, and of varying importance to individuals rioters. 
In order to try to avoid limiting our perceptions of motivations for lower-class violence, 
I have therefore attempted to apply general categories that do not imply preconceptions 
of this type. As such, although episodes of religiously motivated violence are included 
in this study, they will appear under more neutral titles. Secondly, ‘religious violence’, 
along with the military variety, must be the most well studied type in Late Antiquity. 
The most significant single omission of lower-class violence from this study – the 
circumcelliones and the sectarian violence associated with conflict between ‘orthodoxy’ 
and ‘Donatism’ in North Africa – has been left out on this basis. Extensive evidence for 
this violence remains, and extensive scholarly interest has accompanied that evidence. 
Most notably, the monumental recent study by Brent Shaw is sufficiently thorough and 
comprehensive, that I could not realistically attempt a new review of that material whilst 
leaving space for banditry, retainers and riots.29 I would hope however, that his 
reflections on the matter of lower-class violence would, in general, be complementary 
                                                          
29 Brent Shaw, Sacred Violence: African Christians and sectarian hatred in the age of Augustine 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). See also an important contribution to the topic by 
Leslie Dossey, Peasant and Empire in Christian North Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2010).  
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to my own.  Despite these relative restrictions on the inclusion of religious violence, a 
numbers of religiously motivated episodes of violence, particularly in the chapters on 
rioting and retainers, are included in this study. They have been included among similar 
instances of violence with differing motivations in order to compare patterns in those 
types of violence more effectively.   
Finally, it is perhaps worthwhile briefly discussing one or two points of what might be 
called ‘theory’ that will have significance throughout this thesis. The reader may well 
have noticed the use of certain sociologists and political scientists in this introduction to 
help frame theoretical notions which will provide a basis of understanding necessary for 
the rest of this study to be founded upon. Having provided this basis however, they will 
crop up only infrequently hereafter. The purpose of including their ideas was to provide 
definitions so as to avoid miscommunication between writer and reader, rather than for 
the systematic integration of their theories throughout. However, it is important to stress 
that other points of ‘theory’ will feature more conspicuously hereafter.  
This project owes a conspicuous debt to the founders of, and early contributors to, the 
journal Past and Present. Their rigorous scholarship and in particular their emphasis on 
social history helped to steer the study of the past toward a new and more inclusive 
future. More than six decades later, their ideas remain fundamental. In particular, the 
‘social banditry’ theory and ‘endemic and epidemic bandit’ categorisations of Eric 
Hobsbawm, the revolutionary interpretation of the bacaudic revolt by E. A. Thompson 
and the ‘Moral Economy’ theory of rioting by E. P. Thompson have had a profound 
impact upon the arguments and intentions of this thesis. That is not to say that this thesis 
will be a simple defence of their interpretations. Indeed, this study will strongly dispute 
certain aspects of their arguments, especially regarding the interpretation of the 
Bacaudae. Adherence to the particulars of their respective works isn’t the point. Rather, 
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it must be stressed that this study hopes to build upon the praiseworthy intent of those 
authors; to understand history from the perspective of the common people, or, where 
that isn’t possible, to at least try to understand and recognise the role of common people 
in history.    
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Chapter One 
1. Endemic Banditry, Society and Lower-Class Violence.  
In the early Roman Republic latrones was a label, originally derived from Greek, applied 
to those who undertook military service for pay, rather than out of obligation to the 
state.30 Naturally the mercenary status of the latro, coupled with being a non-citizen and 
outsider, resulted in readily apparent pejorative overtones. By the time of the late 
Republic however the armies of the Roman state were already professionalised and 
consequently the latro was juxtaposed with the legitimate soldiers of the state. This 
meaning was retained into Late Antiquity; the latro was someone who practised violence 
without the consent of the state, and in doing so he rejected the state.  
As a result latrones occupied a unique space in Roman law. The term tends to be 
translated as bandit or brigand, and I will continue to do so here, but in some ways 
‘terrorist’ might be a better way to conceive of their status in the Roman judicial 
framework. The state attempted to operate a monopoly of violence, in the Weberian 
sense, and the latrones rejected this; therefore they were within the state but not of it. 
They had none of the dubious credibility of external opponents: ‘Enemies (hostes) are 
those who have declared war on us or on whom we have declared war; all the rest are 
bandits (latrones) or plunderers (praedones)’.31 This differentiation is reflected in the 
procedures for citizens who were captured by opponents of the state. If they were 
captured by legitimate enemies then they lost their rights as a citizen and were enslaved 
– at least until they legally re-entered society – but captives of bandits were held 
illegitimately and therefore never lost their legal freedom and status.32 Meanwhile the 
                                                          
30 Brent D. Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’ in Past and Present, 105. 1, (1984), 3-52, (p. 26). 
31 Dig. 50. 16. 118. 
32 Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’, p. 22; Dig. 45. 15. 19. 2; Digesta: The Digest of Justinian, ed. 
by T. Mommsen and P. Krueger with English trans. by A. Watson (Philadelphia, P.A.: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1985). 
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bandits themselves were subject to unusual judicial savagery.33 They could not expect 
the usual courtesies offered by the state to accused criminals. Book 9, chapter 35 of the 
Theodosian code makes a useful case study for this. The chapter is devoted to the correct 
practice of torture by judicial officials and the first six sections within the chapter 
regulate who was immune to torture and when people were exempt; two of them 
explicitly state that during lent there should be no corporeal punishment and no 
investigation of criminal activities via torture. The seventh and final section, proclaimed 
in 408, provides the exception: bandits could expect no such leniency and judges were 
expected to take every action to learn the plans of brigands through torture, regardless 
of date.34 Bandits, unlike most other categories of criminal, could also be subjected to 
torture on the spot, before any judicial procedure, in order to reveal the whereabouts of 
their associates and of course they were to be executed in the most severe and public 
ways in order to deter others.35 However this punishment was not simply limited to the 
latro himself, but also to conspirators, those who harboured him and the middlemen who 
fenced the loot for him. All of these were liable to receive equivalent punishment unless 
their legal status was sufficiently high and different penalties applied.36 Indeed even the 
families of latrones were subject for punishment since such heinous behaviour was seen 
as hereditary; the sons of bandits only escaped death because of ‘especial imperial 
leniency’ and instead were denied any inheritances or honours  and were damned to live 
in perpetual poverty and infamy.37 That banditry was something of a practical problem 
                                                          
33 CTh 9. 2. 5 ranks latrones alongside murderers, rapists and similar violent criminals of the most 
dangerous category. Theodosiani libri XVI cum constitutionibus Sirmondianis, ed. by T. Mommsen and 
P. M. Meyer, I (Berlin: Weidmann, 1905). 
34 CTh 9. 35. Perhaps similarly, the armed men and slaves had lesser or no right to sanctuary in a 
church, 9. 45. 4 and 5. 
35 Dig. 48. 19. 16. 10. 
36 Garrett G. Fagan, ‘Violence in Roman Social Relations’ in The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations 
in the Roman World, ed. Michael Peachin, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 475 (467-
495). 
37 CTh 7. 11. 1 and 9. 29. 1. For the punishment of families, CTh 9. 14. 3. This entry actually describes 
the procedure for sons of conspirators, and presumably sicarii and similar nocturnal ravagers, but the 
synonymy of these categories with latrones seems very probable, see CTh 7. 18. 7. The Vita Proculi 
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for the Roman state is unsurprising, but what this severity of procedure highlights is that 
the figure of the latro presented an ideological challenge to the state: illegitimate 
violence outside the aegis of the state could not be tolerated.38 
Because of this inimical status the notion of the bandit provided a useful rhetorical mirror 
to hold up to the state. For example Herodian gives an account of the career of Maternus, 
a deserter turned brigand during the reign of Commodus who was so successful that his 
band superseded the status of latrones and came to be considered actual hostes; genuine 
enemies of the state. Maternus through his cunning and leadership was able to escape 
the attentions of the authorities, sack major cities and even mount a bid for the imperial 
throne.39 Only the betrayal of Maternus and the goodwill of the people of Rome saved 
Commodus, but he squandered this goodwill and was soon subjected to popular 
uprisings within the city.40 Through extra-judicial violence the emperor had become a 
tyrant and no better than a bandit. 
Cassius Dio uses the uprising of Bulla Felix for social critique in a similar way. Like 
Maternus, Bulla was able to use his cunning to avoid capture and also utilised disguises 
to free prisoners and capture and humiliate a centurion. This officer was then subjected 
to a mock trial, with Bulla dressed in the regalia of a tribune (thereby assuming the role 
of the legitimate authority), after which the centurion was released with the message 
‘feed your slaves so that they do not become brigands’. Bulla’s startling success resulted 
from his individual brilliance and emphasised the virility of the bandit in contrast to the 
impotence of the emperor who acted only through agents. Meanwhile the role of the 
                                                          
similarly ascribes the characteristics of brigand origins lingering on in the character of Proculus and his 
descendants. SHA, Life of Proculus, 12-13. 
38 A more extended discussion of the legal meaning of latro can be found in Thomas Grünewald, 
Bandits in the Roman Empire: Myth and Reality, trans. J. Drinkwater, (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 
15-17. 
39 Herodian, 1. 10; Herodian: with an English Translation, trans. by C. R. Whittaker (London:  
Heinemann, 1970). 
40 Herodian, 1. 12-13. 
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state as arbiter of justice was exposed to ridicule. But it was the virility of Bulla that 
eventually exposed him; he slept with the wife of another and was betrayed by the 
injured party and captured by the emperor’s agents while asleep in a cave. The prefect 
asked him; ‘why are you a brigand?’ To which Bulla replied ‘why are you a prefect?’41 
Some three centuries later Augustine posed the much the same question, though in rather 
less comic style, when he mused; ‘Remove justice and what are states but gangs of 
bandits on a large scale? And what are bandit gangs but kingdoms in miniature’.42 
The illegitimate nature of banditry also made it useful pejorative label for criticising 
political opposition who would not be understood as bandits in the modern concept of 
the term, nor the contemporary technical legal status. It is around this usage of latro that 
most of modern scholarship on banditry in the Roman world has focused. Raymond Van 
Dam and Thomas Grünewald in particular have investigated the application of the label 
by official sources to imperial rivals in order to denigrate them.43 But while it is 
important to bear in mind that these highfalutin, rhetorical usages are fairly common in 
the sources, the quotidian experience of latrones was far more mundane. Though the 
tales of Maternus and Bulla Felix are constructed for satirical purposes, the daring 
exploits and bravado of this kind of bandit leader probably made them the subjects of 
folk tales in much the same way as Robin Hood and equivalents around the world.44 
Indeed, there was even a popular board game called Ludus Latrunculorum – game of 
bandits – described by Varro in the first-century BC but attested as late as the fifth 
                                                          
41 Cassius Dio, 77. 10, Roman History, trans. by E. Cary, 9 vols (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1914).  
42 Augustine, De Civitate Dei, 4. 4; De Civitate Dei, Volumes 1-7 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2014); G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, p. 477. 
43 Grünewald, Bandits in the Roman Empire and R. Van Dam, Leadership and Community in Late 
Antique Gaul, pp. 9-20. 
44 It is worth noting that in the tales of both Bulla Felix and Maternus the authorial intent is more 
complex than simply relating entertaining bandit stories. Both are intended as critiques to highlight the 
poor leadership or injustice on the part of the Emperor. For fuller discussion see Shaw, ‘Bandits in the 
Roman Empire’, pp. 44-49 and Grünewald, Bandits in the Roman Empire, pp. 110-136. 
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century.45 However these images of bandits are probably no less constructed than those 
of Herodian and Cassius Dio, or indeed the archetypically anti-state portrayal of latrones 
in the legal codes.  
Historical studies of Roman latrones have often focused on these kinds of constructed 
or rhetorical applications of the term.46 Whilst this has certainly been invaluable for our 
understanding of the image of banditry, relatively little attention to the bandits 
themselves; their methods, their relationships with communities both local and region, 
the impetus to behave as a bandit, and the methods used to deter and punish that 
behaviour. I hope that investigating these issues during the Late Antiquity will provide 
some insight into how latrones, and the communities they derived from, experienced the 
later years of the Roman Empire and the aftermath. This insight would be especially 
useful, since the information that remains from such communities for posterity is 
particularly scarce. Few surviving written sources show any interest about the poor, and 
upland communities seem to have been even less interesting to ancient writers than their 
lowland or urban fellows. Furthermore, archaeological evidence – usually a useful guide 
to the common population – is scarce in these regions due to the relative lack of 
excavations, the culture and lifestyle of those populations and climatic conditions which 
render survival of artefacts infrequent. With this in mind, it is to be stressed that a focus 
on the bandits themselves, their lives, relations, and the physical processes of Roman 
banditry, leaves us in relatively uncharted terrain.  
 
 
                                                          
45 J. Gómez Pallarès, ‘"Latro" in Virgil, A. 12, 7: An Alternative Explanation’ in Mnemosyne, Fourth 
Series, 53. 2, (2000), 218-221 (p. 219). 
46 Van Dam, Leadership and Community in Late Antique Gaul, pp. 9-20 and Grünewald, Bandits in the 
Roman Empire in particular, although the latter does devote some considerable attention to ‘real’ 
bandits. 
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1.1. Endemic Banditry.  
Given this notoriety and the complexity of the image of latrones it is unsurprising that 
the brigand seems to have been fairly commonplace in the Roman world. Attack by 
bandits is listed in the Digest as a common cause of death, alongside sickness and old 
age and as a regular misfortune that could affect property, commerce and legal 
transactions such as the repayment of loans.47 Interfectus a latronibus (killed by bandits) 
is formulaic inscription found on tombstones across the Empire.48 Even during the 
proverbially peaceful reign of Antoninus Pius, a provincial governor might find it 
prudent to include a specialist bandit hunter in his entourage.49 However, they were 
certainly not common in all places or at all times. Rural travellers might have generally 
felt fear at the prospect of opportunistic theft, but it seems that notorious brigandage was 
restricted to certain regions and their populations.50  
This pervasive but regionalised impression of banditry in the Roman world correlates 
well with one of the less well-known arguments espoused by Eric Hobsbawm in his 
famous monograph on bandits. He considered banditry to be endemic on the periphery 
of the state in geographic locales where the intrusion of the state was necessarily 
difficult, such as densely forested, mountainous or marshy regions.51 This relationship 
was essentially the product of adversarial inequality. The fertile, lowland areas 
dominated by the state had economic and military superiority but lacked the ability to 
penetrate difficult terrain in anything more than an irregular or superficial way. They 
                                                          
47 Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’, pp. 8-10. This article makes a compelling case for the relative 
ubiquity of banditry. 
48 For discussion and a full set of references see Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’, pp. 10-12. 
49 Fronto, Letter to Antoninus Pius, 8; M. Cornelii Frontonis Epistulae, ed. by Michael P.J. van den Hout 
(Leipzig: Teubner, 1988). 
50 Isauria in particular, but also southern Italy and mountainous regions in general. 
51 Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Montaillou (London: Harmondsworth, 1980) describes in fantastic detail 
how the uplands of the Pyrenees provided shelter for both heretical beliefs and unusual liberty of action 
despite the hostility of both the Church and a centralising state. As the seminal study of pre-modern 
upland societies in Europe Montaillou will be a valuable, if chronologically troublesome, source of 
insight for this study of upland communities in the ancient world. 
 33 
 
were therefore unable to subdue the inhabitants of those regions who often used their 
mobility to raid and rob before escaping back to their inaccessible refuges. The products 
of banditry were then used to complement the relatively meagre agricultural output of 
these geographic regions and enrich its inhabitants. However, so long as the lowland 
state retained enough local influence to prevent the aggregation of politico-military 
bandit organisations into a rival state, then the violence would be maintained at a 
relatively minor level. A form of variable equilibrium was maintained, where the need 
or desire of the state to eradicate bandits was balanced by the difficulty of accomplishing 
that task. It should be noted that these endemic levels of brigandage were certainly not 
unchanging, or even steady. The trends of banditry were subject to any number of 
vicissitudes. Alterations in climate, economic patterns, disease, war, changes in state or 
local policy or attitudes: all of these issues and more might regulate local patterns in 
banditry.52 Rather, the term ‘endemic’ implies that the relationship between bandits and 
the state and/or wider society was limited to an extent that was perceived as normal.  
Hobsbawm theorized that this endemic banditry became epidemic when the modernising 
state began to exert meaningful authority in these regions. In reaction to the imposition 
of obligations and social norms that differed from those of the community more people 
would opt out of their legitimate social roles in favour of a life of brigandage. He argued 
that this pattern would continue until the primitive rebellion of banditry was either 
                                                          
52 The impact of geography, politics and external factors can perhaps best be understood through the 
various works devoted to Isauria. Brent D. Shaw, ‘Bandit Highlands and Lowland Peace: The 
Mountains of Isauria-Cilicia’ in Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 33. 2, (1990), 
199-233 and ‘Bandit Highlands and Lowland Peace: The Mountains of Isauria-Cilicia (Continued)’ in 
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 33. 3, (1990), 237-270; Noel Lenski, 
‘Assimilation and Revolt in the Territory of Isauria, from the 1st Century BC to the 6 th Century AD’ in 
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 42. 4, (1999), 413-465; Keith Hopwood, 
‘Bandits between grandees and the state: the structure of order in Roman Rough Cilicia’ in Organised 
Crime in Antiquity, ed. Hopwood (London: Duckworth with the Classical Press of Wales, 1999), pp. 
177-206. 
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replaced by a more sophisticated form of rebellion, such as the labour movement, or was 
subsumed into a revolutionary guerrilla campaign.53 
These two forms of banditry; endemic and epidemic, are certainly conceptually useful 
and Grünewald has applied the latter notion to Rome’s expansion and the resistance to 
her authority during periods of conquest or in its aftermath.54 However, in the latter years 
of the Western Empire the ability of the Roman state to project its authority in provincial 
regions decreased and in the rest of this chapter will attempt to understand trends in 
banditry during the latter years of the Empire, both in general and in light of endemic-
epidemic theory.55 It is hoped that this method of interpretation will provide insight into 
the conditions of life for the peoples of the geographic periphery of the Empire. 
Latrocinium was an ongoing process which brought together individual bandits with 
their local communities, neighbours, regions and the state through both violent and non-
violent interactions.  
Firstly, I will make some fairly generalized conclusions about endemic banditry in the 
late Roman West, with particular focus upon the networks of bandits and their 
interactions with their communities and neighbours. It is necessary to provide this as a 
background to epidemic banditry, since there was certainly a degree of overlap between 
these categories, but it is also valuable in its own right. Endemic banditry might not have 
the same overt political implications as that which was brought about by anomic social 
conditions, but nevertheless it remains a method by which the lives of common people 
in Late Antiquity can be investigated. As a result of the severely limited nature of the 
                                                          
53 Eric Hobsbawm, Bandits, (London: Abacus, 2001), pp. 22-33. 
54 Grünewald, Bandits in the Roman Empire, pp. 33-56. 
55 This in itself is somewhat original since most study of banditry in the Roman Empire has concentrated 
on particular regions like Isauria, whose notorious brigands impinged on the political events of the wider 
Empire, or on the early Empire or Principate. Consequently Late Antiquity is somewhat neglected; see 
Grünewald, Bandits in the Roman Empire, p. 4. This is rather unfortunate since banditry features much 
more prominently in the source material for this period according to Ramsey MacMullen, Enemies of 
the Roman Order: Treason, Unrest, and Alienation in the Empire, (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard 
University Press, 1966), pp. 256-259. 
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sources, I have drawn upon diverse materials to elucidate this somewhat speculative 
study. Some of these sources are from other regions and periods within the Roman world 
whilst others are sociological or historical works relating to pastoral or bandit societies 
which can be seen as instructive about the general conditions of life in such societies, 
even if the details differ markedly. It is worth stressing that the purpose of this study is 
not a detailed economic geography, nor a detailed micro-history, but rather an enquiry 
into the social interactions between violent members of the humilial inhabitants of the 
late Roman periphery and their neighbours. It is a sketch of what might have been the 
case, based on the insight of what sources we have and what we know of similar 
societies, but certainly does not purport to be an absolute, pan-imperial norm.  
 
1.2. Bandit Social Relations within Uplands.  
Geography and banditry seem to have been inextricably linked in the Roman Empire 
and upland regions in particular seem to have been strongly associated with 
brigandage.56 The bandits themselves were linked with exactly the kind of pastoralist 
communities that Hobsbawm suggested.57 This can be discerned from typical Roman 
depictions and stereotypes of bandits. Given that upland regions were associated with 
brigandage it is unsurprising that their populations were too. However the link was not 
merely incidental; the shepherd and the bandit were considered almost synonymous. For 
example, an inscription from Caria states that shepherds who grazed their flocks on 
vineyards were committing an act of banditry, whilst an entry in the Theodosian Code 
equates the rustling of livestock so closely with banditry that it incurred similar penalties 
                                                          
56 It seems that other geographic regions which state authority found difficult to pervade were similarly 
afflicted. For example the marshland of the Nile delta were inhabited by the Boukoloi, a notorious 
bandit/pirate group who relied on their swampy homeland as a refuge from which to raid on both land 
and water. See Richard Alston, ‘The Revolt of the Boukoloi’ in Organised Crime in Antiquity, ed. 
Hopwood (London: Duckworth with the Classical Press of Wales, 1999), pp. 129-53. 
57 For example, see Lenski, pp. 446-455 on pastoralism and brigandage in Isauria.  
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to latrocinium, even though the crime was non-violent.58 A law of Diocletian and 
Maximian, meanwhile, states that a man who is cleared of the charge of homicide may 
still be tried for the related crimes of herdsmen and brigands.59 Indeed the connection 
between shepherd and bandit was so close that it was a subject for comic subversion. In 
AD 143, the author Marcus Cornelius Fronto wrote to the future emperor Marcus 
Aurelius with a humorous anecdote, telling how he was riding in the hills and overheard 
one shepherd warn another to keep a close watch on Fronto and his entourage because 
they might be bandits. Fronto was so incensed by this that he charged the shepherds, 
scuffled with them and stole one of their walking sticks.60 As ever with history, and 
especially with evidence relating to peripheral, lower class or marginal peoples written 
by the hands of elites, this material does not necessarily reflect absolute reality. We 
certainly cannot claim that all shepherds were bandits; indeed to assume so would be 
ridiculous. However these depictions must represent prevailing stereotypes which 
perhaps themselves reflect some reality; shepherds may sometimes have also been, or 
associated with brigands. 
Likewise the association of uplands and banditry in evidence from antiquity may reflect 
that these locations were particularly notorious; descriptions of both latrocinium and the 
actions taken against it typically occur in these regions. Notably in AD 535, Justinian 
accorded the governor of Pisidia extraordinary powers in order to enforce taxes on the 
truculent inhabitants of the highlands of the province, and to destroy the bandits who 
protected those villages from their lofty refuge known as the wolf’s head.61 This 
                                                          
58 Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’, p. 31 for an explanation of rustling. For the inscription see 
Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua 4. 297 and Hopwood, ‘Bandits between grandees and the state’, p. 
180. 
59 CJ 9. 2. 11; Corpus Juris Civilis, Volumes I-III, ed. by P. Krueger and T. Mommsen (Berlin:  
Weidmann, 1900-4). 
60 Fronto, Letter to Marcus Caesar, 2. 12. 
61 Justinian, Novels, 24. 1; Justinian, ‘Novels’ in Corpus Juris Civilis, Vol III, ed. by P. Krueger and T. 
Mommsen (Berlin: Weidmann, 1900-4). 
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association was not limited to sixth-century Asia Minor. Similar examples exist across 
the Empire: Hydatius records the activity of latrones in Galicia, both St. Martin and the 
Gothic general Sarus were accosted while crossing the Alps, Sardinia and the Apennines 
were notorious as was Isauria in south-eastern Anatolia, whilst in the Balkans the young 
emperor Maximinus Thrax rose to prominence as the leader of an ad hoc band of bandit 
hunters.62 The bandit hideout described by the protagonist of Apuleius’s Metamorphoses 
is described as ‘a wild mountain of unusual height’ covered in forests and surrounded 
by rivers and gorges.63 Even more revealing is a passage from Procopius’ Buildings 
which describes how Justinian pacified a bandit-infested region. Tzanica in eastern 
Anatolia was an inaccessible region replete with mountains, cliffs and tangled forests:64  
‘Accordingly he cut down all the trees by which the routes chanced to be obstructed, and 
transforming the rough places [made] them smooth and passable for horses… And he 
built forts in all parts of the land, [and] assigned to them very strong garrisons of Roman 
soldiers…’  
Through these policies he denied the inhabitants the advantages of the terrain and made 
it easier for the state to exert military pressure in the region. Furthermore, he built 
                                                          
62 Hydatius, ‘Chronicle’, entry 179 (year 456) in MGH AA, 11, p. 29; Sulpicius Severus, Vita Sancti 
Martini, 5. 1; Zosimus, New History, (4. 2), trans. by R. T. Ridley (Sydney: Australian Association for 
Byzantine Studies, 1982), p. 127. For Sardinia see Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’, p. 7n12.; for 
the Apennines see CTh 9. 30. 1 and 9. 30. 4; for Maximinus Thrax see SHA, Life of Maximinus, 2. 1. 
63 Mons horridus silvestribusque frondibus umbrosus et in primis altus fuit. Apuleius, Metamorphoses, 
4. 6. Apuleius, Metamorphoses, ed. and trans. by J. Arthur Hanson (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1989). For further discussion of the literary role of the bandits in the Metamorphoses 
see P. A. Mackay, ‘‘Klephtika’: The Tradition of the Tales of Banditry in Apuleius’ in Greece & Rome, 
10. 2, (1963), 147-152. 
64 It is worth noting that both these passages mention uplands and forests in close connection. This is 
unsurprising, since the marginality of these regions made clearance of woodlands unlikely. Marshes too 
were common in the upland plains or valleys when these were fed by heavy rainfall or snowmelt in hills 
or mountains. The combination of these awkward terrains compounded the difficulties for the 
‘civilising’ forces of the Roman administration. When ‘upland’ is used throughout this chapter, one 
should not just imagine the arid, bare slopes of Mediterranean uplands that perhaps dominate the initial 
perceptions of Roman uplands, but also the forested uplands such as Alpine foothills or the Ardennes. 
Though thick tree cover could limit the grazing of large herds of sheep or cattle, pastoralism could 
continue in the margins whilst herds of pigs thrived on the roots, fruits and nuts available in mature 
woodlands in Late Antiquity. Chris Wickham, ‘European Forests in the Early Middle Ages: Landscape 
and Land Clearance’ in Land and Power: Studies in Italian and European Social History, 400-1200 
(London: British School at Rome, 1994), pp. 184-7. 
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churches, encouraged commerce and other interactions with neighbouring areas, so as 
to homogenize social norms and in doing so Justinian anticipated the methods employed 
by more modern states to control their geographic peripheries.65  
Procopius was unequivocal in likening the wildness of the Tzani to the geography of 
their homeland. He stressed their savagery and emphasised the infertility of the land 
which would not support arable crops, or even fruit trees. Consequently the people of 
this wild land relied on ‘robbing and living always on their plunder.’66 They raised cattle 
but ‘not in order to plough the earth, for the Tzani are altogether indolent and averse to 
the tasks of husbandry…but in order to have a constant supply of milk and to eat their 
flesh.’67 Procopius’s pejorative tone here exaggerates the wildness of the Tzani in order 
to increase Justinian’s glory, but nevertheless many upland regions of the Empire were 
better suited to grazing and pastoralism than to growth of crops.68 However, the 
simplistic, savage depiction of this way of life is entirely false. Myriad local variations 
of pastoralism surely existed, determined by local culture, climate, geography, land 
ownership and innumerable other factors. Perhaps the major distinction between types 
of husbandry in these upland regions was between mixed village agriculture and 
transhumancy. These two methods, which surely often coexisted, may have nevertheless 
remained fairly distinct. Village agriculture surely emphasised the rearing of livestock 
but since the village was a large, relatively self-sufficient community, crops and minor 
production industries were required to maintain this sufficiency. Since the people of the 
village were tied to their homes by shelter, property, family and lifestyle, the potential 
for production of livestock was limited by the grazing that was available within a 
                                                          
65 Procopius, Buildings, 3. 6; ‘Buildings’, in Procopius, Vol. VII, trans. by H. B. Dewing (London: 
Heinemann, 1940).  
66 Procopius, Buildings, 3. 6. 
67 Procopius, Buildings, 3. 6. 
68 Marcellinus Comes, Chronicon, entry 441, in MGH AA, 11, p. 80, likewise associates the Tzani with 
other peoples known for pastoralism, nomadism or brigandage, such as the Isaurians, Saracens and 
Huns.  
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reasonable distance. In contrast, transhumants were not reliant on the village structure. 
They lived a transient existence, at least during certain seasons, when they would drive 
large herds across large distances in order to supply fresh grazing. Despite the 
assumptions of prejudiced observers like Procopius this lifestyle was typically not self-
sufficient.69 The temporary needs of the husbandmen might have been met by the milk 
and meat of their herds, but the production of cheese and textiles required somewhat 
more permanence, as did their need for metal tools and various other commodities. The 
transhumant pastoralist then was a commercial farmer; his transience allowed him to 
produce a surplus of livestock which could then be exchanged for necessities and capital. 
In geographic parlance, the mixed village agriculturalist was sedentary and subsistent, 
whilst the transhumant was (semi)nomadic and commercial.70  
The tone of pejorative depictions of bandits seems to imply that bandits were typically 
drawn from the latter of these two modes of production.71 The freedom of movement 
enjoyed by transhumant pastoralists may have allowed them to raid effectively, as did 
their local knowledge, whilst this same transience kept them relatively safe from the 
reprisals of victims and the state. The differing role of the wandering and village 
                                                          
69 ‘Pure pastoralism’ – characterised primarily by diet derived entirely from animal products – cannot 
really be supported in European environments. Transhumancy is superficially similar because both share 
an economic focus on livestock rearing, but in fact requires highly developed structures of commercial 
exchange. However, the apparently equivalent reliance on animals was enough for Roman authors to 
assume the barbarousness of all pastoralists, whether ‘true’, transhumant or mixed. See Wickham, 
‘Pastoralism and Underdevelopment in the Early Middle Ages’ in Land and Power: Studies in Italian 
and European Social History, 400-1200 (London: British School at Rome, 1994), pp. 121-3 and 146-
151 and throughout for detailed observations on Early Medieval pastoralism in Europe.     
70 Despite these distinctions, it is likely that the boundaries between upland village and transhumant 
pastoralism were fluid. Both certainly would have kept livestock. Semi-nomadic herders typically 
originated from upland villages and possibly sought to retire to them if they acquired sufficient wealth 
from commercial pastoralism. They retained familial connections within those communities and also 
relied on them for shelter and exchange. Indeed, it seems likely that the two systems might have 
operated concurrently on a seasonal basis, whereby during the summer months the herds of the 
community were grazed in uplands by young men from the village, whilst in winter they returned to 
shelter in the village. The herds would then be thinned by slaughter, and the prime breeding animals 
sustained through the winter on hay which had been grown during the summer on pasture close to the 
village. Le Roy Ladurie and Julius Klein, The Mesta: A Study in Spanish Economic History 1273-1836, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920) remain classic studies of upland life in pre-modern 
periods, and the latter, in particular, focuses on the rhythms of transhumance.  
71 Hopwood, ‘Bandits between grandees and the state’, p. 180. 
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pastoralist seems to be reflected in Greco-Roman divinity. Silvanus the careful 
herdsman and domestic deity is associated with but sometimes depicted in contrast to, 
Faunus (or Pan) the wild rustic-shepherd deity characterised by altogether more chaotic 
nature and often malevolent intent. Silvanus is always depicted as aged and was 
perceived as responsible, diligent and loving. Faunus/Pan however was the archetype of 
youthful virility and though both were shepherds, he was far more wild and 
irresponsible. 
Interestingly, this contrast itself reflects an inherent form of social tension within upland 
pastoral communities. In a study of nineteenth and twentieth century banditry in 
Sardinia, David Moss found that there is typically tension between mature shepherds 
and their sons and the younger generation generally. Because of the threat of overgrazing 
and the greater economic potential and bargaining ability of the owners of larger flocks, 
older shepherds tend to be loath to cede their livestock to others, since doing so could 
put their position in the local hierarchy at risk. Multiple sons and/or economic disruption 
in lowland markets for pastoral produce served to further exacerbate these issues. As a 
result it was typical for younger men to seek to enhance their social position either 
through rustling the livestock of neighbouring communities or through raiding.72 The 
contrast of the mature, diligent Silvanus and the virile, chaotic Faunus/Pan may imply 
that the same power dynamic existed in Roman Empire. Unfortunately we are 
particularly lacking in sources that describe the inner workings of ancient pastoral 
communities, but the existence of a law dating from AD 409, which legislated against 
child oblates being given to shepherds, in order that they not be raised as latrones, 
suggests that an excess of children may well have led to inter-generational economic 
competition and banditry.73 On the basis of this evidence – modern-sociological, mythic 
                                                          
72 David Moss, ‘Bandits and Boundaries in Sardinia’, Man, 14. 3 (1979), 477-496. 
73 CTh 9. 31. 1. 
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and Roman legal – it seems plausible to assert that generational tension probably existed 
in some late antique upland communities, and perhaps been a factor in banditry. ‘Excess’ 
human reproduction on arable farms typically improved output by providing more hands 
for work, but in pastoral communities a huge increase in livestock was required to justify 
the additional labour. Producing that increase in livestock might have been theoretically 
profitable, but would often have led to overgrazing or tension with neighbours over 
grazing rights. Many options were surely available to individuals who were 
disadvantaged by these intrinsic socio-economic tensions, including transhumancy, but 
violent roles seem to have been common. Some of these were legitimate; pastoral areas, 
such as upland Syria and the Balkans, seem to have been prime sources of recruits to the 
army.74 However, given the ubiquity of references to banditry, it seems that the violent, 
illegitimate method of latrocinium was a regular means of socio-economic 
improvement.  
Inter-generational tension might not have been the only factor that drove young men in 
the late antique uplands into careers of violence. In his seminal study on early fourteenth-
century Montaillou, an upland, pastoral village in Ariège, Le Roy Ladurie noted a typical 
gender-based demographic imbalance within pastoral communities which resulted from 
a low incidence of marriage among shepherds and a high mortality rate among males 
which was exacerbated by a considerably higher average marriage-age among men.75 
Though we must be cautious about generalisation from data collected centuries later, 
modern evidence from Orgosolo, an upland Sardinian village now considered the 
archetype of shepherd-bandit communities, suggests that such patterns are typical within 
Mediterranean pastoral settlements.76 If this gender imbalance within communities did 
                                                          
74 Michael Whitby, ‘Army and Society in the Late Roman World: A context for decline?’ in A 
Companion to the Roman Army, ed. Paul Erdkamp (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), p. 519. 
75 Le Roy Ladurie, p. 190, 263 and passim.   
76 Antonio Sorge, ‘Divergent Visions: Localist and Cosmopolitan Identities in Highland Sardinia’, The 
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 14. 4 (2008), 808-824 (p. 810 and 815).  
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indeed occur, it might imply that the dislocation between ‘wild’ and ‘responsible’ was 
based on lifestyle as well as age. Shepherds, especially those who practised 
transhumancy, seem to have had reservations about settling down in the village 
community, and with marriage in particular. These concerns crystallised around two 
primary issues: freedom of movement and economic potential. Both are well evidenced 
in both medieval Montaillou and modern Orgosolo. These two issues were intrinsically 
linked. The livelihood of the professional shepherd was tied to his flocks and these 
required semi-constant protection and direction so as to avoid loss of stock, overgrazing 
or the transgression of boundaries. Because of this, shepherds developed a masculine 
subculture, known in Sardinia as balentia and typified there by homosocial gathering, 
eating, drinking, cavorting, the careless squandering of property or capital, honour and 
violence.77 As a result of both economic obligation and social inclination, shepherds 
often remained either incapable of, or disinclined to marry. A contemporary informant 
of Antonio Sorge explains that:  
‘A shepherd can't give a woman the life she wants - nice clothes, cars, vacations, money 
in the bank. It is not that we're dying of hunger, but we have not so much to spare. And... 
we are away for so many hours during the day, and when we come back we're filthy.’78 
 And likewise Pierre Maury, who was born in Montaillou but roamed throughout the 
Ariège, Pyrenees and Catalonia, told his friend: I do not want a wife. I can’t afford to 
keep one. Not only that but, as a Cathar heretic and fugitive from authority, he added: I 
don’t want to settle down because I would not be safe.79 But this concern for freedom 
was widespread; Occitanian shepherds might treasure their lifestyle because they were 
outlaws, because they felt poorly served by judicial process, or out of simple pleasure.80 
                                                          
77 Sorge, p. 815 and Le Roy Ladurie, pp. 69-70, 106-110. 
78 Sorge, p. 815. 
79 Le Roy Ladurie, p. 98. 
80 Le Roy Ladurie, p. 70. 
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Upland areas of limited state control also tended to attract refugees from less peripheral 
regions. These vagrants were likely to be in desperate circumstances already and 
probably inflated shepherd numbers somewhat, even in times of relative peace and 
prosperity.81 If similar concerns affected the upland shepherd in the Roman Empire, then 
it seems probable that a whole range of factors restricted a sizeable proportion of the 
male populations of pastoral communities to an irregular or peripheral presence within 
settled society. Consequently young shepherds were impelled to diversify from village 
pastoralism into other socio-economic roles, including banditry, as a result of structural 
tensions within the upland village, desire for social improvement and perhaps even the 
appeal of a masculine shepherding subculture. But what interactions characterised the 
relationships between bandits and the communities from which they originated? 
Much of the discussion of banditry in modern sociological, historical and 
anthropological disciplines has been devoted to the ‘reality’ of the social bandit; the 
‘noble robber’ who targets only the oppressors and their representatives and who wins 
fame among the people for redistributing that wealth among the oppressed. Whilst Eric 
Hobsbawm and various others have propounded the notion of the social bandit, some 
have refuted these claims and suggest that this idealised portrayal is simply a product of 
popular mythologizing and that the social bandit is merely a cultural construct of the 
oppressed. Instead, opponents of the social bandit thesis typically characterise bandits 
as oppositional to local populations. Even Currott and Fink, whose recent article is 
intended to reconcile the notion of the social bandit, only allows for accidental social 
contribution; “Bandits can unintentionally increase social welfare by opposing 
unpopular laws, by providing checks against government predation”, whilst maintaining 
that bandits were “violent, calculating, ruthless, and undiscriminating in their 
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exploitation”.82 Though an uncritical acceptance of the historicity of bandits as 
ideological opponents of oppression is incautious, such an interpretation of banditry in 
the Roman Empire would encourage the interpretation that its relation to upland 
communities was generally predatory/parasitic, especially in light of the pervasive social 
tensions that seem to have encouraged many young men to become bandits.  
However the rejection of a social conscience on the part of the brigand fails to 
acknowledge that bandits, especially part-time shepherd/bandits, continued to be actors 
within the community.83 Since they potentially had access to wealth and outside, luxury 
goods the successful bandit was likely to be a popular figure in the community, so long 
as he respected the norms and peace of the village, and restricted his violence to the 
mountains. The fictional bandits in Apuleius’s Metamorphoses seem to share exactly 
this relationship with the local upland population. After raiding a rich man’s house on 
the outskirts of a city in Greece they returned to the mountains and sought shelter in the 
houses of some friendly villagers with whom they shared a portion of their booty, 
presumably in return for shelter, provisions and goodwill.84 If a bandit was especially 
successful, he might even assume a leadership role within the community, exploiting his 
wealth, reputation, contacts with the other men of violence to develop ties of dependence 
in much the manner of Hobsbawm’s Haiduk category of bandit.85 The Historia Augusta 
describes this kind of process in the account of the future Emperor Maximinus Thrax’s 
early career, during which he accrued wealth and prestige by forming a cadre, of what 
                                                          
82 Currott and Fink, ‘Bandit Heroes: Social, Mythical or Rational’, American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology, 72. 2, (2012), 470-497, (p. 471).  
83 The part time nature of latrocinium is also observable in the fisherman who moonlight as pirates in 
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84 Apuleius, Metamorphoses, 4. 1.  
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are described as ‘bandit-hunters’, to defend his local area. 86 It is not unlikely that what 
were locally seen as bandit-hunters were considered textbook latrones by the inhabitants 
of neighbouring districts, but within their own territories, they were apparently popular. 
In fifth-century Isauria, the leaders of successful bands rose to such prominence that they 
became major players in Imperial politics.87 Similarly the usurper Proculus is described 
as a nobleman descended from successful Alpine brigands and who was therefore rich 
in herds and slaves. Though he was a nobleman it is clear that he retained the 
characteristics of a bandit. He became a military leader but apparently only made his 
effort on the purple as a result of a prank. When playing ludus latrunculum (a game at 
which he was apparently intrinsically skilled!) in camp his success at being crowned 
king caused one of his entourage to wrap him in a purple cloak in jest. However the 
group were alarmed at the treasonous implications of this act and decided to make a 
serious attempt on the imperial throne. During his brief and contested reign he 
successfully defeated the Alemanni through using the tactics of a bandit.88 Both the 
nefarious origins of Proculus and the fanciful tale about his ‘coronation’ are almost 
certainly fictional but it nevertheless suggests that a successful brigand might, 
eventually, attain a legitimate position of power even if, according to the civilised elite, 
this would never erase the stain of his birth.89 The likes of Maximinus, Proculus and 
Isaurians like Emperor Zeno and general Illus were far removed from the typical lower-
class bandit, but there was potential for violence in the form of banditry to substantially 
                                                          
86 SHA, Life of Maximinus, 2. 1; Scriptores Historiae Augustae, trans. by David Magie (London: 
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Papers, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983).  
87 Lenski, pp. 446-455. 
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improve the social position of the lowly shepherd within their community through the 
distribution of the fruits of their success.  
But the maintenance of good relations between bandits and their communities did not 
rely on success. Indeed, it seems probable that banditry was unsustainable without those 
communities. Bandits, like transhumant shepherds relied on the local population for 
support in the form of food and markets. Whilst the shepherd sold the commercial 
products of his herds, the bandit required an outlet for selling loot; like the shepherd, 
they needed to exchange the product of their trade for essentials and luxuries that they 
could not obtain otherwise. This relationship is hardly surprising. Perhaps a majority of 
bandits were typically shepherds, and therefore many bandits probably retained families, 
especially when banditry was a seasonal occupation that took place during the colder 
months, when the flocks had been bought down from the uplands and potential victims 
could be expected to travel overland, rather than by sea.90 Even if the brigands were 
detached from familial structures, good relationships with kin and the wider community 
had to be maintained if the bandit was to avoid detection, repercussions or betrayal. 
Indeed, the Roman state was well aware of this reliance, and made the communities 
which sheltered bandits a prime focus of its retaliations against banditry. The law 
required that provincial governors ‘must use force against their collaborators 
(receptatores) without whom the bandit (latro) is not able to remain hidden for long.’91 
Unsurprisingly then, the successful brigand could not afford to alienate the local 
population and if he did prosper he might use the village as a public space to display his 
success, or even try to reintegrate with “peaceful” society. For example, Owen Lattimore 
observed that in north-eastern China in the 1920s, the one-time bandit would commonly 
                                                          
90 That Roman bandits maintained flocks can be discerned from the description of the bandit hideout in 
Apuleius’s Metamorphoses which describes the use wicker hurdles used to house livestock. caulae 
firmae solidis cratibus, ovili stabulationi commodae. Metamorphoses, 4. 6.  
91 Dig. 1. 18. 13. For more on betrayal as a tool of Imperial anti-bandit policy, see below, pp. 58-61. 
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return to village life, or indeed do so on a temporary basis, before returning to the hills 
and to brigandage once more.92 In either case, the distribution of wealth to the 
community was surely an opportunity for the bandit to construct relationships of 
dependence and assert his own position in the social hierarchy. 
As a result of this vital dependence on the local population, only the most desperate of 
bandits would prey on the inhabitants of their own region: evidence suggests that 
shepherds/bandits in widespread geographic and chronological contexts separate the 
village and the mountain into the spaces of non-violence and violence.93 In some ways 
this was logical self-preservation; violence in isolation was violence that was 
unaccountable (in the same way that ‘dark alleys’ are proverbially associated with urban 
violence today), therefore the bandit was less vulnerable to the agents of justice. But this 
was not the only factor. Raymond de Laburat, a fourteenth-century farmer from Ariège, 
was willing to publicly declare his desire to fight, and possibly murder, his Bishop up in 
the mountain passes. In the context of informants and the Inquisition, such a declaration 
was surely dangerous in itself, yet the theoretical act of violence is nevertheless 
distanced from the village, even when the posturing and threat is not.94 It seems likely 
that this was out of a desire to maintain good relations within the community.  
If bandits in fact typically enjoy complex ties to their communities, then perhaps it is 
unsurprising that they enjoyable a favourable cultural memory. Though the details of the 
portrayal of bandit ‘heroes’ like Bulla Felix and Maternus were certainly adapted for the 
narrative purposes of their authors, common themes within them are certainly consistent 
with later folk tales of similar bandit heroes. This implies that such equivalent folk tales 
might have existed among the lower-class inhabitants of upland areas during the Roman 
                                                          
92 Owen Lattimore, ‘Return to China’s Northern Frontier’, The Geographical Journal, 139. 2 (1973), 
233-242 (p. 241). 
93 Sorge, p. 817. 
94 Le Roy Ladurie, p. 262. 
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Empire. Such legends, though surely constructed and often idealised, would imply that 
bandits had the potential to be conceptually heroic, in the manner of Hobsbawm’s ‘social 
bandit’. Unfortunately, we have no records of heroic bandits that derive directly from 
non-aristocratic sources. However, it is possible that the Vita Martini records evidence 
of this kind of continued affection for a bandit within his lower-class community. An 
unmarked tomb in the vicinity of Tours was venerated by locals and St Martin was 
concerned by this incautious appreciation, so visited the site in order to ascertain whether 
it contained the body of a person who was worthy of its traditional veneration. During 
the investigation Martin had a vision which revealed the true character of the occupant 
of the tomb; a latro. Naturally, he had the tomb destroyed upon this revelation. The 
likelihood is that Martin invented this revelation in order to justify the destruction of an 
unsanctioned cult, but it is possible that the people of the area had once venerated the 
tomb of a ‘bandit hero’. By the time of Martin, the tomb had perhaps been absorbed into 
Christian tradition and was associated with a martyr, but given the extra-mural and 
seemingly rural location of the tomb, and the doubts over its occupants, it could have 
derived from the distant past and therefore might indeed have once housed a locally 
popular bandit.95  
                                                          
95 Sulpicius Severus, Vita Sancti Martini, 11 in ‘Vita Sancti Martini,’ A Select Library of Nicene and Post-
Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church: Second Series, Vol. 11, trans. by Alexander Roberts (Oxford: 
James Parker and Company, 1894) and Sulpicii Severi Libri qui supersunt, ed. by Carl Halm (Vindobonae: 
C. Gerold, 1866). This is certainly a problematic interpretation. The intent of the passage is to warn against 
popular expressions of Christian faith that occurred without the approval of the Church. As a result, 
Sulpicius Severus’ choice to describe the inhabitant of the tomb as a latro is intentional; an exaggerated 
and villainous occupant made for a more shocking story and therefore greater impact. Consequently, it 
could simply be a constructed account but it is possible that Sulpicius may be describing a common or 
unsurprising tradition. The fact that a latro – a secular villain – as the occupant may be revealing, since a 
persecutor of Christians might have been even more meaningful. A parallel example of veneration might 
be found in the medieval hagiographical association between the bacaudae and the Theban Legion. The 
Legion was ordered to kill fellow Christians – the bacaudae – by the pagan Emperor Maximian. When the 
Legion refused they were martyred and later became the centre of a saint’s cult, whilst the bacaudae came 
to be remembered as particularly Christian rebels. See Van Dam, Leadership and Community in Late 
Antique Gaul, p. 54. J. C. Sánchez León, Les sources de l’histoire des Bagaudes (Paris, 1996), is willing 
to go even further, and suggests that the latro can be positively identified as a bacaud, pp. 68-69 and 143-
144. Additionally, there are more modern parallels of the veneration of the tombs of brigands, see 
Hobsbawm, pp. 160-161. For the probable pagan origin of the tomb, see Peter Brown, The Cult of Saints: 
its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity, (London: SCM, 1981), p. 5.  
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As a result of this evidence it seems that the notion of predatory brigands ravaging the 
local people is problematic. Bandits in areas where the practice of banditry was endemic 
retained good relations with local communities in order to retain necessary social and 
economic contact and, as a result of these cordial relations, seem to have enjoyed a 
popular if idealised position in cultural memory. Of course, the extensive upland regions 
of the Roman Empire were inhabited by many different communities and it is unlikely 
that there was any strict injunction against subjecting fellow upland pastoralists to 
latrocinium. In modern Sardinia, the semi-nomadic inhabitants of the Barbagia region 
were notorious for rustling the herds of the mixed agriculturalists of the Marghine hills 
only a few miles to the northwest.96 Although we are poorly informed about these kinds 
of patterns of banditry in the late Roman period, it is clear that the rustling of livestock, 
with which banditry was almost synonymous, took place regularly.97  Certainly there 
seem to have been raids on neighbouring villas and towns, whilst in Isauria the 
proliferation of fortresses, both large and small, indicates the proliferation of rival bandit 
groups within an upland territory.98 This should not be surprising. The economy of 
pastoral communities relied on livestock and therefore rustling could provide an 
immediate boost to the local herds. Furthermore, these raids might provide an 
opportunity to settle the conflicts that typically develop over grazing rights.  
It is difficult to say anything certain about the regularity of livestock theft within upland 
communities on the basis of severe legal injunctions against the practice. In comparison, 
attacks on travellers are well attested.99 These people were only a transient presence in 
                                                          
96 Moss, p. 44 and passim.   
97 CTh 9. 30. 1; 9. 30. 3. 
98 Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’, p. 41 for raids into nearby lowland regions and Lenski, p. 452 
for conflict between bandit groups. 
99 We know that raiding and rustling of livestock was nevertheless a rather common problem, and almost 
inseparably related to banditry. According to Columella the hounds of shepherds had to be equally suite 
to herding the flocks, guarding against wolves and running down thieves. Columella, De Re Rustica, 7. 
12 in Res rustica, ed. by H. B. Ash et al., 3 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1941–68). 
Travellers as victims of banditry is generally well accepted, but the greater attestation of attacks on 
travellers is, of course, dependent on records and since these derive from exclusively from the literate 
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the region and therefore could be attacked without alienating the local population. We 
have already seen that attack by bandits was cited as a common and sometimes inevitable 
cause of the loss of goods and as a result no legal action could be taken against a victim 
who lost property – theirs or others –  through latrocinium.100 But carters and merchants 
were not the only targets; even military personnel were potential victims. A letter from 
Pliny to Hispanus explains that a certain Robustus, who disappeared while travelling 
north from Rome on the Via Flaminia, likely suffered the same fate as Pliny’s friend 
Metilius Crispus who set out with his entourage to take up a high ranking position in the 
army but was never seen again.101 In comparison, aristocrats travelling between their 
properties, imperial officials, messengers and even travelling monks like St Martin, must 
have made fairly easy targets unless they travelled in convoy for mutual protection.102 
Through the violent despoiling of travellers bandits in the Roman Empire were able to 
derive considerable prestige, not only in the form of wealth, but through fame and/or 
intimidation. Increased reputation and economic status would thereby allow a lowly 
shepherd to establish a position of respect within their community.  
 
1.3. Techniques of Banditry and Anti-Banditry.  
Thus far in this study of banditry, we have considered the relationship of the 
shepherd/bandit to their community and the potential results of a successful career in 
                                                          
lowland elites, and this provides an impossibly skewed perspective. One cannot say whether the victims 
of raids were more typically upland villages or travellers, but it is likely that there were significant regional 
differences in preferred targets. See also Lincoln Blumell, ‘Beware of Bandits!: Banditry and Land Travel 
in the Roman Empire’, Journeys, 8, 1-2, (2007) 1-20.  
100 Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’, p. 8n for a comprehensive list of the legal implications of falling 
victim to latrocinium.  
101 Pliny, Letters, 6. 25. 
102 Epictetus, Discourses, 4. 1, The Discourses: Books III-IV, trans. by W. A. Oldfather (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1928). “A traveller has heard that the road is infested by robbers; he does not 
venture to enter on to it alone, but he waits for the companionship on the road either of an ambassador, or 
a quaestor, or of a proconsul, and when he has attached himself to such persons he goes along the road 
safely.”  
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banditry. However, it also important to consider the actual processes of banditry, since 
these inform us of the methods of violence, the imposition of power and also the role of 
the community in the practice of latrocinium.  
Bandit violence typically occurred in isolated spaces where the local knowledge and 
power of the bandit gave them superiority. Raids on isolated villas may have been 
attempted now and again, but landowners had extensive households and bred large 
mastiff-like guard dogs to defend against nocturnal thieves, so it is likely that only 
powerful or desperate bandits would attempt raiding such a difficult target.103 
Conversely, the ‘devious paths’ through the Alps on which St Martin was accosted were 
a feared and treacherous place for lowland travellers.104 Such locations were difficult to 
police, ripe for ambush and, as we have seen, kept brigandage out of potentially sensitive 
communal public spaces. Salvian also emphasises this clandestine imagery:  
‘You might compare them to brigands lurking in ambush and snatching their spoils from 
passers-by; they so hedged in the paths, the winding roads and byways with their close-
set traps, that scarcely anyone could be cautious enough not to fall into some of their 
treacherous snares...’105  
Unfortunately most accounts of attack by bandits are laconic or disinterested and 
therefore lack details of the process of the attack. However, one letter of Sidonius 
Apollinaris plays on the stereotype of banditry and in doing so describes what might 
have been understood to be a typical episode of banditry. A priest called Riochatus, who 
was carrying books for Faustus of Riez, had stayed with Sidonius for some months 
                                                          
103 Columella, 7. 12. 
104 Sulpicius Severus, Vita Sancti Martini, 5. 1: inter Alpes devia secutus incidit in latrones. Sulpicii 
Severi Libri qui supersunt, ed. by Carl Halm (Vindobonae: C. Gerold, 1866). 
105 Salvian, 7. 17, trans. in The Writings of Salvian The Presbyter, trans. by Jeremiah F. O’Sullivan, 
(Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1977), p. 210. Salviani presbyteri Massiliensis 
Libri qui supersunt, ed. by Carl Halm, MGH AA, 1.2 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1877). 
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during an unsettled time when travel in the Auvergne was unsafe, but during that time 
had failed to share the writings of Faustus with Sidonius. Soon after Riochatus left, 
Sidonius heard rumour that he was carrying a great treasure, so he pursued him on swift 
horses and, having caught up with him despite the headstart, ‘leapt at his throat with a 
kiss, laughing like a man but pouncing like a wild beast’.106  
Of course, Sidonius merely wanted to read the words of Faustus, the recipient of the 
letter, so no harm befell either party. Nevertheless the details of the description are 
intriguing for our purposes. Sidonius’ letter describes the pursuit of a victim on 
horseback. Presumably many of the richest targets of bandits would have had horses, 
and the passage implies that the bandits had access to these too. Though herders were 
likely to have some horses at their disposal, the fact that they had beasts to spare for the 
purpose of brigandage suggests that they had some means, or that either their costs or 
responsibilities might have been covered by some collective action.107 It is possible that 
the expenses of outfitting and maintaining a bandit were covered by kin or the 
community in the hope of profit. However, whilst horses were certainly a valuable asset 
for brigands, they were probably not a necessity. Many potential victims would have 
travelled slowly, either because they were on foot, had baggage or were restricted by the 
terrain.   
Far more significant is the description of the ‘rumours of treasure’ that passed through 
the population. The kin, allies or informants of bandits surely listened for similar 
rumours and gathered information actively in order to coordinate successful attacks. 
After all, many travellers might not have been worth the risk to attack, especially if they 
                                                          
106 Sidonius Apollinaris, Letters, 11. 9, trans. in Poems and Letters: Sidonius with an English translation, 
introduction and notes, trans. by W. B. Anderson (London: Heinemann, 1936). Gai Solii Apollinaris 
Sidonii Epistulae et carmina, ed. by Christianus Luetjohann, MHG AA, 8 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1887).  
107 The utility of horses in the practice of banditry in clear from Roman legislation on the use of horses; 
CTh 9. 30.  
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were guarded, as travellers in notorious bandit country often would have been.108 
Furthermore, the accumulation of information was probably necessary for the planning 
of any attack. Bandit/shepherds could hardly spend their days watching the roads for 
potential victims. Isolated uplands are a harsh environment to wait for an opportunity 
that might not arrive, especially in winters or the baking heat of summer. They were also 
unlikely to have to have so much free time available; as we have seen they maintained 
relationships with the community and may have had flocks that required careful and 
deliberate grazing throughout large swathes of territory. Given these practical 
difficulties, we can reasonably imagine that bandits made use of their existing contacts 
in the community to maintain networks of informants within local towns and villages 
rather than relying on rumour alone. Perhaps informants were rewarded with a share of 
booty, the produce of pastoralism or other services which might be rendered by local 
men of violence. These networks were probably crucial for the coordination of planned, 
clandestine violence and may have even actively provided misinformation, by advising 
targets which routes were supposedly safe, thereby leading them into a trap.109  
The geography of brigandage may also have necessitated a reliance on communication. 
The bandit attack was covert, almost by definition. The location was rendered secret by 
geographic isolation or the cover of darkness in order to render detection unlikely.110 
Clandestine violence of this kind required considerable planning, but the 
bandit/shepherd had the necessary skills to predict the movements of targets whilst the 
                                                          
108 Travellers certainly realised this and often sought formidable company on their journeys. See above, 
pp. 49-50 for the danger to travellers.  
109 The bandits in Apuleius’s Metamorphoses (4. 9) make similar enquiries about where wealth can be 
obtained, but they do so personally, since they are apparently raiding beyond the boundaries of their 
local networks of information. In the Constantius of Lyon, Vita Germani, 20 a clandestine thief 
managed to integrate himself into the saint’s entourage in order to carry out his crime. It is perhaps by 
using equivalent techniques that bandits also gathered information about potential targets. Salvian, 
meanwhile, supposes that latrones met in churches to discuss their ne’er-do-well activities; Salvian, 3. 9. 
110 Authorities seem to have been aware of the necessarily clandestine nature of bandit violence, and 
accorded much more severe punishments to homicides where the killing was secret and the body hidden 
that to overt murder. See Pactus Legis Salicae, XLI; The Laws of the Salian Franks, trans. and intro. by 
Katherine Fischer Drew, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), pp. 104-6.  
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local information networks of the bandit related details about the target so that the 
bandits could concentrate overwhelming force.111 Both of these elements were of great 
significance to bandits; they were neither professional warriors, nor in a position to 
sustain casualties with any regularity.112 In order to overcome the confrontational 
tension between the parties, the brigand probably required the balance of power to be 
stacked so far in their favour as to render defeat highly improbable. The terror of the 
victim may have played a significant role in this. Visible fear on the part of the victim 
impeded their potential to resist and lent the aggressor the emotional advantage in 
confrontation.113 Again, the information networks of bandits were probably useful in 
this regard. If they provided misinformation about notionally safe routes, then the 
element of surprise favoured the assailants. These informants may even have spread 
terrifying rumours about local brigands in order to maximise the fear of confrontation, 
though such measures would have had to be subtle since excessive fearmongering might 
have discouraged travel or alerted the authorities.  
The suddenness of both attack and violence also played a role. The swiftness of the 
attack lent advantage to the bandits, since only they had been able to emotionally prepare 
for the confrontation. Sidonius’ language implies exactly this behaviour; the brigand 
strikes deliberately at the throat and his attacks are executed with the swiftness and 
precision of a tigeress.114 Few bandits may have actually reached this level of 
competence at violence, but the projection of this aura was perhaps as valuable as the 
skills themselves in ensuring a one-sided engagement. Lethality was probably of great 
                                                          
111 For the sociology of clandestine violence, see Randall Collins, Violence: A Micro-Sociological 
Theory, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 431 and for necessity of numerical superiority 
for emotional support during clandestine violence, see p. 432.  
112 Bandits certainly did not have it all their own way. Galen proposed that aspiring anatomists might 
reasonably expect to find the decomposing skeletons of unsuccessful latrones by the roadside. Galen, 
De anatomicis administrationibus, 1. 3, 3. 5. 
113 Emotional paralysis results from a perception of defeat and an acceptance of it as unavoidable, even 
if in reality resistance or even success might have been possible. See Collins, pp. 102-3.  
114 Sidonius Apollinaris, Letters, Book 11. 9.  
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importance, as was subtlety. Victims of latrocinium, like the Metilius Crispus the friend 
of Pliny, were often never seen again.115 As we have seen, banditry was consciously 
limited to a deliberately non-public space and, furthermore, the victims were not 
symbolically displayed.116 In contrast, bandits who had been overcome by their victims 
were deliberately left to decompose within sight of the road as a warning to both bandits 
and other travellers.117 ‘Endemic’ bandits within the Empire were certainly concerned 
with projecting power within their communities, but this expression was necessarily 
more subtle than the brute messages of the state. Endemic bandits could not afford to 
make explicit demonstrations of their authority, even if they wielded that authority 
within their communities. Excessive public display of power was likely to prompt the 
response of legitimate wielders of authority, whether the local aristocracy or the state, 
whilst also discouraging the movement of victims on which the bandit relied for his 
socio-economic position.118 The local power of the bandit was therefore delicately 
balanced. They were able to forcefully exert their authority over victims and maintain 
relationships with local communities, but the expression of this power was restricted by 
legitimate authorities. Bandit power was therefore necessarily clandestine, and this 
subtlety reinforced the illegitimacy of latrocinium in the eyes of ‘civilised’ authority.  
                                                          
115 Pliny, Letters, 6. 25. 
116 Contrast this, for example, with the procedure of the state who displayed executed bandits as a 
deterrent; Dig. 48. 19. 16. 10, or with the circumcellions, whose techniques of violence could be similar 
to those of bandits but for whom public display of power was an essential product of violence, see 
Shaw, ‘Sacred Violence’, p. 701 for depiction of circumcellions as bandits, and pp. 681-698 for their use 
of violence to display authority and ideology. See also Collins, p. 436, for similar practical purposes for 
displaying a body in a modern context. This observation should not be taken as a suggestion of a lack of 
cruelty on the part of bandits. Certainly terror and cruelty must have been employed by certain bandits 
who sought to gain local influence through fear and by those who, like the circumcellions, felt secure 
enough to make more explicit displays of power. See Hobsbawm, pp. 61-69. However, where the 
balance of power between bandit and legitimate authority remain clearly asymmetrical, subtly and 
maintenance of relations with the community were too valuable to be risked by the prudent bandit.  
117 Galen, De anatomicis administrationibus, 1. 3, 3. 5.  
118 There is a critical distinction here from bandit-type endemic conflict in regions where political or 
religious tensions legitimise a state of continuous violence, for example on frontier of Montenegrin and 
Albanian/Turkish territory in the early nineteenth century, see Milovan Đilas, Land Without Justice 
(New York; Harcout, Brace and Co., 1958), pp. 30-32. 
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The continuation of endemic banditry therefore required the recognition and 
maintenance of homeostasis that probably benefitted the community. The bandits 
provided extraordinary income and may have also offered leadership and protection. In 
return, the communities facilitated the practice of banditry and supported their bandits 
with provisions and markets. The practice of banditry probably did little to detract from 
the village economy, since the shepherds probably took to brigandage as an ancillary to 
herding. It is certain that many bandits will have used their violent expertise or the threat 
of violence to exert their dominance to the detriment of individuals within their 
communities but, as we have seen, they were probably too reliant on their communities 
to afford general alienation. Legitimate wielders of authority can exert drastically unfair 
relations of power, but illegitimate bandits always required shelter from the state, whilst 
their communities may have had recourse to it.  Indeed, banditry seems likely to have 
performed a useful social function in easing the same inter-generational and gender-
based tensions that encouraged the practice. Through banditry otherwise problematic 
youths might contribute economically and earn social recognition.  
However, despite the potential benefits of brigandage, it remained an intensely 
hazardous lifestyle. The typical endemic bandit was certainly a humilis and therefore 
vulnerable to torture and public execution by the state. Indeed, it seems probable that 
they were of particularly low status, since banditry was a risky method of enhancing 
ones social position.119 As we have seen, it was a strategy of social enhancement that 
was employed by the youthful and perhaps somewhat detached individuals who were 
otherwise disadvantaged in their communities.  Bandits in the Roman Empire were 
therefore vulnerable and perhaps desperate. Brigandage may have been common, and 
even a traditional supplement to agricultural production in some regions, but it remained 
                                                          
119 Salvian, for example, notes that slaves were forced into theft and latrocinium by need; 4. 3. 
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dangerous for its participants. Modern parallels suggest that bandits rarely survive for 
more than four years.120  
A number of life-threatening dangers weighed on the shepherd/bandit. Transhumant 
herding on upland pasture was itself a hazardous occupation and contributed to a high 
mortality among its practitioners.121 Throwing banditry into the mix can only have 
contributed to this. Death might have come at the hands of an obdurate victim or a rival 
gang of rustlers seeking enrichment or revenge, but surely the greatest danger came from 
the agents of the state.  
Despite the rhetorically antithetical positions of the state and latrones, banditry seems 
to have been de facto tolerated in many areas. The obligation to eradicate brigands 
always had to be weighed against the practical difficulty of catching them and therefore 
endemic banditry tended to persist. But this relation of power was always subject to 
change. Outrageous crimes or changes in personnel or policy might suddenly prompt the 
state to behave more aggressively. For example, it can be assumed that the tenure of 
Fronto as proconsul of Asia was a difficult period for the local bandits given that he 
brought with him Julius Senex, a specialist bandit-hunter from Mauretania, who had a 
reputation for diligence and military tenacity.122 
Nevertheless, the policing of banditry remained a difficult proposition. Sheltered as they 
were by geography and community, bandits were a troublesome prospect for relative 
outsiders who lacked the knowledge of local landscapes and people.123 The only method 
to successfully overcome these obstacles seems to have been to rely on bribes and torture 
                                                          
120 Hobsbawm, pp. 34-45. 
121 Le Roy Ladurie, p. 190, 263 and passim.   
122 Fronto, To Antoninus Pius, 8 
123 Notably this was also the case in the Nile Delta where 20,000km2 of marshes, mud and salt wastes 
were home to pastoral farmers who were notorious for their banditry. According to Achilles Tatius (4. 
14) the local Boukoloi would break dykes and flood the land in order to trap and defeat Roman military 
opposition.  
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to gather information about the bandits and use this to force some cooperation from the 
aristocracies. In order to obtain this information efficiently, the pursuers of bandits were 
afforded unusual rights to use torture; they were impeded by neither usual judicial 
procedure nor symbolic amnesties.124 These were the main weapons in Roman anti-
bandit policy. The state could not afford to garrison the uplands, so needed to precisely 
direct its resources against bandits. To do so required the accumulation of information 
and the state afforded its agents the right to forego usual judicial procedure in order to 
get it.125 This meant that they could overcome the advantages of the latrones by targeting 
one of the pillars of their success: the community.  
The Martyrdom of Polycarp gives us an insight into the process of capturing a bandit. 
This letter/martyr act was circulated in the vicinity of Smyrna during the later decades 
of the second century and it details the pursuit and execution of Polycarp, the bishop of 
Smyrna. Polycarp, because of the threat posed by his pursuers, left the city for refuge in 
the rural hinterland. He subsequently fled from farm to farm, probably in the 
mountainous region slightly inland from the coastal city. The men sent to capture him, 
described as diogmitai (semi-professional killers), tortured some slaves on the estates 
where he had hidden and so discovered his current hiding place.126 When they finally 
found and captured him, they did so “as if they were advancing against a robber”: at 
dusk and fully armed, while the bishop was asleep in the upper rooms of his hiding 
place.127 
                                                          
124 CTh 9. 38 for criminal indulgences during festivals. No specific mention is made of latrones here, 
but the related crimes of homicide, treason and tomb-violation were exempted from amnesty, so it 
would seem that bandits would have been as well. This is especially likely since Isaurian bandits are 
explicitly barred from amnesty in CTh 9. 35. 7.  
125 See above, pp. 27-8.  
126 Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’, p. 18. For the typical role of irregular diogmitae in quelling 
banditry in Anatolia, see Lenski, ‘Assimilation and Revolt in the Territory of Isauria’, p. 423.  
127 Martyrdom of Polycarp, 7, trans. in Medieval Saints: A Reader, ed. Mary-Ann Stouck (Peterborough, 
Ont.: Broadview Press, 1999), pp. 3-9. 
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In this episode we see the same practices that seem to have taken place in the pursuit of 
banditry. Polycarp, like a bandit, relies on community and geography to shelter him 
whilst the agents of persecution direct their strength against the local people in order to 
overcome that shelter. For manpower, the pursuers depend on diogmitai and it seems 
that this reliance on irregular force was also typical in anti-banditry. Under imperial law 
the possession of weapons of war by private citizens was illegal, and this was 
pronounced as late as AD 364 by the Emperors Valentinian and Valens.128 But the threat 
of banditry was sufficiently severe that an exception was made in such cases. In the 
absence of an effective police force, the local aristocracy were often expected to be the 
arm of justice in controlling banditry. Landowners or their representatives were required 
to report bandits to the local authorities but several laws state that is was the 
responsibility of the local cities, and particularly their curiales, to handle the capture of 
bandits and their delivery to judges.129 This devolution of powers of judicial violence is 
itself unusual, but several other laws stress that it was the duty of private citizens to 
‘detect, to pursue and to betray bandits to local authorities’ and in doing so they were 
authorised to injure and kill, and were exempted from the usual laws against those 
actions.130 
Though regular soldiers might have been used to combat brigands, this description 
reveals that the Empire was often required to fight fire with fire; or rather fight bandits 
in a very bandit-esque fashion. The forces of the state were irregular, probably drawn 
from the viri strenui of nearby estates, and sought the element of surprise by attacking 
at moments of weakness when escape was least likely (as when Polycarp was asleep). 
The Martyrdom of Polycarp also emphasises the vital role that betrayal had to play in 
                                                          
128 CJ 11. 47. 1. 
129 CJ 1. 55. 6-7 (A.D. 405), 8. 40. 13 (A.D. 238-40). 
130 Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’, p. 19 and CJ 3. 27. 1-2 (A.D. 391 and 403), 9. 6. 3 (A.D. 
265). For greater discussion of these laws and their implications for our understanding of patterns in late 
antique banditry, see pp. 87-89. 
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the pursuit of bandits, recalling the demise of Maternus and Bulla Felix.131 This was not 
just a literary device but the principal strategy that the state could employ in actively 
hunting bandits, rather than simply defending against them. As we have seen, the 
pursuers of bandits were within their rights to cause injury without legal ramification 
and were empowered to do so on the spot.132 This gave them the legal freedom to torture 
the inhabitants of regions infested with bandits in order to learn their whereabouts. In 
fact, as we have seen before, an entry in the Digest states that doing so was the express 
duty of a provincial governor.133 
The state recognised that geography and the community networks of bandits were vital 
to sustaining banditry. The former might be attacked, as Justinian did in Tzanica, if the 
state had sufficient resources and inclination at its disposal, but most provincial 
governors lacked these means.134 Consequently the emphasis was placed on attacking 
the structure that supported brigandage. The emphasis on betrayal in literary accounts 
of banditry indicate that the state attempted to infiltrate or target the networks of support 
and indication on which the bandits relied.135 Similarly in modern accounts of banditry, 
both factual and legendary, the trope of betrayal is so commonplace that Hobsbawm 
regarded it to be an integral aspect of the noble robber topos: ‘he dies invariably and 
only through treason, since no decent member of the community would help the 
authorities against him.’136 Bandits in the Roman Empire were likewise proverbially 
                                                          
131 It is possible that the betrayal of Jesus was part of a metaphor for banditry. Certainly his capture by 
armed men whilst walking in Gethsemane at night is reminiscent of the tactics used against Polycarp 
and perceived the methods as such, crying; arresters: "Do you take me for a bandit, since you have come 
with swords and clubs to arrest me?"  Mark 14. 48, Luke 22. 52, Matthew 26. 55.   
132 See above, pp. 27-8. 
133 Dig. 1. 18. 13. See above, p. 45-7. 
134 Procopius, Buildings, 3. 6 for Tzanica, and also Lenski, pp. 439-446 on the harrying of Isauria in late 
fifth century. 
135 See above, pp. 29-30 for the betrayal of Bulla Felix and Maternus, and also the account of the 
downfall of the brigand Lydius in Zosimus, New History, (1. 69-70), trans. by R. T. Ridley (Sydney: 
Australian Association for Byzantine Studies, 1982), pp. 21-22. Similarly, Theodosius overcame 
barbarian bandits in the Balkans by torturing an informant into betraying their loction. Zosimus, IV. 48. 
136 Hobsbawm, p. 47. 
 61 
 
tight lipped; Ammianus Marcellinus states with an air of frustration that no torture had 
yet been conceived that could force an Egyptian bandit to proffer even his own name.137 
Furthermore, the proliferation of laws explicitly targeting the harbourers of latrones and 
overlapping nefarious groups, like deserters and sicarii (knife-men), indicates that 
betrayal was the key weapon in Imperial anti-bandit policy.138  
This stratagem was necessitated by the practical difficulties in pursuing bandits. The 
local communities were unlikely to support the activities of authorities in most 
circumstances. As we have seen, in many cases the bandits were closely tied to pastoral 
communities; they maintained traditional occupations as shepherds, retained 
relationships of family and kin, contributed to the economy and may have a popular if 
peripheral presence in the local society. They may also have been a threatening presence. 
If the state was only an occasional actor in the region, the bandits themselves, even if 
they practised transhumance, were far more quotidian and had both the means to 
violently impose themselves and established information networks to direct that force. 
Bandits may have offered both the carrot and the stick to their local communities, as did 
the state who themselves tempted local people with bribes and idyllic freedom from 
raids, whilst sponsoring armed gangs of irregular men with extraordinary rights to 
employ violence. Clearly the application of power in upland regions could be hotly 
contested. The communities within these regions were placed within a complex system 
of networks, where loyalties were tested and violence was often common. The violence 
of bandits might suppress resentment or settle local scores, but it offered enrichment and 
local power. Yet it brought danger, and bandit populations were at the whim of the state 
                                                          
137 Ammianus Marcellinus, 22. 16. 23. 
138 For example: CTh 7. 18. 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14; 7. 19; 9. 29. 1, 2; N.Val. 6 and the various re-issues of 
these laws in the CJ; 5. 17. 8; 9. 39. 2. 
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which might, on occasion, direct its resources against the troublesome inhabitants of the 
uplands. 
 
1.4. Bandit Social Relations beyond the Uplands.  
In the preceding section we have seen the complexity of the position of the bandit within 
the geography of the upland and with the community. In contrast, the rhetorical and legal 
position of bandits suggests that their relationship with the lowlands was relatively 
simple. Bandits might periodically descend in order to raid, whilst the state might exert 
greater or lesser influence in order to limit banditry depending on its resources and 
inclination. This impression is clearly dominated by violence. 
This impression seems to apply, in particular, to the lowland aristocracies whose lands 
bordered upland regions of banditry. They were surely the subjects of raids and therefore 
constructed a cultural perception of bandits, and indeed upland peoples in general, as 
wild and dangerous. As Hopwood states, “Nomads/transhumants were…generally 
considered outside civilisation: throwbacks to an earlier predatory mode of production 
whose language and idiosyncratic appearance proclaimed them as Other”.139 Therefore 
it might be assumed that local aristocracies were willing participants when the state 
called upon them to assist in the policing of banditry. This was apparently a fruitful 
relationship for all involved. The grandees of civilisation, state and aristocracy, which 
were delineated only by the blurry dividers between public and private power, could co-
operatively engage the predatory tendencies of the semi-barbarian uplanders in order to 
maintain mutually beneficial peace and prosperity.  
                                                          
139 Hopwood, ‘Bandits between grandees and the state’, p. 180. 
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However it seems that these local aristocrats were often less forthcoming with their 
support than the state would have liked. Indeed, many laws acknowledge that bandits 
were in fact being harboured on the estates of the aristocracy and even of actively 
offering patronage to brigands.140 This should not be seen as surprising. Although 
geographic boundaries defined upland and lowland zones into areas of differing 
production and state influence, they remained connected through a complex web of 
socio-economic relations. These linked the nomadic and semi-nomadic commercial 
livestock herders with intermediate village communities, which mixed herding with 
subsistence agriculture (and some commercial production of vines, olives etc.), and also 
with the stable, sedentary arable landscapes beyond. Straddling the indistinct boundaries 
of these zones of differing modes of production, were the influences of the rural nobility, 
who attempted to maintain or enhance their domination through control of land and 
chattels, whilst at the centre of the web stood the towns and cities. These were the 
economic hubs, where markets existed for the sale of surplus produce, and which 
functioned as bastions of state power, where agents of the imperial superstructure would 
maintain control, enforce justice and extract taxes, either in coin or in kind. Pastoralists, 
whether nomadic, seasonally transhumant or more parochial, had to engage with this 
system more or less actively. Some element of livestock production was surely for the 
purposes of subsistence, but in any context of large scale production the commercial sale 
or exchange of produce was the object. This often took place within the village, or even 
the family, where meat, cheese and fleeces might be exchanged for bread, textiles and 
similar essentials, but it might also involve the transport or livestock or produce to the 
urban marketplace.  
                                                          
140 CTh 1. 29. 8 for patronage. See also Dig. 1. 18. 13, CTh 7. 18. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14; 7.19; 9. 29. 1, 
2; 9. 30. 5; and N.Val. 6. This extensive list is not exhaustive.  
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Commercial links were not the only connections between shepherd and the lowlands. 
Many shepherds did not just administer their own livestock, but also oversaw the herds 
of wealthy aristocrats in return for a wage or a percentage of profits. Because aristocrats 
had more land at their disposal and greater capital for investment in stock, it seems 
probable that their herds were in fact dominant in many regions. The pastoral business 
interests of the aristocracy tended to be overseen by a master shepherd (archipomen in 
Greek speaking regions), who functioned as an intermediary between the herders and 
the magnate or his representatives.141 It is probable that the same middlemen numbered 
among the receptatores, the illicit fences and collaborators who exchanged food, 
weapons and cash with bandits in return for stolen goods or rustled livestock. It is also 
possible that bribes or extortion money flowed through the receptatores depending on 
the local balance of power.142 Where the brigands were locally powerful they probably 
extracted tribute in order to maintain goodwill, whilst in other circumstances, the 
aristocracies (or their representatives) might expect payment to turn a blind eye, or to 
maintain their patronage.   
One of the numerous laws that condemns the harbouring of bandits implies that the 
connection between landowners and latrones may have been initiated and maintained 
by middlemen:  
                                                          
141 Hopwood, ‘Bandits between grandees and the state’, p. 187. See also the description of Pierre 
Maury’s role as head shepherd in fourteenth-century Pyrenean transhumance, Le Roy Ladurie, pp. 77-
102. 
142 For a pejorative description of the legal role of a receptator see Ausonius, Epistle 26, D. Magni Ausonii 
Opuscula, ed. by Carl Schenkl, in MGH AA, 5.2 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1883), in which he describes a 
middleman-cum-messenger thusly: “You shall see the man himself as he stands close by me, the very 
image of his class, grey, bushy-haired, unkempt, blustering, bullying, Terence's Phormio, with stiff hair 
bristling like a sea-urchin, or my lines. This fellow, when light harvests had oft belied his promises, came 
to hate the name of bailiff; and, after sowing late or much too early through ignorance of the stars, made 
accusation against the powers above, carping at heaven and shifting the blame from himself. No diligent 
husbandman, no experienced ploughman, a spender rather than a getter, abusing the land as treacherous 
and un-fruitful, he preferred to do business as a dealer in any sale-market…”. Translation by Hugh Evelyn 
White in Ausonius, Ausonius, Vol. 2, (London: Heinemann, 1921), pp. 95-97.  
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‘If a person should knowingly harbour brigands or neglect to deliver them to the courts, 
either corporeal punishment shall be inflicted upon him, or the forfeiture of his property, 
according to the rank of the person and the discretion of the judge. But if an overseer or 
procurator (actor sive procurator) should harbour a brigand without the knowledge of 
his master and neglect to deliver him to the judge, he shall be consumed by avenging 
flames.’143  
The stewards on aristocratic estates were directly involved in the maintenance of their 
land and livestock. They dealt with the master-shepherds and may have been all too 
aware of the threat of banditry. It is therefore unsurprising that they maintained 
relationships with local bandits seeking mutual benefit.  
This law also highlights the vulnerable role of the middleman.144 He might typically 
have been responsible for the day-to-day communication with bandits, but this made 
him accountable. Stuck between a rock and a hard place, he was liable to be scapegoated 
by his master in the event of any judicial procedure, especially since such stewards were 
typically of humilial or unfree status.145  
It may well be the case that some relations between bandits and overseers did exist 
without the input of their aristocratic employers, but the law acknowledges that this was 
not always the case. Given the regionality that existed between pastoral communities, 
and equivalent rivalry that probably occurred between groups of latrones, it is 
unsurprising that the prudent landowner might seek to billet some brigands on their land. 
It might well have been cheaper than being the target of raids or paying extortion money. 
Furthermore, there were numerous other useful roles for a gang of men with a penchant 
for violence and intimidation. As shepherds they were used to guarding flocks, but with 
                                                          
143 CTh 9. 29. 2. See also 9. 29. 1, 7. 18. 7 and Dig. 48. 19. 27. 2. 
144 CTh 7. 18. 6; 7. 18. 12; 9. 29. 2. 
145 Clyde Pharr, The Theodosian Code and Novels and the Sirmondian Constitutions, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007), 9. 29., note 4, p. 248. 
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suitable equipment they might also guard them from other bandits, rival landowners or 
even raiding barbarians.146 Fields, properties, local industries, slaves and wagons 
transporting goods – bandits might have been found guarding these valuable sources of 
wealth as often as raiding them.147 The very person of the aristocrat himself might have 
been guarded by shepherd/bandits, and indeed by AD 468 the practice was common 
enough for the Emperors Anthemius and Leo to legislate against the employment of 
Isaurians (known to be bandits par excellence), as well as bucellarii and armed slaves, 
as bodyguards.148  The existence of these complicit relationships between bandits and 
aristocrats is attested in literary sources as well as law codes. Ausonius’ letter to Theon, 
an inhabitant of Medoc in the region of Bordeaux, explains this relationship, despite its 
critical tone: 
‘Or are you concerned with greater matters, chasing thieves who wander throughout 
your whole area who, finally, through fear of you, invite you to join them and share their 
spoils? You, a gentle man, who hate shedding human blood, compound their crimes for 
cash, call it a mistake, demand in payment rustled cattle, and leave off playing the judge 
to take the side of criminals.’149 
As a minor landowner Theon was troubled with bandits and found it easier to come to 
terms with them, for mutual gain, than to defeat them. In this case, at least according to 
Ausonius, this wasn’t because he was unable to defeat the bandits, but because 
cooperation was easier and profitable. So, while the latro was an irreconcilable rebel in 
the eyes of the law, the functional status of the bandit was often more complex. The line 
between latrones and viri strenui, strongmen in the employ of the nobility, seems to 
                                                          
146 CTh 9. 10. 3 for extra judicial violence and seizure of property between landowners. 
147 For the de facto institutionalisation of legitimated violent roles for lower-class people, see Chapter 4 
below. 
148 CJ 9. 12. 10. 
149 Ausonius, Epistle 13, 22-7. The translation given is Hopwood’s, ‘Bandits between grandees and the 
state’, p. 185. The ‘robbers’ of the translation are technically vagantes, but their synonymity with 
latrones is attested in CTh 7. 18. passim and 10 in particular. 
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have been a very blurry one. Violence is a method of expressing dominance, whether 
situational or social, and as such it is not surprising to see that alliances were forged, 
however uneasy, between wielders of authority whose power was not excessively 
asymmetrical. In this context the aspirant lower-class man of violence could negotiate 
with his social superiors from a much stronger position than other humiliores.150  
This association between bandit and gentry is reminiscent of the relationships described 
in detail by Anton Blok in his famous critique of Hobsbawm’s social bandit theory. Blok 
argued that bandits, especially in Sardinia and southern Italy which were the focus of 
his study, were the agents of the rural aristocracy and were employed to supress peasant 
revolt rather than embody mythic lower-class rebellion.151 That shepherds were 
employed as rural enforcers in the Roman Empire is evident from an account of a violent 
rural dispute in Apuleius’s Metamorphoses. A rich farmer who desired the lands of his 
poor neighbour sought to violently drive him off the lands, firstly with threats and 
intimidation, then with shepherds and their terrifying sheepdogs as muscle. Violence 
broke out as the allies of the poor man were attacked by the dogs, and in the course of 
the engagement all the defenders died, as did the rich man.152 Theon too, according to 
Ausonius, was complicit in the despoiling of the area through alliance with bandits. Yet 
this behaviour is not necessarily contradictory to the notion of social banditry. As we 
have seen, bandits relied on close cooperation with their communities which predatory 
alliance with aristocracies might, theoretically, have endangered. But typical endemic 
bandits from within the Roman Empire were pastoralists and therefore tended to occupy 
different geographic spaces with different communities. The shepherd/bandit may 
consequently have been an ideal ally for members of the gentry in the settling of disputes 
                                                          
150 It is possible that these relationships became so ensconced in some regions that banditry developed in 
to ‘entrepreneurial’ raiding or razzia. See Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’, p. 7.   
151 Anton Blok, ‘The Peasant and the Brigand: Social Banditry reconsidered’ in Comparative Studies in 
Society and History, 14. 4, (1972), 494-503.  
152 Apuleius, Metamorphoses, 9. 35-38. 
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in lowland arable contexts. As outsiders they did not have to fear alienating the people 
of the region, whilst through alliance with local aristocracies they gained powerful 
friends within the Roman order. The shepherd enforcers of the rich man in 
Metamorphoses were perhaps his employees, called down from the local uplands to 
intimidate his enemies. They were able to perform this role, presumably in return for 
some reward, then return to their own communities as men of violence who avoided 
local grievances by operating outside their immediate area.153 
But Ausonius’ chastisement of Theon reveals yet another layer of complexity in the 
interactions between bandits and the nobility. As a landowner, he was expected to pursue 
the robbers and either pronounce extra-judiciary punishment or deliver them to the 
courts. But to do so he had to rely on irregular men of violence like the diogmitai 
employed to capture Polycarp from his refuge outside Smyrna. Similarly Musonius, the 
deputy governor of Asia during the early years of Valentinian I relied on diogmitai to 
react to the raiding of Isaurian bandits because the military was not sufficient.154 As we 
have seen, the irregular men of violence who often performed the heavy work on behalf 
of Roman aristocrats were exactly the types of men who might, in other circumstances, 
be derided as bandits. It seems that one aristocrat’s viri strenui might be another’s 
latrones.  
These complex relationships between aristocracies and the violent actors in rural 
communities surely made the state’s task even more difficult. Aristocrats and influential 
figures in rural society certainly benefitted from their arrangements with 
shepherds/bandits/strong men and were willing to shelter them. Clearly then, some 
                                                          
153 A similar example is found in Zosimus, 5. 16, which records how a private landowner, a certain 
Valentinus of Selga in Pamphylia, outfitted a number of his slaves and farm-workers – who were 
practised in the ways of war – to harass the army of the general Tribigild from the hilltops. It seems 
plausible from the upland context and their violent experience, that these men were bandits under the 
patronage of Valentinus. 
154 Ammianus Marcellinus, 27. 9. 6-7.  
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aristocrats could not be relied upon to independently prosecute bandits within their 
spheres of influence were probably reluctant allies or even truculent opponents when the 
state attempted to intervene.  
 
1.5. Interim Conclusion.  
The first half of this chapter has been a broad, general investigation into the character of 
endemic banditry in the Roman Empire. Banditry of this type was mundane and 
ubiquitous enough to accumulate cultural significance. Bandits might be incorporated 
into literature as antagonists (or even protagonists), they might be portrayed as comic 
figures, the subjects of strategic board games or genuine figures to be feared that 
characterised some of the more malign tendencies of the gods. But that very ubiquity 
means that these bandits rarely appear as anything more than incidental in the numerous 
works in which they appear. Consequently one gets the impression, derived from the 
urban aristocratic sources which we have, that bandits were rather ephemeral; a threat 
which did not impose on the civilised Roman world in a manner which deserved 
analysis. Unlike an external war or internal rebellion which might be explained as a 
result of policy or political context, banditry was something ever present, and its victims, 
like those of accidents or shipwrecks, were just the victims of capricious fate.155 
This perspective is in some way reflective of endemic banditry. Despite the judicially 
inimical status of latrocinium it typically did not impose politically in the same way as 
rebels or external foes. This was probably because endemic banditry was not a social 
movement brought about by oppressive taxation, injustice, famine or similar 
extraordinary stimuli.156 Rather it was structurally integrated within those communities 
                                                          
155 Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’, p.9n. 
156 Charles Tilly, ‘Introduction’ in Class Conflict and Collective Action, eds. Tilly and Tilly (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 13-15. 
 70 
 
which practised it. Consequently banditry was not only ubiquitous but, as we have seen, 
connected with upland communities and with legitimate structures of power through 
well-established social networks. These networks allowed endemic banditry to be 
practised and shielded it from the agents of the state who sought to retain the state’s 
rhetorical monopoly of violence.  
Some studies of Roman banditry have interpreted this kind of banditry as in some way 
not ‘proper’ latrocinium, since it was considered to be acceptable, even traditional, 
behaviour in those communities.157 Therefore it was only illegitimate from the 
perspective of elite Roman commentators. Certainly this was the case, but to relegate 
endemic banditry in favour of that brought about by anomic social conditions is to 
overlook probably the most common source of Roman banditry and to fall into the trap 
of elite Roman authors who concentrated not on the social causes of violence, but only 
on the appearance of that violence. For them any violence that was illegitimate and/or 
tactically employed geography or stealth could be described as latrocinium. For example 
Ammianus Marcellinus could assert, without contradiction or confusion, that the 
military traditions of the Sarmatians and Quadi made them masters of brigandage and 
also deride the Emperor Valens for facing the Goths in open battle rather than wearing 
down their numbers and morale using the methods of the bandit.158  
It is historians who impose boundaries on types of latrocinium and categorise these 
forms in order to, hopefully, attain more incisive conclusions. So far in this chapter I 
have taken a sweeping approach to the endemic form of banditry which has ranged well 
beyond the chronological range of this thesis. In some ways this is regrettable, but since 
                                                          
157 Werner Riess, ‘The Roman Bandit (Latro) as Criminal and Outsider’ in The Oxford Handbook of 
Social Relations in the Roman World, ed. Michael Peachin, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
p. 701 (693-714). Apart from this apparent ranking of banditry however, Riess’s distinction of banditry 
into categories of either ‘‘anomic’ perpetrators or ‘labelled’ criminals’ (p. 697) is broadly similar to my 
interpretation. 
158 Ammianus Marcellinus, 17. 12. 2 and also 16. 10. 20 and 29. 6. 8 for Sarmatians and Quadi as 
latrones; 31. 7. 2 for the foolish tactics of Valens.  
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references to what has been defined as endemic banditry are typically incidental it has 
been necessary to look to a wider range of sources. Fortunately this broad scope is also 
rather instructive; the traditions of endemic banditry in upland communities around the 
Mediterranean persist quietly in the backgrounds of the many states that have existed 
there in recorded history. Certainly there is sufficient evidence to justify the continuance 
of endemic banditry in Late Antiquity.   
If we can generalise from this broad array of references then we might draw some 
conclusions about endemic banditry as a form of lower-class violence and its impact on 
the communities of the late Roman Empire. It seems that endemic bandits were no less 
a product of context than those who were forced into banditry by extraordinary stimuli. 
Banditry was a supplement to pastoral production in many regions where local traditions 
and geography made this violence practicable even in the face of a disapproving state. 
The lifestyle of the bandit/shepherd might have caused them to be somewhat detached 
from the community, but this seems not to have hampered the maintenance of close 
relationships between them. The bandit remained a part of the community and relied 
heavily upon it; we can suppose that the upland village was home, marketplace, 
information centre and shelter to the typical late antique bandit. It is hard to be certain, 
but it is likely that successful bandits were powerful figures in their communities. Their 
access to wealth and violence presumably afforded them prestige, but the danger of state 
reprisal probably prevented them from either becoming socially prominent or alienating 
their neighbours. Overt power and resentment were likely to bring about the downfall of 
bandits since betrayal was perhaps the most powerful weapon in imperial anti-bandit 
policy. 
Hazardous though it certainly was, brigandage was a method by which some 
disadvantaged men might have become socially mobile. Certainly it broadened their 
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spheres of influence since their violent expertise made them valuable in the eyes of local 
aristocracies. Perhaps it was through these relationships that endemic bandits had the 
most telling impact on the state. Communities who were reluctant to surrender their 
bandit kin could, if necessary, be bribed or bludgeoned into submission but a wealthy 
patron offered greater protection. Since landowners were expected to do the bulk of day-
to-day policing a complicit aristocrat could covertly use latrones to guard, thieve and 
even oppress his tenants and neighbours on his behalf. Indeed, since irregular viri strenui 
and diogmitae formed the manpower in anti-banditry, we might imagine that competing 
landlords sponsored gangs to fight proxy wars of crop destruction and cattle rustling. 
Each presumably claimed legitimacy for his own retainers, yet labelled his opponents 
‘brigands’. Certainly this was the rhetoric of conflicts between emperors and usurpers!  
The distinguishing lines between brigand, shepherd and rural heavy were exceedingly 
fine. Romantic as the scene of Apuleius’ mountaintop bandit hideout is, it was surely 
atypical, perhaps even fantastical.159 Bandits certainly hid out in mountains, but 
probably in structures like the cabane (hut) in which Occitan shepherds like Pierre 
Maury produced cheese.160 After all, shepherd/bandits still had flocks to guard and 
cheese to make. They might also have been found in their own villages or on the estates 
of aristocrats. It is likely that some ordinary late antique people saw ‘brigands’ every 
day but that this was not remarkable because their violent behaviour was, on the 
communal scale, de facto legitimate. Yet their existence was still precarious: latrocinium 
might not have contravened local norms but its protagonists knew their actions were 
illegal. Anyone had the legal right to kill them and the state bureaucracy, empowered by 
the irreconcilable tone of Roman law, had extraordinary powers to bring about their 
destruction. Nevertheless it seems that many men followed this tradition of incidental, 
                                                          
159 Judith K. Krabbe, Lusus Iste: Apuleius Metamorphoses, (Dallas: University Press of America, 2003), 
pp. 91-97. 
160 Le Roy Ladurie, pp. 106-7. 
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almost accidental, violent disobedience. It was certainly risky, but violent means were a 
common strategy by which humilial pastoralists could exert greater agency in their social 
interactions in Late Antiquity. 
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Chapter Two 
2. Epidemic Banditry in the late antique West.  
In contrast to the preceding section, this study on epidemic banditry will focus more 
closely on the details relating to the late antique West; those territories that had formed 
the Western Roman Empire and which the successor states replaced during the fifth and 
sixth centuries.  Fortunately, it is not the purpose of this study to engage directly with 
the historiographical debate over ‘continuity or collapse’ and the ‘End’ of the Roman 
Empire.161 Nevertheless, the gradual decline of the Western Empire has significant 
implications for trends in lower-class violence and, I would argue, vice versa.  
The Western Roman state weakened significantly from the late-fourth to late-fifth 
centuries to the point that the Emperor Romulus Augustulus was formally replaced by 
one of his generals, Odoacer, in 476. Despite territory changing hands across the late 
antique West many ‘Roman’ institutions remained, both in Italy and in more peripheral 
regions, and whilst political changes often happened quickly, social and cultural changes 
typically occurred at a much more gradual rate.  
It is this interaction between political events and social trends that shall be the main 
focus of this section. As we have seen, typical endemic banditry in the Roman Empire 
was part of a complex system of relationships connecting upland to lowland and 
community to authority. The balance was delicate and the violent power of the state was 
the main barrier preventing the establishment of authority by bandits over anything more 
                                                          
161 To condense this debate into a footnote is a futile task. Nevertheless, it is worth underlining the 
contribution of Peter Brown’s The World of Late Antiquity, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971) to the 
development of the ‘continuity’ thesis. For a modern interpretation that remains focused on aspects of 
collapse, see Bryan Ward-Perkins, The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilisation. For an investigation of 
the trends and intricacies of historiographical debate and dispute over the centuries, see Ian Wood, The 
Modern Origins of the Early Middle Ages, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
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than a local area.162 Similarly the ‘civilised’ honestiorial elite of the Empire were the 
arbiters of legitimacy and their perceptions were always likely to limit the ambitions of 
the successful latro.163 Both of these structures; the military/judicial arm of the state and 
the honestiorial class, were shaken to a greater or lesser extent by the political, economic 
and social issues that afflicted the Western Empire from the mid-fourth century 
onward.164 As a result we can reasonably expect to see corresponding changes in 
banditry as its traditional nemeses came under increasing pressure elsewhere.  
 
2.1. Epidemic Bandits: Fugitives, Deserters and Veterans.  
Epidemic bandits are essentially ‘made’ rather than ‘born’. They are not brought up in 
communities with established traditions of brigandage, but rather become brigands as a 
result of some stimuli such as the desire for social improvement or desperation. The 
distinction is far from clear; bandits of either variety require certain analogous 
circumstances to appear. In both cases state power and geography retain significance. 
Furthermore, as we have seen, there are stimuli based on norms and demography that 
influence the uptake of banditry as a ‘career’ even in communities where its practice is 
common. Nevertheless, the recognition of some degree of distinction is important. The 
existence of endemic banditry gives us an insight into both state power and the lives of 
the communities of banditry over a long duration. Epidemic banditry gives a 
comparatively immediate insight; drastic changes in politics, economy, society or 
                                                          
162 For an investigation of banditry developing into state formation see Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard and Gert 
Tinggaard Svendsen, ‘Rational Bandits: Plunder, Public Goods, and the Vikings’ in Public Choice, 117. 
3/4 Essays in Memory of Mancur Olson, (2003), 255-272. 
163 Associations of banditry could stain even those who reaching the pinnacle of Roman Society. 
Maximinus Thrax, for example, was ridiculed for his violent rustic ways. 
164 For honestiorial class, see Dennis Kehoe, ‘Law and Social formation in the Roman Empire’ in The 
Oxford Handbook of Social Relations in the Roman World, ed. Michael Peachin, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014). 
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climate might produce a rush of banditry in areas where it had previously not existed or 
had ticked over at a relatively steady rate for decades or more.165  
This comparative immediacy is a useful indicator of change. Ammianus Marcellinus, in 
response to potential criticism of the rigour of his inquiry, noted that; ‘not everything 
which has taken place among persons of the lowest class is worth narrating’.166 For 
Ammianus’ purposes that was undoubtedly true, but this lack of concern for the lower 
orders makes the task of the modern social historians significantly more difficult. 
Epidemic banditry on a large scale, because it was violent and abnormal, received 
relatively more attention than most violent occurrences among the ‘lowest class.’  
Of course, most epidemic bandits never made the headlines. Personal problems as well 
as institutional oppression or inequality in the Roman Empire must have prompted a 
steady flow of disadvantaged or adventurous/reckless people to flee their position in 
society.167 For these fugitives banditry was always a potential, albeit risky, way of 
making their living or even their fortune. Its inherent isolation and the prospect of loot 
were surely powerful temptations and the threat of severe retribution was probably 
somewhat less significant given that the fugitive had already incurred severe penalties 
as a result of their flight.  
In the late Roman Empire such fugitives appear to have been relatively common. Many 
occupations were hereditary. Not just farmers and soldiers were held to their careers 
                                                          
165 Hobsbawm, p. 26. Of course, endemic banditry is never truly steady; at a micro-level it is constantly 
in flux with the changes of seasons, times and society. But for our purposes this cannot be measured ad in 
any case, study at the macro-level might give us a more practical insight into lower-class quality of life in 
Late Antiquity. 
166 Ammianus, 28. 1. 15, in Ammianus Marcellinus: Roman History, Volumes I-III, trans. by J. C. Rolfe 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939). 
167 Banditry as an opportunity for reckless pursuit of improvement invites comparison with the rise of 
the holy man in Late Antiquity, which likewise provided similar opportunities. Indeed, even closer 
parallels seem to have existed on these peripheries of the traditional Roman World; ascetics in late 
antique Syria referred to themselves as shepherds and men of the mountains – labels that could equally 
apply to bandits; Peter Brown, ‘The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity’, The Journal 
of Roman Studies, 61 (1971), 80-101 (p. 83). 
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throughout the generations, but also postmen, limeburners, fishermen, weavers, swine-
collectors, miners and numerous other occupations that were regulated by the state.168 
These institutions were rarely monolithic; there were free farmers and private mines, but 
in many cases the employees of these less rigorously regulated industries were still of 
semi- or unfree status. Freedom of movement was likewise restricted. Unattached 
persons who were found wandering, and who could not demonstrate their position in 
society, were considered vagrant and were liable to be conscripted or enslaved.169  
Peasant and lower-class interactions with the state could be intensely personal, as could 
their relationships with aristocracies.170 The myriad social actions and events that might 
result in an individual taking up banditry surely changed from case to case. All peasants, 
except those who were illegally shielded by a wealthy patron, were subject to taxation 
and most young males were also liable for conscription.171 But the weight and experience 
of these burdens were felt differently from province to province, village to village and 
person to person. Those that took up banditry, out of desire or necessity, represent a tiny 
proportion of the population but this proportion was subject to change. Crises and 
upheaval seem to have had an impact on both the numbers of fugitives and the numbers 
of bandits.172  
An individual case of this may be found in a letter of Sidonius to Lupus of Troyes 
regarding the murder of their associate Lampridius. He had been strangled by his own 
household slaves who, after the murder, had fled only to be captured and tortured until 
they gave a confession and were executed. Sidonius calls the murderous conspirators 
                                                          
168 For example, see CTh 8. 4. 36 for postal workers; 10. 19. 7, 9, 15 for miners; 10. 20. 11 for collectors 
of shellfish; 10. 20. 16 for weavers; 14. 7. 1 for limeburners. 
169 For example CTh 7. 18. 10. 
170 Cam Grey, Constructing Communities in the Late Roman Countryside, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), pp. 186-9. 
171 CTh 7. 13. By 397 even imperial estates were required to furnish recruits; CTh 7. 13. 12. 
172 For fugitives see CTh 5. 7. 1; 5. 17; 5. 18. 
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latrones.173 In a technical sense this was not true, but the connotation of brutal and 
clandestine violence provided the required imagery. It is also possible that banditry 
might have been the intent of the murderous slaves; they were already fugitives and 
willing to commit violence, so the transition from homicide to actual latrocinium is 
perhaps not farfetched. The close connection between fugitives and banditry is hinted at 
in the terminology of legislation designed to combat both practices. The laws place 
particular emphasis on the harbourers of the criminals as, in both cases, it was assumed 
that the practices could not continue without support.174 Furthermore, the penalties for 
the actual crimes were usually fairly constant, whereas the penalties for accomplices 
were variable, based on class and context.175  
Unfortunately, our sources are typically unconcerned with the background of brigands 
in general or with the options available to fugitives. Consequently when we isolate 
episodes of banditry in Late Antiquity it can sometimes be difficult to discern whether 
the bandits were endemic (born) or epidemic (made). However, one important category 
of fugitives did elicit a great deal of attention; those who were eligible for military 
service, recruits, deserters and veterans were of great significance to the state. Their loss 
to flight or brigandage was a blow to both manpower and the martial honour of the state 
and consequently there is a deal of legislation concerning desertion and related issues, 
as well as some references in literary material.176 The visibility of ex-military personnel 
who engaged in brigandage therefore makes them our primary method of insight into 
the process of epidemic banditry. It must be stressed, however, that this is likely as a 
                                                          
173 Sidonius Apollinaris, Letters, 8. 11; Poems and Letters: Sidonius with an English translation, 
introduction and notes, trans. by W. B. Anderson (London: Heinemann, 1936). 
174 Compare, for example, CTh 5. 17. 2 on the harbourers of deserters and 9. 29. 2 on the harbourers of 
bandits. However, it is worth stressing that this emphasis on harbourers even extends beyond these self-
evidently violent groups of undesirables. CTh 10. 20. 8; 9 for example have similarly structured laws 
which describe the punishments for the harbourers of fugitive hereditary weavers.  
175 CTh 9. 29. 1 declares that accomplices will suffer the same punishment as the latrones, whilst 9. 29. 
2 lists punishment by burning for humilial harbourers and the forfeiture of property for honestiores.  
176 CTh 7 in general, and 7. 18 in particular. 
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result of source bias. We cannot assume that all, or even most epidemic bandits hailed 
from military backgrounds; rather it seems that deserters and veterans who became 
brigands elicited a particularly prominent interest from ancient writers. 
Herodian’s semi-heroic Maternus was a deserter-turned-brigand extraordinaire who 
supposedly challenged the emperor, as were Tacfarinas and Gannascus according to 
Tacitus. Even the archetypal villain Spartacus had walked that career path; miles, 
desertor, latro, gladiator.177 But the connection was clearly more than just a literary 
trope; of the eighteen laws in the section of the Theodosian Code relating to deserters, 
three equate the desertion and banditry directly whilst most of the other entries retain 
similar language to the legislation on latrocinium.178 Veterans are also directly accused 
of brigandage in the Code.179  
This is hardly surprising. Men of military age, even if they had not yet been conscripted 
or were new recruits, were still within the typical demographic of bandits.180 Deserters 
and veterans were even more suited to careers in brigandage since they already had the 
skills, and possibly the material tools, required for the violent acts of banditry. Indeed, 
it is even possible that they had already acted as legitimate latrones during their careers. 
Soldiers in the Roman Empire expected to profit from looting and plunder while raiding 
external enemies or on campaign, and could fight using the guerrilla-type techniques of 
latrones when required.181 Even in peacetime it seems they sometimes acted like bandits; 
                                                          
177 Grünewald, p. 37. 
178 CTh 7. 18. 7, 14, 15. Ramsey MacMullen, Soldier and Civilian in the later Roman Empire, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 89 also supposes that the bands of roving men who 
made travel in Italy during the day of Symmachus were deserters turned to brigandage. See Symmachus, 
‘Letters’, 7. 38 (dated c. 398).   
179 CTh 7. 20. 7. 
180 According to the modern parallels this seems to be males aged between the 15 and 30 years old; 
Hobsbawm, pp. 36-7. 
181 For example Ammianus Marcellinus (31. 7. 2) condemns Valens and his general Victor for opposing 
the Goths openly rather than whittling down their numbers in the manner of brigands. 
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there are numerous complaints of soldiers despoiling peaceful provincials in the 
Theodosian Code.182  
Not only were military personnel well equipped for banditry, but it seems they were also 
well motivated to desert or avoid military service during the later years of the Roman 
Empire. The incentives for military service seem to have declined as more emphasis was 
placed on hereditary soldiers and forced conscription. For example, in the early fourth 
century, the state was legally obligated to reward veterans with a large monetary sum 
for those who wished to take up business or a smaller sum and land, seed and grain for 
those who intended to farm. They were also allowed tax exemptions for five family 
members and freedom from tolls on traded goods. However these incentives were 
gradually eroded; already in 324 Constantine limited tax-exempt status to only the 
veteran and his wife, whilst Valentinian I removed the monetary gift for both 
businessmen and farmers in 364.183 In 385, the freedom from tolls was capped at fifteen 
solidi.184 This combination of steadily decreasing rewards for service and martial ability 
seems to have encouraged at least some veterans to employ their violent skills in 
illegitimate ways:  
‘We learn that certain veterans, unworthy of that name, are committing brigandage. We 
command, therefore, that…they must be stripped of all special privileges if they should 
disturb the public peace, and if they should commit the slightest delinquency, they shall 
be subjected to all the penalties.’185 
As well as receiving fewer incentives for service, potential recruits and soldiers were 
also more restricted in the ways by which they might avoid or cut short their military 
                                                          
182 For example; CTh 7. 1. 12; 7. 4. 12, 21, 35; 7 .7. 3-5; 7. 9. 1-4.  
183 CTh 7. 20. 4 and 7. 20. 8 respectively.  
184 CTh 13. 1. 4. For a detailed examination of the reduction in the benefits of military service see 
Gabriele Wesch-Klein, ‘Recruits and Veterans’ in A Companion to the Roman Army, ed. Paul Erdkamp 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 443-4. 
185 CTh 7. 20. 7. 
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service. Men who were already in service were required to serve longer in order to 
receive their bonuses and serious medical reasons were required for an early honourable 
discharge. Corruption, which helped men get early discharge fraudulently, was also 
legislated against.186 Even those who had been released from service might still be 
recalled, as was the case in 350 when Constantius required that the wrongfully 
discharged must return to service.187 Meanwhile, the sons of soldiers were required to 
get special imperial dispensation to avoid military service and anyone not hereditarily 
tied to farming or a guild was liable for the draft.188 Veterans were threatened with legal 
recourse if they did not hand over their sons, as were patrons who might otherwise have 
helped eligible men avoid the army in return for personal service.189 Sons of veterans 
serving on the office staffs of governors and other high-ranking officials were to be 
dragged away to military training camps.190 
In the face of these restrictions some potential recruits took the drastic action of self-
mutilation in order to avoid conscription.191 Early in the fourth century, Constantine 
declared that men who avoided service by cutting off their fingers or thumbs would serve 
the state as decurions instead.192 Valentinian I reiterated this decree in 367, but within 
months seems to have become infuriated with the practice and instead demanded that 
the offender be burnt alive. Additionally, any master who, through negligence, allowed 
the mutilation to take place was also to be subjected to severe penalties.193 It may have 
been Valentinian’s own harsh practices that encouraged self-mutilation at this time, as 
                                                          
186 CTh 7. 1. 7. 
187 CTh 7. 1. 4. 
188 Wesch-Klein, p. 437. 
189 CTh 7. 1. 5, 8. 
190 CTh 7. 22 .6-10, 12. 
191 Ammianus Marcellinus (15. 12. 3) claims that the militaristic and brave Gauls did not practise self-
mutilation, unlike the Italians, but this claim is sandwiched in a passage emphasising the valour of the 
Gauls and is unlikely to represent genuine common practice.  
192 CTh 7. 22. 1. 
193 CTh 7. 13. 4, 5. 
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he was a notorious and feared disciplinarian and recruited heavily during the late 360s.194 
This would indicate that ‘draft-dodging’, like epidemic banditry, was influenced by 
context and zeitgeist. Finally in 381, Theodosius repealed this penalty and instead 
compelled the mutilated person to serve anyway, whilst masters who furnished mutilated 
recruits had to provide two ‘damaged’ recruits for each fully fit one.195 By then even an 
absence of thumbs was not sufficient reason to get one out of military service.  
Given the difficulty of escaping military service by legitimate means (or at least means 
that maintained one’s position within society), it is not surprising that many tried to flee. 
The state recognised this tendency and legislated against it: soldiers who were found 
wandering through the provinces were subject to severe punishment, as were those 
exceeding the agreed terms of absence on leave.196 Flight seems to have been a particular 
problem with recruits. Officers were aware of the stress caused by the introduction to 
military life, and so decreed that deserters who fled within their first year of service were 
to be forgiven. This also avoided doubling the yearly burden on landowners who might 
otherwise have to provide an additional recruit to replace the one that fled.197 Despite 
this comparatively welcoming attitude, the army had to be careful with recruits. The Life 
of Pachomius records that new recruits might be imprisoned for overnight stops on their 
way to an encampment.198 They were also bribed and intimidated into good behaviour.199 
The pressure of recruit desertion also put a burden on recruitment officials; in 380 they 
were offered a two year exemption from their obligations if they could find any 
deserters, whilst in 382 the state agreed to vindicate their burden of the repayment of the 
                                                          
194 Zosimus, 4. 12. 
195 CTh 7. 13. 10. 
196 CTh 7. 1. 16; 7. 12. 3. 
197 CTh 7. 18. 14. 
198 Dionysius Exiguus, ‘The Life of St. Pachomius’, 4, in H. van Cranenburgh, La Vie latine de saint 
pachôme, traduite du grace par Denys le Petit, (Bruxelles: Société des Bollandistes, bd. Saint Michel, 
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199 CTh 7. 13. 9. 
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monetary value of recruits who fled during their first year.200 Innovative measures like 
these suggest that the problem of desertion had ceased to be limited to a military issue. 
Pressure on landowners and the bureaucracy implies increasingly social implications. 
The steady flow of deserters was almost certainly influenced by prevailing opinions on 
the likelihood of conflict, mortality, distant service and reward. We can imagine, for 
example, that famous victories or the promise of loot or donatives prompted a greater 
degree of loyalty, whilst late delivery of pay or the rumour of enemy attack had the 
adverse effect. However, more drastic moments of desertion seem to have come in the 
aftermath of military defeat. The numerous regional rebellions and civil wars that 
afflicted the Empire created whole bodies of defeated and leaderless Roman soldiery 
whose options were severely limited.201 Some might be incorporated into the army of 
the victor but otherwise hundreds, even thousands, of men could expect slavery or death 
from their foes. In such situations flight and eventual brigandage seems to have been 
common. In 399, Arcadius and Honorius promulgated a law on the treatment of the 
fugitives from the conspiracy of the Saturians and Subafrensians. This revolt is 
otherwise unknown, but the law directly links the human fallout of military defeat with 
brigandage. This disturbance had been overcome through force of arms, but following 
this defeat many of the rebels had gone into hiding and some were being actively 
harboured. Consequently the Emperors declared harsh penalties on the harbourers of the 
brigands and despatched inspectors to return the unsettled lands to a fruitful state.202 
Similarly, though somewhat less explicitly, another piece of legislation, dating from 391, 
granted the right of armed resistance to men who were attacked by soldiers who ‘entered 
                                                          
200 CTh 7. 14. 4, 6. 
201 Parallel observations have been made about the impact of conflict and social disruption on banditry 
and vagabondage in numerous contexts, for example in the Hundred Years War when companies of 
soldiers would regularly resort to illegitimate plundering whenever their legitimate payments ceased. 
See Bronislaw Geremek, ‘The Marginal Man’ in The Medieval World ed. Jacques Le Goff, (London: 
Collins and Brown, 1997), pp. 358-60. 
202 CTh 7. 19. 
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their fields as nocturnal ravishers or should beset frequented roads by attacks from 
ambush.’ As a result of this law private citizens were entrusted with the right to pre-
emptive vengeance and were encouraged not to ‘spare a soldier who should be resisted 
with a weapon as a brigand.’203  
Imperial legislation was typically reactive; it responded to petitions or complaints that 
were often temporary or regional, so we should be cautious about extreme generalisation 
regarding the scale of desertion. Nevertheless, it seems that the steady, variable flow of 
deserters who fled the armed forces on their own terms was supplemented by drastic 
extraordinary desertion events that followed military defeat. A concentration of 
unattached, armed men combined with the political uncertainty that typically followed 
defeat, could result in uprisings and significant outbreaks of brigandage. For example, 
during the reign of Valentinian I the north-western provinces were regularly beset with 
raids and warfare between the state and external foes. In 367-8 a ‘Great Conspiracy’ of 
Picts, Scots and Attacotti overran Britain, whilst both sides of the Channel were 
scourged by seaborne Franks and Saxons. Count Theodosius was despatched with 
significant reinforcements to restore order. However, whilst he was initially able to 
defeat the dispersed raiding bands south of the Thames, he seems to have found the task 
of overcoming the uprising of ferocious native citizens (diffusam variarum gentium 
plebem) of the province a more daunting prospect.204 According to Ammianus, Count 
Theodosius arrived in London quickly but on arrival was informed by captives and 
deserters that these enemies could only be overcome through guerrilla warfare. However 
Theodosius seems to have had more success through offering amnesty to deserters 
(desertores) and the multitude (multos) of ‘others who were wandering about in various 
places on furlough’.205 The interpretation that these are natives of Roman Britain is not 
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205 Ibid.  
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certain, but the use of plebem suggests that the perpetrators were citizens. Indeed plebem 
and multos may in fact imply that the disturbances resulted from a popular, lower-class 
uprising as, perhaps, does the concern of Theodosius to restore captured property to its 
rightful, tribute-paying owners. 206  In any case, the involvement of deserters is evident 
and we can clearly discern that the raids of traditional hostes caused serious socio-
political upheaval in Britain where people and soldiers of the Empire superseded 
external enemies as the major contributor to unrest. 
Similar problems also afflicted contemporary Gaul. After years of oscillating warfare 
with the Alamanni on the Rhine, Valentinian I hoped to restore order through the 
development of new defences, including a major fortress on the eastern side of the river. 
While this fortress was still under construction, it was destroyed by the Alamanni along 
with almost the entire prospective garrison. This instability surely contributed to the 
simultaneous frenzy of brigandage throughout Gaul which devastated the province by 
ambushing travellers on the roads and even claimed the life of Constantius, chief of the 
Imperial stables and kinsman of Valentinian.207  
Interestingly, in both cases of internal unrest in the north-western provinces, Ammianus 
immediately draws a parallel with equivalent troubles affecting the eastern provinces of 
the Empire. At the same time as the ‘Great Conspiracy’, and recorded in the following 
chapter of book 27 of the Res Gestae, the praedones of Isauria were raiding the towns 
and villas of Cilicia and Pamphylia.208 Meanwhile the Gallic latrones of 28.2.10 were 
                                                          
206 Ammianus had, for example used plebs to describe the rioting mob who attempted to burn the house 
of the Prefect of Rome in 27 .3. 8. See also M. E. Jones, The End of Roman Britain (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1998), p. 171 for plebem and multos as evidence of lower-class uprising.  
207 Ammianus, 28. 2. 10. This was not the first time Gaul had been upset by an outburst outburst of 
deserter-fuelled epidemic brigandage. Maternus, himself a fugitive from the army, led a bellum 
desertorum against the Roman state in the second century SHA, Life of Commodus, 16. 2 and De Ste 
Croix, p. 476. 
208 Ammianus, 27. 9. 6. 
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mirrored by the Syrian Maratocupreni grassatores of 28.2.11.209 Clearly Ammianus was 
explicitly attempting to convey the impression of Empire-wide unrest.210  
Ammianus’ narrative comes to an end following the disastrous defeat of the Eastern field 
army by the Goths in Adrianople in 378, but the pattern of imperial legislation suggests 
that similar problems of desertion and associated epidemic banditry followed that defeat. 
Six211 of the eighteen laws on desertion in the Theodosian Code date from the period 
379-383, and one of these is explicit in connecting these phenomena:  
‘If any person…has deserters or brigands on his farm…he shall know that if he is 
convicted of connivance, the farm on which the aforesaid deserters could afterwards be 
found shall be annexed to the resources of Our fisc…’212 
This law follows a pattern that is common to legislation on both desertion and banditry: 
the target is the harbourers of these malcontents and, typically, condemns complicit 
landowners to the loss of property and overseers to death.213  
This concern for harbourers suggests that at least some of the epidemic bandits, who 
were created out of military failure and desertion, received support from the owners or 
overseers of property in much the same way that some traditional endemic bandits did.214 
This is hardly surprising. Defeat and embarrassment of the state and army undoubtedly 
caused widespread and dramatic concern. Pagan intellectuals placed the blame for the 
loss on Christian neglect for the traditions of the Empire, whist Nicene commentators 
                                                          
209 Ammianus, 28. 2. 11.  
210 There are hints from other sources which also suggest widespread disturbance during this period. For 
example CTh 10. 23 seems to suggest that the Orontes River in Syria was troubled by pirates in c.370 
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more likely; Pharr, p. 177 n. 40. This also seems to be the case with 9. 29. 2, which deals with brigands 
and their harbourers; Pharr, p. 248. 
212 CTh 7. 18. 7. 
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condemned the homoean beliefs of the Emperor Valens.215 But wherever the blame was 
placed, many landowners may have sought to defend their own person and property by 
sheltering armed men and some no doubt also employed these men to harass their 
neighbours, whilst the attentions of the state were concentrated on the overcoming and 
placating the Goths in the Balkans.216 In this way the military defeat at Adrianople seems 
to have had a dual effect; it increased the supply of bandits through refugees and 
desertion as well as the demand for irregular violence that was induced by politico-
military instability. Furthermore, the defeat and consequent rovings of the Goths also 
lowered the capacity of the state to devote its hard pressed resources to the lesser issue 
of latrocinium.  
If the pattern of legislation is any indicator, the cessation of hostilities with the Goths 
had a fairly immediate impact. From 383 there is a lull in laws relating to banditry and 
desertion and this presumably relates to the conclusion of peace negotiations between 
Emperor Theodosius and the Goths in the autumn of 382. Meanwhile, in the Western 
Empire, the usurper Magnus Maximus seized power from Gratian, who was swiftly 
assassinated. It is possible that this coup prompted a degree of epidemic brigandage as 
Magnus Maximus attacked pro-Gratian loyalists, but unfortunately, since the laws of 
usurpers were routinely scourged, we have little evidence of Maximus’ domestic 
policies.217 What is clear is that the relative peace of the middle and late years of the 
380s did not last.  
                                                          
215 Michael Kulikowski, Rome’s Gothic Wars: from the third century to Alaric, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. 144. 
216 Augustine, for example, describes that certain churchmen and the lay defensor ecclesiae of Fussula, a 
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tyrant [Maximus]’.  
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From 391 until the 410s there is a relatively steady stream of legislation relating to 
desertion and banditry, and the tone of this legislation suggests an increasing urgency. 
In 391, as we have seen, new rights of self-defence were granted as a result of the threat 
of attack by nocturnal ravishers.218 Furthermore, separate laws were passed against the 
harbouring of both brigands and deserters; in each case the honestiorial accomplices 
were financially liable whilst humilial ones were subject to beatings, death or 
condemnation to the imperial mines.219 The promulgation of a similar law on desertion 
in 396 implies that desertion had become a significant problem during Theodosius’ 
campaigns against the Western usurpers Magnus Maximus (383-388) and Eugenius 
(392-394). The law follows the same pattern in describing the punishments for the 
harbourers based on status, but includes an additional clause explaining that men who 
had gained medical or honourable discharge were safe from the penalties of desertion, 
even if this had been given during the reign of a usurper.220 It seems then that any ex-
soldier who had served under an illegitimate ruler was likely to be viewed as a deserter 
by the agents of the state.221  
However the deaths of these usurpers apparently did not stem the current of epidemic 
banditry. The use of horses in the southern Italian provinces of Picenum, Flaminia, 
Apulia, Calabria, Bruttium, Lucania and Samnium had already been restricted in the 
360s in an effort to deny brigands this precious resource, but in the winter of 399 this 
restriction was extended to the shepherds of Valeria.222 It is clear that by this time 
                                                          
218 CTh 9. 14. 2 and above, p. 83. 
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Imperial agents were aggressively searching out deserters and vagrants; a law given at 
Milan in the spring of 400 calls on the Prefect of Gaul to prevent them from doing harm 
to landowners by detaining the indigenae (native people) of the provinces.223  
This concern for the finances of landowners should not be taken as evidence for a 
slackening of state policy. Indeed the year 403 saw a series of laws that demonstrate 
how serious the problem had become. In February it was demanded that wandering 
deserters should be apprehended. This is far from unusual, but the law goes on to state 
that: ‘…if, when such deserters are found, they should suppose that they ought to resist 
and hold out with arms, they shall be crushed as rebels in the very attempt of such rash 
lawlessness.’224 
At any time in the history of the Roman Empire deserters who resisted capture, much 
like any criminals or deviants, could expect violent treatment at the hands of 
representatives of authority. The fact that this violent response was acknowledged as 
lawful, and that violent deserters now required a different legal status suggests that the 
problem was increasingly severe. Deserters who were returned to society, whether 
military or civil, were punished by demotion or equivalent loss of civil status, branding, 
beating or imprisonment. Reclassification as ‘rebels’ destroyed the possibility of 
renewing association with Roman society. Furthermore it indicated a significance that 
was far beyond the truculence of normal unrepentant deserters. Rebels were a pernicious 
threat to the authority of the state: they had to be ‘crushed’.  
In the summer of 403, only months after this law was given, a second law was 
proclaimed which reiterated, along familiar patterns, the punishment for harbourers of 
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deserters. In this case however, it was acknowledged that the practice was even taking 
place on imperial estates.225  
The third and fourth laws followed in October. The first of these demanded that deserters 
be detained by any means. In order to facilitate their capture:  
‘All provincials, therefore, shall know that they are granted the right to overpower 
deserters, and in order that deserters may have no delay of punishment as a solace, We 
order that punishment shall be swift everywhere. This regulation shall be brought to the 
notice of the primates of the cities, villages and fortresses, that they may know that 
harbourers of such deserters will be subjected to the penalty which was established by 
the laws of Our sainted father.’226 
The contemporaneous second decree stressed this new right: 
‘We grant by law to provincials the right to overpower deserters, and if the deserters 
should dare to resist, We order that punishment be swift everywhere. All persons shall 
know that, in defense of the common peace, they are granted the right to administer 
public vengeance against public brigands (latrones publicos) and deserters from military 
service.’227 
This extension of martial roles to the people of the Empire was not without precedent. 
The right to defend person and property with arms against nocturnal ravishers and 
ambush had already been granted in 391.228 However, through this decree, the recently 
established prerogative to resist roaming and dangerous deserter-bandits was extended 
to a ‘license of kill’; all provincials of the Empire were empowered to aggressively hunt 
them down. The state which, rhetorically at least, justified both its monopoly on violence 
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and its very existence in order to defend the public peace – the pax Romana – had 
legalised vigilante justice. Clearly, by 403, desertion was perceived as a problem that 
could, at times, exceed the normal means employed to control it.229 
Our evidence for epidemic banditry in this period derives primarily from legal material. 
This evidence does not describe particular incidents of brigandage, nor their direct 
causes and effects, but rather the reaction of the state and lawmakers to a perceived 
problem. I have argued, and will continue to argue, that these laws – in the context of 
social and military unrest – indicate a genuine increase in the incidence of banditry. 
Moreover, the emphasis on fugitives and deserters strongly suggests that these brigands 
were created by circumstances in context, and therefore represent epidemic banditry 
rather than just a greater impetuousness on the part of traditional endemic bandits. 
However, it must be stressed that the evidence we have mainly demonstrates that it was 
the state and lawmakers who, at this time, paid particular interest to the issue of banditry. 
Why? 
It may be simply deterministic. Military defeat and socio-economic uncertainty caused 
brigandage which elicited attention. This must be part of the reason, but the state had 
undergone defeat and instability previously, yet we do not have the same concentrations 
of evidence in other contexts. Perhaps then out image is skewed by the relative 
proliferation of legal data for this period. I suspect this is also the case. However, I think 
it is also clear that Roman lawmakers thought these circumstances peculiar, since they 
implemented changes that were significant and unprecedented, such as the 
reclassification of bandits as rebels, and the legitimisation of private, vigilante violence 
                                                          
229 It is perhaps worth emphasising that the equivalent legislation which legalised the carrying of arms 
by private citizens to defend against the depredations of barbarians was not introduced until 440; N.Val 
9; Theodosiani libri XVI cum constitutionibus Sirmondianis, ed. by T. Mommsen and P. M. Meyer, I 
(Berlin: Weidmann, 1905). 
 
 92 
 
to combat them. In fact, I think the very extremity of this material gives an indication of 
part of this issue. In 384-5, Symmachus complained that he could not cross the 
boundaries of the city of Rome for fear of banditry; surely this is a rhetorical 
exaggeration.230 The legal material is probably similarly rhetorical. It is likely that the 
years between the reigns of Valentinian and Honorius were given over to a moral panic 
over the issue of brigandage. Indeed, it was surely politically expedient to do so; blanket 
condemnation of barbarians or usurpers might result in political embarrassment if 
diplomatic conclusions were reached, but the state surely benefitted from being seen to 
take a hard line on brigandage.    
If the evidence of banditry does reflect a moral panic, then it may very well be 
disproportionate to the actual incidence of epidemic banditry. Unfortunately however, 
the lack of available material makes this very hard to measure. Indeed, it is also possible 
that banditry might be underrepresented in the sources that remain to us. We should 
consequently be cautious about assigning epidemic banditry a prominent place among 
the ‘causes of the fall of the Roman Empire’, or similar grandiose historiographical 
narratives. However, I would argue that the unprecedented nature of some of this legal 
evidence suggests that banditry was a real problem for the state. If so, then it must have 
been a defining feature in the lives of many provincials and common people. That alone 
should make it worthy of study. 
How then do we approach our legal evidence? If it represents a moral panic then we 
should rightly be doubtful about conclusions regarding the scale or impact of banditry 
in this period. Nevertheless, it does seem reasonable to consider this material in light of 
military setbacks, which do seem to have had a genuine effect on the incidence of 
                                                          
230 Symmachus, ‘Letters’, 2. 22 (dated c. 382-3); ‘Letters’ in Q. Aurelii Symmachi quae supersunt, ed. by 
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banditry. Certainly the particularly drastic laws on brigandage from 400-403 seem to 
correlate to the unsettled context to some degree. Theodosius’ war to overcome 
Eugenius had been fairly devastating and the decisive battle at the Frigidus River in 394 
was particularly bloody. Additionally, only months later, Theodosius died leaving the 
Empire divided once again. The consequent rivalry between Rufinus and Stilicho, the 
de facto rulers of the Eastern and Western Empires respectively, resulted in further 
conflict. Late in 401 Alaric, a Gothic leader and general in the Eastern field army crossed 
over the Julian Alps into Italy. The motives and intricacies of this move have been much 
discussed, but for our purposes the significant issue is the devastation that occurred over 
the following months as Stilicho and Alaric fought a series of battles in northern Italy.231 
Surely the fallout from these campaigns prompted the legislation of 403 on desertion 
promulgated by Honorius from his refuge in Ravenna. By that year, Stilicho had 
managed to force Alaric back to the Balkans but the respite was temporary. The 
continuation of legislation throughout the year suggests that significant desertion and 
consequent epidemic banditry had already taken place. It is possible that the state and 
society was able to use the sweeping new rights to restrain brigandage during 404, but 
in the autumn of 405 Radagaisus, a barbarian leader crossed into Italy from central 
Europe. Perhaps as a result of this in early 406, the state had to legislate again: ‘Persons 
who desert military camps and turn to depredations or brigandage shall not escape the 
severity of the state.’232 This law seems to indicate that soldiers were, at this time, 
ignoring their obligations to the state and leaving their camps to employ their violent 
skills illegitimately.  
It seems probable that, over the following years, this trend did not quickly decelerate. 
The problems for Honorius and the Western Empire certainly did not. In the winter of 
                                                          
231 For an overview of the politico-military tensions of 394-403 see Kulikowski, Rome’s Gothic Wars, 
pp. 162-171. 
232 CTh 7. 18. 15. 
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405/6 a significant group of Vandals, Alans and Suevi crossed the Rhine causing 
disruption to the Gallic provinces, whilst in Britain a succession of usurpers were 
proclaimed, resulting in Constantine III crossing the Channel in 407.233 He swiftly 
wrested control of Britain and most of Gaul and Spain from Honorius and Stilicho, who 
were fully occupied in resisting another invasion of Italy by Alaric. The turmoil from 
these disruptions probably increased brigandage as more soldiers deserted and the state 
concentrated its efforts on fighting invaders and usurpers.234 The legislation from the 
court of Honorius seems to reflect this. Since the army, or whatever remained of it, was 
busy and the very population of the Empire was mobilised against the threat of epidemic 
banditry there was little more that Honorius could do and, in any case, the vast majority 
of the Western Empire was controlled by Constantine III.235 Therefore, instead of 
pursuing more active policies against brigandage, the state attempted a social solution. 
In 409 the following legislation was proclaimed in Ravenna: 
‘No decurion, plebeian or landholder shall commit his children to herdsmen to be reared. 
But We do not forbid that such children shall be given to other rural persons to be reared, 
as is customarily done. If, indeed, after the publication of this law, any person should 
give his children to herdsmen to be reared, it will appear that he acknowledges that he 
is an associate of brigands.’236 
Endemic banditry was already present in Italy. The herdsmen of the Italian provinces 
were already identified as virtually synonymous with bandits and denied the use of 
                                                          
233 For further discussion of this event, and the disputed dating of the crossing, see J. F. Drinkwater, 
‘The usurpers Constantine III (407–411) and Jovinus (411–413)’, Britannia, 29, (1998) 269–98. 
234 For example Zosimus 5. 35. 6 notes the extraordinary desertion even which followed the execution of 
Stilicho in 408 for crimes against the state. In the aftermath city garrison troops apparently attacked the 
families of the mostly barbarian field army prompting more than thirty thousand men to rebel and join 
Alaric. While Zosimus’ testimony regarding the ethnicity and number of soldiers in Stilicho’s army is 
questionable, it does seem likely that significant desertion would occur in the aftermath of a favoured 
general.   
235 Of course, Constantine’s usurpation was unsuccessful so we lack any of his legislation. 
236 CTh 9. 31. 
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horses across most of the peninsula south of the Po valley.237 This attitude was further 
entrenched with the publication of this law. It seems likely that they were attempting to 
curb links between upland pastoralists and those who lived in arable farming or urban 
communities so as to thwart the practice of harbouring. However, by attempting to halt 
the ‘artificial’ increase of pastoral communities this legislation shows that the state was 
concerned about an overpopulation of herdsmen and the consequent abundance of 
brigands. This is a significant point. Given the troubles with deserter-brigands over the 
previous years, one might expect the traditional, more endemic, pastoralist bandits to 
have been eclipsed, yet clearly herdsmen were still identified as bandits and, even in the 
midst of invasion and usurpation, they were still an acknowledged danger. While it is 
likely that endemic bandits continued to practise banditry, we cannot know for sure if 
these references reflect this or just centrist prejudices.238   
During the following years the government of Honorius managed to regain a degree of 
control over the Western provinces. The Goths, having sacked Rome in 410, moved out 
of Italy and into Gaul where they fought as allies of the Emperor in defeating his rival 
Constantine III, whilst the Vandals, Alans and Suevi moved on into the Iberian 
peninsula. With the return of relative stability, the court offered an amnesty to its vagrant 
troops; in 413 soldiers who had been absent without leave for one, two or three years 
were to receive degrees of demotion that depended on the length of their absence, whilst 
those who had been gone for four years or longer would receive no pardon.239 The 
rehabilitating tone of this law suggests that the worst of this outbreak of epidemic 
banditry had passed – at least in the eyes of the Imperial administration. This may well 
indicate, likewise, that the moral outrage over banditry which probably contributed to 
                                                          
237 See above, pp. 88-9.  
238 We will come on to an exploration of the relationships between these varieties of bandit below, pp. 
102-4. 
239 CTh 7. 18. 16.  
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the proliferation of laws against banditry during the 410s was also coming to an end. 
Italy was free of invaders and the Goths had ceased to be enemies and could, potentially, 
be used to keep the peace in the southern Gallic provinces. The north of Gaul, Britain 
and much of Spain were, for the time being, outside the direct control of the Western 
Roman state so the continuance of banditry in those regions was of little concern in 
Ravenna. In 416, it was acknowledged that the disturbances of barbarian invasions had 
caused rifts in society and Romans to kill and plunder other Romans, yet because the 
circumstances had been extreme the state decreed that those plunderers be treated with 
mercy. They were protected from all prosecution so long as all property was restored.240  
Desertion no doubt continued and presumably still fuelled banditry in regions where 
conflict or geography allowed lawlessness to prevail. However the close association of 
desertion and brigandage seems to have waned, as did Imperial and legalistic concern 
for desertion in general. Valentinian III once again felt the need to legislate against 
desertion and the harbourers of deserters in 440, but otherwise there is little to suggest 
that these remained severe social problems.241 However, references to banditry in the 
ancient sources for the mid-fifth century do not suffer the same kind of decline, so how 
are we to account for this discrepancy?  
As we have seen, it is possible that the image of severe deserter-bandit disruption during 
the later fourth and early fifth centuries is a product of source bias, and that the 
Theodosian Code – which contains a great number of entries from these years – skews 
our perspective. However, the account of Ammianus seems to show a correlation 
between military defeat, desertion and brigandage in the years preceding 378. 
                                                          
240 CTh 15. 14. 14. 
241 N.Val 6. 1. There is, however, mention of barbarian deserters from the foederati who turned to piracy 
in 437, and in 438 ravaged many islands including Sicily in the Chronicle of Prosper; Prosper, 
Chronicon, MGH AA 9, pp. 475-6. It is likely that these piratical deserters can be associated with the 
praedo/pirate who was captured and executed along with his men in 438 according to the Chronicle of 
Marcellinus Comes; Marcellinus Comes, Chronicon, MGH: AA 11, p. 79.  
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Furthermore, while most sources for the troubled years between 400 and 410 concentrate 
on conflicts between the state and usurpers or barbarians, there is some evidence 
independent of the Code which suggests that deserters and brigands were active in this 
period. For example, in c.401, in the aftermath of the revolt of the Gothic Roman general 
Gainas, a group of deserters and fugitives pillaged the countryside and threw Thrace into 
turmoil. It took an army led by Fravitta, another Gothic Roman general to restore peace 
to the region.242 A few years later in c.408 a general, whom Stilicho had appointed to 
fight Constantine III in Gaul, was accosted and robbed of all his booty by bandits in the 
Alps.243 To rob such an important military figure was clearly a serious undertaking; even 
without his army a general would have been accompanied by a bodyguard and train to 
defend his person and treasure from just such occurrences, so these brigands must have 
been particularly fearsome or numerous. This corroboration of the evidence from the 
Theodosian Code, though it is limited, does suggest that increased levels of desertion, 
particularly in the Western Empire but also in Thrace and the Balkans, did periodically 
contribute to epidemic banditry and that there was a major peak of deserter-brigandage 
during the first decade of the fifth century.244 Since deserter-brigandage seems to decline 
thereafter, but brigandage still appears, it seems that desertion was no longer such a 
severe problem in the Western Empire. Likewise, we can probably assume that the 
particular concern among Imperial policymakers to be seen as active opponents of 
banditry (and desertion) also declined.   
                                                          
242 Zosimus, 5. 22. 3. 
243 Zosimus, 6. 2. 5. Technically these brigands were labelled ‘Bacaudae’. See chapter 3. 
244 It has been argued that the contentious passage 6. 10. 2 in Zosimus, dated to 410, which instructs the 
cities of Britain to look to their own defences, in fact refers to the cities of Bruttium. This seems 
unlikely, but Bruttium, along with the other southern Italian districts, were among the most disrupted by 
epidemic brigandage around the year 410. For details on this passage, and a refutation of the Bruttium 
interpretation, see E. A. Thompson, ‘Zosimus 6. 10. 2 and the Letters of Honorius’ in The Classical 
Quarterly, 32. 2, (1982), 445-462.  
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It is not the purpose of this study to enquire deeply into the details of the Roman military, 
but it seems probable that from this period changes in both the military balance in the 
Western provinces and the composition of Western imperial armies undercut the 
phenomenon of desertion. Military service seems to increasingly have been owed to 
generals rather than to the state and, since these generals were often in competition, ex-
soldiers could probably find a powerful patron rather than having to strike out as 
independent latrones. Furthermore these soldiers, whatever the origin, increasingly 
came to be labelled as belonging to barbarian ethnic groups. The use of these labels, 
even if they had lived inside the Empire for generations, seems to have barred them 
being viewed as deserters or indeed brigands. Roman authors were inclined to 
characterise these processes not as the rebellion of citizens, but as the characteristically 
‘barbarous’ behaviour of ‘external’ peoples.245  
Despite this decline in deserter-brigandage, it seems that conflict, political upheaval and 
a decline in the ability of the state to enforce the peace continued to produce the requisite 
conditions for epidemic banditry, as it had in the fourth century, and as Hobsbawm 
theorized. For example, the region around modern Bratislava had been ravaged by wars, 
raiding and the movement of people throughout much of the fifth century so that, by 
c.500, it was considered a wasteland ‘where no man tilled the soil.’246  Yet this 
devastation seems to have provided opportunity. Political vacuum and a surplus of 
armed men allowed sizable bands of latrones to form. Jordanes describes one Mundo, 
apparently a descendent of Attila, who: 
                                                          
245 These kinds of developments will be explored further in later when we talk about patrons and 
retainers in 4.2. See also pp. 64-7. 
246 Jordanes, Getica, 58. 
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‘…gathered around him many outlaws and ruffians and robbers from all sides and had 
seized a tower called Herta, situated on the bank of the Danube. There he plundered his 
neighbours in wild license and made himself king over his vagabonds.’247 
This episode is perhaps questionable in the details, since only Jordanes describes Mundo 
as a bandit king and others seem to consider him a Gepid, but there is a significance to 
his description of the process.248 In a troubled context this individual was able to create 
a local hegemony of brigandage that was significant enough to draw the attention of 
Sabinian, the Roman general of Illyricum, and to make him a worthy client of Theodoric, 
the Ostrogothic ruler of Italy. Jordanes’ language aptly represents this gathering of 
disparate outlaws into a more cohesive and significant whole. Mundo gathers 
abactoribus (cattle-thieves) scamarisque249 et latronibus – three varieties of brigand – 
and combines them into yet another form, grassatores, under his own leadership. 
Whatever the historicity of this brief outlaw kingdom, the description of Jordanes shows 
that conflict and disruption was creating a context in which epidemic brigandage could 
flourish. 
In the chronologically and geographically distant circumstances of southern 
Merovingian Francia, similar disruptive influences could lead to equivalent 
disturbances. Sometime prior to 590 a man from Bourges was driven mad by a swarm 
of flies whilst chopping wood in a local forest. He took to dressing in animal skins and 
aping the behaviour of ascetic holy men. Then he wandered from Bourges to the district 
                                                          
247 Jordanes, Getica, 58. …plerisque abactoribus scamarisque et latronibus undecumque collectis turrem 
quae Herta dicitur super Danubii ripam positam occupans ibique agresti ritu praedasque innectens 
vicinis regem se suis grassatoribus fecerat. Jordanes, Romana et Getica, ed. by T. Mommsen, MGH AA, 
5 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1882). The translation is from Mierow. For more information on Mundo, see B. 
Croke, ‘Mundo the Gepid: From Freebooter to Roman General’, Chiron, 12 (1982), 125–35. 
248 The Rugi raiders and latrones that feature in the Vita Severini of Eugippius would seem to parallel this 
kind of barbarian-latrocinium; see for example the praedones barbari and latrones in Eugippius, Vita 
Severini, 4; Vita Sancti Severini, ed. by Hermann Sauppe, MGH AA, 1.2 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1877). 
249 The meaning of scamares is somewhat unclear, but it certainly seems to describe some kind of 
bandit-like troublemakers. See below, section 3.5. 
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of Arles, but soon moved on to the vicinity of Javols, where he adopted the persona of 
Christ re-born and took a female follower as his ‘Mary’. Through healing and prophecy 
he gathered fame, followers and wealth which he proceeded to redistribute among the 
poor.250 According to Gregory his retinue numbered over three thousand, among whom 
were credulous priests alongside the rustic, rural people.251 This irregular group then 
began to rob travellers and again the Pseudo-Christ gave this wealth to his followers.252 
Eventually they made their way to Le Puy and seem to have besieged the city. Aurelius, 
the Bishop there, sent out his strongest servants, under the guise of being deserters and 
recruits to the Pseudo-Christ’s cause. They succeeded in getting close to the Pseudo-
Christ and killed him, whereupon his army, deprived of leadership, dissolved.253  
Gregory is explicit in placing this episode in a social context. In the same chapter and 
immediately before discussing the Pseudo-Christ, he explains that the region had been 
devastated by plague and famine. The effect of this plague on Marseilles is described 
elsewhere in more graphic detail; he suggests that the terror of pestilence drove many of 
the inhabitants out of the city and that there were few survivors among those that 
remained.254 In addition to plague and associated famine there are episodes dotted 
throughout the preceding books of the Histories that explain the devastation in the region 
that resulted from Guntram’s campaigns against the Goths in Septimania in 588 and 
589.255 War, pestilence and famine give the final book of the Histories an apocalyptic, 
                                                          
250 LH, 10. 25; Conferebant etiam ei aurum argentumque ac vestimenta hi qui ad eum conveniebant. Quod 
ille, quo facilius seduceret, pauperibus erogabat. This, and the latin excerpts in the following notes, derive 
from Libri Historiarum X, ed. by B. Krusch and W. Levison, MGH SRM, 1 (Hanover: Impenis Bibliopolii 
Hahniani, 1951). 
251 LH, 10. 25; Seducta est autem per eum multitudo inmensa populi, et non solum rusticiores, verum 
etiam sacerdotes eclesiastici. Sequebantur autem eum amplius tria milia populi. 
252 LH, 10. 25; Interea coepit quosdam spoliare ac praedare, quos in itinere repperisset; spolia tamen 
non habentibus largiebatur.  
253 LH, 10. 25. 
254LH, 9. 22. The famine is also discussed in greater detail in 7. 45. 
255 The most significant detail is in 8. 30 which describes how Guntram’s men devastated the Frankish 
lands on their way southward to Septimania, were defeated, and devastated them again on their way out 
again. These atrocities included the looting of churches and caused the local people to rise up against 
their own King’s army. The retreat of Duke Nicetus to his city of Clermont seems to have been 
especially ruinous and probably passed throught the territory of Javols in which the Pseudo-Christ 
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millenarian tone. Interestingly the Pseudo-Christ seems to have appealed to this 
pessimistic zeitgeist. Many of his followers were probably refugees from plague or 
peoples otherwise ruined by their circumstances, and he won their loyalty with the 
pragmatic and populist tactic of redistributing wealth as well as by appealing to their 
religion through assuming the identity of Christ reborn.256 The parallels with Mundo and 
the characteristics of epidemic banditry are clear. Desperate times forced people into the 
desperate measure that was banditry. Fugitives and refugees formed into a violent group 
that ambushed and despoiled travellers in the hills and mountains of the Massif Central 
in characteristic bandit fashion and were even successful enough to attempt to seize a 
city.   
If the examples discussed here can be taken as representative of what might have been 
common responses to conflict and unrest in Late Antiquity, then it seems that epidemic 
banditry was a significant social process throughout these centuries. Nevertheless, it is 
important to stress this process was necessarily temporary and regional, because the 
outbreaks were responses to stimuli. As we have seen disturbances caused by warfare 
and other socio-economic factors created circumstances in which people were forced to 
take the uncertain and dangerous choice to engage in banditry. They were products of 
these difficult circumstances, but also the beneficiaries of it, since those same 
circumstances also may have hampered the ability of the state to counteract brigandage. 
Furthermore, a troubled politico-military context may have also created a surplus of 
men, weapons and military skills for banditry which allowed their brigand exploits to 
exceed the norms of endemic banditry.  
                                                          
operated. In addition to these sufferings, the Goths under Reccared followed the retreating Franks and 
devastated the borderlands from Toulouse to the vicinity of Arles.  
256 Lester K. Little, ‘Life and Afterlife of the First Plague Pandemic’ in Plague and the End of Antiquity: 
The Pandemic of 541-750, ed. Lester K. Little, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 10, 
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2.2. The Context of Epidemic Banditry in Late Antiquity.  
As we have seen, it was typical that epidemic bandits in Late Antiquity were either in or 
faced with desperate circumstances. They might have been driven to the hills by warfare 
and plague, been subjected to years of regional unrest, abandoned after military defeat 
or weighing the relative pros and cons of flight or self-mutilation as a response to 
conscription. Hobsbawm argued that ‘ex-soldiers, deserters and marauders who 
abounded in periods of disorder, war or its aftermath, provided a link between social and 
anti-social banditry. Such men would have fitted easily into social bands, but attached 
themselves with equal ease to the others…’257 The proposition is that fugitives, including 
ex-military ones, might fit into existing structures of banditry or bandit-type activity.258 
However, groups of deserters who left the army on the scale that is suggested by the 
evidence of the late fourth and fifth centuries probably would not have needed to link 
into existing structures, as they would already have had the numbers, equipment and 
military expertise to function effectively. Since many of them were fugitives or ex-
military personnel one might assume that they did not enjoy the close connections that 
typified the relationships between endemic bandits and their communities. Roman 
soldiers showed a strong preference for staying local; already in the fourth century the 
supposedly mobile comitatenses were loathe to serve outside their home provinces.259 
However, when they were in their home provinces they were more likely to be happy, 
and less likely to be called into the large scale, high risk military engagements that could 
prompt exceptional moments of desertion. So, though our evidence is limited, it is 
                                                          
257 Hobsbawm, p. 45. 
258 Hobsbawm suggested in particular that they might be attracted into traditional pre-industrial rural 
criminal organisations, ‘like the great and long lasting secret societies of Imperial China or Vietnam, 
or… the Sicilian Mafia.’ See p. 45. This certainly seems plausible for the late Roman period, but despite 
the similarities and indeed overlap between rural crime and banditry proper, there is not the time to 
investigate such structures in the Roman period. 
259 Michael Whitby, pp. 515-531. 
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probable that the greatest heights of epidemic banditry were caused by initial outbreaks 
that occurred in the immediate aftermath of catastrophe. These homogenous deserter-
bandit groups probably had a limited life span if they existed in isolation. In our 
investigation into endemic banditry we have seen that unsupported bandits, especially 
those who were alienated from the local community, were not only vulnerable to betrayal 
– the primary weapon of Imperial anti-bandit policy – but would also lack access to the 
sophisticated networks of commerce and information that were required for banditry to 
function in the longer-term.260  
So after the initial phase of disruption, epidemic bandits were likely faced with a 
conundrum. Either they would have to cease their activities and in some way re-join 
legitimate society or they could attempt to form connections with existing structures of 
banditry in the manner that Hobsbawm suggested. The former option was surely 
popular. Pressure on bandits would have increased as the state recovered from disruption 
and attempted to combat latrocinium. Furthermore, the state made sure that conduits for 
reintegration remained open; for example the legislation on desertion in 413 allowed 
deserters who had been absent for up to three years to return to service with only a 
demotion.261 Nevertheless, it seems that many epidemic bandits did attempt to continue 
their careers in brigandage. It is the relationships between these epidemic bandits, 
communities and the state that we will be investigating here.  
Where did epidemic banditry take place? It is worth dwelling on this point, because 
evidence that we have can help us to understand the process in its social context. 
However, locating epidemic banditry is not necessarily a simple task. Firstly, ancient 
authors rarely draw any distinction between endemic, traditional banditry and epidemic 
banditry that came about as a result of stimuli. Secondly, the references we have are 
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often vague. Ammianus, for example, says that a frenzy of brigandage raged through 
Gaul in 369, but offers no closer detail in the geographic or social landscapes.262 
Nevertheless, there does seem to be a basic pattern among the episodes of brigandage 
that occur in a context that appears ‘epidemic’. Most obviously, epidemic banditry often 
appears in the immediate aftermath and vicinity of sustained conflict or devastation. For 
example, this seems to be the case with the fugitives and deserters who devastated 
Thrace in the aftermath of Gainas’ revolt, and with Mundo’s bandit kingdom.263 The 
other typical location is in upland areas which have the beneficial attributes of 
geographic isolation and limited state control and therefore allow banditry to flourish. 
This is not surprising. Those same features which allowed the successful practice of 
endemic banditry would have also been valuable to deserters and other fugitives. 
Isolation provided them with a refuge and the geography facilitated epidemic banditry 
equally well.  
Of course, many of these upland areas which were sought out by fugitives would have 
already supported the complex networks of endemic banditry. One might expect that 
there would have been conflict between these groups. Individual fugitives could, 
perhaps, have been incorporated but, as we have seen, there seem to have been 
instabilities already extant in the demographics of upland communities that pushed 
‘surplus’ young men toward banditry.264 The introduction of numerous outsiders can 
hardly have eased these tensions. However, apart from the general violence and 
lawlessness that was associated with banditry at the best of times, we have little evidence 
of increased tension within upland communities during times of epidemic banditry. This 
can hardly be considered evidence, since our sources are at best laconic and disinterested 
about social relationships on the fringe of civilised society. But there is some positive 
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 105 
 
evidence to suggest that the incomers were not as foreign or unwelcome as might be 
expected. Once again the interest of contemporary writers with military affairs gives us 
an insight that we otherwise lack.  
Upland areas were perhaps the most significant recruiting grounds for the Roman 
army.265 The geographic names of units in the army reflect the area in which they were 
originally raised: ‘the cohortes Asturum, …, Dalmatarum, Thracum, Vindelicorum, or 
the alae…, Illyricorum, …, Noricorum, and Pannoniorum.’266 Likewise many soldier 
emperors, those who were of lower-class origins but rose to the purple through military 
skill, seem to have come from these regions. For example, Maximinus Thrax, Diocletian 
and Maximian were from Thrace, Dalmatia and Pannonia respectively whilst Marcian 
and Justin I ‘left the rugged central Balkans to seek fortune in Constantinople.’267 Isauria 
was famous in the fifth and sixth centuries for its significance as a recruiting ground and 
as the homeland of Emperor Zeno, but remained notorious as a hotbed of brigandage.  
The continuance of violent lifestyles in these regions was probably a significant factor 
in their importance for recruitment. Jordanes, in his classicising epitome of Roman 
history Romana, continued to associate regions like Isauria, Dalmatia and Liguria with 
inherent bandit-like characteristics.268 Perhaps the Empire found, or believed, that 
recruits from these regions already had skills that advantaged them as soldiers. However 
the Empire may have also intended to alleviate the problem of latrocinium in upland 
areas by recruiting from them. Honorius’ legislation which banned the practice of giving 
children to pastores to be raised in order that they not become brigands shows that the 
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Empire was mindful of demographics as a factor related to banditry. Furthermore, it 
demonstrates that imperial legislators were able to formulate preventative, social 
solutions to the problem of banditry as well as just punitive responses.269 It is therefore 
quite plausible that recruitment officials believed that targeting uplands was doubly 
beneficial; the troops were better and it alleviated the danger of unrest in those areas.270  
Moreover, if many soldiers already had a strong association with uplands then they may 
have already had the requisite skills for banditry there. If they happened to desert within 
a reasonable distance of familiar uplands, or in the company of comrades who knew 
those areas, they may even have been able to fluidly integrate into the existing networks 
of endemic banditry. Again, this is a theoretical probability which cannot be definitely 
confirmed. However, recent research into the patterns of military retirement do bolster 
the argument. The prevailing evidence once suggested that veterans returning to the 
regions of their birth was relatively rare, and that most settled elsewhere; perhaps in the 
vicinity of their post as an active soldier. But recent finds of military diplomas in the 
Balkan and Danube provinces, especially Thrace and Moesia, suggest that soldiers 
regularly returned home, even if they were stationed thousands of miles away.271 If the 
pull of home was this strong for legitimate veterans, we can surely assume that deserters 
from the Thracian mountains, or any other uplands, were quick to turn homeward if they 
intended to take up brigandage.  
The patterns of banditry within Isauria, the most notorious centre of brigandage in the 
Empire, can be taken to illustrate this process. The region had been pacified to a greater 
or lesser degree during the early centuries of Empire but the attempts of the state to 
impose more direct control, particularly under Gallienus in the third century, seem to 
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have stoked the tensions between local power and the Empire. Shortly afterward Probus 
attempted to stabilise the region by settling his (non-local) veterans in the strategic 
centres of the Isauria uplands on the basis that: ‘it was far easier to keep brigands out of 
these places than to expel them.’ He also attempted to prevent the descent of these 
populations into the local traditions of banditry by demanding that the male sons of these 
communities be sent to join the army as soon as they turned eighteen ‘in order that they 
might never learn to be brigands.’272 It seems that these policies were unsuccessful. By 
the mid-fourth century, when Ammianus was arguing that the whole Empire, from east 
to west, was threatened by the internal barbarity of latrocinium, the state struggled to 
intrude militarily upon the highlands of Isauria.273 The raiding seems to have continued 
with regularity, but along with it organised units of Isaurian soldiers began to emerge, 
often serving under Isaurian officers.274 Both the men and their leaders seem to have 
increased in significance during the fifth century. Flavius Zeno was successful in 
defending Constantinople against Attila with Isaurian troops in 447 and was soon after 
awarded the consulship and given Patrician status. Flavius Zeno’s fame was clearly 
widespread since, a few years later, another Isaurian general called Tarasis changed his 
name to Zeno. He too fought successfully against the enemies of the Empire by 
employing Isaurian soldiers, but this did not win him the devoted support of his 
homeland since in 469 he had to suppress rebellion in Isauria.275 By 474 Flavius Zeno 
had become Emperor, and spent much of his troubled reign campaigning against 
rebellion and revolt in Isauria. Nevertheless, when he was deposed in 475 he fled back 
to his mountain powerbases. His Isaurian generals, the brothers Illus and Trocundes, 
initially supported the usurper Basiliscus, but switched back to their former employer 
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273 Lenski, p. 456. 
274 Lenski, pp. 424-5.  
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and helped Zeno regain the purple. However, their relationship was never fully repaired, 
and they revolted again in 484.276 Following their Emperor’s example, they returned to 
highlands of Isauria and held out in the fortress at Papirium for four years until their 
eventual betrayal and defeat.277 When Zeno died in 491 violent competition for the 
throne broke out between his brother Longinus and Zeno’s widow’s favourite 
Anastasius. Longinus, like Zeno and Illus before him, retreated to Isauria to build up his 
strength, just as his predecessors had done and in 492 came down to Phrygia where he 
was defeated by Anastasius at Cotyaeum. Once again the Isaurians took to the mountains 
and defended a number of fortresses for five years, despite ‘intense military pressure’, 
until their eventual collapse when Anastasius was eventually able to cut their supply 
routes.278  
The ebb and flow of success, defeat and retreat hints at the patterns of escalating 
epidemic brigandage on an enhanced scale. Isaurians ranged through the Eastern Empire 
as men of violence in both illegitimate and legitimate roles and enjoyed a great deal of 
success, but it seems that when they experienced defeats, the Isaurians, from generals to 
common soldiers, returned to the highlands of the Taurus Mountains. Of course, the 
Isaurian generals and Imperial claimants had long ceased to be brigands, but their policy 
of returning to the highlands in times of duress does seem to correspond to the pattern 
of veterans returning home after service. The familiarity of locality and the safety offered 
by the dramatic geography of the uplands was clearly a significant draw to persons who 
had left military service for whatever reason. After all, the Isaurians were a people of 
the Empire and even if they enjoyed peculiar independence, their circumstances were at 
the extreme end of a spectrum, rather than entirely unique. Therefore, despite the lack 
of general detail in our sources about the origins and choices of epidemic bandits, it can 
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be argued with some confidence that, much as Zeno, Illus and Longinus all retreated to 
their homelands, so too would a veteran or fugitive deserter from Thrace or Dalmatia 
whose intent was to take up brigandage.  
It is very difficult to be certain about how returning fugitives were received upon 
returning to their homes. It seems that some ex-military fugitives, and presumably some 
civilian fugitives as well, such as escaped slaves, would seek out uplands both as refuges 
and homelands. If they did, then we can presume that the relations between existing 
endemic bandit communities and the epidemic ‘newcomers’ were not inherently or 
absolutely hostile.279 While it seems almost certain that tension or conflict would have 
occurred between traditional endemic bandits, with established links to community and 
patronage, and epidemic newcomers, some of those newcomers may have possessed 
tools and connections to allow a smoother integration. Deserters who were born and 
raised in the mountains surely retained close ties to communities there and could fluidly 
reintegrate with the existing social networks, including those connected to traditional 
banditry. If this was the case, then epidemic and endemic bandits – far from being hostile 
– might have catalysed one another and created a mutually exacerbated problem for the 
state and local anti-brigand authorities. This mixture of ‘born’ and ‘made’ bandits is 
perhaps what Jordanes had in mind when he described the brigand-kingdom forged by 
Mundo. The traditional local latrones and abactores – bandits and cattle-thieves – of the 
region were combined with ex-military (perhaps even barbarian?) grassatores and 
scamares to create a genuinely heterogeneous gang.280  
Mundo’s band may have only existed briefly, but it is entirely plausible that the 
combination of endemic and epidemic bandits may have prolonged the latter 
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phenomenon.281 Certainly it seems possible that the unsettled context which created 
epidemic bandits and was, in turn, exacerbated by them, may have allowed traditional 
endemic bandits a greater freedom to operate. Necessarily this blurring of spheres makes 
it difficult to categorise, but it is reasonable to suppose that in the aftermath of political 
unrest which created epidemic banditry, endemic bandits may have been fuelled by the 
same currents so that their exploits may have become more common and more daring. 
In peaceful periods the existence of large households and numerous, large guard dogs 
might have been enough to deter brigands from tackling isolated, rural villas, but, as we 
have seen, by 391 Theodosius felt it necessary to legislate for more vigorous methods 
of self-defence.282 In the aftermath of epidemic banditry, it may have been rather 
difficult to discern between bandits who were created and those who were born into 
traditions of brigandage, in much the same way that the line between retainers and 
bandits was blurry, sometimes even intangible. It is nevertheless important to stress the 
distinction of these categories, because it demonstrates a vital difference in motivation 
for lower class violence. It was perhaps natural for adolescents raised among traditions 
of cattle-thieving to become rustlers like their fathers and grandfathers. But for peasants, 
slaves or soldiers to take up violent careers in banditry, either in desire of social 
improvement or because they could see no alternative, required an active rejection of 
their perceived social role.  
Once epidemic banditry was waning, the arrival of deserter-fugitives in a context that 
was socially and geographically conducive to the propagation of banditry surely caused 
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many of them to retain this way of life for longer than they might have otherwise been 
able to. If the expedient circumstances, such as war, famine or plague, which caused or 
encouraged epidemic banditry had abated, the state would have quickly attempted to 
shackle those bandits. But by surrounding themselves with favourable terrain and the 
support networks which sheltered endemic bandits, they could effectively bridge the gap 
and perhaps assimilate into endemic banditry. In liminal upland territories the ability of 
the state to repair roads, clear the encroachment of vegetation and provide effective 
deterrent in the aftermath of disruption was diminished.283 These areas were physically 
harder to access, less valuable and, perhaps, the population was more resistant to the 
resumption of ‘normality’. Even once the state had recovered from war or instability, 
notorious bandit-hotspots like Isauria might have been difficult to fully re-pacify.  
The Roman state itself seems to have been concerned about the long-term causes of 
banditry. As we have seen, in 409 at the height of epidemic banditry in the Western 
provinces (or at least those that were still under the control of Honorius), the Imperial 
court forbade the giving of children to pastores in order that they might not be raised as 
bandits.284 The concept of abandoned children coming back to haunt those who had had 
them exposed was certainly well known in the Roman Empire. Oedipus was abandoned 
and raised by a shepherd before returning to his family with catastrophic results. 
Romulus and Remus too, after having been thrown into the Tiber by the King Amulius 
and suckled by a she-wolf, were raised by shepherds and returned to overthrow their 
persecutor at the head of an armed band of herdsmen.285 Of course, the caveat in both 
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cases was that the children were ‘inherently’ royal or noble, and so ‘deservedly’ rose 
again to the status of their birth. These tales surely did little to discourage the practice 
of abandoning children, but they do reveal that uncertainties about the ceding of children 
into the dangerous hands of shepherds existed well before the fifth century. Honorius is 
unlikely to have been concerned about exposed children directly imposing tragedy or 
deposition on him, but it is interesting that, even in this context of epidemic banditry, 
the Imperial court was legislating against a practice that cannot have had an immediate 
impact on brigandage. Perhaps the contemporary problems of brigandage had simply 
drawn attention to the issue, but it is plausible that the social disruption in the first decade 
of the fifth century caused more children to be abandoned than was usual. It is not 
possible to determine whether this was the case, but more modern parallels about which 
we have more information do suggest that abandonment broadly increases with conflict 
and economic downturn. Furthermore, it is worth stressing that the number of children 
abandoned may have easily had a significant impact, especially if it rose above normal 
levels in such times. Records from the ancient world do not survive, but Boswell 
concluded that levels of abandonment in eighteenth-century France and Italy, which 
ranged from 15 to 30 percent of registered births, would be far more analogous to Roman 
history than the loose parallel of 1.5 percent of recorded births who become available 
for adoption in the modern United States.286 Of course, the vast majority of those 
children who were abandoned would not have become bandits. Some would not have 
survived exposure or childhood, and many it seems were raised into adolescence in the 
countryside before returning to city as slaves.287 Others meanwhile would have lived 
perfectly peaceful lives as free or unfree farmers or labourers. But nevertheless, if 
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politico-economic stimuli created a surplus of males in the population of upland pastoral 
communities which, as we have seen, might have contributed to a growth in banditry, 
this must surely be considered a longer term ‘symptom’ of epidemic banditry.288  
How then did the Empire respond to outbreaks of epidemic banditry in areas that were 
already known to be traditional hotbeds of brigandage? The case study of the pastoral 
uplands of Italy, south of the Po valley, is useful because we have some sustained 
discussion of brigandage in this region throughout much of Late Antiquity. These upland 
regions had long been associated with violence because of their troublesome 
inhabitants.289 In the sixth century Jordanes dwelt on the difficulty early Rome had in 
subduing the Samnites and Ligurians who prowled through the forests and mountains 
and fought in the manner of latrones.290 Apparently the same concerns were pressing in 
the 360s since a string of legislation relating to this region was promulgated at this 
time.291 It is plausible, though not possible to determine with any certainty, that the 
political situation of the years 360-3 had caused the weight of state intrusion to falter in 
the Italian uplands and therefore allowed brigandage to temporarily increase. In 360 
Julian, Caesar in the Western provinces, was proclaimed Augustus against the wishes of 
Constantius II who was himself troubled with war in the East against the Sassanid 
Persians. Both gathered military forces in expectation of conflict, but Constantius died 
in 361 before any confrontation occurred. Julian, now sole Augustus, moved east to 
confront the Persians but was defeated and died in 363. Jovian, his successor, was barely 
able to extract the remnants of the army from Persian territory before he too died early 
in 364. We cannot be sure that these political upheavals had a direct impact on the 
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presence of state apparatus in upland Italy, but there is evidence that economic policy 
during these years may have had a direct impact on pastoral farmers in the upland 
communities that both provided livestock and were the source of banditry. In c.363 
Julian, to the detriment of the guild of swine-herders, set the price of pork in the city of 
Rome at the current price in Campania, a traditional area of pig rearing.292 Demand for 
pork in the eternal city was always high, so by setting the price in line with Campania, 
where production and supply far outstripped local demand, was a potentially severe blow 
to the livestock farmers. More restrictive measures followed in 367; in this case the 
Lucanian and Bruttian livestock producers were required to cover the costs of the 
transportation of their stock.293 These measures are only known to have applied to swine 
production, but similar measures may have afflicted other pastoral producers. Certainly 
there were close relations between the guilds of swine and cattle herders since they were 
formally combined in the reign of Honorius.294 In any case, it seems these restrictive 
measures may have had a damaging effect; the next extant laws referring to the swine-
herders guild were designed to resurrect it and re-establish lapsed rights after it collapsed 
in the late 380s.295 We cannot know with certainty that there was a causal relationship 
between the collective impact of political disturbances and increased economic pressure 
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and an increase in banditry in upland Italy, but we know that soon after his accession, 
Valentinian enacted a series of measures to halt the depredations of brigandage. The 
Emperor, after his acclamation in Asia in the spring, travelled west where, at Altinum in 
October 364, he wrote to his Praetorian Prefect to inform him that: 
‘…all persons [except those who had performed imperial service] shall be excluded from 
the privilege of possessing horses or mares throughout Picenum and Flaminia 
[presumably the territories along the Flaminian Way from Rome to Umbria], and 
likewise throughout Apulia and Calabria, Bruttium and Lucania, and Samnium. Those 
persons, indeed, who do not turn their minds from such usurpation shall be held liable 
to the punishment of cattle thieves.’296  
A couple of days later he called upon Bulephorus, the Governor of Campania, to assist 
in these measures. These two additional directives have also been preserved in the 
Theodosian Code and the first provides explicit evidence about the reason for the ban 
on equine animals throughout so many Italian provinces: 
‘In order that all efforts of brigands may cease because of lack of resources, We deny 
the right to possess a herd of horses to the shepherds of the estates of Our privy purse, 
that is to the herders of wool-bearing sheep and of cattle, also to the procurators and 
overseers of Senators…’297  
Violators of this law were likewise subject to receive punishment as cattle-thieves 
(abactores). It seems apparent from these laws that, whatever the preceding situation, 
Valentinian or his Italian advisors found the scale of brigandage intolerable in 364. Even 
imperial estates and the staff of Senators were considered liable to be involved, or at 
least complicit in the brigandage. To complement the ban on horses he also called on 
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the Bulephorus to severely limit the possession of arms: ‘No person whatever, without 
Our knowledge and advice, shall be granted the right to employ any weapons 
whatsoever.’298 
It is significant that this latter restriction was even more comprehensive than that on 
horse possession, and it stands in stark contrast to the policies of Theodosius and 
Honorius who granted rights of armed self-defence first to property owners and later to 
all provincials everywhere.299 Valentinian, rather than mobilising the people, sought to 
create a sort of demilitarised zone throughout much of Italy where only Imperial 
servicemen might ride horses and official licences were required to employ weapons. 
The purpose was to root out brigandage, but all violators were subject to the punishment 
as abactores.  
We do not know what effect these measures had on banditry, though Ammianus’ 
lamentation of Empire-wide brigandage in 367-8 may indicate that the latrones were, at 
least, not totally scourged from Italy. However, these laws do seem to have had an 
impact on civil life and commerce because in 365 the palatines were granted the use of 
horses in Picenum and the much-burdened swine-herders were allowed horses for 
official duties in the urbicarian districts (Italy south of the Rubicon); or at least those 
regions which were not notorious for cattle-theft.300  
Perhaps the policies of Valentinian created, or re-established a balance between state 
power and latrocinium; in effect this would mean that epidemic banditry returned to 
endemic levels. However it is worth stressing that endemic banditry was not an 
immutable constant, nor did brigandage cease to be a danger. As we have seen, in the 
380s Symmachus claimed that he could not cross the boundaries of the city of Rome for 
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fear of banditry, whilst in 399 the problems were apparently severe enough that Honorius 
extended the ban on horses to Valeria.301 In 403 and 409, as we have seen, unprecedented 
legislation was published on public use of violence and the abandonment of children to 
herdsmen.302 When travelling north in 416, Rutilius Namatianus complained that:  
‘I choose to go by sea, for rivers flood the level 
roads and rocks obstruct the mountain ways. 
Since the coastal road and fields of Tuscany, 
besieged by Gothic hordes with fire and sword, 
no longer tame the woods with homes nor bridge the streams, 
it’s better to set sail on dangerous seas.’303  
The Goths had since left for Gaul, but it seems likely that the continued presence of 
epidemic banditry in Italy left these roads dangerous as well as in disrepair. 
It is reasonable to suppose that the state had to reckon with the ebb and flow of endemic 
and epidemic banditry through much of the fifth century. These regions, as we have 
seen, had long been associated with banditry on some scale and given the preponderance 
of political and military issues during this period it seems likely, at least, that brigandage 
did not lessen. Nor should we assume that this situation altered much under the rule of 
Odoacer or the Ostrogothic Kings of Italy. Cassiodorus, writing in the early sixth century 
in characteristic, classicising style, informed various recipients of his letters that 
pursuing brigands ranked high among their duties, or likened exorbitant prices to the 
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activity of highway robbers.304 As a senior administrator in the court of Theoderic and 
his successors, Cassiodorus was presumably quite concerned with the depredations of 
brigands in the kingdom. He may also have been personally familiar with them. As a 
native of Squillace in Calabria, he hailed from a region that was known in ancient times 
for producing fleeces and, in the 360s, was one of the provinces in which the use of 
horses had been prohibited for fear of brigandage.305 Cassiodorus Variae preserves a 
letter to Severus, Vir Spectabilis, from c.527 which demonstrates that such issues still 
afflicted the province of Calabria. A certain Nymphadius was travelling to court and 
stopped for respite at a beautiful spring in the region of Squillace and, while resting 
peacefully, his pack animals were apparently stolen by cunning local rustics. 
Cassiodorus, perhaps particularly worried by this brigandage in his own back yard, 
therefore prescribed the following course of action to Severus:  
‘Let the thieves be approached with complete silence, let furtive men be bound in their 
own snares, so that, as soon as the executioner will have bellowed, their hearts will 
become distraught, they will leap forth with voices and throw themselves into disorder 
with murmuring. Thus will signs determine them to surrender their own blood to 
punishment. Therefore, let what is exacted from them be fitting, so that these places may 
be passable. Invite the eagerness of travellers with strict discipline, lest such a miracle 
as is known to always gladden the pilgrim should be avoided on account of the excesses 
of brigands.’306 
This description of methods of anti-banditry, florid as it is, recalls the description of 
techniques we have previously explored.307 Silent approach, binding bandits in their own 
                                                          
304 Cassiodorus, Variae, 7. 1, 11. 12. 
305 Columella, 7. 2 for the quality of Calabrian fleeces and CTh 9. 30. 1 for Valentinian’s ban on horses. 
306 Cassiodorus, Variae, 8. 32. Trans. by Bjornlie, in: Shane Bjornlie, The Variae of Cassiodorus 
Senator and the Circumstances of Political Survival, CA. 540-545. PhD Thesis. (Princeton University, 
2006), pp. 489-90.  
307 See above, section 1.3. 
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snares (i.e. using their own techniques against them) and causing panic and disorder 
suggest that the administration of Athalaric was still fighting banditry with the 
traditional techniques used for centuries in the Roman Empire.308 Another letter to 
Severus (which likewise dates from the reign of Athalaric), who seems to have been 
tasked with combatting banditry across much of southern Italy, suggests that latrocinium 
also continued throughout those same districts. Apparently the major fair in Lucania was 
regionally and economically very significant since; ‘Everything that industrious 
Campania, or opulent Bruttii, or cattle-breeding Calabria, or strong Apulia produces, is 
there to be found exposed for sale’. Unfortunately however: 
‘We hear that the rustics are indulging in disorderly practices, and robbing the market-
people who come from all quarters to the chief fair of Lucania on the day of St. Cyprian. 
This must by all means be suppressed, and your Respectability should quietly collect a 
sufficient number of the owners and tenants of the adjoining farms to overpower these 
freebooters and bring them to justice. Any rustic or other person found guilty of 
disturbing the fair should be at once punished with the stick, and then exhibited with 
some mark of infamy upon him.’309 
The provinces listed in these passages were all included among those in which 
Valentinian had restricted possession of horses, so it seems that despite the efforts of 
Roman and Ostrogothic administrators through the centuries, these regions remained 
stubbornly troublesome. Furthermore, we see once again that Athalaric’s policies 
remained very similar to those of his Italian predecessors. If bandits were to be hunted 
                                                          
308 This was, of course, Cassiodorus’s ideological project; to demonstrate that the Empire and Res 
Publica was continuing as-ever under the able administration of the Ostrogothic monarchy. Continuance 
of anti-bandit policy was but a small aspect of this continuity. 
309 Cassiodorus, Variae, 8. 33, trans. in Cassiodorus, The Letters of Cassiodorus: being a condensed 
translation of the Variae epistolae of Magnus Aurelius Cassiodorus Senator, trans. Thomas Hodgkin, 
(London: H. Frowde, 1886), pp. 381-383. I have used Hodgkin’s translation here, as this passage is not 
translated in Bjornlie, unlike the other excerpts cited. Despite the looser translation of Hodgkin, the 
meaning is nevertheless sufficiently exact for the purposes of this argument.  
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down aggressively, then a state official was required to round up a posse from the local 
farms to pursue them. Given the close association we have seen between local 
landowners and shepherd/bandits, we can once again presume that men who could fairly 
be described as brigands featured on both sides of these engagements. Given these 
accounts it seems that, during the relative calm of Theoderic and Athalaric’s reigns, 
endemic banditry continued to flourish in southern Italy. A century after the extensive 
epidemic banditry of the late fourth and early fifth centuries it seems that latrocinium 
had waned to a more traditional intensity. 
However, another letter implies epidemic conditions were to ensue in the region shortly 
afterward. In 535 the army of Justinian, commanded by Belisarius, attacked Ostrogothic 
Sicily and, having quickly seized the island, crossed over to Bruttium in early 536 and 
began to march north through Lucania and Campania toward Naples.310 This army no 
doubt caused some destruction, and we know that the Gothic force, sent in response to 
Belisarius’ advance did too:  
‘And so with the arrival of a numerous army, which is known to have been sent for the 
defense of the republic, the crops of Lucania and Bruttium are said to have been wasted 
and the abundance of the region to have been given over to a zeal for plunder.’ 
Cassiodorus assured his correspondent Valerianus, and the people of the affected 
regions, that they should not worry for the loss of these supplies since by providing for 
the troops in the area they had already done their service to the state and therefore would 
be free of the exactions of tax collectors in the coming year. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
these assurances were too little or too late for many of the local rural population. Those 
people, already well versed in brigandage, had risen up and were causing a great deal of 
trouble. This was probably as a result of the opportunity provided by local disruption as 
                                                          
310 Procopius, History of the Wars, 5. 8.  
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well as in defence of their property against the foragers from either Gothic or Byzantine 
armies. Cassiodorus implored that these people calm themselves:  
‘Let there be peace for the Romans while the army of the Goths wages war. Blessed is 
that desire which obeys, lest rustics, a wild sort of race, should they flee the fatigue of 
laboring act with illegal daring and those whom you are barely able to control in peace 
should raise up against you.311 For which reason, by royal decree, should you remind the 
individual tenants of estates and the influential possessores that they should incite 
nothing barbarous in this conflict, lest however much they strive to further the cause of 
war, they confound peace. Let them take up iron, but that whence they till the fields; let 
them raise pikes for goading cattle, not the rage of battle.’ 
The details of this passage are particularly interesting. It confirms that this was an 
outbreak of epidemic banditry, since rustics who could scarcely be controlled in 
peacetime had risen up and that others, by behaving barbarously in times of conflict, 
were confounding peace. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the traditions of Roman 
social norms were not much altered. The Goths might have replaced the role of the army, 
but the only reason for the lower classes to take up iron was to till the fields.312 Finally, 
and once again, it demonstrated that the accusation of banditry was often subjective. As 
we have seen, retainers and bandits might be one and the same, and vary only according 
to the opinions of the viewer. Likewise, these rustics who seem to have been defending 
their crops – or those of an aristocratic patron – could be seen as brigands by 
Cassiodorus, but might have been thought of quite differently by their local 
communities.   
                                                          
311 It is worth noting that the pejorative tone of the word ‘rustic’ is typical in the Variae; see 1. 2, 2. 13, 
5. 17. 
312 Cassiodorus, as mentioned, was interested in depicting the Ostrogothic Kingdom as loyally 
continuing the traditions of Rome. However, it is unlikely that he would have thought Roman 
latrocinium was a tradition worthy of continuance, so it is probably safe to assume that these concerns 
were relatively genuine, despite the rhetoric of peaceful Romans and warlike Goths.  
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Finally Cassiodorus, as personal advice to Valerianus, advised, as he had with Severus, 
the best way to restore peace: 
‘…let the law courts not desist in thundering verdicts against wicked habits. Let the thief 
fear a sentence that always terrifies… For thus, you will not even notice the war being 
waged so victoriously, if your sphere is consideration for civil harmony. Let no man 
oppress the poor. Seize trespassers and harass those who pursue with hostile intent. It is 
for you to conduct the civil battle. You will restore everything to peace if you vex the 
leaders of crime.’313 
Unlike the tone of the advice given to Severus in the 520s though, this proposed policy 
is far more martial. Thundering verdicts, terror and battle were to be the weapons of the 
state, not just strict discipline, beatings and branding. It seems that the context of war 
had made the matter far more serious; not only had banditry in southern Italy become 
epidemic, but the scale of the disruption threatened the success of the defence of the 
realm. 
Much like Isauria, it seems that southern Italy, and perhaps other less well-documented 
upland regions where banditry was endemic, was always liable to periods of epidemic 
banditry when stimulated by contemporary events. However, unlike the major peak of 
epidemic brigandage in the Western Provinces between 390-410, the flow of militarised 
Isaurians in the late fifth century, or the Pseudo-Christ in southern Gaul in the 590s, this 
disturbance in the provinces of Lucania, Bruttia and Campania in the 530s does not seem 
to have been fuelled by fugitives. Rather, the passing of armies, and the associated 
devastation seems to have incited an already troublesome population to greater violence.  
                                                          
313 Cassiodorus, Variae, 12. 5. Trans. by Bjornlie, in: Shane Bjornlie, The Variae of Cassiodorus 
Senator and the Circumstances of Political Survival, CA. 540-545, pp. 549-51.  
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The devastation of Justinian’s Gothic Wars in Sothern Italy was extensive, and was 
surely a factor in the troubles in Bruttia that cased Cassiodorus to pen his letter to 
Valerianus. Procopius notes of the peoples of Aemilia and Etruria, that by 539; ‘many 
of them as lived in the mountains were reduced to eating loaves made of the acorns of 
the oak trees, which they ground up like grain. The result of this was that most of the 
people fell victim to all types of disease.’ Meanwhile; ‘It is said that of the Roman 
farmers in Picenum no less than fifty thousand died from famine, as did a great many 
more in the region north of the Adriatic.’314 (Wars 6.20.18–33). In such a troubled 
context, it is of little surprise that the local population – and especially those with 
traditions of brigandage – took to violence out of necessity and perhaps for self-
defence.315  
Moreover, as far as can be discerned, the commercial long distance horizontal 
transhumancy in central and southern Italy broke down in the Early Middle Ages. As 
we have seen, upland pastoral communities were closely tied to endemic bandits, and 
therefore this unrest, famine and even the earlier raid on the livestock fair might be 
symptomatic of the breakdown of the primary economic system in the region.316 These 
communities, which had been reliant on the inter-regional cloth and leather commerce, 
presumably came under increased pressure during the long decline of their industry.317 
If so, then this outpouring of epidemic banditry may have been as much a result of long-
term commercial, agricultural and economic developments as it was the invasion of 
Justinian. This is worth stressing, because it demonstrates that epidemic banditry did not 
                                                          
314 Procopius, Wars 6. 20. 18-33. See also B. Shaw, ‘War and Violence’ in Glen Bowersock, Peter 
Brown, Oleg Grabar eds., Late antiquity: a guide to the postclassical world (London: Belknap Press, 
1999), p. 132. 
315 For endemic banditry in southern Italy, see above, pp. 114-17.  
316 The raid on a livestock fair, described by Cassiodorus, Variae, 8. 33, and above, p. 119, may indicate 
that pressure was already significant in Athalaric’s reign, and therefore prior to Justinian’s Gothic Wars, 
since such fairs were of primary importance to herders. A raid on such an event may have verged on 
taboo in such communities, and may therefore indicate that some local shepherd/bandits were in dire 
straits. For the centrality of livestock fairs in transhumancy, see Julius Klein, pp. 3-17, 49-67.  
317 Wickham, ‘Pastoralism and Underdevelopment in the Early Middle Ages’, p. 140. 
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only, or necessarily, occur as a result of the movements of people. At least in areas where 
the brigand traditions of lower-class violence where maintained endemically, there was 
potential for a wider uptake of latrocinium when conditions allowed.     
We cannot be sure what this meant for the people who considered taking up brigand life 
in these times, nor should we generalise excessively. Some may have seen it as an 
opportunity for enrichment, others as a desperate necessity when war or plague had 
robbed them of other options. All, whether locals, fugitives, deserters or already extant 
endemic bandits who were swept up in the commotion, could expect the harshest of 
punishments if they fell into the hands of the authorities who themselves saved the most 
severe penalties for times when brigandage was most damaging. Nevertheless, even if 
banditry was a last resort, it was a statement of power. Robbery and raiding required the 
exertion of physical power over others, often those who were socially superior in any 
other context. Yet the spectre of the fugitive slave, deserter or lowly shepherd waiting 
in the mountains and forests cast fear into the hearts of Senators, Prefects and even 
generals.  
 
2.3. The social and political implications of Epidemic Banditry in the late antique 
West.  
Before we precede toward a reinterpretation of the Bacaudae in light of epidemic 
banditry, it is worthwhile reiterating a few of the major arguments of this chapter. 
Historical studies of the lives of lower-class people in Late Antiquity make up a 
relatively minor percentage of the scholarship. This is unsurprising because the written 
sources that remain to us devote relatively little space to such people. This investigation 
has focused on violence performed by lower-class people because such actions seem to 
have been more noteworthy to ancient writers. However, it is important to not lose sight 
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of the purpose, which is to attempt to deepen our understanding of the lives of poorer 
people in Late Antiquity, and the methods (in this case violent ones) through which they 
sought to affect their own lives.  
The specific implications of epidemic banditry are perhaps best explained in contrast to 
endemic banditry. Endemic banditry was a social tradition which was intrinsically linked 
to the community. Latrones therefore were men of violence who might have been, in 
some sense, detached from their communities, but they were still very much a part of 
them. It was not brought about by extraordinary circumstances, but was among the 
norms of those communities. Epidemic banditry was by contrast, in some sense a 
rebellious, even revolutionary, practice. I must emphasise, at this point that I in no way 
mean to assert that epidemic bandits were had collective political intent, or were even 
conscious of any political implications of their own actions. I would certainly not agree 
that bandits in Late Antiquity had any intent to implement fundamental societal change. 
However, whilst all bandits were criminal from the perspective of authority, endemic 
bandits were relatively legitimate in the eyes of their community and therefore their 
immediate society. Epidemic bandits only became bandits through rejection of their 
position in society; slaves or farmers had to become fugitives, refugees were driven from 
their homes, army recruits or deserters had to actively choose illegitimacy over 
legitimacy. Endemic bandits cold be born into that role, but epidemic bandits were 
created by context. It required the breaking of social relationships, norms and bonds in 
a more radical sense than endemic banditry. Bandits raised in among traditions of 
brigandage were only criminal in the eyes of distant authority. Epidemic bandits had 
existed within the communities that reviled their violent actions and therefore their 
transgression seems more striking from the perspective of legitimate authority.  
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However, as we have seen, the boundaries between endemic and epidemic bandits were 
far from clear, especially when they existed or operated in the same geographic spaces. 
As such, it will be worthwhile exploring what evidence we have for flashes of epidemic 
latrocinium beyond the uplands and the forests and the reaction of authorities to 
brigandage when it was rather more difficult to ignore or overcome. With that in mind, 
in the following chapter, we will attempt to interpret a serious of rebellions which were 
labelled ‘bacaudic’ or have been associated with the Bacaudae in light of the 
understanding of epidemic banditry we have established in this chapter.    
Two further points must be emphasised before we move on. Firstly, there is a tendency 
among historians to use the terms ‘banditry’ and ‘brigandage’ in a way that makes the 
process seem trifling or incidental, as if such things were unimportant. I cannot criticise 
this attitude unduly, because banditry, lower-class violence, or even social history are 
not necessarily the focus of the study, nor relevant to its conclusions. However, I must 
stress that banditry was of great individual importance to the bandit, to their community, 
to potential patrons and to victims; it was a matter of life and death. Few people would 
approach a task of such gravity without reason, so we can be sure that affected parties 
found banditry to be profoundly important. That alone should justify its historical 
relevance. Moreover, to dismiss brigandage as unimportant – even on a grand political 
scale – is to ignore the more outstanding implications of the process, and of epidemic 
banditry in particular. As we have seen in this chapter, banditry could pose a significant 
challenge to even the mighty Roman state. Even during the stable period of the 360s, the 
powerful and militaristic Emperor Valentinian I struggled to subdue brigandage. By the 
410s the problem was so great that it required Honorius to forego the state monopoly on 
violence that it had maintained for centuries, and to legalise the private use of violence 
against bandits. The late fourth and fifth centuries are often perceived as a period in 
which the Western Empire struggled, and ultimately failed, to deal with conflict in the 
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forms of usurpation and barbarians. Conflict with bandits played out in a different arena, 
but it is plausible that it was little less significant than these more fashionable issues.  
Secondly, we have seen throughout this chapter that epidemic banditry was not a 
uniform response to a specific stimulus, or by a specific group. Life in Late Antiquity 
raised any number of challenges and epidemic banditry posed a varied and potential 
solution to some of them. Fugitive slaves, farmers or members of hereditary guilds might 
turn to banditry because of insufferable social or economic conditions. Fear, or rumours 
of impending defeat might have encouraged army recruits or deserters to turn to 
brigandage for self-preservation. Soldiers from defeated armies might have exploited 
their martial skills for enrichment through brigandage because they had nowhere else to 
turn. Young men with a spirit for adventure might have exploited a weakness of the state 
in policing brigandage in pursuit of a better life. Persons whose livelihoods were 
destroyed by the ravages of a passing army, epidemic disease or famine may have 
become bandits as a last resort for survival. For others, the impetus to turn to brigandage 
may have resulted from long-term economic or commercial factors that were beyond 
their control. It is important to remember that in each of these circumstances, individual 
lower-class people in Late Antiquity could use violence in the form of epidemic banditry 
to implement their agency. They were not simply passive observers, or victims of change 
in society, but could use violence to alter their position within it.  
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Chapter Three 
3. Bacaudae: History, Historiography and Banditry.  
No study of lower-class violence in the late antique West could be complete without 
attempting to understand the rather problematic issue of the Bacaudae. This label was 
applied by around half a dozen authors to rebels against Roman authority in Spain and 
particularly in Gaul in the third and fifth centuries. The evidence that can be said with 
certainly to apply to the Bacaudae, or Bagaudae as it is sometimes rendered, amounts to 
only few dozen lines, yet the topic has attracted a deal of attention. 318 At the time the 
rebellious activates of the Bacaudae demanded the attentions of the foremost generals 
of the day, their plight became associated with the actions of holy men and their threat 
affected the relationship between the Roman state and Germanic peoples. The 
historiography of the Bacaudae is little less dramatic. Contentions between schools of 
interpretation for the Bacaudae have proliferated throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century and continue up to the present. Because of this historiographical 
intrigue, it is now seems problematic to attempt to develop an understanding of the 
bacaudic revolts – as episodes of lower-class violence – without first engaging the 
historiography of the subject directly. Therefore this chapter will, in the first section, 
provide an overview of the interpretations that have dominated Anglophone 
historiography. This will provide an analysis of those scholarly traditions as well as an 
overview of the subject itself. With that basis established, we can continue on in the 
following sections to a more thorough discussion of the evidence for the Bacaudae, 
                                                          
318 It is appropriate that in studies on the Bacaudae not even the name is agreed upon. Many scholars 
prefer the rendering Bagaudae, though both the ‘g’ and ‘c’ spellings are attested in ancient sources. The 
‘c’ variant seems to have been settled upon in the fifth century however, and since this period of activity 
is of greater relevance to this study that variant will be used throughout. See Clifford Minor, ‘Bagaudae 
or Bacaudae?’ in Traditio Vol. 31 (1975), 318-322. 
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which will hopefully be revealing about patterns in late antique lower-class violence, 
both in circumstances specific to the Bacaudae and in general.  
The bacaudic rebellions were understood by some Marxist historians to be evidence of 
class struggle at a vital moment of transition between classical and feudal modes of 
production and were consequently attributed great significance. The greatest scholar of 
the Bacaudae, at least in the Anglophone tradition, was E. A. Thompson. In a number of 
publications spanning several decades he argued that the bacaudic revolts were not only 
a symptom of the oppressive nature of Roman society but were a significant, yet 
overlooked, factor in the decline and fall of the Roman Empire.319 His premise assumed 
an adversarial relationship between the higher and lower classes of the Empire and the 
direct evidence of bacaudic revolts was used as a basis to argue for common features 
with other revolts or outbreaks of unrest. The accretion of further revolts under the 
‘bacaudic’ umbrella testified to the significance of the revolts and its influence in other 
matters. Most notably, he argued for the existence of widespread bacaudic revolts in 
Britain and that the settlement of the Visigoths in Aquitane was an attempt to prevent 
the spread of the bacaudic menace from the north of the Loire.320 
Responses to Thompson’s argument were varied. Some accepted the thesis in general, 
while others chose to accept his assertion that the Bacaudae were peasants in revolt, but 
chose to reject their wider associations or downplay their historical significance.321 The 
                                                          
319 The earliest and fundamental statement of his understanding is E. A. Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolts in 
Late Roman Gaul and Spain’, Past and Present, 2, (1952), 11-23. Other contributions to the topic are 
found in various other works, notably; Romans and Barbarians: the Decline of the Western Empire 
(London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982), Saint Germanus of Auxerre and the end of Roman 
Britain (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1984), ‘Zosimus 6. 10. 2 and the Letters of Honorius’ in The 
Classical Quarterly, 32. 2 (1982) 445-462 and ‘The Settlement of the Barbarians in Southern Gaul’ in 
The Journal of Roman Studies, 46 (1956), 65-75. 
320 See ‘Zosimus 6. 10. 2 and the Letters of Honorius’ and ‘The Settlement of the Barbarians in Southern 
Gaul’. 
321 Many general histories that discuss Gaul in Late Antiquity devote some time to the Bacaudae or refer 
to their activities. Most of these, however, have maintained the basics of either the Thompson or Van 
Dam schools of thought, either in part or in entirety. For examples of such coverage in passing, or at 
greater depth, see; Peter Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire: A New history of Rome and the Barbarians 
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most strident argument to the contrary was voiced by Raymond Van Dam.322 No 
historian is detached from their context, so it is perhaps unsurprising that the Marxist 
interpretation of Thompson was most critically opposed in an American publication in 
the 1980s! In a detailed and fascinating rethink of the bacaudic material, with particular 
focus on the evidence for the third century, Van Dam instead proposed that the unrest 
was prompted by patterns of imperial engagement with the territories in northern Gaul. 
When the Emperor or his court was present or nearby, especially at Trier, the patronage 
that trickled down kept the local aristocracies closely engaged with the centralising 
project of Empire. When Imperial influence decreased however, and especially during 
times of warfare, the local elites were inclined to look to their own devices. Van Dam 
argued that the Bacaudae, far from being peasant revolutionaries, were in fact the 
retinues of local aristocracies who were sometimes derided in pejorative terms by the 
sources representing the central Empire which have survived into the modern day.  
The variance between these interpretations cannot be underestimated. At root this 
dispute was an ideological opposition between arguments which either assumed or 
rejected inherent conflict between social classes. Indeed, when Van Dam claimed that 
the ideology for ‘social reversal’ simply did not exist in Late Antiquity, he was not only 
rejecting the specifics of Thompson’s interpretation of the Bacaudae, but also one of the 
central tenets of the Marxist historical model.323 It is important to stress that many other 
contributions have been made to the debate, and works by J. Drinkwater, V. Neri and J. 
C. Sánchez León have also been influential, as we shall see. Indeed, neither Thompson 
                                                          
(London: Pan, 2006), p. 283; Adrian Goldsworthy, The Fall of the West: The Death of the Roman 
Superpower (London: Phoenix, 2010), pp. 159-50, p. 359. Christopher Kelly, Attila the Hun: Barbarian 
Terror and the Fall of the Roman Empire (London: Vintage, 2008), pp. 83-5; Peter Brown, Through the 
Eye of a Needle (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 403; Wickham, Framing the 
Early Middle Ages, pp. 529-33. 
322 R. Van Dam, Leadership and Community in Late Antique Gaul, (London: University of California, 
1985), pp. 25-56. 
323 Van Dam, p. 41. 
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nor Van Dam nor receives much unreserved support. However, because the rival 
arguments of Van Dam and Thompson represent the poles of interpretation on the 
spectrum of bacaudic historiography, their juxtaposition will take a prominent place in 
this chapter. 
It will perhaps surprise the reader then to hear that there is a point of reconciliation 
between these differing interpretations of the role and identity of the Bacaudae in history. 
Thompson was surely incautious in drawing a direct link between the rather dubious 
accounts of revolt by Bulla Felix and Maternus and the later uprisings of the Bacaudae 
in the third and fifth centuries, but it is possible that there remains some correlation. 
Indeed, Thompson was quite correct to recognise that these events seem to have occurred 
in similar contexts of substantial military and political upheaval, either regionally or 
across the Empire.324 Van Dam likewise supposed that a lack of direct imperial 
involvement in the regions afflicted by bacaudic unrest was responsible for necessitating 
the self-help actions of local aristocrats.325 This common ground between otherwise 
irreconcilable interpretations attests to the importance of context. As we have seen in 
the previous chapters, outbreaks of epidemic banditry – such as those that were attributed 
to the leadership of Bulla Felix and Maternus – most typically occurred in a context of 
military reversal. In the aftermath of defeat the army was less able to impose control, 
waves of deserters could be released and economic hardship or instability could fuel 
considerable increases in banditry.326 If the premise of epidemic banditry, as I have 
argued, is accepted, could the rebellion of the Bacaudae be included within this 
interpretation? It is the intent of this chapter to demonstrate the validity of including the 
revolts of the Bacaudae within this phenomenon. In this sense, it should be seen to 
directly follow on from the previous chapter. However, given that the study of the 
                                                          
324 Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolts’, pp. 17-19. 
325 Van Dam, pp. 41-55. 
326 See above, section 2.1.  
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Bacaudae has provoked such contention among historians, it is necessary to treat them 
as an isolated case. Fortunately, the significance of the Bacaudae as a social movement 
merits discussion at some length. However, the final sections of this chapter will attempt 
to directly integrate the Bacaudae within our understanding of patterns of banditry in 
Late Antiquity, and in particular the developments in this form of lower-class violence 
during the years of transition from the Roman Empire to its successor states. 
 
3.1. Context for ‘Bacaudic’ Rebellion: Historiography and History.  
E. A. Thompson’s controversial article ‘Peasant Revolts in late Roman Gaul and Spain’ 
lists a number of separate rebellions as part of the bacaudic phenomenon. This list has 
been strongly criticised for ascribing bacaudic character to uprisings that are never 
described by the authors themselves as bacaudic on the basis of circumstantial 
evidence.327 These various episodes of unrest were only precariously linked by an 
unsettled political context and geographic proximity (the latter factor here has itself been 
questioned).328 Moreover, he developed notions of what made the bacaudic revolts 
distinct based heavily on evidence that derived from sources that described episodes of 
unrest that Thompson believed were bacaudic, but were not labelled as such in the 
evidence. 
Raymond Van Dam, in an influential rebuttal published in 1985, proposed a radically 
different alternative. Instead of Thompson’s peasant revolutionaries, he proposed that 
‘Bacaudae’ was a belittling label applied to authors from the imperial heartlands to 
                                                          
327 Drinkwater is perhaps the most prominent critic of the evidential basis of Thompson’s attribution of 
bacaudic character to various episodes of unrest, particularly in Gaul and Armorica. J. Drinkwater, ‘The 
Bacaudae of fifth-century Gaul’ in Fifth-Century Gaul: a crisis of identity? Ed. by J. Drinkwater and H. 
Elton (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1992), pp. 208-17. 
328 Again, the most significant critiques are found in Van Dam, pp. 25-41 and J. Drinkwater, ‘The 
Bacaudae of fifth-century Gaul’, pp. 208-17. 
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describe unruly behaviour in peripheral regions of Gaul. He plotted evidence for the 
relationships between the northern Gallic aristocracies and the Imperial court and 
proposed that in times where the court was distant – being centred at Arles, Milan or 
Ravenna as opposed to Trier – those aristocracies tended to become more unruly, or look 
to their own defences. In the unsettled times of the 280s and 410-40s in Gaul, he 
supposed that the disturbances labelled as ‘bacaudic’ were in fact the actions of those 
neglected northern aristocracies, who formed self-help bands to defend themselves and 
assert their desires. However, despite the extreme contrast between this interpretation 
and Thompson’s, they both suffer from similar flaws. Each rightly notices patterns in 
geographic location and unsettled context, yet both present models for bacaudic 
character based on doubtful evidence. In Thompson’s case he is incautious about 
ascribing both events and defining characteristics under the ‘bacaudic banner’, while 
Van Dam makes an association to the actions of aristocracies which is largely 
speculative and, in fact, seems to run directly contrary to our evidence. 
It is perhaps these underlying difficulties that have resulted in the contentious 
historiography for the Bacaudae. Even Thompson considered that subject ‘his King 
Charles’ Head’, whilst scholars since have sought to avoid contenting with the 
material.329 The bacaudic question has even been described as ‘vexed’.330 However, for 
the purposes of this investigation, it is exactly those circumstantial associations – like 
context and geography – that might prove to be the most revealing. The criticism of both 
Thompson and Van Dam’s interpretations is that their notions of bacaudic character do 
not seem to fit with the evidence that we have. It is hoped that through analysis of the 
evidence that a different interpretation of what it was to be a bacauda can be established 
– namely that these episodes can fit beneath the accommodating umbrella notion of 
                                                          
329 J. Drinkwater, ‘Review’, The Classical Review, Vol. 49, No. 1, (1999) 287-8 (p. 287). 
330 R. Samson, ‘Slavery: the Roman legacy’ in Fifth-Century Gaul: a crisis of identity? Ed. by J. 
Drinkwater and H. Elton (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1992), pp. 218-227 (p. 224). 
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banditry.331 If the episodes that have been taken as evidence for the Bacaudae, both 
explicitly bacaudic and otherwise, can be found to fit into the framework of epidemic 
banditry as has been outlined above, then we may be able to both shed light onto the 
mysterious identity of the Bacaudae and fit them into a more valid long-term pattern of 
social unrest in the later Roman Empire. Moreover, if the Bacaudae can be said to fit 
within the category of epidemic bandits, then we may be able to shed light on what 
particular details about their activities or context caused them not to be called latrones, 
but Bacaudae.  
Firstly however, it is important to understand the material that has been described as 
bacaudic, why it was described thus, and what details for bacaudic character emerged 
from those sources according to existing historiographical interpretations. In order to do 
so, I will attempt a discussion of the bacaudic material recognised by Thompson and 
Van Dam as a way of elucidating both the historiography and an introduction to the 
subject. The earliest uprising in Thompson’s list of bacaudic events, the revolt of 
Maternus, occurred from c.186, and resulted in the creation of a ‘powerful [rebel] army, 
a combination of soldiers, peasants, and others, whose history was the first act in the 
long tale of the Bacaudae.’332 The uprising, led by a soldier turned brigand, was severe 
enough that, for once, the latrones came to be considered as genuine hostes – a reputable, 
almost worthy opponent for the Roman state.333 Thompson contrasted this uprising with 
that of Bulla Felix, which he also considered broadly bacaudic in character, but insisted 
that the ‘difference [between them], it seems, is the difference between robbery and 
                                                          
331 No less a scholar than Peter Brown has described such projects as fantastical, so a particularly 
cautious and tentative approach is required (Peter Brown, Through the Eye of a Needle, p. 403). 
Nevertheless, as with most studies of lower-class people in pre-modern times, a certain amount of 
theoretical thought is required. It is hoped that this is a worthwhile pursuit, if for no greater purpose than 
to encourage more thought about the lives of common people in the ancient world.   
332 Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolts’, p. 12.  
333 See above, pp. 27-8.  
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something like revolution’.334 Scale was the defining factor in this. Though both bands 
were comprised of brigands, led by deserters and violently defied their Emperors, 
Maternus demanded the attentions of armies, whilst Bulla, at best, led six hundred men. 
Thompson is happy to concede that Bulla lived in secret, relying on the goodwill of 
peasants and slaves who he rhetorically championed, but insists that the size of the forces 
available to Maternus must have necessitated the seizure and appropriation of 
aristocratic estates within the territories he conquered. Because of this, ‘the character of 
[Maternus’] movement must be sharply distinguished from the mere routine brigandage 
which could be found in all corners of the Empire at that time, and the suppression of 
which was part of the day-to-day duties of the armed forces of the government; for the 
ordinary brigands were scarcely concerned to win control of large tracts of the provinces 
and to expropriate the landowners.335 For Thompson this was the feature that 
distinguished the Bacaudae from mere bandits; bandits might be allies of the poor and 
symptomatic of oppression, but the Bacaudae were attempted a reversal of the social 
hierarchy. 
The first appearance of the Bacaudae proper (i.e. an episode that is definitively labelled 
as bacaudic in the evidence) seems to have begun in c.283-4 whilst the Emperor Carinus 
was troubled with barbarian incursions on the frontiers. After the accession of Diocletian 
the state was able to turn its attention to the uprising of the Bacaudae, led by two 
individuals called Amandus and Aelianus. Diocletian appointed Maximian as his co-
emperor in the west and tasked him with the mission of destroying the Bacaudae, which 
he accomplished in a single year. A more detailed discussion of these events will be 
provided below. For the time being however, it is worthwhile emphasising that this 
episode of bacaudic revolt attracted relatively lesser attention from Thompson. He noted 
                                                          
334 Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolts’ p. 15. 
335 Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolts’ p. 14. 
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that the sources tended to stress the rural origins of the participants in the revolt, but 
provided little more elaboration since those sources offer little reason for the actual 
causes of the rebellion or the motivations of the individual rebels.336 
Following this outbreak a considerable lull occurred, punctuated only by a few outbreaks 
of brigandage in Gaul under the reign of Valentinian I, until the most major bacaudic 
event according to Thompson’s interpretation. This revolt apparently arose in 407 in the 
context of invasions and usurpations and lasted until around 417 when they were finally 
crushed, after a decade, by a campaign commanded by Exuperantius. Unfortunately for 
Thompson’s argument, this great revolt can no longer be reasonably considered 
‘bacaudic.’ Indeed, it was the source material for this revolt that has attracted the 
strongest rebuttal from critics of Thompson’s interpretation. Drinkwater, for example, 
described the use of Rutilius Namatianus and the Querolus to determine the character of 
bacaudic revolts as ‘inadmissible’.337 The centre of the supposed revolt was north of the 
Loire, and though there is evidence for unrest, or even peasant revolt in that time and 
place, it is nowhere described as the activity of Bacaudae. Indeed, the only reference to 
the Bacaudae during those years comes from the Alps, where a group described by 
Zosimus as ‘Bacaudae’ waylaid the Roman general Sarus and captured his baggage.338 
Furthermore, this ‘great revolt’ can hardly have posed very stern opposition; 
Exuperantius, unlike Maximian, was certainly not a major military leader and his 
campaign may even have been undertaken as a private citizen.339  
                                                          
336 Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolts’ pp. 15-16. 
337 Drinkwater, ‘The Bacaudae of fifth-century Gaul’, p. 209. 
338 Zosimus, New History, (6. 2), trans. by R. T. Ridley (Sydney: Australian Association for Byzantine 
Studies, 1982), p. 127. This passage is particularly problematic. Zosimus is a routinely unreliable 
source, and though he does use the term Bacaudae, it is not absolutely certain that he meant the term to 
mean any more than ‘bandit’. See below, section 3.5. 
339 Van Dam, pp. 41-2. Exuperantius’ status is likely to remain uncertain; he may have been a 
commander within the military and even if he was a private citizen, they could – as we have seen – 
wield considerable violent power. A. Wallace-Hadrill, Patronage in Ancient Society (London: 
Routledge, 1989), p. 198. 
 137 
 
Nevertheless, though one can refute Thompson’s conclusions regarding the scale, 
intensity and character of the supposed 407-17 revolt, it does seem that some unrest 
occurred in the northern Gallic provinces during those years. The evidence raised by 
Thompson, though it may not be evidence for ‘Bacaudae’, still suggests some 
disturbance. For example, Zosimus records that Armorica followed Britain in rebellion 
in 409 by ousting magistrates, disregarding Roman law and governing themselves.340 
Moreover, whilst it is true that using sources for unrest that do not refer to the Bacaudae 
as evidence for bacaudic motivations is incautious, that does not invalidate the use of 
that evidence in general. The comedy Querolus, which is generally dated to the first half 
of the fifth century, refers to ‘natural’ law holding sway across the Loire, where rustics 
perorate, sentences are pronounced under the boughs of an oak and are recorded on 
bones.341 Additionally, a passage in De Reditu Suo, by Rutilius Namatianus, (to whom 
the Querolus might be dedicated) describes how Exuperantius, an Imperial official and 
kinsman of Rutilius, ‘trains the Armoric sea-board to love the recovery of peace: he re-
establishes laws, brings freedom back and suffers not the inhabitants to be their servants 
slaves’.342 These passages were of central importance in Thompson’s interpretation in 
the revolutionary character of the Bacaudae; the passage in De Reditu Suo demonstrated 
their ideology of social reversal, whilst the pejorative description of a rustic judicial 
system was the evidence of an alternate state created by the peasant revolutionaries in 
opposition to Rome.343 We should now reasonably doubt the ‘bacaudic’ nature of these 
events, and we should certainly not assume a decade-long, coherent ‘bacaudic 
alternative’ to Rome north of the Loire in the early fourth century.344 Yet in looser 
                                                          
340 Thompson, Saint Germanus of Auxerre and the end of Roman Britain, p. 32.  
341 Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolts’, pp. 18-19. 
342 Rutilius Namatianus ‘De Reditu Suo’ in Minor Latin Poets by J. W. and A. M. Duff, p. 783. 
Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolt’, p. 19; for the dedication.  
343 Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolts’, p. 19. 
344 Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolts’, p. 18,  took this to be certain; ‘What is certain is that the Bacaudae 
intended to detach themselves altogether from the Roman Empire and set up an independent State of 
their own.’  
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conjunction, they may still imply opposition to Rome, or at least a lack of centralised 
authority in the region – conditions in which epidemic banditry could flourish.  
Further and final rebellions of the Gallic Bacaudae occurred in the 430s and 440s. The 
most notable, led by a certain Tibatto, is documented by the Chronicle of 452 as having 
occurred in 435 and been quelled in 437. This outbreak seems to be alluded to in 
panegyrics by Merobaudes and Sidonius Apollinaris, and is mentioned in the Vita 
Germani. Thompson miscalculated the length of this revolt and proposed that it 
continued to c.444 on the basis of a misdating of the activities and death of St. Germanus, 
but it does seem that some trouble continued since as late as 448 an individual bacauda, 
named Eudoxius, fled from the Empire to Attila’s territory outside the Empire. More or 
less contemporary are the several rebellions by Spanish Bacaudae that are recorded by 
the chronicle of Hydatius, dated to 441, 443, 446, 449 and 454.345 These later events, 
from the 430s onward in Gaul and Spain represent our best evidence for the Bacaudae. 
Though the sources are not unproblematic, they are far more contemporary than the 
remaining sources for the third-century Bacaudae and refer to the rebels as Bacaudae 
more or less explicitly. They were however less useful for Thompson, since the laconic 
chronicle entries lacked the evidence of social aims and policy that most interested him. 
Together, according to the argument of Thompson, this corpus of evidence represented 
the scant remaining detail of a disposition of unrest and revolution that existed among 
the peasantries of the Western provinces for almost three centuries. However, when 
shorn of a connecting thread of ‘bacaudic’ nature, the correlation between these events, 
                                                          
345 The sources for the fifth-century Bacaudae will be discussed at greater length below, section 3.3. Most 
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which otherwise represent a relatively thorough and inclusive narrative of rural unrest 
in these provinces during the period, is rather less certain. 
This overview has highlighted the major outbreaks of bacaudic activity according to 
Thompson; namely the Maternus rebellion, the revolt against Carinus and Maximian 
ending in c.284, the c.406-417 outbreak, that led by Tibatto in the 430s and the Spanish 
Bacaudae intermittently from 441-454. As we have seen, the relationship between these 
events is doubtful, especially if we believe bacaudic identity to be defined by social 
‘polices’ obliquely referenced to in material that does not refer to the Bacaudae. With 
these problems in mind, we cannot reasonably assign all these events within a ‘bacaudic’ 
phenomenon as Thompson described. However, as has been alluded to above, the model 
of epidemic banditry is far more inclusive, and could perhaps help us to understand why 
the bacaudic revolts took place. Interestingly, Thompson was aware that a tradition of 
banditry could adequately link these events. Yet he did not think traditional banditry – 
what we might term endemic – could really cause disruption on such a scale. It was 
because of this that Thompson drew such a distinction between Bulla Felix the 
robber/latro and Maternus the revolutionary bacauda; the latter was able to build armies 
and appropriate estates from landowners; projects Thompson considered to be beyond 
the capability of brigands. This might be a reasonable assertion in the case of endemic 
bandits, who relied on a certain obscurity and isolation in order to shelter them from the 
violent response of the state. Perhaps for Thompson, the definition of bandits implies 
small scale actions by peasants with traditions of banditry. But day-to-day bandits, like 
the humble shepherd-bandit, or even Bulla Felix, could be described in the same 
terminology of latrocinium as more serious military rivals such as Maternus. It is up to 
modern historians and social scientists to describe and theorise further sub-categories 
that might help elucidate complex social phenomena that attract attention today. Based 
on such sub-categories, as we have seen, it has been proposed by this investigation that 
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epidemic banditry in the Roman Empire had a rather different character. Its existence 
was provoked by the weaknesses or defeats that the state suffered, and fuelled by 
deserters and fugitives, it could present a weakened state with rather more formidable 
opposition.346 Just a few years prior to the rebellions of the fifth-century Bacaudae, 
epidemic banditry had provoked an extraordinary and unprecedented set of policies from 
the court of Honorius. Centuries of proscription of legitimate interpersonal violence – 
the ideological bane of the pax Romana itself – were swept away because the state was 
unable to defend its citizens.347 In this case the primary concern was not barbarians, or 
usurpers, but bandits. In light of this, the scale of bacaudic activity does not seem 
sufficient reason to preclude it from falling within the category of banditry.   
In additional to underestimating the potential for disruption that epidemic banditry could 
cause, Thompson also seems to have failed to properly understand the strength of 
connections that linked the bandit to his community; whether they be humble peasants 
or wealthier landowners. He was certainly aware that bandits did not operate in isolation, 
and was aware that they could form connections with citizens of honestiorial status. For 
example, he noted the interaction between Theon and certain brigands in the endnotes 
of ‘Peasant Revolts’ and related the tale of a third-century bandit/usurper who hailed 
from a landowning ancestry and could outfit a band of two thousand followers from his 
own estates.348 Yet in spite of these episodes, he considered the seizure and 
administration of estates by Maternus and the fifth-century Bacaudae a prime feature 
that demonstrated that they were greater than mere robbers.349 However, as we have 
seen, connection and even co-operation between bandits (and rural enforcers who might 
                                                          
346 Thompson was surely aware that defeats could fuel severe outbreaks of brigandage, but did not 
attempt to integrate this phenomenon into his Bacaudae thesis; Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolts’, endnote 
12, p. 21. 
347 See above, pp. 89-91. 
348 Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolts’, endnote 12, p. 21 and see above, p. 45 and pp. 66-8 for more 
discussion of these episodes.  
349 Thompson, ‘Peasant Revolts’ p. 14.  
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easily be labelled bandits) and landowners was far from rare; indeed it might well have 
been unthinkable for ‘bandits’ to operate without a wealthy patron in some regions. The 
boundaries between brigands, rural enforcers and pseudo-military retainers like 
bucellarii were surely blurry at the best of times. In a context of military disruption, 
usurpation, desertion and widespread brigandage these distinctions may have fallen 
away entirely.350 
Given the evidence for interactions between latrones and the proprietors or overseers of 
estates, the administrative achievements of the more long-term rebellions, like those of 
Maternus and the fifth-century Bacaudae, no longer seem to definitively distinguish 
them from brigandage.351 If the Bacaudae were bent on social reversal then such 
relationships would have been unthinkable, but given that the evidence of De Reditu Suo 
and the Querolus can no longer be considered unproblematic evidence of bacaudic social 
aims, then ideological barriers no longer seem impermeable. We should not, of course, 
consider leaders of rebellions like Maternus, Amandus and Aelianus and Tibatto to be 
the mere playthings of aristocratic patrons, since they clearly had significant power in 
their own rights. However, the relatively small scale parallel example of Theon’s 
relationship with his bandit accomplices perhaps reveals how easily an aristocrat could 
fall under the sway of men of violence.352 In a context of war and unrest, it does not 
seem inconceivable the estate proprietors were the junior partners in relationships with 
powerful brigand leaders.    
If we can presume, on the basis of this re-evaluation of Thompson’s ‘bacaudic’ evidence, 
that the categories of ‘bandit’ and ‘Bacaudae’ are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
then what are the implications for the alternate interpretation of Van Dam? His proposal, 
                                                          
350 See below, sections 4.2 and 4.3.  
351 See above, pp. 65-6. 
352 Ausonius, Epistle 13, 22-7 and p. 65. 
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in contrast to that of Thompson, was that the Bacaudae were informal groups of retainers 
that were employed by local leaders and aristocracies in Gaul at times when Imperial 
influence was at a low ebb. Though these groups were seen as suspicious or hostile from 
the perspective of the imperial centre – hence the use of pejorative language such as 
‘Bacaudae’ – Van Dam stressed that their project was not separatist, and certainly not 
revolutionary. They were simply looking to their own devices at a time when the 
unstable political context demanded a level of defence that the state was failing to 
provide.353  
As previously mentioned, the point of reconciliation between these two pervasive battle-
lines of bacaudic historiography is that both agree that the unrest took place in a context 
of reduced imperial influence in the afflicted regions. Van Dam’s proposal that 
‘Bacaudae’ was a ‘belittling epithet’ used by centralist authors to describe the loyalist 
self-help groups formed by aristocrats in troubled districts in northern Gaul certainly 
does not seem incompatible with a closer association of bandit and Bacaudae.354 Based 
on the considerable evidence of association between bandits and landowners, this 
interpretation certainly seems plausible.  
One certainly cannot claim, unequivocally, that the Bacaudae were inimical to 
aristocracies or did not have relationships with Romans of honestiorial status. Moreover 
lower-class men of violence – especially retainers, but also rioters and bandits – could 
and did participate in relationships with those higher up the late antique social hierarchy. 
However, it must be stressed that the evidence of aristocrats as participants in the 
movement of the Bacaudae is almost completely lacking. No participants can be said to 
be of honestiorial status, and it seems that, at least in the context of the 430s revolt in 
northern Gaul, the aristocracies tended to want (not unreasonably!) to be elsewhere when 
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bacaudic unrest (or any unrest!) was underway. In the Querolus the eponymous 
landowner, for whose petulant complaining the poem is named, shies away from the 
prospect of greater power north of the Loire. Though his desire was to despoil and strike 
at both his neighbours and those unconnected to him, he did not desire a life of 
latrocinium or being subject to the laws of the forest in that unsettled region.355 In this 
hesitancy his perspective was surely representative of many landowning 
contemporaries. The situation in northern and eastern Gaul had been thrown into 
upheaval in c.407 by the arrival of both the usurping Emperor Constantine III in 
Boulogne from Britain, and the crossing of the Rhine frontier by the Alans, Vandals and 
Sueves. The barbarians proceeded to pillage the towns and countryside of Gaul whilst 
the usurping army occupied itself with both fighting loyalists and a brisk descent into 
infighting.356 It must be emphasised that these events created a considerable degree of 
conflict within Gaul. North-eastern Gaul had suffered heavily at the hands of the Rhine 
invaders as the list of towns sacked by them, recorded by St. Jerome, emphasises: Mainz, 
Worms, Reims, Amiens, Arras, Tournai, Speyer and Strasbourg all feature.357 It has been 
estimated that military losses during these years, based on the Notitia Dignitatum, 
totalled around 47.5% of units destroyed or disbanded due to casualties and desertion, 
with the attrition rate especially high among the Rhine garrison.358   
During this time the aristocracy clearly suffered. Rutilius Namatianius, for example, 
fled Gaul at this time and penned De Reditu Suo in anticipation of a rejuvenation of 
Roman power in the region. The troubles of Paulinus of Pella provide an equivalent 
example: his grand estates were ruined by invaders and he was forced to retire, poverty 
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stricken, to his remaining lands in the south.359 His story, and that of Rutilius, parallel 
the route trodden by many of the northern Gallic nobility; they found their lands either 
dangerous or unprofitable and they fled to the south, in particular to the monastery of 
Lérins, founded largely by northern refugees (c. 410). This institution notably included 
the monks Honoratus, Hilary, Lupus and Vicentius who all seems to have hailed from 
Lugdunensis.360 Those that could, unlike the unfortunate Paulinus, brought their 
moveable wealth and bought up available lands in the south.361 Though Rutilius 
Namatianus did attempt to return to Gaul in 417, with the perceived ordo renovatio 
underway, he met several fellow honestiorial refugees en route who still felt that Italy 
was a safer abode.362 It is clear that many aristocrats suffered during the early decades 
of the fifth century in Gaul. Imperial officials were targeted by usurpers, whilst loyalists 
were quick to purge aristocrats who were too enthusiastic in their support for their 
enemies such as Apollinaris (grandfather of Sidonius Apollinaris) and Decimus 
Rusticus, the praetorian prefect of Constantine III.363  Furthermore, whilst Rutilius 
clearly believed the situation to be fruitful enough to attempt a recovery of his estates in 
417, the reassertion of Roman authority in the late 410s in Gaul was a temporary 
recovery. Indeed, even in the relatively settled year of 418, the Council of Arles – 
convened to renew civil administration in Gaul after the disturbances since 407 – only 
called officials from the seven provinces of southern Gaul. It seems that even 
administrators from the Gothic controlled districts in Aquitaine were seen as more likely 
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to contribute to renewal than anyone from north of the Loire.364 The conditions only 
deteriorated with the death of Constantius III in 421 which plunged the Empire back 
into infighting. Warfare and uncertainty was renewed in Southern Gaul as 
generalissimos and usurpers fought to influence Honorius and, after his death in 423, 
Galla Placidia and her son the infant Valentinian III. Furthermore the barbarians 
renewed their activities; the Visigoths began to expand and attacked Arles, the Gallic 
capital, in 427. The city was saved that year by magister militum Felix and Aetius and 
the war halted by 430, but Aetius proceeded to assassinate Felix in 430 and kill another 
general, Boniface, in battle two years later. The political fallout from this indiscretion 
was sufficient to drive Aetius into exile with the Huns until his reconciliation with Galla 
Placidia in 433.365 Throughout these years authority throughout much of Gaul was 
tenuous and uncertain. Those with considerable power tended toward squabbling for 
titles and imperial influence so that the now semi-peripheral north of Gaul, if it ever 
truly returned to Imperial hands after 407, was once again overlooked by the machinery 
of the state. In such circumstances we can be reasonably certain that the greater part of 
the northern Gallic honestiorial classes were rather embattled. Not only may they have 
felt distaste – as Querolus did – for direct association with the uncouth activities of 
bandits or Bacaudae, but it seems that a sizeable portion of them were displaced by the 
unsettled political climate in the first decades of the fifth century. Given this hostile 
context, it is perhaps not surprising that there is no solid evidence of aristocratic 
involvement in the bacaudic disturbances. 
That is not to say that power structures or romanitas disappeared. The context might not 
have been particularly hospitable for northern aristocracies and the apparatus of the 
Roman administration, but those traditions were durable and long established. We can 
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discern, for example, that at least some authority existed in the region of Armorica 
during the 430s, perhaps centred on urban districts, even though this region seems to 
have been afflicted by revolt at exactly that time. The Vita Germani reveals that at least 
some of these were still liable for taxation since the bishop of Auxerre appealed to the 
praetorian prefect for remission of that obligation (although the need for a remission 
may itself indicate that state administration north of the Loire was less than 
flourishing).366 While there is no evidence of aristocratic involvement among the 
Bacaudae, it does not preclude involvement at some level. Moreover, it seems probable 
that those aristocrats and honestiorial persons who remained would have taken steps to 
secure and protect both their status and property. In such cases, Van Dam is surely along 
the right lines, and archaeological evidence would seem to confirm that the northern 
Gallic aristocracies were involved in significant competition for power in an effort to 
assure their positions.367 
Yet while it would be foolish to argue that traditional Roman power structures had 
disappeared from northern Gaul during the first half of the fifth century, it cannot 
however be taken as evidence for aristocratic leadership of the Bacaudae. For such 
leadership, no solid evidence exists. The ‘people of Armorica’ who were in rebellion 
under Tibatto (the Vita Germani does not mention the term Bacaudae, but the 
connection is certain as the date in c.437 and leadership of Tibatto links this evidence 
directly to the bacaudic revolt mentioned in the chronicle of 452) did send a delegation 
to Germanus to intercede on their behalf against looming destruction at the hands of 
barbarian federates, but this certainly need not have been a deputation composed of 
honestiorial emissaries. Indeed, according the Vita composed by Constantius of Lyon 
c.480, the saint was a favourite of the people and was perhaps the ideal intermediary 
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between rebelling peasants and the legitimate upper echelons of the Roman state who 
had ordered the destruction of the Bacaudae.368  
In fact, the only certain association of higher status elements within the Bacaudae seems 
to derive from Salvian who, in an oft quoted passage, laments the condition of the 
common people and curiales of Gaul who were burdened by taxation and oppressed by 
powerful neighbours:  
‘All the while, the poor are despoiled, the widows groan, the orphans are tread underfoot, 
so much that many of them, and they are not of obscure birth and have received a liberal 
education, flee to the enemy lest they die from the pain of public persecution.’369 
Some have taken this passage to imply that the composition of the Bacaudae was of 
higher status, but this claim is doubtful.370 It must be noted firstly, that the enemy in 
question are barbarians rather than Bacaudae, although they were fairly closely 
associated in the rhetoric of Salvian, who juxtaposed the simplicity and morality of their 
uncivilised existences with the moral outrages of his Roman society. Nevertheless, the 
distinction is significant. No one would dispute that wealthy Romans might exist and 
thrive in regions dominated by barbarians. These remained thoroughly Roman, and were 
probably no less well administered than areas that were still directly controlled by the 
Empire. The proposition that they might flee to peripheral regions dominated, or at least 
afflicted by rebellion is far less certain. Moreover, it is clear that Salvian stressed the 
greater social status of certain refugees in order to emphasise or even exaggerate his 
point; by noting the plight of educated persons he could stress the severity of the 
                                                          
368 Constantius of Lyon, Vita Germani, 19.  
369 Salvian, 5. 5, trans. in The Writings of Salvian the Presbyter, trans. J. F. O’Sullivan (Washington: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1977), p. 135. 
370 Drinkwater, for example, takes this comment as reason to exclude the peasantry from involvement 
with the Bacaudae; ‘The Bacaudae of fifth-century Gaul’, p. 213. 
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situation to elite, literate members of his audience.371 We should certainly not assume 
that the richer echelons of society composed a majority of fugitives who headed the 
relative ‘Wild West’ north of the Loire. Indeed, as we have already seen, the flow of 
honestiorial refugees seems to have had a firmly southward trajectory.  
There are several named bacaudic leaders, who would presumably be of aristocratic 
heritage if Van Dam’s theory is to be accepted. Alas, as with most matters that relate to 
the Bacaudae, detail is generally lacking. Nevertheless, is probably worth reviewing the 
evidence for these leaders. The earliest recorded leaders who are positively associated 
with Bacaudae are Amandus and Aelianus who were of primary significance among the 
Bacaudae in the early 280s according to Eutropius, Orosius and Aurelius Victor. These 
leaders are sometimes referred to as Emperors, or usurpers, but there is little reason to 
do so. The only evidence of an imperial claim by them comes from a Greek translation 
of Eutropius by Paeanius, and this denotation does not appear in the original.372 It seems 
likely that Paeanius was unfamiliar with the revolt, and assumed it belonged to the 
succession of usurpations in the third century. Following on, we have three further 
named Bacaudae who were active in the fifth century. Tibatto, a leader among the 
Bacaudae from 435-7, despite appearing in two sources, has no detail attached to his 
name in the sources. Van Dam proposes that he might have been a local aristocrat, and 
cites Barnes who suggested that Tibatto might be a suitable candidate for an otherwise 
mysterious novus exul (new exile) who appears before the emperor Valentinian III and 
                                                          
371 Van Dam, p. 44, notices that Salvian spends more time discussing the well-born and educated men 
who were fleeing, but does not realise the rhetoric significance that even the better off were struggling 
due to the immorality of Roman society. This point only serves to emphasise the plight of the poor in 
Salvian’s narrative. Moreover, at other points in the text, Salvian clearly describes the afflicted who 
became Bacaudae as pauperes 5. 5, and humiliores 5. 7. In the latter passage, he claims that the social and 
judicial problems that were the cause of the bacaudic revolt were common to almost all the lower classes: 
Ita ergo et cum omnibus ferme humilioribus agitur. Salviani presbyteri Massiliensis Libri qui supersunt, 
ed. by Carl Halm, MGH AA, 1.2 (Berlin: Weidmann, 1877). 
372 See Van Dam, p. 30n. There are supposedly coins minted by Amandus, but these are considered 
suspect to say the least; Lawrence Okamura, ‘Social Disturbances in Late Roman Gaul: Deserters, 
Rebels and Bacaudae’ in Forms of Control and Sublimation in Antiquity, ed. Toro Yuge and Masaoki 
Doi, (Tokyo; University of Tokyo Press, 1986), 288-302, p. 293. 
 149 
 
deplored his losses in a scene in a fragmentary Merobaudes poem. However, Barnes 
himself acknowledged that the connection was tenuous and proposed Tibatto only as a 
better fit than some other known candidates.373 How that equates to Tibatto belonging 
to the Gallic aristocracy is unclear; even if Tibatto was kept as a trophy prisoner and 
taken to Rome where he bemoaned his losses and became the subject of this Merobaudes 
reference, it would not require us to understand his status to be honestiorial. In fact, 
given the likely Celtic origin of his name, it seems far more probable that he belonged 
to the humilial classes.374 Nothing at all is known of the origins of Basilius who lead 
some Bacaudae in Spain, according to Hydatius, in the 440s. His name may have had 
associations of authority in the Greek world, but the name cannot be taken as evidence 
of honestiorial origin in fifth-century Spain. Even if such an association was intended, it 
is plausible that the name was assumed, just as Roman Emperors of humble origin 
assumed names that associated them with the divine. The evidence for the final named 
bacauda, a certain Eudoxius, provides rather more insight. The Chronicle of 452 
describes him as a medicus, which precludes honestiorial origin. While Eudoxius may 
nevertheless have been free-born and wealthy, he may also have been a slave as was 
commonplace among physicians in antiquity.375 It is hopefully apparent from this list of 
known leaders of the Bacaudae that aristocratic leadership is doubtful. There is no 
positive evidence that Amandus, Aelianus or Basilius were honestiorial, whilst it is 
likely that Tibatto was humilial. Eudoxius may have had the means associated with 
artisan status, but was clearly not an aristocrat. Based on this analysis, we cannot 
                                                          
373 Barnes, ‘Merobaudes on the Imperial Family’, Phoenix, 28. 3, (1974), 314-19 (p.319): ‘It may 
nonetheless be premature to assume that Merobaudes refers either to an otherwise attested victory or to a 
known person. The description novus exul is barely apposite to an insurgent like Tibatto. Since the 
words would better suit a defeated barbarian king or prince, they might refer to an unknown victory in 
Gaul.’ 
374 For Celtic origin and survival of Celtic languages, see Barry Cunliffe, Facing the Ocean: the Atlantic 
and its peoples (Oxford: Oxford University, 2001), p. 463. 
375 Vivian Nutton, ‘From Galen to Alexander, Aspects of Medicine and Medical Practice in Late 
Antiquity’, Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Vol. 38, (1984) 1-14 (p. 12). 
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presume the existence of aristocracies at the core of the bacaudic revolts as leaders of 
‘self-help’ organisations. Nor however, does the information that we have seen reveal 
very much about the composition of the Bacaudae otherwise. It has hopefully been 
established that there are serious flaws with the existing historiographic treatment of the 
Bacaudae. There is little evidence of either a long-term revolutionary pattern of a 
bacaudic character that was bent, explicitly, on social-reversal, or of positive evidence 
for aristocratic leadership in the same movement. 
As has been stated previously, the contrast between the theories of Thompson and Van 
Dam, each representing ends of a spectrum of interpretation, has formed much of the 
basis of bacaudic historiography and has provoked this attempt at finding a proverbial 
‘third way’. Consequently, I have explained the basic tenets and the various difficulties 
with these theories, and I will continue to make reference to them throughout. However, 
it would be remiss to not acknowledge some other recent and influential scholarship. 
Significantly for the purposes of the rest of the chapter, V. Neri has emphasised the 
marginality of the Bacaudae on the basis of their geographic location and the 
terminology employed to describe them. Moreover, he has also noted the influence of 
brigands and drawn some comparison between their shared marginality.376 However, he 
nevertheless considers the scale of the Bacaudae, in the fifth century at least, to be too 
great to be the result of lower class violence and banditry alone and therefore follows 
Van Dam in assuming some local aristocratic organisation and leadership, especially in 
opposition to barbarians, though his assumptions about this leadership are more 
                                                          
376 Valerio Neri, I marginali nell'Occidente tardoantico. Poveri, infames e criminali nella nascente società 
cristiana (Bari, 1998), pp. 367-417 and, more specifically, pp. 400-417. As we have seen, Neri is aware 
of the influence of desertion on brigandage in the late fourth and early fifth centuries, but generally 
underplays the participation of the non-military lower classes in banditry in Late Antiquity, but – primarily 
on the basis of legal evidence – considered the contribution of the ex-military persons to be far more 
significant. See above, section 2.1 and also Valerio Neri, ‘Povertà, criminalità e disordine sociale nella 
tarda antichità’, pp. 198-99.  
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moderate than Van Dam’s.377 Other historians, most notably J. Drinkwater and J. C. 
Sánchez León, have attempted to elucidate the troubled historiography by a deliberate 
return to the source material. This intent is mirrored in this study, although to a much 
more specific, and less encompassing extent than Sánchez León, who has collected all 
direct and (probable) indirect references to the Bacaudae.378 Interestingly, their 
approaches divergence over what to do with this material; Drinkwater adopts a 
somewhat puritanical approach whereby he dismisses virtually all the information that 
has been said to indirectly refer to the Bacaudae and some other evidence on the basis 
of questionable manuscript evidence. There is much to be said for this approach, and he 
rightly highlights that we should not incautiously generalise about what can be said to 
be bacaudic.379 However, through such rigorous rejection of generalisation his argument 
risks becoming fragmentary, as it segregates the Bacaudae from other instances of 
violence with which they share common features. Sánchez León, by contrast, is willing 
to utilise sources, such as that of Rutilius Namatianus and the Querolus, which 
Drinkwater considers inadmissible as evidence for the Bacaudae.380 With this different 
methodology, Sánchez León attains different results; like Neri he stresses the marginal 
character of the revolt and its participants, which he identifies as largely rural poor, but 
often in association with bandits or deserters.381 However, he differs from Neri in his 
assessment of the relation of the Bacaudae to the Roman state; where Neri believes the 
bacaudic revolts to be oppositional to both Rome and barbarians, Sánchez León stresses 
the antagonism towards Rome more strongly, and consequently allows only for a much 
                                                          
377 See, for example, Neri, ‘Povertà, criminalità e disordine sociale nella tarda antichità’, pp. 205-6 
where he considers the brigand-retinue of Proculus a model for bacaudic leadership. For more on 
Proculus, see above, p. 45.   
378 J. C. Sánchez León, Les sources de l’histoire des Bagaudes. 
379 J. Drinkwater, ‘The Bacaudae of fifth-century Gaul’, pp. 208-17. 
380 J. C. Sánchez León, Los Bagaudas: rebeldes, demonios, mártires. Revueltas campesinas en Galia e 
Hispania durante el Bajo Imperio (Jaén, 1996), pp. 18-19, 35-6, 74, 87. 
381 Ibid, pp. 31-80 and especially pp. 43-44 for the role of bandits.  
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less substantial role to be played by local aristocrats.382 Significantly, by stressing 
marginality, both Neri and Sánchez León differ in their identification of the core of 
bacaudic support from Drinkwater, who, by focusing on what he considers the core texts, 
instead stresses the role of fugitives from more central territories. Nevertheless all three 
rely, to a greater or lesser degree, on the foundations laid by the strident divergence of 
Thompson and Van Dam. Arguably, any of these valuable contributions may be closer 
to the mark than their predecessors, but I would argue that some of the original faults 
still remain.  
  
3.2. Evidence for the third-century Bacaudae.  
As we have seen, there are serious flaws in the prevailing historiographical 
interpretations of the evidence for the Bacaudae. In discussing these flaws, a great deal 
has been said so far about who the Bacaudae were not. It is hoped that in this section 
more can be said about who they were. Fortunately, our sources for the general 
composition of the Bacaudae are typically more revealing than those that hint at the 
leadership of the movement. In order to make a more positive association between the 
Bacaudae and what we can discern of their composition, we shall review that relevant 
source material that can be definitively associated with the Bacaudae as well as certain 
others which were considered to be bacaudic by Thompson but which cannot be 
correlated with certainty.383 It is worthwhile paying attention to some of this tenuous 
evidence because although we cannot associate it with the Bacaudae with any certainty, 
it may nevertheless inform us about the context in which they emerged. 
                                                          
382 Ibid, p. 61 for antagonism to Rome; for the role of local aristocrats, p. 78. 
383 This approach broadly follows the example of Drinkwater, ‘The Bacaudae of fifth-century Gaul’ and 
Sánchez León, Los Bagaudas, even if my argument otherwise differs from theirs, at least to some 
degree.  
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The sources for the third-century clearly ascribe lower-class labels to their subject when 
describing the revolt of the Bacaudae. Eutropius, writing around 360 – and therefore 
nearly eighty years after the revolt – describes the Bacaudae as peasants (agrestes) and 
rustics (rusticani), and as a faction (factioni) in insurrection (tumultum).384 Aurelius 
Victor, writing at more or less the same time, mirrors the use of agrestes whilst Orosius 
too, following his example in the early fifth century, employs much the same 
terminology.385 Jerome’s Chronicle, c.380, likewise describes them as a rustic multitude 
whose faction was supressed by Maximian.386 All these sources date from seventy or 
more years after the revolt itself, and none of the authors were alive at the time. This 
presents something of a problem, not only with the specific descriptions, but with the 
very usage of the term Bacaudae, since the earliest certain references to them are almost 
                                                          
384 Eutropius on the Bacaudae: ‘He [Diocletian] thus became master of the Roman Empire; and when 
the peasants in Gaul made an insurrection, giving their faction the name of Bagaudae, and having for 
leaders Amandus and Aelianus, he despatched Maximian Herculius, with the authority of Caesar, to 
suppress them. Maximian, in a few battles of little importance, subdued the rustic multitude, and 
restored peace to Gaul.’ Trans in; Eutropius, ‘Breviarium’, 9. 20, trans. in Justin, Cornelius Nepos and 
Eutropius, trans. by John Selby Watson, (London: George Bell and Sons, 1886). 
Ita rerum Romanarum potitus cum tumultum rusticani in Gallia concitassent et factioni suae 
Bacaudarum nomen inponerent, duces autem haberent Amandum et Aelianum, ad subigendos eos 
Maximianum Herculium Caesarem misit, qui levibus proeliis agrestes domuit et pacem Galliae 
reformavit. Eutropi Breviarium ab urbe condita cum versionibus Graecis, ed. by H. Droysen, MGH AA, 
2 ((Berlin: Weidmann, 1879). Bold highlights my own.  
385 Orosius on the Bacaudae: ‘Later Amandus and Aelianus in Gaul gathered together a band of farmers, 
who were called Bacaudae, and stirred up destructive insurrections. Diocletian appointed Maximianus, 
surnamed Herculius, Caesar and sent him into the Gallic provinces. Here, by his military prowess, he 
easily put down the inexperienced and disorderly company of peasants.’ Trans in; Orosius, Seven Books 
Against the Pagans, 7. 25. 2, trans. by Irving Woodworth Raymond, (New York: Colombia University 
Press, 1936). 
dehinc cum in Gallia Amandus et Aelianus collecta rusticanorum manu, quos Bacaudas uocabant, 
perniciosos tumultus excitauissent, Maximianum cognomento Herculium Caesarem fecit misitque in 
Gallias: qui facile agrestium hominum imperitam et confusam manum militari uirtute conposuit. 
Historiarum adversum paganos libri VII, ed. and trans. by Marie-Pierre Arnaud-Lindet (Paris: Les Belles 
Lettres, 1990-1). The evidence for the Bacaudae from Aurelius Victor will be provided below (see n.396) 
when we return to focus on his account. Bold highlights my own. 
386 ‘Diocletian adopted as co-ruler Maximianus Herculius who, after suppressing a multitude of 
peasants, to whose faction he gave the name of Bacaudae, restored peace to the Gallic provinces.’ 
Diocletianus in consortium regni Herculium Maximianum assumpsit, qui rusticorum multitudine 
oppressa, quae factioni suae Bacaudarum nomen indiderat, pacem Galliis reddit. Jerome, Chronicle, 
2303, trans. by Kevin Edgecomb (Berkley: California, 205) and accessed at 
http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/jerome_chronicle_03_part2.htm 
<Accessed June 2016> Bold highlights my own. 
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as close or closer to the activities of the fifth-century revolt than to their third-century 
subject.387  
The similarity between these four sources for the third-century Bacaudae present an 
interesting possibility, since Jerome’s Chronicle was largely a translation of Eusebius’ 
earlier Chronicle, and only the material dating from 325 to 379 is original to Jerome.388 
It is not possible to know if this evidence of the Bacaudae was recorded in the Chronicle 
of Eusebius, written in 325, on which Jerome’s Chronicle is based, as the former does 
not survive in isolation. However, it seems likely that it was included, and this evidence 
would represent a more contemporary attestation of Bacaudic activity in the third 
century, but we are reliant on Jerome’s translation of Eusebius for content since the 
extant Armenian translations of Eusebius do not contain the latter portions of the text. 
Furthermore, it is tempting to believe, on the basis of common form and terminology, 
that these texts derive from a common origin, such as Eusebius. All four sources 
(Eutropius, Aurelius Victor, Jerome and Orosius) mention the appointment of Maximian 
to deal with the Bacaudae in Gaul, all refer to him as Maximian Herculius and record 
that he restored the province to peace. Three of the sources, Eutropius, Jerome and 
Orosius, use the ‘bac’ rather than ‘bag’ form of Bac/Bagaudae and all these three 
likewise use the term ‘rustic’. Similarly, Eutropius, Aurelius Victor and Orosius share 
the use of the names of bacaudic leaders Amandus and Aelianus and the term ‘agrestes’, 
whilst Eutropius and Jerome share the usage of ‘faction’. Finally, all four explain how 
the Bacaudae came by the name, although the detail differs slightly; Eutropius claims 
they called themselves by that name, Aurelius Victor notes that they were called 
                                                          
387 Van Dam, for example, is reluctant to accept the fourth-century descriptions of Bacaudae as 
reflective of third-century reality, p. 30. 
388 Stefan Rebenich, Jerome, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 12. Jerome’s project was to make Eusebius’ 
work available for Western latin-reading audiences and he seems to have included some supplementary 
details that would be of greater interest to westerners. It is possible that the detail on the bacaudic revolt 
in the 280s represents one of these original supplements. 
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Bagaudae by the local inhabitants, Jerome says Maximian gave them the label, whilst 
Orosius simply records that they were called Bacaudae.389  On the basis of these common 
forms in the texts it does seem likely that some common source was drawn upon, 
whether directly or indirectly. If Eusebius were considered a probable common source, 
then the translations from a Greek text could account for the discrepancies and remaining 
differences between them, such as the failure to mention the leaders of the rebellion in 
the account offered by Jerome. However, it is not possible to prove any common source, 
much less the identity of one. Indeed, the relatively sparse features extant in Jerome’s 
account of the revolt might indicate that Eusebius was not the common sources, or at 
least not the only one, since it would have required him to truncate Eusebius’ version 
(or for the other sources to elaborate upon it) when we might reasonably expect Jerome 
to be the most faithful copyist. Nevertheless, on the basis of Jerome’s reference to 
Bacaudae alone, it does seem quite reasonable that we can propose a probable attestation 
of the term Bacaudae in reference to the third-century revolt as early as the 320’s. If so, 
then we can assume the usage had appeared already in the early fourth century at least.  
It is significant to emphasise this point because a far more contemporary source, a 
panegyric poem from the Panegyrici Latini dating to 289, seems to make reference to 
the revolt of the Bacaudae in the 280s, but does not mention either the leadership of 
Amandus and Aelianus or the label Bacaudae itself. Given the controversial 
historiography of the Bacaudae, a lack of explicit usage of the term makes the use of the 
Panegyrici Latini as a source for the Bacaudae somewhat problematic. It has been 
presumed that because Maximian’s victory was over fellow citizens rather than external 
hostes that the panegyrist might not wish to dwell on the victory, or legitimate the revolt 
                                                          
389 See notes 384, 385 and 386 above, and 391 and 396 below for Latin and translations of the relevant 
passages for our understanding of the third-century Bacaudae.  
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overly by recording such details.390 This might very well explain why the panegyrist did 
not linger on detail, but without those detail we are nevertheless faced with a lacuna of 
seventy years between the earliest evidence of the revolt and the first use of the term 
Bacaudae in the sources. However, if we can accept that a common source was employed 
by the later sources, or that the term ‘Bacaudae’ was probably used by Eusebius within 
forty years of the rebellion, the lacuna between the Panegyrici Latini and the later 
sources can be halved. This proposed closer chronological association of evidence for 
the third-century Bacaudae is significant because it allows us to feel rather more 
confident about the validity of both the Panegyrici Latini and the later sources as 
evidence for the Bacaudae. This does not mean that the sources should be read 
uncritically, but it does at least mean that they are worth reading. It is important to stress 
that the sources can and perhaps should be listened to. Both Thompson and Van Dam 
did much to undermine the validity of the descriptions provided; for Thompson they 
were the voices of a fearful and hostile upper-class elite, whilst for Van Dam they were 
‘belittling epithets’ with which haughty centralists could deride provincial elites. It is 
hoped that the above analysis of the relationship of the sources to each other and to the 
revolt itself will go some way toward justifying a fresh look at the evidence. By doing 
so, we will ideally be able to provide more evidence for who the Bacaudae actually were.  
With that in mind, we can now continue to highlight the types of terminology used to 
assess the composition of the revolt. Significantly, the Panegyric to Maximian, which, 
as we have seen, is by far the most contemporary source, uses similar descriptive 
terminology to that employed by the later evidence. It described the revolt as one of 
                                                          
390 The editors of In Praise of Later Roman Emperors: Panegyrici Latini: introduction, translation, and 
commentary with latin text of R.A.B. Nixon, ed. by C. E. V. Nixon and Barbara Saylor Rodgers 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1994) are confident in the connection between the relevant 
passages on the Panegyrici Latini and the attestations of bacaudic revolt by later fourth-century sources. 
See p. 61, n.22 and 23 for lesser glory in conflict with Romans and panegyrist’s embarrassment over the 
subject.  
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inexperienced farmers (ignari agricolae), ploughmen (arator), shepherds (pastor) and 
rustics (rusticus).391 The labels used in the Panegyric therefore mirror the descriptions 
by Eutropius, Jerome and Orosius in usage of ‘rustic’. Meanwhile the terms agricolae 
and arator broadly parallel agrestes, which features in the accounts of Eutropius, 
Aurelius Victor and Jerome. While we cannot discount the possibility that these labels 
are intentionally belittling and do not accurately depict the leadership of the revolt, the 
theme of rural lower-class participation is significant. At the very least, this was not a 
military usurpation in the normal form; indeed the panegyric plays on the juxtaposition 
of peasant – whose social role was supposedly non-violent – taking on the roles of 
military personnel: ‘Inexperienced farmers sought military garb; the ploughman imitated 
the infantryman, the shepherd the cavalryman, the rustic ravager of his own crops the 
barbarian enemy.’ This line is heavy with invective against illegitimacy and it seems 
clear that the composition of the revolt marked it out as something different from the 
civil wars between rival imperial candidates that feature heavily in the narrative histories 
of the third-century Empire. 
Significantly for our purposes, the usage of the term pastor in the description provided 
by the panegyric might signify an acknowledgement that the disturbance was of 
brigandage-like character. As we have seen, shepherds were often considered barely 
distinguishable from bandits in the Roman Empire. A contemporary law, dating from 
                                                          
391 Panegyrici Latini, 10 (2), 4. 4. ‘Was this not similar to that calamity of two-shaped monsters in our 
lands, I know not whether to say supressed by your bravery Caesar, or calmed by your mercy? 
Inexperienced farmers sought military garb; the ploughman imitated the infantryman, the shepherd the 
cavalryman, the rustic ravager of his own crops the barbarian enemy. I pass this over in haste, for I see 
that such are your dutiful feelings that you prefer that victory to be cast into oblivion rather than 
glorified. Look what followed. Scarcely was that unhappy outburst stilled when immediately all the 
barbarian peoples threatened the destruction of the whole of Gaul…’ 
An non illud malum simile monstrorum biformium in hisce terris fuit quod tua, Caesar, nescio utrum 
magis fortudine repressum sit an clementia mitigatum, cum militaris habitus ignari agricolae 
appetiuerunt, cum arator peditem, cum pastor equitem, cum hostem barbarum suorum cultorum rusticus 
uastator imitatus est? Quod ego cursim praetereo; uideo enim te, qua peitate es, obliuionem illius 
uictoriae malle quam gloriam.  
Quid vero? Statim, uixdum misero illo furore sopito, cum omnes barbare nationes excidium uniuersae 
Galliae minarentur… In Praise of Later Roman Emperors, p. 60-62. 
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the reign of Diocletian and Maximian, insists that a man who is cleared of the charge of 
homicide may still be tried for the related crimes of herdsmen (pastores) and brigands.392 
Given this close association, it seems possible that the panegyrist intended to conjure an 
image of latrocinium in the mind of his audience. This may also account for the 
hesitancy to discuss the revolt in detail, or to include the name Bacaudae. Maximian 
was, if we can believe Eutropius and Orosius, raised to the purple with the express 
mission to quell the revolt. Because of the gravity of the task, the panegyrist could hardly 
leave the achievement unmentioned in a praise poem. However, latrones and other 
civil/social disturbances were not considered victories over legitimate enemies and did 
not represent glorious triumphs. A victory over bandits or Bacaudae was not to be 
celebrated and although Maximian could be commended for his dutiful resolution of 
unrest, the existence of the revolt was itself a cause for lament and best forgotten.393 In 
conjunction, the use of pastor and the attitude to victory over the Bacaudae in the 
panegyric suggests that the author wanted his audience to understand the foe to have 
been akin to latrones, but on a scale that demanded not only the attentions of the 
Emperor, but even the appointment of one.394   
What then was the composition of the Bacaudae in the third century? What sorts of 
people joined together in revolt against the Empire during a context of conflict between 
rival claimants to the Imperial throne? The consistent usages of peasant labels and 
terminology of illegitimacy across the sources must be taken as indicative of a lower-
class composition. 395 There is, as has been said, no evidence of aristocratic involvement, 
                                                          
392 CJ, 9. 2. 11. See above, pp. 35-6 for more detail.  
393 As the panegyrist says: ‘. I pass this over in haste, for I see that such are your dutiful feelings that you 
prefer that victory to be cast into oblivion rather than glorified.’ 
394 For role of victory over Bacaudae in Maximian’s elevation to co-rule alongside Diocletian, see In 
praise of Later Roman Emperors, p. 48. 
395 Van Dam, p. 30, has argued that these terms cannot be used to determine to social origin of the rebels 
because of the prejudices of the authors. While it may be true that these terms might have been designed 
to belittle the status of some leaders of the rebellion, or demonstrate its illegitimacy, this cannot 
reasonably discount its accuracy regarding participants in the revolt. From what other origin might they 
have hailed? The terminology and attitude of the evidence surely discounts the possibility that the 
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although we cannot discount the possibility out of hand. However, the overwhelming 
use of labels which suggest that the revolt was composed by the rural lower classes 
suggests that they comprised the bulk of the rebels, and perhaps that their grievances 
were the reason for the uprising.  
The use of pastor in the Panegyric to Maximian suggests that bandits may have also 
featured, perhaps alongside fellow rural labourers who are attested in almost every 
source. For the purposes of identifying the association between the Bacaudae and 
epidemic banditry, the other significant source is Aurelius Victor. Writing in c.361 
Aurelius, as we have seen, mirrors some of the terminology used in Eutropius, Jerome 
and Orosius, but also adds the further detail that they were latrones: ‘in Gaul Helianus 
and Amandus had stirred up a band of peasants and robbers, whom the inhabitants call 
Bagaudae’ (Helianum Amandumque per Galliam excita manu agrestium ac latronum, 
quos Bagaudas incolae vocant).396 Alone, the usage of such a fluid term in association 
                                                          
Bacaudae were military usurpers, and likewise any close association with urban unrest. Indeed, 
according to Aurelius Victor (see below, note 396), they seems to actively target the cities of Gaul. 
Based on this analysis of evidence for the third-century Bacaudae, I can find no reason to doubt that 
peasants formed the backbone of the revolt. Though the presence of honestiorial elements, or even 
leadership cannot be disproved on the basis of this evidence, the burden of demonstrating the inaccuracy 
or irrelevance of terms like agrestes, agricolae, arator, latro, pastor, rusticus, must fall to those that 
claim it. 
396 ‘For when Diocletian had learned, after Carinus’ death, that in Gaul Helianus and Amandus had 
stirred up a band of peasants and robbers, whom the inhabitants call Bagaudae, and had ravaged the 
regions far and wide and were making attempts on very many of the cities, he immediately appointed as 
emperor Maximian, a loyal friend who, although he was rather uncivilised, was nevertheless a good 
soldier of sound character. He subsequently received the surname Herculius from the worship of that 
deity, just as Valerius received that of Jovius. This was also the origin of the names given to those 
auxiliary units which were particularly outstanding in the army. Well, Herculius marched into Gaul and 
in a short time he had pacified the whole country by routing the enemy forces or accepting their 
surrender.’ Aurelius Victor, Liber De Caesaribus, 39. 17. Liber de Caesaribus by Sextus Aurelius 
Victor, ed. and trans. H. W. Bird, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Pres, 1994), pp. 42-3.  
Namque ubi comperit Carini discessu Helianum Amandumque per Galliam excita manu agrestium ac 
latronum, quos Bagaudas incolae vocant, populatis late agris plerasque urbium tentare, Maximianum 
statim fidum amicitia quamquam semiagrestem, militiae tamen atque ingenio bonum imperatorem iubet. 
Huic postea cultu numinis Herculio cognomentum accessit, uti Valerio Iovium; unde etiam militaribus 
auxiliis longe in exercitum praestantibus nomen impositum. Sed Herculius in Galliam profectus fusis 
hostibus aut acceptis quieta omnia brevi patraverat. Livre des Césars, ed. and trans. by Pierre Dufraigne 
(Paris: Belles Lettres, 1975). Bold highlights my own.  
The term semiagrestem, highlighted in the above passage, applies to Maximian and refers to his social 
background, which Bird translates as ‘rather uncivilised’. Van Dam, p. 30, n.20 argues that if an 
Emperor could be semiagrestes then we cannot use the term agrestes to argue for a lower-class 
composition of the Bacaudae. Why? If Maximian was a former soldier, from the ranks, with a lower-
class origin, then in the eyes of the educated elite of Roman society he certainly was a semiagrestes. 
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with a rebellion might indicate very little; the word could simply be a marker for 
illegitimacy or a style of warfare. Indeed, as we have seen, any guerrilla-type warfare – 
even that of barbarians – could be labelled latrocinium.397 Nevertheless, the use of both 
latro and pastor in descriptions of the Bacaudae does suggest bandit like activity. It 
seems very likely that rural lower classes formed the core of the bacaudic revolt in the 
third century. Identification with bandits is less emphatic, but nevertheless seems 
probable. 
What are we to do with these descriptions of the composition and character of the third-
century Bacaudae? Whilst it is conceded that the evidence is somewhat problematic, the 
proliferation of references to peasant involvement coupled with the lack of reference to 
local aristocratic leadership would seem to invalidate the fundaments of Van Dam’s 
thesis. Thompson’s proposal that the Bacaudae were an association of revolutionary 
peasants however, seems to stretch the evidence too far. On the basis of the third-century 
evidence we have seen, there is little to suggest that level of coherence in the 
organisation and ideology of the Bacaudae. Thompson sought to overcome this 
shortcoming by placing these alongside other outbursts of similar violence, notably the 
bandit disturbances led by Maternus and Bulla Felix, all of which he labelled bacaudic, 
even where the term was not employed. As we have seen, the rival interpretations of 
Van Dam, and especially Drinkwater, were fuelled by such incautious identification.398 
In order to justify this appropriation of other disturbances to a bacaudic character, 
Thompson argued that the contemporary description of Maternus and Bulla Felix as 
                                                          
Diocletian presumably was as well. To senatorial observers, nothing necessarily separated the social 
origins of a bandit like Bulla Felix and an Emperor like Maximian. I do not see how this usage can 
demonstrate that the agrestes described by Aurelius Victor should be considered anything other. On 
Maximian’s origins, see Timothy Barnes, The New Empire of Diocletian and Constantine, (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University press, 1982), p. 32, who proposes that his parents were shopkeepers from 
Sirmium, and In Praise of the Later Roman Emperors, pp. 55-6n which suggests that they were day 
labourers and confirms that all sources agree on Maximian’s rustic background.  
397 See above, pp. 69-71. 
398 See above, p. 151. 
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‘bandits’ overestimated the ability of mere brigands to offer violent opposition to the 
state. On this matter he was clearly wrong. As we have seen in Chapter 2, epidemic 
brigandage was quite capable of causing serious problems for the Roman Empire.399  
But if episodes of brigandage cannot by re-categorised as bacaudic, then perhaps the 
Bacaudae could be understood within the wider phenomenon of brigandage? In order to 
avoid the charge of ruthlessly applying an ill-fitting model to the evidence, one must 
avoid exaggeration or generalisation. Fortunately however, we have already seen that 
suggestions of banditry do exist amongst the evidence for the third-century Bacaudae, 
sufficiently, at least, for Neri and Sánchez León to attest to their role.400 Furthermore, 
banditry is a much more inclusive category of lower class violence than Thompson’s 
Bacaudae theory. It is widely attested throughout the Roman Empire and Late Antiquity, 
both before and after the Bacaudae. Its relative ubiquity would suggest that it existed 
endemically in Armorica and marginal regions in north-western Gaul, and related crimes 
are attested in Spain where the Bacaudae would flare up again in the fifth century.401 
More importantly however, the conditions on which the third-century Bacaudae 
emerged closely match the conditions through which epidemic banditry is created.  
Epidemic bandits – in contrast to endemic – are made by their context. As we have seen, 
the fugitive and deserter brigands that caused panic among state legislators in the late 
fourth and early fifth centuries, the violent peasants that prompted Cassiodorus’ letters 
in Ostrogothic Italy and the rustic retinue of the Pseudo-Christ in Merovingian Gaul 
were all created by the socio-economic and military context. Likewise, the third-century 
Bacaudae emerged in the troubled context of late third-century Gaul. The century was 
                                                          
399 See above, Chapter two, and more theoretically, on the issue of banditry and state formation see 
Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen, ‘Rational Bandits: Plunder, Public Goods, and the Vikings’. 
400 Neri, ‘Povertà, criminalità e disordine sociale nella tarda antichità’, pp. 198-9, 205-6 and J. C. Sánchez 
León, Los Bagaudas, pp. 43-4.  
401 Neri, ‘Povertà, criminalità e disordine sociale nella tarda antichità’, pp. 197-8. 
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dominated by political infighting and usurpation of the Imperial throne and for much of 
the century the Emperor ruling in Gaul was often different to, and sometimes at war 
with, imperial rivals in Italy or the East. Significantly, at the time of the bacaudic 
uprising northern Gaul was particularly troubled.402 Only in 274 was the separate Gallic 
Empire finally returned to central control through the campaigning of Aurelian, but these 
civil wars, along with regular incursions across the Rhine by the Franks and Alemanni, 
seem to have caused considerable socio-economic and military disruption. The 
Bacaudae emerged seemingly in the direct aftermath of the defeat and death of Emperor 
Carus in the East in 283 and the subsequent defeat of his son Carinus by the usurper 
general Diocletian. Unfortunately, the Panegyrici Latini, Aurelius Victor and other 
sources for the third-century Bacaudae, unlike the sources for their successors in the fifth 
century, do not offer us specific reasons for revolt. However, it seems reasonable to 
assume that factors that we have seen to have influenced epidemic banditry elsewhere 
in Late Antiquity, such as war and military defeat, famine, plague, taxation and 
oppressive social structures, were probably significant in the uprising of the Bacaudae. 
In light of these observations, it seems plausible that the third-century Bacaudae can be 
considered a variety of epidemic banditry, and to have existed within the broader 
phenomenon of banditry in Late Antiquity. For the moment however, we must be 
content with just ‘plausible’ and move on to the evidence for the fifth-century bacaudic 
where more positive conclusions can be given.  
 
 
 
                                                          
402 Indeed, no sooner were the bacaudae defeated than an attempt was made at reforming a separate state 
in the northwestern provinces of the Roman Empire by the usurper Carausius.  
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3.3. Evidence for the fifth-century Bacaudae.  
Having established the terminology of the bacaudic revolt in the third-century and 
proposed some conclusions about the character of the rebels themselves, we will now 
consider and compare with the evidence that we have for the fifth-century Bacaudae. As 
we have seen, much of what Thompson considered to be evidence for the Bacaudae in 
the fifth-century now seems questionable, since much of it does not reference the 
Bacaudae directly.403 In order to make comparisons between known bacaudic events – 
separated by over 140 years – I shall first evaluate the material that refers directly to the 
Bacaudae, or that we can be reasonably sure refers to them. As with the third-century 
material, it is worth spending some time evaluating these sources, since some of the 
evidence is of questionable validity, whilst other elements are relatively unknown, 
(Drinkwater, for example, in his otherwise thorough overview of the evidence for the 
fifth-century bacaudae, did not mention the reference to revolt in Armorica which is 
preserved in the fragmentary remnants of John of Antioch).404 However, most of the 
sources for the fifth-century Bacaudae are well known and analyses have been offered 
by modern historians both with relation to the Bacaudae and in general, therefore it is 
not necessary to undertake a particularly sustained analysis here.405 Rather, it is hoped 
that by revisiting these sources, and particularly by comparing and contrasting the 
evidence contained within them, we can better understand the place of the fifth-century 
Bacaudae within the general phenomenon of lower-class violence, as well as within their 
particular historical context.  
                                                          
403 Drinkwater, for example, considers the use of De Reditu Suo and the Querolus to understand the aims 
of the bacaudic movement ‘inadmissible’; ‘The Bacaudae of fifth-century Gaul’, p. 209. 
404 John of Antioch, Ioannis Antiocheni Fragmenta quae supersunt omnia / recensuit Anglice vertit 
indicibus instruxit Sergei Mariev, (Berolini: W. de Gruyter, 2008), frag. 2, pp. 407-9. 
405 Drinkwater, ‘The Bacaudae of fifth-century Gaul’, offers probably the most influential analysis of the 
relevance or the sources for the bacaudae, but others, including Thompson, Van Dam and J. C. Sánchez 
León, Les sources de l’histoire des Bagaudes, have offered insights as well. 
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Probably the most significant source – for the Gallic Bacaudae at least – is the Chronicle 
of 452. Such is the brevity of its references to the Bacaudae that they are worth quoting 
in full: 
‘435 – (117): Farther Gaul (Gallia Ulterior) followed Tibatto, the leader of a rebellion, 
and separated from Roman society (a Romana societate discessit). This was only the 
beginning of almost all the servile order (servitia) of Gaul coming into accord in a 
Bacaudic revolt. 
437 – (119): After Tibatto was captured and the other leaders of the revolt (seditio) were 
put in bonds or killed, the commotion of the Bacaudae quietened down.  
448 – (133): Eudoxius, a physician by profession and of perverse, if well-developed, 
talents, fled to the Huns when implicated in the Bacauda that took place at that time.’406 
A number of significant divergences in the depiction of the fifth-century Bacaudae from 
their third-century equivalents appear on the basis of this evidence. The Chronicle of 
452, unlike the sources for the third-century Bacaudae, does not contain lists of 
(pseudo)technical labels for the composition of the Bacaudae, but instead simply refers 
to them under the umbrella term servitia. This label could equally apply to rustics and 
farmers, rural slaves like coloni, household slaves or to urban lower classes. Perhaps this 
contrast in nomenclature results from stylistic differences between the chronicle genre 
and the narrative or poetic sources that contain our information about the third-century 
Bacaudae, but it is equally likely that the Chronicler intentionally employed the term to 
emphasise the scale of the disruption. The entry claims that almost the whole of the 
servile order joined in sedition in order to leave Roman administration; this is clearly an 
exaggeration and the chronicler must have known it to be, since the revolt surely didn’t 
                                                          
406 Anon. ‘Chronicle of 452’ (year 435, entry 117) in From Roman to Merovingian Gaul, pp. 83-4 and 
Chron. Galllica, MGH AA 9, pp. 660-2. 
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involve between 50 and 90% of the population of Gaul. Instead, the Chronicler seems 
to have employed the exaggeration as a literary device to demonstrate the seriousness of 
the revolt. 
This is not surprising; the focus of the Chronicle is on Gaul and the region of Valence 
in particular, so much so that this is generally assumed to an approximate region for the 
composition of the work.407 The activities of the Bacaudae no doubt drew the attention 
of the Chronicler, particularly as a result of their relations with St. Germanus and the 
Alans. The former probably passed through Valence in c.433, when the Chronicler noted 
his increasing renown, on his way to Arles – the capital of the Gallic provinces – in an 
attempt to alleviate the tax burdens of the people of Auxerre.408 Tax burdens throughout 
Gaul seems to have been a significant factor in the creation of unrest in fifth-century 
Gaul if Salvian is to be believed, and Germanus was able to assuage the sufferings of 
the people of Auxerre through appeals to Auxiliaris.409 Though some inhabitants of the 
region were soon to rise up under the leadership of Tibatto in 435, it nevertheless seems 
probable that the charitable reputation of the Saint, formed through actions like these, 
was the reason that the Bacaudae appealed to Germanus to intercede on their behalf and 
halt the advance of the Alan federate soldiers under Goar. Indeed, it is even possible that 
the Saint carried information of his diplomatic mission from the Bacaudae and Tibatto 
to Aetius south though Valence in 437, as the Rhône Valley was the probable route of 
transit from Gallia Ulterior to Italy. If so, then the Chronicler may have been, or had 
access to, eyewitnesses of the delegation of Armoricans to Germanus. In light of the 
particular interest and probable access to information that the Chronicler may have had, 
                                                          
407 S. Muhlberger, ‘The Gallic Chronicle and its Authority for British Events’ in Britannia 14 (1983), 
23-33, (p. 25). 
408 Anon. ‘Chronicle of 452’ (year 433, entry 114). 
409 Salvian, book 5 is critical of taxation and various ills for causing undue and immoral suffering. See 
Anthony Barrett, ‘St. Germanus and the British Missions’ in Britannia 40 (2009), 197-217, (p. 208) for 
Auxiliaris and the inscription that dates his prefecture in Gaul to c.435. 
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we should take the usage of servitia seriously. The evidence of the Vita Germani and 
Chronicle in conjunction would seem to confirm the argument of Salvian; that the 
Bacaudae were formed at least partially as a result of the severity of taxation.410   
At this juncture however, we must explain the validity of using these sources in 
conjunction to justify these conclusions. Salvian, for example, does talk about the 
Bacaudae, but conceives of the burden of taxation as a general moral ill – one that 
certainly afflicted potential Bacaudae – but not explicitly as a specific cause for their 
revolt. The Vita Germani meanwhile does not use the term Bacaudae, but like the 
Chronicle of 452, does refer to Tibatto as the leader of a revolt in the region of Auxerre. 
Drinkwater, in an effort to better understand the bacaudic movement, divided the 
material that Thompson had used as evidence for the fifth-century Bacaudae into two 
categories. The first category included those sources that referred directly to the 
Bacaudae, ie. Zosimus, Chron. Gall. 452, Hydatius and Salvian, whilst the second 
included those sources that ‘scholars consider as referring indirectly to bacaudic activity, 
and which seem to indicate particular unrest in the region of Armorica.’411 In this latter 
category he included Zosimus, Rutilius Namatianus, the Querolus, Sidonius Apollinaris, 
Constantius’ Vita Germani, Merobaudes. Drinkwater did not include the brief comment 
of John of Antioch in his analysis, but it is safe to assume it would fall within the latter 
bracket.   
This division is useful in some ways and certainly highlights the need for a cautious 
approach to the subject material. The Querolus, Zosimus and Rutilius Namatianus in 
particular are problematic and will be dealt with below. For the moment however, it is 
worth stressing that differences in terminology do not mean that the second category of 
                                                          
410 Drinkwater, ‘The Bacaudae of Fifth-Century Gaul’, pp. 211-12 provides a very insightful sketch of 
the likely economic and social conditions in Gaul c.430-40. 
411 Drinkwater, ‘The Bacaudae of fifth-century Gaul’, p. 209. 
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sources are necessarily less relevant. The relationship between the Chronicle of 452 and 
the Vita Germani is key. As stated, the Vita Germani does not refer to the Bacaudae 
directly, but does name Tibatto and Armorica. The reference to Tibatto surely ties the 
disturbance directly to that described by the Chronicle of 452, whilst the respective 
geographical labels – Armorica and Gallia Ulterior – while not identical, do broadly 
overlap. Both describe the conflict as sedition or rebellion. If sedition or rebellion in 
Armorica between c.435-7 can be assumed with some certainty to refer to the Bacaudae, 
then we can tie in the evidence of Sidonius, Merobaudes and John of Antioch with a 
degree of confidence. For clarity, I have opted to include a simple table that shows the 
various sources that do, or probably do refer to the Bacaudae and certain relevant 
common details: 
  
 168 
 
 
Fig. 1. Table to illustrate the usage of key terminology in the sources for, or 
associated with, the Bacaudae in the 430-50s. 
 Usage of: 
Bacaudae/ 
Bagaudae 
 
Tibatto 
 
Armorica/ Armoricans/ 
Gallia Ulterior 
 
Spain 
 
 
Sedition, 
rebellion etc. 
Chron. 
Gallia. 452. 
X X X  X 
Constantius 
of Lyon, Vita 
Germani 
 X X  X 
Salvian, De 
Gubernatione 
Dei 
X    X 
John of 
Antioch, 
Fragment 
201.3. 
  X  X 
Merobaudes, 
Panegyric 
  X  X 
Sidonius 
Apollinaris, 
Carmina VII 
  X  X 
Hydatius, 
Chron. 
X   X  
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As this table hopefully demonstrates, there is a relationship between these sources. 
Whilst only the Chronicle of 452 is unequivocal in linking the Bacaudae, Tibatto, 
Armorica and sedition, this template of association allows us to understand probable 
links between other references to unrest associated with either the label Bacaudae, the 
name Tibatto, or the region of Armorica. Hydatius, of course, stands alone as our 
evidence of bacaudic unrest in Iberia. 
With this in mind it does seem reasonable to use the evidence of the Chronicle, the Vita 
Germani and Salvian in conjunction to emphasise the role that over-burdensome 
taxation had in encouraging unrest in the population of Gaul in the fifth century. Indeed, 
the ability to cross-reference certain themes between these sources is invaluable in 
establishing a context for the activities of the Bacaudae.  
The Chronicle was particularly concerned with matters relating to Provence.412 As we 
have seen, he made reference to Germanus when the Saint came within his particular 
sphere of interest. However, the Chronicle was not just an unbiased continuation of 
Jerome with an inclination toward local affairs; it was structured with an intent to 
demonstrate certain moral and political ills that were a blight on the region and the 
Empire. The recent history of the Alans for example, independently of the influence of 
Germanus (who according to the Vita Germani, temporarily prevented them from 
destroying Tibatto’s rebels), was of significance to the chronicler since soon after the 
quelling of the Bacaudae in 437, they would be settled in Valence by Aetius who was 
keen to keep the peace in Gaul while he journeyed to Italy in c.440.413 The chronicler 
records that initially they only divided up abandoned country districts in the region, but 
over the next year or so, their influence spread into Gallia Ulterior, the region so 
disrupted by bacaudic unrest, in 441-2. Once again, the chronicler acknowledges that 
                                                          
412 S. Muhlberger, pp. 23-27. 
413 Constantius of Lyon, Vita Germani, 28, and Anon. ‘Chronicle of 452’ (year 444, entry 124). 
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Alan military dominance in the district was ordered by Aetius, but as their power grew 
it seems that they forcefully seized property and slaughtered the opposition that arose as 
a result.414  
For the chronicler, these events were part of a rising crescendo that culminated with the 
sack of Carthage and the death knell of the Empire, dated (wrongly) in the Chronicle to 
444.415 Wood isolated a cluster of entries from 440-444 that signified this thematic 
emphasising of a major event, namely; the cession of Valence to the Alans, the Saxon 
takeover of Britain, the Alan expansion in Gallia Ulterior, the Burgundian settlement in 
Sapaudia and the Vandal capture of Carthage.416 However, it is important that this cluster 
of barbarian successes is understood in the context of previous entries. As we have seen, 
the Roman influence in the more peripheral regions of Gaul was severely curtailed after 
the deaths of Constantius and Honorius in 421 and 423 respectively. The chronicler notes 
that Honorius’ reign left the Empire weakened by many crises, and these continued in 
the aftermath of his death, with the attempted usurpation by John, who was backed by 
Aetius, the warfare between rival generals Sigisvult and Boniface in 424, and the murder 
of the prefect of Gaul by some soldiers in 425. At the same time, the chronicler records 
that Carthage was encircled by walls for the first time since the Third Punic War. This 
symbolic detail marks the beginning of a greater cluster of events, still building up to 
444, during which the context for the post-440 losses to the barbarians is recounted.  
From 425 onward, the Chronicle of 452 records conflict between Aetius and the Goths 
in 427 and probably again in 433, between Aetius and the Iuthungi in 430, the massacre 
of Roman soldiers in Spain by the Vandals also in 430, the revolt of Tibatto and the 
                                                          
414 Anon. ‘Chronicle of 452’ (year 441-2, entry 127). 
415 On the problems of dating in the Gallic Chronicle of 452, see Muhlberger, p. 32 and Ian Wood, ‘The 
End of Roman Britain: continental evidence and parallels’ in Gildas: New Approaches, ed. Michael 
Lapidge (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1984), p. 18. 
416 Wood, ‘The Fall of Western Empire and the End of Roman Britain’ in Britannia 18 (1987), 251-262 
(pp. 254-6) isolates a similar cluster in the run-up to another symbolic capture of an Imperial city: the 
sack of Rome.  
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Bacaudae from 435-7 and war between the Burgundians and Aetius in 436. Only in 440, 
with Gaul apparently pacified and the Alans settled in Valence, could Aetius leave for 
Italy.417 Taken alongside other the other contemporary chronicles written by Prosper and 
Hydatius, we can add further evidence of further war between Aetius and the Goths near 
Arles in 430 and in the vicinity of Narbonne from 435-9. Aetius also battled the Franks 
in 428 and quelled the revolt of the Roman provincials in Noricum, alongside barbarian 
Iuthungi allies, in 430-1. Finally, in 437-8, barbarian pirates seem to have been active in 
the western Mediterranean.418 The impression given by these sources is that the 430s 
and early 440s were an intensely troubled time, militarily at least, for the Western 
Empire. Infighting between the generals Felix, Boniface, Sigisvult and Aetius quickly 
gave way to multiple conflicts with peoples – both barbarian and Roman – once Aetius 
had gained pre-eminence in Gaul. It seems reasonable to suppose that both barbarians 
and Romans who had been left to their own devices during the years of civil war from 
423-432 resented and resisted the manner of Aetius’ reassertion of Imperial hegemony. 
It seems that the significance of the Bacaudae, according to the project of the Chronicle 
of 452, was to emphasise the depths of the resistance to Aetius. It was not only barbarians 
who fought back, but Romans too; the burdens of civic life were severe enough to drive 
all the servile people of Gaul into a peripheral region – Gallia Ulterior – from which 
they could resist Aetius’ renovation of central power.419  
                                                          
417 Anon. ‘Chronicle of 452’ (years 425-440, entries 97-124).  
418 See the Chronicle of Prosper of Aquitaine, and the Chronicle of Hydatius, respectively conveniently 
translated in Prosper of Aquitaine, ‘Chronicle’ in From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader, pp. 62-
76 and in Hydatius, ‘Chronicle’ in From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader, pp. 85-98.  
419 It is worth acknowledging at this point that the provinces of Gaul were of primary importance to the 
policies of Aetius, and by extension the Western Empire, during the 430s and 40s. In those years, 
Pannonia was ceded to the Huns and the Sueves and Vandals made significant territorial expansions in 
Spain and North Africa. These actions were undertaken with minimal resistance from the Roman state, 
which, in the meantime, was busy subduing the potential threats to their authority in southern Gaul, 
posed by the Franks, Nori and Iuthungi, Burgundians, Bacaudae and Goths. For further explanation of 
Aetius’ military policies, see J.R. Moss, ‘The Effects of the Policies of Aetius on the History of Western 
Europe’, Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 22. 4, (1973), 711-731.    
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The integration of various accounts allow us to plot the record of disruption in Gaul 
during the first half of the fifth century. Moreover, as with the use of accounts in 
conjunction to explain facets of the bacaudic revolt, the use of sources together in this 
careful manner allows us a greater understanding of unrest and resistance to Rome and 
especially the policies of Aetius. The Chronicle of Hydatius provides an interesting 
parallel to certain details in the Chronicle of 452. Though Hydatius does not record the 
revolt of Gallic Bacaudae in Armorica, he does briefly mention the revolt by the Roman 
provincials in Noricum. Apparently, in 430 they and the Iuthungi fought against Aetius 
or his lieutenants – presumably in resistance to his efforts to re-take the region. This 
initial conflict seems to have been indecisive, as the following year he was forced to 
campaign against them again and subdue their rebellion.420 It is important to stress that 
the Norici and the Bacaudae did not necessarily have equivalent aims. We must be 
cautious about assuming too much common ground between groups of known 
Bacaudae, let alone with other groups with other names. However, these rebellions 
conform to a pattern in much the same way as the contemporary conflicts with 
barbarians; it seems that the further from Arles you were, the less the inhabitants of Gaul 
liked Aetius. In light of the evidence of punitive taxation and resistance to it by the 
Bacaudae, it seems probable that these taxes were a part of Aetius’ policy in Gaul. As 
he reasserted Imperial authority he reintroduced taxation that had probably lapsed in 
intervening years. Given the disruptions in the outlying provinces of Gaul, it is perhaps 
                                                          
420 Hydatius, ‘Chronicle’, 93 and 95. The Chronicle of 452 mentions Aetius’ conflict with the Iuthungi, 
which it likewise dates to 430, but is silent about the involvement of the rebellious Nori. Sidonius, 
Carmina 7, however, does provide confirmation of the suppression of the Nori. The poem, a panegyric 
to Avitus, lists the encounter among those which Avitus fought in his years as a young warrior alongside 
Aetius: thou didst follow Aetius, because he had learnt many a lesson from the Scythian warfare; and 
he, glorious in arms though he was, did no deed without thee, though thou didst many without him. For 
when he had finished with the Iuthungi and the war in Noricum, and had subdued the Vindelicians, 
thereafter in partnership with thee did he deliver the Belgians, whom the fierce Burgundian had 
harassed… trans. in Sidonius Apollinaris, Poems and Letters: Sidonius with an English translation, 
introduction and notes, trans. by W. B. Anderson, (London: Heinemann, 1936), pp. 137-9. For some 
discussion of Noricum during this period, see E. A. Thompson, Romans and Barbarians, pp. 113-136. 
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unsurprising that many were unable or unwilling to pay. The people of Auxerre appealed 
to their Bishop to plead their case, but it seems that the followers of Tibatto, and perhaps 
some citizens of Noricum, opted for a more belligerent course of action.  
Additional detail regarding the revolt of the Bacaudae in Gaul under Tibatto can be 
found in the indirect references to the conquests of Aetius and his lieutenants. Doubt has 
been cast on these materials because they do not refer directly to these Bacaudae, and 
instead only to the Armoricans. However, given that these references to sedition or 
unrest in Armorica are closely paralleled by the more certain evidence recorded in the 
Chronicle of 52 and, more generally, the Vita Germani and Salvian, it seems reasonable 
to include them within our analysis of the fifth-century Bacaudae. Three sources make 
reference to the victories of Aetius or his lieutenants over rebels in Armorica; Sidonius 
Apollinaris Carmina VII, John of Antioch and Merobaudes Panegyric II.  
The first of these, Sidonius’ poem, a panegyric to the newly proclaimed Emperor Avitus 
dating to c.455, records the activities of Litorius who in 437 was – like Avitus – a 
subordinate commander under Aetius. It states that: ‘Litorius, elated by the conquest of 
the Armoricans, was hurrying his Scythian horsemen against the Gothic host through 
the land of the Arvernian…’421 This incidental detail offers little more than confirmation 
of the revolt of provincials in Armorica that was quelled in 437. The Scythians under 
Litorius’ command may possibly have been the Alans that Germanus restrained in the 
Vita Germani, but were more probably Hunnic auxiliaries who were the favoured 
soldiers of Aetius. It seems very likely that the enemies of Litorius and the Scythians 
were the Bacaudae; if so this at least demonstrates that the revolt was serious enough to 
                                                          
421 Sidonius Apollinaris, Carmina 7, trans. in Sidonius Apollinaris, Poems and Letters: Sidonius with an 
English translation, introduction and notes, pp. 140-41. 
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justify the attentions of Litorius as well as Goar, and probably the Huns as well as Alans, 
as well as mention in a later triumphalist panegyric.  
The fragment 224 from the corpus of texts ascribed to John of Antioch provides similar 
confirmation. This Eastern source, dating to the first half of the seventh century, seems 
largely to be a compilation derived from various late antique historians. The fragment in 
question, which seems to be based on the earlier history of Priscus (c.470) lists certain 
accomplishments of Aetius and among them the suppression of rebellious 
Armoricans:422 
‘[Aetius] murdered Felix, his fellow magister militum, by a trick, because he had been 
warned by Placidia that Felix was planning to do away with him. He defeated the Goths 
of West Gaul, who had trespassed on Roman territory. And he disciplined the 
Armoricans, who had rebelled against the Romans. To sum up, he acquired the greatest 
power, so that not only emperors, but also neighbouring peoples obeyed his 
instructions.’423 
This laconic overview of the early career of Aetius seems to offer little more about the 
identity of the rebellious Armoricans – presumably Bacaudae – than Sidonius. It credits 
Aetius with their defeat, although this was presumably achieved by his subordinate 
Litorius instead or as well, alongside the defeat of the Goths. The final sentence would 
appear to group the Armoricans and Goths together, however, as ‘neighbouring 
peoples.’ This indication of separateness from the Empire is interesting. Though it was 
recognised in antiquity that the inhabitants of the Empire were distinguishable by gens 
as well as their city, province, social status and various other layers of identity, it is 
interesting that classification as a ‘people’ was often used to describe rebellious groups 
                                                          
422 John of Antioch, Ioannis Antiocheni Fragmenta…, See p. 40* for the details of this fragment and 
Priscan origin.  
423 John of Antioch, Ioannis Antiocheni Fragmenta…, frag. 2, pp. 407-9. 
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such as the Nori, as we have seen, and the notorious Isaurians. Though neither the Goths 
nor Armoricans were external ‘neighbours’ beyond the frontiers, this description 
indicates a perception that the rebellion was distinguishably belonging to a gens. 
Merobaudes, likewise, indicates that the rebellion could be ascribed to Armoricans in 
particular. In a Panegyric the warrior-poet, who actually fought the Bacaudae in Spain 
according to Hydatius, depicts a (presumably typical) rebellious Armorican whose 
belligerence had been crushed by Aetius, the subject of the praise poem:  
‘A native dweller, now more calm, traverses the Armorican wilds. The land, accustomed 
to conceal with its forests plunder obtained by savage crime, has lost its old ways, and 
learns to entrust grain to its untried fields. The hand which long fought against the efforts 
of Caesar upholds the laws received under our consul...’424 
In typical florid, panegyric style, this excerpt describes the rebel as native of Armorica 
who had ‘long fought’ against the representatives of Empire, taking refuge in the forests. 
But had been returned to his natural law-abiding condition and to agriculture. This 
imagery of lawlessness among the forests of Armorica, likewise attested in the early 
fifth century by the Querolus, would seem to chime with the tropes of banditry that we 
have seen in earlier chapters. Bandits were certainly troublesome, and in this case seem 
to have demanded the attentions of the foremost generals of the day, but they were 
closely associated with the geography of their region which could serve to facilitate their 
violent actions. Just as the Isaurians and Tzani relied on mountains or forests to shelter 
them from the reprisals of the state, it would seem that the Armoricans did.425  
                                                          
424 Merobaudes ‘Panegyric II’ trans. F. M. Clover ‘Flavius Merobaudes: A Translation and Historical 
Commentary’ in Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 61, No. 1, (1971) 1-78 (p. 
13). 
425 See above, pp. 36-8. 
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However, assuming that the rebellious Armoricans described by Sidonius, John of 
Antioch/Priscus and Merobaudes are the same as the Bacaudae of Chronicle of 452 and 
the Vita Germani who likewise place them in the same region, and indeed Salvian, we 
are left with some problems. Firstly, if the Bacaudae were defined by their gens, or at 
least region, then why was the term used in the manner that it was in the fifth century? 
It would be understandable to re-use a term for peasant rebellion from the third century 
to describe similar troubles in the same region, but why then did Hydatius use the term 
Bacaudae in description of the rebels in Spain, and indeed by Zosimus to describe the 
individuals who robbed Sarus in the Alps in c.409?426 Secondly, and perhaps even more 
problematically, there would seem to be a contrast between the ‘Bacaudae as 
Armoricans’, and the ‘Bacaudae as servitia (or other individuals oppressed by tax or 
injustice)’ as seems to be depicted by the Chronicle of 452, Vita Germani and Salvian. 
The basis of this contrast may be representative of how the fundamental character of 
bacaudic unrest was understood; for some commentators the rebellion was defined by 
its geography, for others it was characterised as a protest against social injustices. It is 
probable that this juxtaposition of alternate characteristics of the bacaudic revolt in the 
fifth century have influenced the partisan trends in subsequent historiography of the 
rebellion. Put simply, the evidence for the regional character of the revolt seems to be 
reflected in the argument of Van Dam, whilst Thompson felt that the bacaudic revolts 
were tied together by social revolutionary motivation.  
The evidence for the Bacaudae in the fifth century is nevertheless consistent about two 
characteristics. The first, as we have already seen, is that the revolt seems to have been 
undertaken by members of the lower classes. As we have seen, there is no reason to 
assume aristocratic leadership given the lack of evidence, and the existence of some 
                                                          
426 See above, p. 136, n.338.  
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evidence to the contrary. To insist upon aristocratic motivations and leadership of the 
revolt on the basis of the extant evidence would not only deny common people in Late 
Antiquity agency, but also overlook the myriad examples of collective lower-class 
violence which feature regularly throughout the period. In addition to the apparent 
lower-class character of the revolt, another common feature of bacaudic revolts in the 
fifth century is opposition to the Empire. Van Dam, in particular, has supposed that the 
Bacaudae were actually Roman traditionalists who formed violent self-help groups to 
defend their interests against the barbarians and other threats.427 Though Van Dam is 
right to stress that certainty is hard to achieve given the hostile nature of many of the 
sources, it is nevertheless clear that the evidence firmly points away from this 
conclusion. The Bacaudae certainly did fight barbarians; in Armorica they opposed the 
Alans of Goar and the Huns, whilst in Spain they fought the Goths in 454. However, in 
all of these instances the barbarians were serving as federate soldiers of the Empire, and 
in the case of the Huns, were under the direct command of Aetius and Litorius. In every 
record of bacaudic violence the opposition is either Imperial or the barbarian 
representatives of the Empire. This might be a distortion of our sources, which might 
have been less interested by independent hostilities between the barbarians and 
Bacaudae, yet this does not seem to be the case. In fact, the Bacaudae are known to have 
fostered good relations with barbarians; in Spain the Bacaudae in northern Tarraconensis 
fought against Rome alongside the Suevi, whilst in 448 Eudoxius, the bacaudic leader, 
sought refuge from Attila.428 By forming alliances with other parties that were hostile to 
the Empire, the Bacaudae were part of a common pattern of behaviour by those 
disadvantaged by the Empire in Late Antiquity.429 As we have seen, the Nori allied with 
                                                          
427 Van Dam, p. 41. 
428 Hydatius, ‘Chronicle’, 142 and Anon. ‘Chronicle of 452’ (year 448, entry 133). 
429 Neri, I marginali, stresses the significance of marginality as a factor in criminality both as 
disobedience and dissidence, and with particular reference to the bacaudae, pp. 400-17. 
 178 
 
the Iuthungi against Aetius in the 430s, whilst numerous examples exist of individuals 
or groups of Roman citizens joining barbarians in the hope of improving their lot in life. 
Ammianus, for example, records that many humilial Romans joined the Goths during 
their revolt in 378.430 Orosius, meanwhile, famously stated that many Romans preferred 
a poverty stricken libertas among the barbarians to tributaria solicitude within Roman 
society.431 Salvian expressed similar sentiments:  
‘Thus, far and wide, they migrate either to the Goths or the Bacaudae, or to other 
barbarians everywhere in power; yet they do not regret having migrated. They prefer to 
live as freemen under an outward form of captivity than as captives under an appearance 
of liberty. Therefore, the name of Roman citizens, at one time not only greatly valued 
but dearly bought, is now repudiated and fled from, and it is almost considered not only 
base but deserving of abhorrence.’432 
Given these indications, it seems reasonable to maintain that the Bacaudae – and 
probably other associations of disgruntled former Romans – were more concerned with 
opposition to state authority than with defence against barbarians. Indeed, what evidence 
we have suggests that such groups were liable to form alliances with barbarians against 
the forces of the Roman state. 
So far in this study we have seen various characteristics that might seem to help us 
identify common features in bacaudic unrest. The fifth-century Bacaudae, like their 
third-century predecessors, seem to have been composed primarily of members of the 
Roman lower classes. There is reason to believe that this may include the leadership of 
the rebellions as well, but this seems less certain. In either case, there is little evidence 
to suggest the participation or leadership of Romans of honestiorial class. Furthermore, 
                                                          
430 Ammianus Marcellinus, 31. 6. 6. 
431 Orosius, 7. 41. 7. 
432 Salvian, 5. 5, trans. in trans. in The Writings of Salvian the Presbyter, p. 136. 
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as we have seen, their adversarial nature to the army and administration of the Empire 
is a consistent feature. We cannot necessarily deduce that this rejection of oppressive 
elements of the state equates to a rejection of romanitas in general. However, in contrast 
to the descriptions of the third-century Bacaudae – who are overwhelmingly depicted as 
rural peasants – the sources for fifth-century Bacaudae depict them as somewhat more 
composite, with suggestions of fugitives and bandits alongside rustics and hints of some 
regional/marginal association. As we have seen, it is difficult to deduce, on the basis of 
this evidence, whether the information we have reviewed in this section implies that the 
revolt was based on groups whose violent opposition to Rome was based on common 
regional origin, or shared social status.  
 
3.4. Bacaudae as latrones? Understanding the Bacaudae as brigands in socio-
political context.  
Thus far, I have established a number of difficulties with both the Thompson and Van 
Dam interpretations of bacaudic character in the first section of this chapter, and in the 
second and third sections we hope to have proposed some alternative observations based 
on a fresh analysis of what sources we have. In this final section, an attempt will be made 
to establish a long term context for bacaudic activity. This is not without precedent; 
Thompson supposed that the ‘Bacaudae’ were themselves a distinct phenomenon in their 
own right, and argued that there remains evidence for revolutionary revolt in Gaul from 
the second to fifth centuries. Meanwhile Van Dam plotted episodes of bacaudic unrest 
alongside other measurable currents in independent action on the part of Gallic 
aristocracies based on the strength of Imperial influence in the region. As we have seen, 
the contrast between understanding the Bacaudae as characterised by their region, or by 
their social status, seems to be integral to the seemingly intractable divide between these 
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schools of thought. Both of these interpretations rejected the notion that the Bacaudae 
might be closely associated with banditry. Both considered banditry an insubstantial 
explanation for the records of their activities that remain to us.433 However, as has been 
demonstrated elsewhere in this study and by others, banditry – and particularly epidemic 
banditry – was quite capable of causing enough disruption to attract the attention of 
ancient authors.434  
With this in mind, it is my proposal that patterns in endemic and epidemic banditry are 
the most satisfactory explanation for the resolution of the relationship between the 
various episodes of unrest which we understand to be bacaudic. The following section 
will draw upon the evidence of banditry in the Roman world that we have seen in 
previous chapters, as well as the analysis of evidence for the Bacaudae that we have 
established above, to attempt to understand the bacaudic revolts in the context of lower-
class violence in the form of banditry.  
It is quite plausible that the western territories of northern Gaul had longstanding, if 
inconsistent traditions of small-scale endemic banditry. This is equally plausible in 
north-eastern Hispania, if not in the Ebro valley itself, then perhaps in the uplands of the 
Pyrenees to the east, and the “central Spanish plateau??” to the west.435 As we have seen, 
endemic banditry of this type was fairly ubiquitous in the Roman world and we know of 
better-documented parallels in other regions of the Empire, such as Isauria and the 
Apennines.436 Even in these troublesome regions banditry seems to have gone through 
long periods of stability (when endemic banditry was suppressed sufficiently to only 
appear irregularly in our sources if at all) which were upset by periodic outbreaks that 
                                                          
433 See above, pp. 137-40. 
434 See above, pp. 88-93.  
435 Neri, ‘Povertà, criminalità e disordine sociale nella tarda antichità’, pp. 197-8 notes that, for example, 
cattle-rustling was widespread throughout the Spanish provinces. While abactores and latrones were not 
synonymous, this does indicate a proliferation of brigand-like activity in the region.   
436 For the ubiquity of banditry in the Roman World, see Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’, pp. 8-
10. 
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were typically caused by weakening in state influence in the region, or fuelled actively 
be refugees, rebels or deserters.437 These outbreaks have been interpreted by this study 
as epidemic banditry. If an equivalent situation prevailed in north-western Gaul, then it 
would help us understand the relationship between the third and fifth-century Bacaudae, 
and between the Bacaudae and other episodes of bandit-like lower-class violence in the 
region. Few scholars would now assert, as Thompson did, that Maternus was a ‘bacaud’ 
but it is quite well accepted that he was a bandit. Moreover, he seems to have been a 
deserter whose rebellion occurred in the context of political and military instability. Such 
activity seems to comfortably lie within the category of epidemic banditry.438 Similarly, 
the revolt of Amandus and Aelianus seems to have been a violent movement of peasants, 
perhaps focused around a core of more traditional latrones and associated pastores in a 
similarly troubled context in the 280s.439 When the Rhine frontier was unsettled during 
the reign of Valentinian I in the fourth century, ravages of brigandage – perhaps fuelled 
by desertion or fugitive army recruits – once again occurred in Gaul. In the 410s similar 
outbreaks of illegitimate and apparently lower-class violence seem to have broken out 
as conflict broke out between rival Emperors and various barbarians.  Thompson 
labelled these bacaudic, but as we have seen, such attribution is not justifiable based on 
the information we have. However, it does seem that this violence can be placed within 
a pattern of revolt in specific political context. The final and most well documented 
episodes of bacaudic unrest, in Gaul in the 430s and Spain in the 440s and 50s follows 
much the same pattern. 
It is possible to consider these episodes of violence as related only by causation; i.e. the 
various revolts were simply resultant from an unsettled context and are otherwise 
                                                          
437 For contrasting accounts of the patterns of banditry in Roman Isauria, see Shaw, ‘Bandit Highlands 
and Lowland Peace: The Mountains of Isauria-Cilicia’ volumes 1 and 2, and Lenski, ‘Assimilation and 
Revolt in the Territory of Isauria, from the 1st Century BC to the 6th Century AD’. 
438 For deserters and epidemic banditry, see section 2.1. 
439 See above, section 3.2. 
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unconnected. But this interpretation presents a number of difficulties. As we have seen, 
much of our information about the Bacaudae and other bandit-like violence in Gaul 
seems to associate them with social groups. Maternus and many of his followers were 
deserters, the third-century Bacaudae seem to have been largely peasants, while the fifth-
century Bacaudae seem to have been fugitive servitia according to the Chronicle of 452. 
It is plausible that these groups could have seized the opportunity of unsettled context 
to revolt and attempt their grievances whilst the Roman state was otherwise distracted. 
Such outbreaks of violence could therefore be otherwise unrelated. However, as we have 
seen, many of our authors seem to closely associate these episodes of violence with 
particular regions, particularly Armorica but the Ebro valley for Hydatius and the 
Spanish Bacaudae, and with a regional character of some kind.440 It seems that these 
conflicting characteristics may have resulted from a combination of endemic and 
epidemic banditry. Put simply; there may have been a more-or-less consistent 
undercurrent of endemic brigandage in north-western Gaul and north-eastern Spain onto 
which these various epidemic outbreaks latched, or with which they were associated.  
It is quite plausible that these forms of banditry could become closely associated. In the 
case the third-century Bacaudae, we have seen that the peasants who seem to have 
formed the majority of the rebels may have been assisted by a core of shepherd/bandits. 
Longstanding community ties may have already existed between these groups and the 
peasants may have adopted the practices of the endemic bandits during their revolt.441 
Likewise, as we have seen, deserters and fugitive recruits – such as may have fuelled the 
outbreaks of brigandage under Maternus and during the reign of Valentinian – often 
sought to return to familiar territories where they could rely on existing relationships 
                                                          
440 See above, pp. 172-177.  
441 In much the same way, ‘highland shepherd communities …constituted the driving force behind three 
or four of the largest slave uprisings documented in all ancient history.’; Brent Shaw, ‘Bandits in the 
Roman Empire’, p. 29. See also De Ste Croix, p. 475. 
 183 
 
within known communities to support their brigandage. If the fringes of the Ebro valley 
and Armorica and its environs had longstanding traditions of banditry, then this would 
have represented a plausible location from which to enact their clandestine and 
illegitimate violence.442 Providing positive confirmation of ‘background level’ endemic 
banditry is a particularly difficult task, because it was neither particular significant for 
elite writers, nor particularly noteworthy. However, the relationship between Theon (the 
correspondent of Ausonius) and his entourage of brigands might be taken as reflecting 
a commonplace degree of banditry in the Gallic provinces.443      
In the fifth century, once again, banditry and unrest broke out in northern Gaul in the 
context of usurpations and invasions. This epidemic banditry was probably underway 
from c.406 and is discernible in the sources that Thompson assumed were evidence of 
the ‘great’ bacaudic revolt of 406-17. As we have seen, there is no justification to assume 
a decade of coherent, revolutionary ‘bacaudic alternative’ north of the Loire in these 
years, but there is quite enough evidence to suppose limited and inconsistent bandit-type 
unrest in the region, especially in a context of diminished state authority. Zosimus 
records that Armorica followed the example of Britain in rebelling against Rome, whilst 
Rutilius Namatianus claims that Exuperantius quelled the unrest by training the 
Armoricans to observe the laws and halting the attempts of the poor to enslave their 
former masters.444 Drinkwater rightly argued that these snippets of evidence could not 
support Thompson’s theorisation of a ‘great revolt’, nor could this hint of social 
inversion justify the supposition that all Bacaudae were fundamentally class warriors, 
especially when neither source refers directly to the Bacaudae. However, in conjunction, 
these sources provide sufficient evidence for unrest. In the troubled socio-economic and 
                                                          
442 For relations between endemic and epidemic bandits, see above, pp. 108-110. 
443 Our best evidence for the general region of western Gaul derives from Ausonius, Epistle 13, 22-7 and 
see above, pp. 66-8. Widespread bandit-like activity is attested rather better Spain. Neri, ‘Povertà, 
criminalità e disordine sociale nella tarda antichità’, pp. 197-8. 
444 See above, p. 137.  
 184 
 
military context of northern Gaul c.409-17, it is reasonable to suppose that this rebellion 
was alike to the epidemic banditry which attracted so much attention from Roman 
lawmakers as we saw in Chapter 2.445 Significantly however, the marginal rebels from 
the troubled provinces probably attracted little attention compared to the deserter fuelled 
brigandage in Italy that we know from the legal material, since the state was far more 
concerned with the contest for the Imperial throne between Constantine III and 
Honorius. Without the imbalance of violent potential between bandits and the state, 
which limits the authority of bandits, then it is quite plausible that some bandits were 
able to establish networks of influence and power, embryonic equivalents to those that 
allowed Isaurian leaders to come to influence imperial politics in the late fifth century.446 
The mocking depiction of rustic peroration north of Loire recorded in the Querolus, 
which Drinkwater likewise rejected as evidence for the Bacaudae but which remains 
useful if we understand the Bacaudae within the broader phenomenon of brigandage, 
may be a hostile depiction of such authority formation.447  
It is likely that this unrest in northern Gaul c. 406-17 was based on an increase or 
expansion of local endemic banditry. The restoration of peasants to their traditional non-
violent social role by Exuperantius suggests that – as seems to have been the case in the 
bacaudic revolt in the third century – peasants may have joined with extant endemic 
bandits in an attempt to violently improve their social condition. However, the accounts 
of Salvian and 452 suggest that taxation and other oppressive polices of state, during a 
time of extraordinary duress for the revenues of the Western Empire, may have 
encouraged many Romans to seek a refuge among these de-facto external Romans.448 
                                                          
445 See above, Chapter Two, especially 2.2. 
446 See above, pp. 55-6. 
447 See above, pp. 136-8.  
448 See Drinkwater’s discussion of migration as a factor in the revolt of the fifth-century Bacaudae in 
‘The Bacaudae of fifth-century Gaul’, p. 213. 
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An influx of fugitives may have both fuelled unrest and added to the authority of nascent 
bandit authority in northern Gaul.  
Though the Roman state did attempt to re-establish its usual authority in the northern 
Gallic territories from c.417, it seems that the deaths of Emperors Constantius and 
Honorius in the early 420s and the subsequent civil wars curtailed these efforts, to the 
extent that state authority was patchy and uncertain in these territories. This is far from 
surprising. Even in Italy the state was struggling to combat the irregular ravages of 
banditry; this blight forced Honorius to devolve the prerogative for violent power and 
essentially legitimise private vigilante action against brigandage.449 This freedom to 
establish non-state authority in Gaul seems to have allowed various barbarian groups 
and the Bacaudae to form embryonic networks of authority. These were severely upset 
by the expansionist policies of Aetius in the 430s which took the form of extensive 
campaigning in Gaul and provoked rebellion form the Bacaudae and Nori as well as 
Goths, Burgundians, Iuthungi and Franks.450 These groups had been afforded the 
opportunity to establish independent power in Gaul during the years of limited state 
intervention from c.406 until the 430s, and violently resisted the attempt of Aetius to 
curtail these powers. Much as bandits in Isauria formed authority that was independent 
of the state and resisted the attempts of the Romans to dismantle this authority, and much 
as the endemic banditry in Southern Italy was sparked to epidemic proportions by the 
campaigns of Justinian in the 530s, it seems plausible that Aetius’s policies in Gaul in 
the 430s provoked extensive epidemic banditry in Armorica under the leadership of 
Tibatto and others.451   
                                                          
449 See above, pp. 89-91. 
450 See above, pp. 170-1. 
451 See above, pp. 106-8 for Isauria and pp. 117-123 for southern Italy.  
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Our evidence for the Spanish Bacaudae in isolation is rendered more problematic 
because we have only a single source, Hydatius, and he offers little detail about their 
composition or motivation. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Bacaudae based in or around 
the Ebro valley were causing the Roman state some serious problems. Indeed their 
opposition to the state was probably no less significant than that of their Armorican 
counterparts. They are first mentioned in 441 when the ‘Master of Both Services’ 
Asturius was sent to quell them; presumably their disturbances had reached a 
significance that demanded the action of such a major military figure. He slaughtered a 
‘multitude’ of them in Tarraconensis, but they remained powerful enough two years later 
to demand the attentions of Asturius’ successor, Merobaudes – the same military poet 
who wrote the Panegyric II devoted to Aetius which celebrated his success over the 
Armoricans. He broke the ‘insolence’ of the Bacaudae at Aracelli, so that in 446 the next 
Master, Vitus, was sent against a different enemy – the Suevi. 452 Thompson raises the 
significant point that the Bacaudae appear to have been a more pressing concern for the 
Empire than barbarians. 453 At the very least they clearly posed a threat to the supply 
lines of an army campaigning further into the Spanish interior as well as endangering 
the only province in Iberia that remained Roman. 
The Bacaudae recovered sufficiently from these substantial attacks to massacre Imperial 
federate soldiers and the local bishop inside a church in the city of Tarazona in 449. 
Presumably this church was the refuge of the defenders of the city after its outer defences 
were overcome.454 Later in the year the Bacaudae joined the Sueves of Rechiarius to 
plunder the lands around Saragossa and sack the city of Lerida. Both these activities 
were undertaken with the leadership of a certain Basilius. The Bacaudae then remain 
unmentioned until 456 when Frederic, the brother of the Visigoth King Theodoric II, 
                                                          
452 Hydatius, ‘Chronicle’ 125, 128 and 134. 
453 Thompson, Romans and Barbarians, p. 183. 
454 Thompson, Romans and Barbarians, p. 184. 
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was encouraged into Tarraconensis by Roman authorities to slaughter the Bacaudae. He 
was apparently more successful than Asturius, as they did not appear again.455 
Van Dam regards the Spanish Bacaudae as examples of the growing authority of 
aristocrats in the Ebro valley and that deeds they performed that might seem unusual are 
the result of ‘laconic’ references of Hydatius that ‘it would be unwise to read too much 
into.’456 But this view is too dismissive of Hydatius.457 It is true that he gives little detail 
about the character of the Bacaudae in Tarraconensis, but they certainly appear to have 
acted more like rural rebels than traditionalist aristocrats; as their attacks on Roman 
cities, officials and soldiers and alliances with barbarian enemies of the Empire suggests.  
It is possible to make some inference, from the evidence of the Gallic Bacaudae and 
epidemic banditry in general, about the composition of the Spanish Bacaudae. The 
province of Tarraconensis, centred on the fertile Ebro valley but bounded to the east, 
north and west by uplands – the Pyrenees, the Basque and Cantabrian Mountains and 
the Meseta Central – was home to many great estates and in recent times the power in 
the region had become more concentrated into the hands of the rural aristocracy who 
were increasingly assertive.458 This concentration was catalysed by the reliance of the 
state on the province, which escaped invasion and settlement by the barbarian Alans, 
Vandals and Sueves in the aftermath of the Rhine crossing. A greater burden of taxation 
presumably fell on the citizens of Tarraconensis, but the aristocracy were able to escape 
these burdens and thus to thrive in contrast to their lower class neighbours.459 We can 
infer from the apparent marginality of Gallic Bacaudae that the Bacaudae of Spain 
                                                          
455 Hydatius, ‘Chronicle’, 141, 142 and 158. 
456 Van Dam, p. 51. 
457 R. W. Burgess ‘From Gallia Romana to Gallia Gothica: the view from Spain’ in Fifth Century Gaul: 
a crisis of identity? Ed. by J. Drinkwater and H. Elton (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1992) pp. 
19-27 (p. 19).  
458 Alexandra Chavarría Arnau, ‘Villas in Hispania during the Fourth and Fifth Century’ in Hispania in 
Late Antiquity, ed. by Kim Bowes and Michael Kulikowski (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 519.  
459 The scale of Villa construction and renovation in early fifth-century Tarraconensis would seem to 
attest to this; S. J. Keay, Roman Spain (London: British Museum Publications, 1988), p. 206. 
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probably originated in the mountainous margins of Tarraconensis which were sought, 
like the Armorican forests, as refuge by the impoverished and oppressed. It is also likely 
that these uplands were home to pastoralists and transhumants amongst whom banditry, 
or at least cattle-rustling, had long been practiced.460  
The influx of fugitive migrants perhaps increased population in these areas allowing the 
formation of an identity and the development of enough cohesion to encourage raiding 
and other acts of violence that were directly oppositional to the Roman state. It is 
possible that this identity was encouraged by, or borrowed from, the example of the 
Gallic Bacaudae whose exploits would probably have been transmitted to Tarraconensis 
via fugitives, traders and personal correspondence from Gaul. It is perhaps relevant to 
note that both Tarraconensis and the Armorica/Gallia Ulterior were geographically 
contiguous with the seven provinces region of Gaul. Some kernel of bacaudic character 
was perhaps spread via the influence of fugitives from that region, which remained under 
the direct control of the Roman state or its Visigothic allies in the first half of the fifth 
century.   
Though specific details in Hydatius record of the activities of the Spanish Bacaudae are 
sparser then we might wish, they generally correspond well to certain characteristics 
which we can discern rom their Gallic equivalents. They we clearly hostile to the Roman 
state; they opposed Roman armies, attacked urban centres – where particularly Roman 
culture was more marked than in the rustic, marginal countryside – and battles with 
barbarian allies of the Empire. They likewise made common cause with the Suevic 
enemies of the Roman state, much as Eudoxius seems to have found an ally in Attila. 
                                                          
460 Transhumancy is well documented in medieval Spain; see Julius Klein, The Mesta and Le Roy 
Ladurie, Montaillou for Pyrennean transhumancy, which connected Occitan Ariège to the Ebro Valley. 
See above, p. 180, n. 435 for cattle-rustling in Roman Spain. Hydatius, ‘Chronicle’, entry 179, himself 
used the term latro to describe brigands elsewhere in Spain; this usage of the more ordinary term 
suggests that he saw the Bacaudae as something different, and more significant. The ordinary latrones 
were, perhaps, rather more akin to traditional endemic bandits.  
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As far as we can tell the understanding of the Spanish Bacaudae as ‘marginal’, according 
to the interpretations of Neri and Sánchez León is as valid as it seems for the Armorican 
Bacaudae. In both cases marginal peoples, in the geographic periphery of the Empire, 
seem to have provided a core around which fugitives and oppressed peasants could 
coalesce.461 These margins were probably home to endemic abactores and latrones and 
were probably traditional haunts of fugitives and ‘ruffians’ throughout the history of the 
Empire.462 In the conditions of socio-economic and military chaos that created and 
catalysed epidemic banditry, fugitives aplenty flocked to these zones where they formed 
organisations that were sufficiently potent to resist the oppressive countermeasures of 
the state for over a decade.   
The understanding of bacaudic revolt and similar episodes of unrest as periodic 
outbreaks of epidemic banditry from a backdrop of endemic brigandage as a result of 
political, military and social context seems to satisfactorily associate these otherwise 
disparate events into a tangible social pattern. Moreover, it would fundamentally alter 
our understanding of banditry in the Roman world, allowing us to plot similar outbreaks 
of epidemic banditry to a probable backdrop of endemic brigandage in various regions. 
This might not much alter our perceptions of the grand politics and institutions of the 
Empire, but it would encourage historians to perceive the structures through which the 
unnumbered lower-class citizens of the Empire could attempt to flex their agency and 
affect their position within the world. Our perceptions of Rome are too often, though 
understandably, dominated by the wars and intrigues that feature so heavily in the 
historical sources that remain to us. However, a greater understanding of currents in 
endemic and epidemic banditry can encourage us to consider the late antique world at a 
more parochial level, where a slave or free-farmer might take advantage of the martial 
                                                          
461 Neri, I marginali, pp. 400-417, and ‘Povertà, criminalità e disordine sociale nella tarda antichità’, pp. 
198-9, 205-6 and J. C. Sánchez León, Los Bagaudas, pp. 43-4. 
462 See above, p. 188, n. 460.  
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preoccupations of the upper classes to hoist his cattle goad and take to the hills or forests 
in search of freedom, fortune or adventure. 
 
3.5. Interim Conclusion: Bacaudae, scamarae, vargi and barbari: Changing  
conceptions of banditry in in the late antique West.  
If the Bacaudae are to be understood as epidemic bandits born from a context of political 
instability in a region of endemic brigandage (specifically north-western Gaul), the 
question remains; why was the term used to describe similar unrest in the distant regions 
of north-eastern Spain and indeed the Alps? This inconsistency could be considered 
simply an error or, more reasonably, a fashion. Zosimus and Hydatius were presumably 
familiar with the Bacaudae as raiders and citizens in revolt, so applied the term beyond 
the regional context of northern Gaul. It is plausible that by the mid-fifth century the 
term was applied generically, much as we might today colloquially refer to all vacuum-
cleaners as ‘hoovers’, despite the fact that the label properly applied to products made 
by the manufacturer Hoover.  However, it does seem that the usage of Bacaudae was not 
simply a fashionable synonym for latrones, since Hydatius uses the term consistently to 
describe the violence of rebels in the area of northern Tarraconensis, but elsewhere uses 
latro to describe banditry in Gallecia.463  
The reader may have noticed over the course of this chapter, and the previous two, that 
the language of banditry is far more diverse than latro and its derivative terminology. 
Some of these terms might be broadly synonymous, such as praedones, or describe a 
practice with which banditry was associated, such the cattle-rustling abactores. 
However, it is clear that during the later years of the Roman Empire in the West, a new 
                                                          
463 Zosimus, 6. 2 and Hydatius, ‘Chronicle’, 179.  
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terminology for bandit-like violence seems to have emerged. Barbarians, and especially 
those peoples who practised hit-and-run style warfare, increasingly came to be described 
in the terms of banditry. For Ammianus, the military traditions of tribes like the 
Sarmatians and Quadi were to be associated in the mind with the guerrilla-type violence 
of latrones.464 Furthermore, as barbarian groups became more firmly ensconced within 
the boundaries of the Empire, the practices of barbarian raiding and banditry became 
increasingly difficult to delineate. In a memorable passage, Zosimus describes the anti-
bandit policy of the Emperor Theodosius in the Balkans. The soldiers of the Empire had 
been away campaigning under the command of the Emperor in the West when certain 
bandits in the region had taken the advantage of the absence of the army to pillage 
extensively. When Theodosius returned to pacify the area, he found that regular military 
tactics were ineffective, so he employed anti-banditry tactics. Much as the hunters of 
Bulla Felix, and indeed St. Polycarp relied on information and betrayal to locate their 
elusive foes, likewise Theodosius went undercover and was able to expose an informant 
of the bandits who resided in a local tavern which he used to gather intelligence for his 
fellow brigands.465 Under torture the informant revealed the location of the bandit 
hideout, and the Emperor was able to quell their unrest.466 This policy followed the 
standard pattern of imperial anti-bandit tactics, yet it seems that at least some of these 
brigands were barbarians, perhaps Goths who had been settled in the aftermath of their 
crossing of the Danube in 376. 
This blurring of lines between barbarians and bandits should not been seen as surprising. 
Rather it is likely that the transition from one to the other was easy; to the civilised, 
urban elite of the Roman Empire, bandits – who were characteristically upland 
                                                          
464 Ammianus Marcellinus, 17. 12. 2 and also 16. 10. 20 and 29. 6. 8 for Sarmatians and Quadi as 
latrones. 
465 See above, pp. 58-61. 
466 Zosimus, 4. 48. 
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shepherds – were semi-barbarian at the best of times anyway. It was for such reasons 
that certain internal gentes – such as the Isaurians – were considered both synonymous 
with bandits and virtually barbarian.467 However, it seems that in the Western provinces 
of the Empire a new influx of barbarian settlement after 376 (although certainly not an 
unprecedented one – the settlement of barbarians within the Empire was a long-
established policy) catalysed the development of a new terminology of banditry.  
Some observers, such as Ammianus and Zosimus, simply added the terms bandit and 
barbarian together to describe their meaning. Others seem to have tried out new 
vocabularies. Sidonius Apollinaris described the raiders that dragged the relative of the 
bearer of one of his letters as vargi – a Germanic term for outlaw – and mentions that 
this term was the common name for bandits in the region of Auvergne.468 Similarly, as 
we have seen, Jordanes used the term scamarae to describe some of the diverse band of 
brigands that operated under the leadership of Mundo.469 Eugippius uses the same word, 
scamarae, to describe barbari praedones – possibly Rugi – who raided Noricum from 
across the Danube.470 It seems that these forms of vocabulary were solutions to a 
problem in discourse. Either through use of new terminology or by compounding 
existing terms together, late antique writers were attempting to reflect a new reality: that 
banditry in the period was perceived to have changed. Ethnicity seems to have taken on 
a greater significance in these years as a signifier of brigandage. Where latrocinium had 
once been internal illegitimate violence, that of citizens against their state, the 
relationship of brigand to authority seems to have changed. Vargi, scamarae and bandit-
                                                          
467 For the Isaurians see pp. 102-4. However, they were not alone in bearing the stigma of brigand 
association; see Benjamin Isaac, The Near East under Roman Rule, (Leiden: Brill, 1998), pp. 122-58. 
468 Sidonius Apollinaris, Letters, 6. 4 in Murray, From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader, p. 231. 
469 Jordanes, Getica, 58 and above, pp. 98-9.  
470 Eugippius, Vita Severini, 10. 
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Goths were internal and their violence was still perceived as illegitimate, but their status 
had changed and they could no longer be juxtaposed with external hostes as easily.  
This development was hardly without precedent; as stated above, bandits had been 
perceived as semi-barbarian throughout the history of the Empire, and various internal 
peoples were associated with brigandage. We have seen that various authors seem to 
have identified the bacaudic revolt by its location in north-western Gaul, that at least one 
of its leaders had a local name of Celtic origin and that the term itself derives from a 
Celtic word.471 It seems possible, therefore, that in its obscure origins the term Bacaudae 
describes unrest of a specifically regional character. More significantly, it seems likely 
that by the fifth century, and in the aftermath of the various barbarian settlements in the 
Western provinces over the previous decades, that the term ‘Bacaudae’ found relevance 
as a label for banditry in a changed context. If it had once specifically implied banditry 
in the region of north-western Gaul, perhaps as the label Isaurian conjured notions of 
both region and brigandage, this was clearly not the usage by the fifth century.  Though 
we, as historians, might reasonably label the bacaudic rebellions as episodes of epidemic 
banditry, it would be foolish to assume that Roman observers considered it synonymous 
with latrocinium. Therefore, when Hydatius and Zosimus came to use the term, it seems 
likely that they meant to describe a phenomenon that they considered different to the 
usual contemporary perception of traditional latrocinium.472   
This is significant, because it affects how we perceive banditry to have changed as 
authority passed from the Roman state to the various successors that replaced it in the 
West. Michael McCormick may be correct in arguing that banditry became more 
common in the post-Roman West, but it seems to have been perceived in a different 
                                                          
471 See above, p. 149, n.374. 
472 See above, p. 136, n.338 and p. 190 and n.463. 
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way.473 Gregory of Tours uses the term latro only twice in his Histories and either in 
quotation, or in the improper sense of assassins.474 In fact, although Gregory describes 
many episodes of lower-class violence that we might categorise as banditry, to my 
knowledge he only uses the word latro to describe banditry (as we define it) once in all 
his numerous works.475 Similarly, the specific use of the word seems to have disappeared 
in the Pactus Legis Salicae, where latro seems to be synonymous with fur (thief), and 
in the Lex Burgundionem, where the usage seems to describe animal theft.476 Although 
we cannot generalise too far from this limited sample, it seems to reflect the changes in 
perceptions that were already ongoing in the later Roman Empire. Raiders were 
increasingly identified by their ethnicity if they were perceived as external, whilst 
internal brigands were not seen as betraying the civilising ideology of a monolithic state, 
but more akin to other criminals. Where in Roman law the latrones could be identified 
as the rhetorical antithesis of the Res Publica, in the Early Middle Ages they seem to 
have been robbers in some form or other. 
This development should not be seen as evidence of the diminishing prevalence or 
significance of banditry in the Early Middle Ages, but rather as emblematic of changes 
in perceptions of legitimacy in violence and the implementation of authority by the 
successor states. For our purposes however, it is important to remember that although 
the discourses of banditry may have changed, we should not assume that shepherds had 
ceased to raid flocks, or that lower-class persons no longer sought to improve their 
                                                          
473 Michael McCormick, The Origins of the European Economy: communications and commerce c.700-
c.900, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 74. 
474 LH, 2. 40 and 10. 1. The former use describes assassins sent by Clovis to kill Sigibert as latruncolis, 
the latter is a quote from Gregory the Great.  
475 Gregory of Tours, ‘De virtutibus sanct Martini episcopi’, 1. 36. See Raymond Van Dam, Saints and 
their miracles in Late Antique Gaul (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 226. 
476 Pactus Legis Salicae LXXX; The Laws of the Salian Franks, p. 137. Lex Burgundionem XLVII; The 
Burgundian Code, trans. Katherine Fischer Drew, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972), 
p. 54. ‘Pactus Legis Salicae’, in Leges nationum Germanicarum, 4.1, ed. by Karl August Eckhardt 
(Hannover: Hahn, 1962) and ‘Leges Burgundionem’, in Leges nationum Germanicarum, 2.1, ed. by 
Ludovicus Rudolfus de Salis (Hannover: Hahn, 1892). 
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quality of life with violence in the hills and forests of what had been the Roman Empire. 
Although the Empire fostered an adversarial rhetoric between the bandit and the state, 
this was a relationship in which the bandit was unlikely to actively engage. Indeed, if a 
bandit-leader had reached a prominence where they could directly affect the workings 
of the Empire, then they were unlikely to remain a bandit for long, but could expect 
either punishment or some degree of legitimisation. But everyday bandits, even at times 
of epidemic brigandage, interacted in power relations at a far lower level, and it seems 
such interactions continued – and continued to effect the lives of common people – well 
into the post-Roman era of the late antique West.  
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Chapter Four 
4. Retainers: Lower-class people in legitimated violent roles.   
Throughout this study we have seen that the Roman authorities, especially private 
citizens in positions of power, were routinely able to call upon persons from non-military 
occupations and statuses to perform violent functions.477 This was an everyday 
occurrence throughout the Empire; though the state had a rhetorical claim to a monopoly 
on violence, it was practically (though not always) limited to the public sphere. In the 
household the dominus had great power to inflict corporeal punishment over his social 
inferiors.478  
Assertions of violent power by individuals on a societal scale were generally seen as less 
acceptable. The social process known as patrocinium, for example, is depicted as 
grasping and predatory by several late antique authors. The term was generally used to 
describe patronage, whereby an individual exchanged services for the favours or 
influence of a benefactor from higher up the social hierarchy. However, certain late 
antique authors, most notably Salvian who directly mirrored patrocinium with 
latrocinium, describe the process as one which the wealthy exploited in order to prey on 
their neighbours and force them through means that were dubious, or even blatantly 
illegal, to surrender their properties.479 It is fair to say that Salvian and other critics of 
the immoral use of patrocinium for the exploitation of the lesser by the mighty were far 
from unbiased, but nevertheless their critiques perhaps do represent a development in 
power relations in the late Roman world. And although most of the agglomeration of 
power by late antique aristocracies surely took place by fair means, the violent assertion 
                                                          
477 For discussion of the legal status of violence, see Jill Harries, ‘Violence, Victims and the Legal 
Tradition’ in Violence in Late Antiquity, ed. H.A. Drake, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). 
478 Garrett G. Fagan, ‘Violence in Roman Social Relations’ in The Oxford Handbook of Social Relations 
in the Roman World, ed. Michael Peachin, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 475 (467-
495). 
479 Salvian, 5. 8, pp. 142-3. 
 197 
 
of power by private individuals is of primary importance in this chapter. Though wealthy 
individuals, those with high status, or landowners did have the potential to undertake 
violent actions in the late Roman Empire, those acts of violence were likely to be on the 
edge of legality and legitimacy.480  Law codes dating to the time attempt to alleviate 
these agglomerations of private power, instituted a number of injunctions against the 
soliciting of military personnel or the harbouring of private men of violence. In this case, 
the response of the state to the growth of private power, especially that associated with 
predatory patrocinium, is probably indicative of the general insecurity about the ability 
of private individuals to wield violence. Moreover, while this study is not focused on 
aristocratic or upper-class violence, that violence required individuals who were willing 
and able to perform it. Through violent actions on behalf of patrons and despite dubious 
legitimacy, violence as a retainer could promise persons of lower-class status an 
opportunity to negotiate their position in life and society. 
The growth of the violent power of late antique aristocracies has been relatively well 
studied from the ‘top down’. The implications of increased private power for the 
development of late Roman ‘proto-feudal’ relationships in particular has attracted a great 
deal of scholarly interest, as have more general developments in military practice and 
aristocratic authority.481 It is well known and often quoted, for example, that Didymus 
and Verenianus raised slave armies from their estates in Spain to fight on behalf of 
                                                          
480 For a definition of what is meant by ‘legitimacy’ in this context, see above, Introduction, ii.  
481 See, for example; Penny MacGeorge, Late Roman Warlords, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002); John O’Flynn, Generalissimos of the Western Roman Empire, (Edmonton: University of Alberta 
Press, 1983); C. R. Whittaker, Frontiers of the Roman Empire: a social and economic study, (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press), pp. 243-78, Wolf Liebeschuetz, ‘Warlords and Landlords’ in A 
Companion to the Roman Army, ed. Paul Erdkamp (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 479-94. These 
accounts generally focus on the development of ‘warlords’, their political involvement during the later 
years of the Western Empire and sometimes their interactions with fellow aristocrats. The actual 
processes of recruiting private violent supporters and the institutions and processes by which aristocrats 
gained and maintained that private power have attracted less attention. The implications for those people 
that were employed in violence directly has been largely overlooked. 
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Honorius against usurpers and barbarians in the early fifth century.482 The significance 
of this development for the immediate intricacies of imperial politics and the long-term 
implications of military recruitment practices have been considered in due course, but 
the effect that such actions had on the people involved is rather less well understood.483 
We cannot really discern from the account of Orosius, who described this event, how 
the arming of slaves affected the relationship between them and their masters, but it is 
still worth considering. The unfree agricultural workers on grand estates seem to have 
experienced a radical transformation in their social role. En masse they were armed and 
thrust into danger. What negotiations governed this change in role? Of course, the slaves 
were unfree and therefore technically bound to obey their masters, but the provision of 
weapons and enfranchisement to violence (a demonstration of power far outside the 
notional social roles of lower-class people) may have allowed them a greater vantage 
point from which to bargain their statuses.  
If these slaves, and the late antique poor in general, were truly passive to external threats 
in the manner of Phaedrus’ Ass, then how were they encouraged to serve in a new, more 
onerous and dangerous role?484 In this chapter we will investigate examples of how 
lower-class people assumed violent roles in non-official, but ‘legitimated’ ways so as to 
understand how these new roles and obligations altered their social standing.  
 
 
                                                          
482 Orosius, 7. 40. Slaves were considered deeply inappropriate for military roles except in the most 
extreme of circumstances: see for contrast CTh 7. 13. 8 and 7. 13. 16. For the particular context of 
Didymus and Verenianus see S. J. Keay, Roman Spain (London: British Museum Publications, 1988), 
pp. 202-4. 
483 For military recruitment practices see Bernard S. Bachrach, ‘Grand Strategy in the Germanic 
Kingdoms: Recruitment of the Rank and File’ in L’armée romaine et les barbares du IIIe au VIIe siècle, 
ed., Francoise Vallet et Michel Kazanski (Paris: Association Francaise d’Archeologie Merovingienne et 
Musee des Antiquites Nationales, 1993), p. 59. 
484 For the fable of Phaedrus’ Ass and its implications, see above, Introduction, i, p. 9-11. 
 199 
 
4.1. When are violent roles legitimate?    
Determining the legitimacy of violence is a notoriously difficult task. Fortunately, the 
historian is not required to make a moral judgment, but rather analyse the contemporary 
understanding of legitimacy. Nevertheless, the problem is fraught with complexity. As 
we have already seen, banditry was considered absolutely illegal, even inimical to the 
state, yet banditry was tolerated by many wealthy citizens who were otherwise quite 
invested in the trappings of Roman citizenship. Furthermore, except in extreme 
circumstances when the army might be tasked with anti-bandit operations, wealthy 
citizens were expected to outfit state officials with manpower or even undertake the 
suppression of brigands in a private capacity.485 Suppose then a situation in which two 
aristocratic neighbours outfit irregular bands of pastores to raid their opponent’s 
livestock and to defend their own. Both would surely accuse the other of harbouring 
latrones, yet if the modern historian is presented with a biased account of the conflict, 
then one will be depicted as a harbourer and the other as the supporter of legitimated 
diogmitae.486 Legitimacy, therefore, is very much in the eye of the beholder.    
Despite this significant caveat, it is worth persevering with the concept of legitimacy, 
since inconsistencies in the depictions of violent roles can provide significant insight 
into the differing conceptions of violence across time, space and social hierarchy. 
Therefore, in the use of the term legitimacy henceforth I will apply a broad definition. 
Violent actions by lower-class persons must be legitimated by the authority that 
enfranchises them to that role, whether that be the state, nobility or the Church. However, 
I will not include detail on the assumption of military roles by lower-class persons.487 
                                                          
485 See above, pp. 58-61. 
486 For diogmitae, see Lenski, ‘Assimilation and Revolt in the Territory of Isauria’, p. 423, and above, 
pp. 58-9, 68.  
487 Though of course there was a significant overlap between specifically military and more ad hoc 
violence, so some discussion will occur, particularly in consideration of ex-military personnel in Late 
Roman bodyguards, and the ‘military’ status of aristocratic retainers in Merovingian Francia. 
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Regulated recruitment of this kind certainly did have a significant impact on the lower-
class person’s social status; indeed by joining the army rural peasants (the typical and 
preferred class for military service) technically became honestiores.488 However, these 
processes are both well studied and less significant as indicators of quality of life. The 
state necessarily recruited both in times of peace and war, and therefore it is difficult to 
use the existence of standard military recruitment as a measure of peaks and troughs in 
the lives of common people. Instead, this chapter will focus on examples that reveal how 
authorities negotiated the bestowal of legitimate, or at least tolerated, violent roles to 
those whose status still technically denied them violent agency.489 Hopefully by 
considering these interactions, and the circumstances of these violent deeds, we can gain 
a more complete understanding of the potential agency of the lower classes in the late 
antique West.490 Moreover, this investigation into legitimated violence might prove 
informative about the quality of life of lower-class people and the potential for 
occupations in violence as a tool for social mobility. 
 
4.2. Retainers and the Late Roman Aristocracy.  
There were any number of jobs for legitimate or de facto legitimated men of violence in 
Roman society.491 Aristocrats, as well as merchants and similarly wealthy persons were 
                                                          
488 Wesch-Klein, p. 447. Likewise professional (waged) military service and legitimacy to participate in 
violence necessarily altered the social norms by which their actions were judged. 
489 As with the rest of this thesis, the examples which I have chosen to investigate do by no means 
represent an exhaustive list of all such interactions between authorities and lower-class persons. Rather I 
hope to provide a series of case studies from each of which information on particular events and local 
circumstances can be gained. Having complied these case studies, it is hoped that more general 
conclusions case be applied.  
490 It is worth stressing, once again, the word ‘potential’ in this sentence. By no means was it typical or 
even common for lower-class persons to be able to affect or re-negotiate their status by violent means. 
Nor were violent means the only option available; see Allen E. Jones, Social Mobility in Late Antique 
Gaul, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). These examples display social mobility at the 
extreme: typically when the position of the authorities was so shaken that they had to allow greater 
violent freedom to their social inferiors in order to maintain their own status, safety or supremacy. 
491 Shaw, Sacred Violence, pp. 630-674 provides an excellent description of the rural itinerant labourers, 
who in North Africa came to be called circumcelliones, who might often have engaged in violent work. 
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unsurprisingly cautious about the loss of their riches or damage to their lives or property 
and therefore sought to protect them against crime or the machinations of rivals. As we 
have seen, brigandage was a ubiquitous, if not necessarily common source of peril, and 
guards (perhaps even other brigands!) might be employed to defend against 
latrocinium.492 A harrowing, if comedic scene, in Apuleius’ Metamorphoses perhaps 
illustrates the concern for safety among travellers and the affray that could result from 
it. Lucius, in Ass-form, was travelling in a tightly grouped and well-armed band of 
pastores who had been forewarned about the dangers of ravening wolves in the district. 
Unfortunately, the workers (coloni multitudinem) on a nearby estate took them to be 
latrones and released a horde of ferocious hounds on the party and then climbed nearby 
buildings and trees and rained stones down upon them. Cries for pity eventually halted 
the onslaught and revealed that the violence resulted from a misunderstanding, but 
Lucius’s party suffered some grievous injuries in the meantime.493 We should not take 
a dramatic tale from a fictional and ridiculous narrative to be evidence for commonplace 
encounters between overzealous guards who each believed the other to be ill-
intentioned. But this tension, amplified to the absurd, does indicate that guards were 
commonly and necessarily employed. Indeed Columella, in his comparatively sober 
treatise on the proper management of rural estates, included a lengthy description of the 
breeding and character of large mastiff-like dogs to defend property against attacks in 
the manner described by Apuleius.494 Columella does not discuss the role of the rural 
labourers in defence of the property, but there is some indication that loyal service in a 
potentially violent capacity would be rewarded. He stresses that the employees chosen 
to oversee livestock must be both loyal and intelligent, because they were entrusted with 
property and a greater degree of agency and freedom. They were responsible for the care 
                                                          
492 Shaw, ‘Bandits in the Roman Empire’, pp. 8-10, and above pp. 31-2.  
493 Apuleius, Metamorphoses, 8. 17-18. 
494 Columella, 7. 12. 
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of the herds and the defence of livestock against wild animals and thieves.495 We cannot 
tell exactly what the assumption of these violent responsibilities entailed for either the 
guards of the house or the herds in terms of social status or rewards. However it is clear 
that the latter at least enjoyed far more privileges than other unfree workers on the estate 
who might, as Columella advised, be chained while working and overnight and who 
were often kept under constant supervision.496  
Violent roles like these existed throughout the Roman Empire, both regionally and 
chronologically. It is not easy to determine whether they became more or less common 
in Late Antiquity. The outraged and damning verdict of Salvian on the practice of 
predatory patrocinium by his contemporaries has often been understood as evidence of 
increasing predation by the wealthiest aristocrats on lesser landowners in the fifth 
century.497 If this depiction is accepted then it would presumably indicate an expansion 
of the violent power that major ‘patrons’ could exert. However, Salvian was not a 
commentator without bias. He intended to juxtapose the deplorable situation in society 
with the ideal of a Christian community, and therefore sought to manipulate, or perhaps 
even exaggerate certain rapacious characteristics of power relations in Southern Gaul. 
In particular, he depicts the independent peasantry as saddled with unbearable taxes 
which forced them to cede their property and freedom to wealthy patrons (who might, 
of course, be responsible for collecting those taxes), in order to escape the tax 
                                                          
495 Columella, 7 .6, 12. 
496 Columella, 1. 8, 9. These relationships were extant in the business of government as well as in 
parochial rural occupations. For example, the Emperors Valentinian II and Theodosius I considered 
slaves (presumably armed), alongside palatine guards, as a vital part of the escort for postwagons 
carrying imperial treasure. CTh 8. 5. 48. 
497 In combination with Libanius’s Oration 47 Against Protection Systems and legislation from the 
Theodosian Code, 11. 24, this interpretation has been extended, perhaps incautiously, to apply to the entire 
Empire. See Cam Grey, ‘Salvian, the ideal Christian community and the fate of the poor in fifth-century 
Gaul’ in Poverty in the Roman World, ed. M. Atkins and R. Osborne, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), p. 162. For a more general introduction to patrocinium see Arnaldo Marcone, ‘Late Roman 
Social Relations’ in The New Cambridge Ancient History XIII, ed. Averil Cameron and Garnsey, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 338-70 (pp. 360-63). 
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collector.498 Though the moralising intent of Salvian has long influenced scholarship, a 
revisionist trend on patrocinium has recently stressed the more ordinary aspects of 
patronage and representation. Cam Grey, in particular, has emphasised that this process 
could, conversely, be evidence for a certain agency on behalf of the poor who might, for 
example, move or erect boundary markers to suggest that their property belonged to 
more powerful persons in order to dissuade unwelcome visitors.499 Likewise, he has also 
criticised the tendency to take the critiques offered by Salvian and others at face value.  
Whilst it is certainly right to acknowledge the complexity of patrocinium as a process, 
and to not generalise excessively from a problematic source, it is certainly worth 
stressing that ‘predatory patrocinium’ – as we shall henceforth refer to the violent 
appropriation of property or services from the lesser neighbour by a wealthy one – could 
provide ample opportunities for men of violence. While some of the entries in the 
Theodosian Code on Patronage imply that the cession of property was voluntary, other 
sources suggest that violent seizure also occurred.500 Literary sources seem to confirm 
this suggestion. Apuleius, for example, describes an extremely violent case of 
involuntary appropriation in which both parties took up arms. A rich farmer was able to 
abuse the position afforded to him because of his wealth and lineage to despoil his 
neighbour with impunity. He sent men to trample his crops and slaughter or steal his 
livestock. Then he brought baseless boundary dispute against the neighbour who called 
up friends and kin to testify to the traditional, accepted boundary between them. The 
rich man also brought a retinue and attempted to intimidate the neighbour with vicious 
dogs, which his shepherds unleashed on the poor neighbour. The dogs killed one 
                                                          
498 Salvian, 5 .8 and Cam Grey, ‘Salvian, the ideal Christian community and the fate of the poor in fifth-
century Gaul’, p. 176. 
499 Cam Grey, ‘Salvian, the ideal Christian community and the fate of the poor in fifth-century Gaul’, 
pp. 179-80. Similarly, it seems that some persons of lesser status would fraudulently transfer debts owed 
to them to wealthy patrons so that they could forcefully extract the money their client was owed. CTh 2. 
13. 1. 
500 For example; CTh 13. 11. 9 and N.Val 8. For the laws on Patronage; CTh 11. 24. 
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defender, the rich man slew another with a thrown spear and called in a particularly large 
and fierce slave to help. A third defender, brother to those who had been slain, lured the 
rich man close by feigning injury then killed him and committed suicide before the rich 
man’s slaves could avenge their master. The poor neighbour, unable to countenance the 
recriminations that would follow, also committed suicide.501  
This episode of extreme violence, invented for Apuleius’ narrative purpose though it is, 
perhaps indicates the types of techniques used by some unscrupulous aristocrats to bully 
their social inferiors.502 Moreover, it reveals the role of lower-class attendants; both sides 
called in those that they could to offer support, whether employees, slaves or kin.503 
These were enabled to perform violence on behalf of their social superiors and, perhaps 
could expect reward for it. For example, the leader of destructive raids or a particularly 
powerful slave might have been considered for an overseeing position in a newly 
acquired estate, or a loyal shepherd and dog-handler might have become a master 
shepherd, or archipomen.504 Finally, we can see that the poor farmer, himself of 
apparently humilial status and abandoned by the Roman judicial system on account of 
his minor social significance, was nevertheless able to round up a group of allies that 
were willing and able to violently resist the predatory intent of the powerful 
neighbour.505 So, in addition to understanding patrocinium as a system which might in 
fact be exploited in a positive manner by individuals of lesser status (as Cam Grey has 
argued), we should also recognise that lesser persons might – despite their disadvantages 
                                                          
501 Apuleius, 9. 35-8. 
502 A terser depiction of similar depredation wrought on weaker neighbours by those who could employ 
violent retainers is provided by Augustine’s description of the town of Fussala, south of Hippo, c.422. 
There the church hierarchy, and especially the lay defensor ecclesiae, employed soldiers and deserters, 
as well as men from the village, to pillage and thieve from the local people. Augustine, Letters, 20*. 
503 Likewise, Libanius deplores the intervention of ‘strong men’ on behalf of patrons; Libanius, 
Orations, 47 and Arnaldo Marcone, p. 363. 
504 Columella, 1. 7. For master shepherds and their relationship to landowners see Hopwood, ‘Bandits 
between grandees and the state’, p. 187 and above, pp. 63-4.  
505 Provincials and rustics enjoyed some legal protection in cases like these, but it is doubtful that they 
had the influence and social capital to routinely avoid oppression by illustrious neighbours; CTh 11. 1. 
1.  
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– violently resist the encroachment of grasping aristocrats. Salvian’s description, even 
if it is sympathetic to the plight of poorer persons and critical of patrons and excessive 
taxes, still ignores the possibility of active, violent resistance to predatory patrocinium 
and the potential for social mobility for retainers on both sides of the confrontation.  
Furthermore, even if recent scholarship has been right to stress uncertainty about 
Salvian’s depiction of increased predatory patrocinium in Late Antiquity, there is 
evidence that suggests that changes were occurring in the patterns of retaining violent 
men in a private capacity. Didymus and Verenianus were certainly extreme examples of 
this process, as they were able to raise forces sufficient to trouble barbarian invaders and 
imperial usurpers. Few aristocrats were as richly endowed in property and we should 
envisage late antique retinues on a far smaller scale.506 However, Roman aristocrats 
certainly had greater legal freedom to maintain private retinues for violent functions in 
the fifth century than in previous centuries.507 As suggested, patrons might arm their 
employees, tenants or slaves in order to avoid, or protect them from, the exactions of the 
state.508 Moreover, from 391 landowners were granted rights to armed resistance against 
nocturnal marauders.509 Such perils had always existed on a minor scale, as the 
misunderstanding between Lucius’ band and the estate workers shows, so this 
prerogative probably ensured the defenders legal rights and perhaps enabled them to 
equip themselves with proper weapons rather than relying on hunting equipment, stones 
and hounds.510 In 403, this right was extended and all provincials were empowered to 
actively seek out and attack bandits, rather than just defend themselves against attack.511 
                                                          
506 S. J. Keay, pp. 202-4. 
507 For the use, and increasing use of manpower for violence in Late Antiquity see Lenski, ‘Harnessing 
Violence: Armed Force as Manpower in the Late Roman Countryside’, Journal of Late Antiquity, 6. 2, 
(2013), 223-250. 
508 CTh 13. 11. 3 forbids the avoidance of taxes by the use of armed coloni.   
509 CTh 9. 14. 2. 
510 Apuleius, 8. 17-18 and above, p. 201.  
511 CTh 7. 18. 14. 
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Finally, in 440 the threat of seaborne raids by the Vandals, who had recently captured 
the Roman fleet at Carthage, caused Valentinian III to concede to his citizens the right 
to:  
‘…defend their own, with their own men against the enemy, if the occasion should so 
demand, they shall use the arms which they can, but they shall preserve the public 
discipline and the moderation of free birth unimpaired.’512    
This proclamation makes clear that the state, though it remained wary of generic 
enfranchisement to violence (hence the stress on maintaining public discipline), was 
necessitated to allow limited private ‘militarisation’ because of the patterns of violence 
that brigandage and seaborne raiding had elicited. The Vandals, tellingly, are described 
as praedones and it is significant that only this new development caused the Empire to 
allow for private violence against barbarians.513 The implications are fairly clear. The 
state was responsible for true ‘warfare’, when armies faced armies, but could not 
practically defend its citizens against the hit and run methods of piratical Vandals and 
guerrilla-like bandits. Slave ‘armies’, like those of Didymus and Verenianus were not 
required. Instead we should imagine small retinues, probably numbering in tens or 
scores, rather than thousands. 
Private retinues on this scale need not have been significantly different from the slaves, 
shepherds and estate workers who performed violent functions in the time of Apuleius. 
Indeed, we have evidence that armed slaves were a component of such retinues and, as 
we have seen, there was a great deal of emphasis on the illegal harbouring of 
                                                          
512 N. Val, 9. 
513 N. Val, 9. Interestingly it seems that Stilicho had already taken measures to fortify the coastlines 
because soon after his execution in 408 Honorius ordered that the coastlines would no longer be guarded 
because it was hampering commercial exchange. This policy was even more short-lived. Just two years 
later he ordered all ports, shores naval bases and even remote islands to be guarded against incursion by 
violence or stealth. CTh 7. 16. 1; 2. 
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brigand/shepherds in the late fourth and early fifth centuries.514 However, it does appear 
that the private employment of more specifically and explicitly violent persons was 
increasing during these years.515 We have already seen that desertion from the army in 
the context of political or military disruption contributed to epidemic brigandage and 
that these brigands were linked to networks of information and patronage in much the 
same way that endemic bandits had been.516 These ex-military bandit/retainers 
presumably brought a new expertise to private retinues. But not all ex-military personnel 
became retainers by way of brigandage. In 398 Honorius introduced a law forbidding 
the solicitation or harbouring of border fortress troops (burgarii) from Spain or 
anywhere else.517 It seems that the soliciting of public soldiers into private retinues was 
a significant issue in the 390s because in 396 the fine for doing so was set at five pounds 
of gold and this was raised, two years later, to twenty pounds.518 Such practices were by 
no means unprecedented and the solicitation had already been legislated against the 
360s.519 However, in parallel with the trends in desertion, it seems that the decades either 
side of the turn of the fifth century were particularly troubled. This is unsurprising. As 
we have seen, desertion from the army increased during times of unusual strife.520 
Presumably private solicitation followed this general trend, as the soldiers sought to 
avoid increased danger whilst aristocrats hunted for additional muscle as an insurance 
against it. Furthermore, the ability of the state to crack down on either deserters, 
brigands, solicitation or the accumulation of private power was hampered during 
                                                          
514 CJ 9. 12. 10 and Zosimus, 4. 5 and 5. 15 for armed slaves; for harbourers see above, pages 61, 78, 83, 
86. 
515 I stress the apparently intentional violence of these retinues in contrast to the accidental or emergency 
usage of kin, employees or slaves in violent functions. This was typical throughout the Empire both in 
rural power relations as we have seen, but also in urban contexts. For example, an unpopular prefect of 
Rome named  Lampadius had to rely on his neighbours and servants hurling roof-tiles at the Roman 
mob to save his mansion from being torched; Ammianus, 27. 3. 
516 See above, section 2.1.  
517 CTh 7. 14. 1. 
518 CTh 7. 1. 15; 17. 
519 CTh 7. 1. 7. 
520 See above, pp. 83-5.  
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wartime. Indeed, private armies – like that of Didymus and Verenianius – which might 
have been condemned in peacetime were lauded for loyalty in a crisis. Therefore it seems 
likely that the practice of retaining was linked to political context. If so then it informs 
us about the agency of those lower-class individuals involved; when times got hard it 
seems that many military persons wanted out. They fled from hazardous service in the 
name of the state and engaged themselves with aristocrats as guards or hired muscle. We 
cannot know the exact details of these new ties of power, but it seems that private violent 
service provided a tantalising alternative.  
These unofficial but legitimated men of violence were probably drawn from diverse 
backgrounds. We have already seen the utilisation of armed employees or slaves, ex-
soldiers and shepherd/bandits by Roman aristocrats for violent functions and a law of 
Leo and Anthemius in 468, which demanded that private citizens could not employ 
bucellarii, Isaurians or armed slaves, demonstrates that this practice continued into the 
fifth century.521 Aristocrats in need of private power were innovative in their ways of 
acquiring it. If soldiers could not be found and slaves wouldn’t do, then alternatives 
could be found instead! For example, the would-be Pope Damasus hired charioteers and 
gladiators to form the violent forefront of his partisans in riots over the disputed Papal 
succession in 366.522 It therefore seems likely that the personal retinues of private 
                                                          
521 CJ 9. 12. 10. Similarly, Zosimus, 5. 16 records how a private landowner, a certain Valentinus of 
Selga in Pamphylia, outfitted a number of his slaves and farm-workers to harass the army of the general 
Tribigild from the hilltops.  
522 For the use of charioteers and gladiators in the riots between the followers of Damasus and Ursinus 
in 366 see Collectio Avellana, 1. 7 and below, pp. 245-6. In fact charioteers and gladiators seem to have 
been common troublemakers and formidable bodyguards in Late Antiquity, and the Theodosian Code 
has regulations about the employment of both in private, violent service; CTh 13. 12. 3 for gladiators 
and 9. 16. 11 for charioteers. These classes of people, both typically unfree, were closely associated with 
violence. Gladiators, of course, had a specifically violent occupation whilst charioteers also had a 
reputation for drunkenness, brawling and association with magic and they seem to have been preferred 
muscle in various dodgy interactions involving accusations of maleficium (magic) and murder in the 
fourth century. Given this propensity for violence, it is unsurprising to see that their careers seem to 
have diversified into the same roles of retaining and private violence that (ex-)soldiers and (ex-)brigands 
seem to have undertaken. Though we cannot tell if the lure was more typically a one-off payday, or 
steady employment in a career of violence and intimidation, we can discern that they too exploited a 
reputation to allow greater social mobility. Not all charioteers (or gladiators) we successful enough to 
achieve the riches and celebrity of the few, but it seems that providing muscle for senatorial backers was 
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individuals in the later Roman Empire were diverse groups composed of persons from 
definitively violent backgrounds as well as more typical employees from various 
occupations but who were deployed in a violent capacity. Aristocrats seem to have been 
attempting to create groups of retainers through which they could assert their power by 
violent means. The establishment of such groups was perhaps necessitated in some 
regions by the unsettled context which allowed raiding to flourish. However, many 
employers of these retinues surely outfitted their band because it was fashionable to do 
so. It was a highly visible means of demonstrating their status and personal power.523 
However, it also provided opportunities to a cadre of potential lower-status recruits who 
could use violent means to improve their social position. 
This agglomeration of violent power around private individuals, even if it was typically 
on a small scale, was a concern to the Roman state which attempted to restrict these 
developments even as it allowed its citizens greater license to perform violent acts. We 
should not forget that the legal records that allow us to gain an insight into the 
composition of private retinues are generally proscriptions against the employment of 
certain categories of people. Similarly, we glean evidence of the fortification of estates 
– a process that presumably went hand in hand with the creation of retinues – from laws 
that allowed the right to fortify in certain regions or that prosecuted persons who had 
privately occupied border fortresses which had belonged to the state.524  So, while 
                                                          
a less illustrious alternative for some. Parshia Lee-Stecum, ‘Dangerous Reputations: Charioteers and 
Magic in Fourth-Century Rome’ in Greece & Rome, 53, 2 (2006), 224-234. For more on the role of 
charioteers and gladiators as the vanguard of illegitimate violence, see below, pp. 245-6 and 262-6.  
523 The confident and somewhat self-aggrandizing inscription of Dardanus is a fine example of such 
demonstrations of personal power, see Serena Connolly, ‘Fortifying the City of God: Dardanus' 
Inscription Revisited’, The Classical Journal, 102, 2 (2007), 145-154.  
524 CTh 7. 15. 1; 2 for private occupation of border forts; CJ 8. 10. 10 for limited prerogative to fortify 
estates. For more on this process, see Serena Connolly, ‘Fortifying the City of God: Dardanus' 
Inscription Revisited’. This article focuses in particular on the fortified settlement Theopolis which was 
constructed in Gaul in the first half of the fifth century by Dardanus, a former praetorian prefect in Gaul, 
but it also provides a useful bibliography on private fortifications elsewhere in the Empire. John 
Matthews’ description of the unsettled atmosphere in Gaul during the first decades of the fifth century 
gives an indication of why infighting occurred and why such fortification might have been necessary: 
John Matthews, Western Aristocracies and the Imperial Court, A.D. 364-425, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1988), pp. 322-4. 
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cautious steps toward the legal recognition of private violent power were being taken in 
the late Roman Empire, the legitimacy of the people who formed the core of that power 
was somewhat uncertain. While they were clearly de facto legitimated by their socially 
superior aristocratic employers, in the eyes of the state they were viewed with distrust. 
This emphasis on the techniques and technicalities of retaining, and the involvement of 
lower-class persons in the retinues of aristocrats in the later Roman Empire, provides  
further insight into the practical means by which aristocrats and the people they 
patronised (voluntarily or otherwise) avoided the burdens of state taxation. Avoidance 
of taxation and the substitution of obligations to the state with obligations to a patron 
was, after all, the major characteristic of patrocinium. Most of the legislation in the 
Theodosian Code seems to be aimed at protecting taxpayers from the violent excesses 
of patronising aristocracies (and their retinues), but the proscriptions against fortification 
of estates and the employment of explicitly violent persons implies that wealthy patrons, 
especially in areas of waning imperial influence, were more able to ignore or resist the 
demands and violent potential of tax collectors.525 The state certainly took measures to 
rectify any shortfall that resulted from patrocinium. Imperial legislators recognised the 
difficulty that curial tax collectors faced in collecting from illustri and the potential for 
superexaction when anyone of higher prestige was to collect from peasants, and 
therefore insisted that taxes be collected by persons of equivalent status.526 However, 
aristocrats were routinely able to avoid imperial obligations and there is little evidence 
to suggest that this legislation proved effective. Indeed, we can discern that by the fifth 
century some aristocrats were able to blithely disregard imperial legislation that limited 
                                                          
525 For legislation on tax collection, see CTh 11. 7 and especially 11. 8 for superexactions. For 
discussion of collection of taxes in the Later Empire, see Harmut Ziche, ‘Making Late Roman 
Taxpayers Pay: Imperial Government Strategies and Practice’ in in Violence in Late Antiquity, ed. H.A. 
Drake, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). 
526 CTh 11. 7. 12. 
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their private power, and even violently resisted judicial procedure against them.527 In 
such situations lower-class retainers, whether they engaged in willing or predatory 
patrocinium, must have been at the violent frontline of the private rejection of state 
influence. Likewise, the citizens who were charged with collecting tax on behalf of the 
Empire surely employed retainers to dissuade tax avoidance.  
The plethora of potential occupations in lower-class violence within the legitimate 
society is perhaps only overshadowed by the convoluted aspect of legitimacy in these 
myriad and conflicting roles. Over-grasping tax collectors, nefarious patrons and those 
who used their retinues to form private power were routinely condemned by 
commentators because their actions were perceived as illegal or immoral, but we can be 
sure that they were to some degree legitimated at the micro-scale by the persons that 
employed these retainers. However, it is interesting that other aristocrats who formed 
retinues to demonstrate their private power were perceived in a more positive way. As 
we have seen, Orosius (and presumably Honorius) appreciated the loyalist efforts of 
Didymus and Verenianus.528 Similarly, we can see that Sidonius waxed lyrical about the 
actions of his brother-in-law Ecdicius, who broke through the Gothic siege lines to 
resupply Clermont with his private, mounted retinue.529 Sidonius could hardly afford to 
be critical. He had himself used attacked and driven off, with the help of his attendants, 
a group of ‘brigands’ who were desecrating the tomb of his grandfather; clearly he had 
a measure of his own private power.530  
                                                          
527 CJ 9. 12. 10. 
528 Orosius, 7. 40 and above, pp. 197-8, 207-8.  
529 Sidonius Apollinaris, Letters, 3. 3. Similarly, a certain Gallic count named Titus and his personal 
retinue were apparently so famous that the Emperor Leo called them into his service at Constantinople. 
Vita Danielis Stylitae, 60; in ‘Vita Danielis Stylitae’, in Three Byzantine Saints: contemporary 
biographies, trans. by Elizabeth Dawes and Norman H. Baynes (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1948).  
530 Sidonius, 3. 12. Violent attacks on bandits by private citizens had, as we have seen, been legal for 
several decades at this stage (CTh 7. 18. 14), so Sidonius in no way incriminated himself through this 
act, but instead upheld his family honour. However, though Sidonius describes them as latrones, it is 
likely that they were just incautious grave diggers who had inadvertently begun to exhume Sidonius’ 
grandfather. In any case, the episode was not without violent threat; the guilty were prepared to resist 
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What we seem to have then is a complex situation whereby legitimacy was afforded to 
the practice of retinue-keeping based on the actions of the employers and the moral 
attitude of the observer. Sidonius might well pat himself and kin on the back for their 
heroic efforts, but if those same retainers helped him despoil his neighbours or avoid 
taxes, then moralists like Salvian or imperial bureaucrats were unlikely to be as 
laudatory. This surely placed the retainers themselves in an awkward position. Their 
employers were no doubt loathe to acknowledge their violent status in an official manner 
because of the potential for legal or social incrimination. Indeed, all aristocrats must 
have been anxious to distance themselves from any nefarious connections. Fortunately 
for them, loopholes in the legislation which attacked the harbourers of violent ‘muscle’ 
must have allowed aristocrats to pass responsibility onto their overseers.531 If valued 
employees such as overseers – who might be responsible for sizeable estates on behalf 
of their owners – could be cast aside in this manner, we must assume that retainers were 
no less expendable.532 Adoption of legitimated, private violent roles in the later Empire 
could bring opportunity to those willing to risk it, but the ambiguity of that status, as 
well as the obvious risk of a violent career, surely made it a hazardous choice. 
Despite the danger of a violent career and dubious legitimacy it seems that a large 
demand existed in the late Roman Empire for unofficial men of violence, and that this 
demand was met by lower-class persons for whom this kind of violence was not a part 
of their accepted social role. Many certainly had backgrounds in violence, whether this 
was legitimate – as in the case of ex-soldiers or gladiators – or illegitimate, like the 
latrones that were routinely harboured on aristocratic estates. Backgrounds in violence 
may have made such men desirable as guards or goons, but their safety was not assured, 
                                                          
Sidonius’ onslaught with force and were tortured (presumably beaten) on the spot for their crimes. See 
Allen Jones, p. 234. 
531 See above, pp. 64-6 and n.142.  
532 Overseers, especially enslaved ones could be quietly put to death by their masters without legal 
implications. CTh 9. 12. 1. 
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even though they had entered the employ of a patron. Accusations of desertion or 
latrocinium might linger, and patrons were likely to deny or jettison bodyguards if they 
were pressured by the state. Yet private employment as a man of violence seems to have 
been relatively common. For genuine deserters and brigands a wealthy patron could 
provide shelter against the retribution of the state in the same way that more humble 
provincials might seek refuge from crushing taxation on the estates of benefactors. 
Furthermore, the establishment of networks of genuine reliance with socially influential 
persons high up the Roman hierarchy could provide potential for social mobility that 
would be out of the question as a rustic peasant, un-patronised shepherd-bandit, fugitive 
deserter or unsuccessful charioteer. For such persons violent activity in the service of an 
employer could have had a remarkable impact on their quality of life. The ‘little guy’ 
was little valued in late Roman society and an able bodyguard or hired goon was 
certainly more valued by his masters than a labourer or peasant. For many, the increased 
status of a violent career or reputation was worth the hazards of physical danger and 
doubtful legitimacy.  
 
4.3. Legitimated lower-class violence in the post-Roman West.  
For all the continuity between the Empire and its successor states that were formed in 
the fifth century in the former Western provinces, one significant change seems to have 
been in the perception and legitimacy of violent power. That is not to say that all violent 
actions were legitimated; many ‘immoral’ actions, such as massacres, murders, 
usurpations and rebellions were still perceived to be illegitimate in the post-Roman 
West. However, in the fifth and sixth centuries, the successor states did not attempt to 
claim a monopoly on violence in the manner that the Empire had rhetorically attempted. 
This altered perception of violence may have made very little difference at a local or 
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regional level. As we have seen, semi-legitimate private violence had always been 
wielded in the Empire, and legal rights to do so seem to have increased during the last 
century of Roman rule in the West. We certainly should not fall into a trap of assuming 
that greater legal freedom to perform private violence must equate to increased 
violence.533 Rather, the significance of the change – for the purposes of this investigation 
– is that it clouds the categorical boundaries between private, state and ‘military’ power. 
Whilst we can be sure that the actions of Didymus and Verenianus were not ‘military’, 
because neither they nor their followers were part of the professional state ‘army’, 
historians could not have the same certainty of categorisation in Merovingian Gaul or 
Visigothic Spain. In these polities, aristocrats might raise similar armies from private 
estates or territories for which they were responsible as a matter of course, whilst many 
free men were liable for military service based on their legal status.534 Professional 
soldiers certainly did not disappear, but they were no longer the sole repository or 
representation of violent state power.535  
Unfortunately, we can still discern relatively little about the position of the lower-class 
participants in these structures for violence in the post-Roman West. Indeed, the 
proliferation of states and regional powers makes it even more difficult to generalise, as 
does the distribution and interest of our source material. On occasion we have glimpses 
of unusual detail, most significantly in the account of Gregory of Tours (which I shall 
rely on), but typically laconic chronicles, hagiographies and legal material offer little 
specific insight into the employment of lower-class persons in violent roles and the 
social implications of that employment. Therefore, in order to avoid the relatively better 
studied military sphere and to stick within the chronological boundaries of this 
                                                          
533 Wolf Liebeschuetz, ‘Violence in the Barbarian Successor Kingdoms’ in Violence in Late Antiquity, 
ed. H.A. Drake, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006). 
534 Bernard S. Bachrach, ‘Grand Strategy in the Germanic Kingdoms: Recruitment of the Rank and 
File’, pp. 57-60. 
535 Guy Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West 450-900, (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 45. 
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investigation, only a few case studies of legitimated lower-class violence shall be 
investigated here.536 The intent is not to present a detailed and exhaustive description, 
but rather a series of examples that will hopefully form a framework of how lower-class 
persons could537 assume legitimated violent roles in the successor states to the Roman 
Empire.  
From the time of Apuleius to Salvian, aristocrats used violence to prey on their less 
powerful neighbours and, in sixth-century Touraine, they continued to do so. Chuppa, 
former Count of the Stables to Chilperic, made a raid on the district to seize livestock 
and other property. As a former holder of a military command, we might assume that 
his retinue was composed of specifically violent personnel (described here as pueri), 
though it is not inconceivable that others of his household had been mobilised on a more 
irregular basis akin to the armed slaves that helped Apuleius’ rich man raid his poor 
neighbour. In any case, the incolae (residents) of Touraine were not to be bullied. They 
collected a band and pursued their persecutor who only escaped by abandoning his 
booty. The people of the district around Tours regained their property and killed two and 
captured two more of Chuppa’s men.538 This episode is interesting for a number of 
reasons. These Tourangeaux were apparently within the broad definition of ‘lower’ 
class. Incolae is not class specific, but certainly does not positively indicate aristocratic 
presence, whilst Gregory gives little suggestion that the Count of Tours – mentioned 
elsewhere in the passage – was responsible for rounding up the posse.539 Indeed, given 
the immediacy of the response, which was able to quickly catch up with the fleeing 
                                                          
536 For a detailed investigation of post-Roman and early medieval militaries, see Guy Halsall, Warfare 
and Society in the Barbarian West 450-900.  
537 I stress ‘could’ here, because this sample may well reflect extreme examples, rather than a 
representative survey which ought to be considered the norm. Indeed, ‘normal’ examples, by their 
mundane nature, are likely to be drastically underrepresented in the source material.  
538LH, 10. 5, p. 552. 
539 It is possible that some of these defenders were part of the Tours city militia, but in any case it seems 
that militias were at best semi-official anyway; S. T. Loseby, ‘Gregory’s Cities: Urban Functions in 
Sixth-Century Gaul’ in I. N. Wood ed., Franks and Alamanni in the Merovingian period: an 
ethnographic perspective, (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1998), p. 258. 
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Chuppa, it seems probable that both the victims and the violent respondents were peasant 
farmers or lesser landowners, although Animodius, a local representative of the Count, 
seems to have taken part.540 So, as with the poor man in Apuleius’ description of violent 
aristocratic oppression, it seems that the small farmers of Tours were able to defend their 
property, but with rather more success.  
Moreover, the actions they took to defend themselves – at least in the partisan account 
of Gregory – seem to have been entirely legitimate. Chuppa’s raid was ‘immoral’, and 
undertaken in a private capacity, so personal violent retribution was justified. 
Furthermore, King Childebert ordered an investigation into the affair, and found that 
Animodius was responsible for allowing Chuppa to escape. He ordered both Animodus 
and Chuppa arrested, though both eventually avoided punishment.541 So, not only were 
the actions of the Tourangeaux legitimated, but commendable, and the judicial system 
prosecuted those who had hindered them.  
According to Gregory, a similar incident of defensive violence on a far smaller scale 
took place in the rural districts of Tours a few years earlier in 585. King Guntram had 
ordered soldiers from the city levies of Orleans and Blois to guard over Eberulf (who 
was charged with the assassination of King Chilperic) so that he could not flee from his 
sanctuary in the Church of St. Martin in Tours. The soldiers stayed only fifteen days, 
probably because of their ill-discipline; Gregory reports that they looted, stole pack-
animals from the Church and quarrelled so severely that some were killed. On their 
return, somewhere in rural Touraine, two soldiers, who had been driving stolen mules, 
came to the house of a local and asked for a drink. The man said he had none, so the 
soldiers levelled their spears at him and were about to transfix him when he drew his 
                                                          
540 LH, 10. 5, p. 553. 
541 Ibid. 
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sword and killed them both.542 Gregory went to some lengths to show a miraculous 
aspect to this event; he claimed that the mules found their way home to the Church. 
However, in this scenario Gregory does not suggest divine punishment in the death of 
the soldiers, only the divine justice of the return of Church property.543 Therefore, the 
notable success of one rural inhabitant in overcoming two soldiers is depicted as more 
mundane and temporal, yet just. It seems probable that, for Gregory, this was not a 
unique example of pre-ordained justice, but more typical of rural violent agency in the 
manner of the incolae who defeated Chuppa. It should be remembered that the soldiers 
were from the city levies, rather than professional soldiers, and so might not have been 
of particularly notable martial quality, but it nevertheless implies potentially significant 
physical capability on the part of the rural inhabitants. It seems likely that the man in 
question, who in the account, lacks a name, status, retinue or attendants, and apparently 
even drinks, was lower class, although his ownership of a sword and house implies that 
he was at least a freeman and could probably be equated with the small landowners who 
formed the posse to pursue Chuppa. Similarly, a sword-owning free man might have 
been liable for military service himself, perhaps in the Touraine militia. Prior experience 
as a warrior – even a part-time one – might explain how he overcame the militiamen 
from Orleans/Blois. 
                                                          
542 LH, 7. 21, p. 402. An interesting parallel to this account of personal resistance to the excessive 
exactions of soldiers can be found in Apuleius, 9. 40 where Lucius, in Ass form, is commandeered by an 
overbearing centurion until the farmer who owned Lucius succeeded in tripping the centurion by 
pretending to supplicate at the feet of his tormentor. The farmer then smashed the centurion’s head 
thoroughly with a rock, took his sword and fled into town on Lucius’ back to avoid any retribution. In 
both cases a farmer, that is a person with a non-violent description of their social role, overcomes 
specifically military opposition in reaction to injustice. Given these accounts it seems likely that such 
events took place throughout antiquity, though it is probable that they were infrequent in comparison to 
successful violence on the part of the oppressive troops. Nevertheless, we should not assume an absence 
of violent agency.  
543 Gregory’s intent in describing this episode was probably to support the ‘main event’ of the bloody 
deaths of Claudius and Eberulf – both of which demonstrated the fate of ill-disciplined and immoral 
soldiers. For detail of that episode, see below, pp. 230-1.  
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The impression given by Gregory in these episodes is that the victims of immoral 
oppression had great agency and capacity to perform defensive violence in Merovingian 
Gaul; perhaps more than they had enjoyed in the Roman Empire. Given the increase in 
legitimate violent roles for civilians, among retinues and city militias, this may well 
represent an accurate depiction.544 However, Gregory was the local bishop and spiritual 
guardian to the oppressed in these events. It was very much in his interest to stress that 
justice came to both the morally upright persons under his care, and to the sinners. 
Consequently, it is difficult to determine on the basis of these accounts whether there 
was a qualitative difference in the violent capacity of lower-class persons between the 
late and post-Roman periods.  
In any case, we must be aware that there were significant elements of continuity in the 
character of the violence. Because the details involved in these accounts of legitimate 
lower-class violence are framed around Merovingian specifics, it is easy to forget the 
Roman precedent in a tale of Kings, inter-city warfare and actors with ‘barbarian’ names. 
Nevertheless, clear parallels remain. As we have seen, Apuleius describes similar 
personal resistance to grasping aristocratic neighbours and roving marauders in the 
violent confusion between estate workers and shepherds. More significantly, the 
unnamed Tourangeau would have been well within his rights to oppose oppressive 
soldiers according to late Roman law which, as of 391, had encouraged its citizens not 
to ‘spare a soldier who should be resisted with a weapon as a brigand.’545 Therefore it 
seems likely that the general patterns of lower-class violence in these contexts remained 
broadly similar between imperial and post-imperial contexts, even if there were 
differences in the regularity of such incidents, or the particular legal or social agency of 
those involved. It might be possible, with a more sustained focus, to juxtapose specific 
                                                          
544 Guy Halsall, Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West 450-900, p. 45. 
545 CTh 9. 14. 2. 
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characteristics of late Roman and Merovingian social violence in order to isolate more 
certainty of continuity or change. However, for the purposes of this study it is only 
necessary to stress the major trend; that lower-class people had the potential for 
legitimated violence within the legitimate society. This was typically in service to a 
patron of some sort, but equally lower-class persons might exert legitimated if unofficial 
violent power in defence of their own person and property.  
Nevertheless, when the focus is refined to the specific subject of lower-class retainers to 
aristocrats, some changes do seem to have occurred in post-Roman Gaul. The most 
significant aspect seems to have been the institutionalisation of (often professional) 
bodyguards whose primary function was violence.546 Aristocratic persons who were 
considered deeply immoral in the account of Gregory were not criticised for employing 
retainers. Even if they used them in a criminal way, the moral choice, not the institution 
of retaining was criticised.547 This stands in contrast with the late Roman concern over 
the practice of retaining, which seems to have gained social legitimacy only when the 
actions of the employer were morally positive.548 Put simply, it seems as if late Roman 
retainers were bad unless made good by their employer’s morality, whilst post-Roman 
retainers seem to have started from a more neutral position. Therefore, it is probable that 
lower-class retainers in the post-Roman period were not liable for punishment because 
of their (violent) role in itself, though they could still be prosecuted for specific criminal 
                                                          
546 The actual regularity of violent ‘actions’ might have still been fairly infrequent, especially if retainers 
were kept more for display and status than conflict. Nevertheless, the distinction is significant because it 
necessitates a recognition of a specifically violent social role, and therefore some degree of legitimation 
of the participant’s agency for violence.  
547 Retinues were involved in various lamentable feuds and squabbles between aristocrats, such as the 
famous dispute between Chramnesind and Sichar (LH, 9. 19), Secundinus and Asteriolus (3. 33), and 
Syagrius, son of Bishop Desideratus of Verdun and Syrivald (3. 35), but Gregory limits his criticism to 
the choices of individuals, not the existence or proliferation of their armed followers. The Lex Salica 
seems to affirm this interpretation. Various Salic laws acknowledge the involvement of armed bands 
(contubernii) in pillage or homicide, but the legality of the ‘band’ itself is not prohibited. Pactus Legis 
Salicae, XIV, XLII, XLIII; The Laws of the Salian Franks, pp. 79-80, 106-8. 
548 Legal legitimacy was even more difficult to come by. Roman aristocrats were only given the legal 
right to employ armed retainers in the first decade of the fifth century, but had been expected to provide 
support to state officials for hunting bandits for centuries. See above, pp. 87-91 and 58-61.  
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actions. This occupational security probably contributed to the institutionalisation of 
violent bodyguards, since neither aristocrat nor retainer had to retain plausible 
deniability. This position of more concrete legitimacy may partially explain why 
Merovingian aristocratic retainers tend to look more ‘military’; they were perhaps 
becoming more professionalised in a context where persecution was unlikely.  
Whatever the cause of the more professionalised retinues, their distinctly more 
privileged, perhaps even waged status means that they – like the Roman military – are 
less relevant to this study. Once their social role became overtly violent, they attained a 
legitimacy that distinguished them from accidental, occasional or ad hoc men of 
violence. However, we can perhaps see the legacy of problematic legitimacy in retaining 
when the employer’s aristocratic legitimacy or violent role was itself problematic. For 
example, Chramn’s retinue is described as a ‘young and dissolute [band] from the lower 
classes’ (vilibus personis aetate iuvenele fluctuantibus).549 Munderic, meanwhile is 
described as having gathered a rustica multitudo with promises of an improved life, 
saying: ‘I am a prince, follow me and all will be well with you’ (Princeps ego sum. 
Sequimini me, et erit vobis bene).550 Both these individuals had dubious personal 
legitimacy; Chramn was a disinherited son of Clothar I, whilst Munderic was an 
unrecognised claimant to Merovingian lineage and the associated royal status. It is likely 
that their own personal illegitimacy ‘infected’ their respective retinues and coloured 
Gregory’s depiction of them.  
However, it is also plausible that Chramn and Munderic had to appeal to supporters from 
backgrounds that were not inherently violent because their royal statuses were not 
accepted. The disparity of legitimacy between these two examples may confirm this: 
Gregory felt the need to have Munderic assure his rustic supporters of improved lives, 
                                                          
549 LH, 4. 13, pp. 207-209. 
550 LH, 3. 14, pp. 173-175. 
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but Chramn is recorded as giving no such assurances, whilst his followers are more 
ambiguously described and may be understood as vagrants or mercenaries (as opposed 
to the ‘rustics’ of Munderic).551 Both seem to have had to form retinues from less 
favourable, or at least less reputable personnel, but Chramn’s greater legitimacy, as the 
recognised offspring of a King, meant that he may have attracted a more militarised 
following, whilst Munderic seems to have acknowledged an obligation to his rustic 
adherents. We should perhaps interpret him as a demagogue figure; rallying popular 
support to bolster his position and doing so by promises of alleviation of grievances. 
Nevertheless it should be acknowledged that this charismatic leader was successful in 
encouraging the people to violence against their King; the motivation for aggressive and 
treasonous behaviour against such a powerful figure must have been very considerable 
indeed and as far as we can tell, social improvement was a prominent factor in this.  
Similar issues are encountered in the descriptions of the retinues of other employers who 
did not perform a specifically violent role themselves. Gregory explains that a wine 
merchant called Christopher employed two armed slaves as a bodyguard, which 
transpired badly for Christopher, because they murdered him in a forest.552 Meanwhile 
Clothild, a nun in St. Radegund’s in Poitiers, employed ‘a band of cut-throats, evil-doers, 
fornicators, fugitives from justice and men guilty of every crime in the calendar.’553 As 
with the de-legitimated ‘Merovingians’ Chramn and Munderic, it seems likely that 
tradesmen and women also had more difficulty both in negotiating the employment of 
violent lower-class retainers and in justifying their legitimacy. Neither seems to have 
                                                          
551 LH, 3. 14, pp. 173-175 and LH, 4. 13, pp. 207-209. 
552 LH, 7. 46. 
553 LH, 10. 15, p. 567 trans. in The History of the Franks, trans. by Lewis Thorpe (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1974). Thorpe’s translation, given above, is not exactly accurate, but represents Gregory’s 
distaste rather well. adgregatis sibi, ut supra diximus, homicidis, maleficis, adulteris, fugitivis vel 
reliquorum criminum reis, in seditione parata resederet. Libri Historiarum X, ed. by B. Krusch and W. 
Levison, MGH SRM, 1 (Hanover: Impenis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1951). 
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performed as desired; Christopher’s guards killed him, whilst Clothild’s men seem to 
have offered little resistance when faced with the retinue of Count Macco of Poitiers. 
So, while personal, private retainers certainly do seem to have been more legitimate, 
institutionalised and ‘military’ in post-Roman Gaul, the practice nevertheless seems to 
have followed certain Roman precedents. Employers whose legitimacy was doubtful, or 
whose social role did not typically involve violence still seem to have had to appeal to 
non-‘military’ persons for violent support. Retaining in the sixth century may appear 
more ‘feudal’ in character, but this development did not preclude the participation of 
makeshift heavies and muscle on an ad hoc basis. Indeed, it seems that many 
opportunities still existed for lower-class men of violence within the legitimate society, 
even if their assumption of violent roles was often perceived with distaste by 
contemporary commentators. 
Indeed the insight provided by Gregory of Tours affords us a greater insight into 
bargaining that seems to have been required to create a Merovingian retinue. We have 
to be mindful that Gregory is disparaging or downright hostile to the violent power of 
Chramn, Munderic and Clothild, but he nevertheless provides some descriptions which 
are informative. Chramn’s followers – the young and dissolute lower-class men – were 
perhaps enticed with promises of loot and the prestige that accompanied a violent 
reputation, a formidable Merovingian patron. Munderic’s followers might have had 
similar incentives, but their apparent rustic status and his promises of improved quality 
of life suggest more holistic reward; perhaps along the lines of tax exemptions, 
protection or rights to land use. Clothild’s followers are the only retainers who are 
described as evil in their own right and in the employ of an appropriately immoral 
master. Yet even their description might be insightful; the fugitives at least seem 
reminiscent of the latrones and deserters who traded violent service for patronage in the 
later Roman Empire. These examples build on the more general picture of post-Roman 
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lower-class violence within legitimate society. Not only did the residents of Touraine 
have violent agency, but persons like them seem to have pursued careers in violence 
that, as in the Roman period, differed from the roles that were assigned to them by their 
social standing. 
 
4.4. Lower-class violence and the Church.  
Much like Clothild and Christopher, Merovingian churchmen did not have a social role 
that typically included violence.554 After all, they were men of God. But, in sixth-century 
Gaul the Church was very wealthy, owned a vast amount of property and wielded 
significant political influence. Individual Bishops were often the most important secular 
leaders within their dioceses. Therefore, we should not be surprised that clerics, 
especially of the lower orders, were personally involved in violence or that they used 
their influence to obtain the violent assistance of lower-class persons. 
But before we come to the post-Roman period, it is worth stressing that this was not a 
new development. Already in the fourth and fifth centuries ecclesiastical personnel were 
employing violence for various reasons. Rivalry and political intrigue between 
competing Churchmen could spark severe violence; as in the disputed succession to 
Pope Liberius in 366. Factional conflict between the adherents of Damasus and Ursinus 
spiralled beyond the capacity of prefect Viventius to control so that, according to 
Ammianus, at least 137 people died on a single day of violence.555 Minor clerical orders, 
such as gravediggers and pallbearers were at the forefront of this struggle (alongside less 
surprising men of violence like charioteers and gladiators) and seem to have often 
                                                          
554 Although some Merovingian Bishops seem to have been rather bellicose! The Bishops Sagittarius 
and Salonius were – according to the hostile observer Gregory – especially warlike and personally went 
into battle clad in mail and helmets; LH, 4. 42. 
555 Ammianus, 27. 3. 
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functioned as the violent arm of the Church hierarchy when extenuating circumstances 
arose.556 Damasus’ faction eventually overcame the partisans of Ursinus and he became 
Pope, but defeat or deposition did not necessarily inhibit the violent potential of clerics. 
Indeed, a law of Honorius and Arcadius given at Ravenna in 405 describes that deposed 
priest could often present a severe and violent threat by using their extant connections 
with the people to raise up violent mobs of their partisans. Such clerics had to be 
separated from their support networks, and so were exiled to a minimum of 100 miles 
distance from their former community.557 Likewise, an established ecclesiastical figure 
could use his connections with the people to drive out a challenge, perhaps from a 
‘heretic’, as in the case of Priscillian who, along with his fellows, was beaten up and 
driven out of Emerita by a mob loyal to the incumbent, orthodox Bishop.558 It is likely 
that the churchmen who were able to raise such violent uprisings in their favour had 
done considerable groundwork to engender such loyalty. Gregory of Tours describes 
that Desideratus of Verdun had personally appealed to King Theudebert for a loan to 
assuage the suffering of his poverty stricken diocese.559 When Desideratus died, after 
being tormented and personally robbed by the intrigues of King Theuderic and Syrivald, 
he could count on the lasting loyalty of those he succoured. His son Syagrius rounded 
up a gang of Desideratus loyalists and murdered Syrivald.560 It seems likely that in 
incidents such as these, prudent priests and bishops fostered good relations with the 
people, by distributing alms and fighting poverty. By doing so they established strong 
material bonds which could be exploited to mobilise violent lower-class support when 
necessary. The post-Roman example of Desideratus which explains this mechanism is 
                                                          
556 Allen Jones, p. 234. Collectio Avellana, 1. 7, and above, p. 208, n.522.  
557 Sirmondian Constitution 2; C. Pharr, T. S. Davidson and M. B. Pharr, The Theodosian Code and 
Novels and the Sirmondian Constitutions, a Translation with a Commentary, Glossary and Bibliography 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 477-8.   
558 Priscillian, ‘Priscilliani Liber ad Damasum Episcopum, Tractate II’ in Priscillian of Avila: The 
Complete Works, ed. and trans. Marco Conti, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 76-77. 
559 LH, 3. 34. 
560 LH, 3. 35.  
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probably reflective of how these networks of power could function throughout Late 
Antiquity. 
These social bonds with the needy of the parish or diocese were often institutionalised. 
Many persons of minor social status were accepted into the lower orders of the clergy 
as lectors, gravediggers, doorkeepers, cantors or acolytes.561 Others were employed as 
custodians (this was also a task performed by the lesser clergy) or became the 
institutionalised recipients of alms (matricularii).562 Together, these fairly numerous 
categories of persons were employed by the Church for all manner of menial tasks that 
ranked low on the ecclesiastical cursus honorum. Among these roles was the violent 
protection of Church property and personnel. They probably operated as cheerleaders 
for the popular tumults we have seen, railing against opponents and perhaps leading 
from the front in matters of violence.  
These potential sources of ecclesiastical violence were already being employed in the 
later Roman Empire.563 An entry in the Theodosian Code, dating to 398, insisted that 
clerics, monks and synoditae (companions, fellow travellers) must not rescue, by force 
or usurpation, criminals who had been sentenced and were due punishment.564 The 
rescue or release of prisoners is a common theme in descriptions of saintly behaviour in 
Late Antiquity.565 Violence is not typical in these descriptions, but this legislation 
suggests that force or intimidation might have been a significant factor. Moreover, the 
release of prisoners may have been influential in creating support for churchmen. 
                                                          
561 Allen Jones, p. 233. 
562 Allen Jones, pp. 226-233. 
563 Perhaps the most prolonged, severe and significant use of violent retainers by the Church was in the 
sectarian conflicts between the rival Nicene and Donatist Churches in North Africa throughout much of 
the fourth and the early fifth century. However, for reasons described in the Introduction, iii, the Donatists 
and their notorious circumcelliones cannot be discussed in detail. For thorough investigation of this 
sectarian violence, which involved a deal of lower-class violence, see Shaw, Sacred Violence: African 
Christians and sectarian hatred in the age of Augustine.    
564 CTh 9. 40. 16. For synoditae, see C. Pharr, T. S. Davidson and M. B. Pharr, p. 257, n. 27. 
565 Allen Jones, pp. 194-209. 
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Dramatic, even violent displays of clemency towards the condemned was surely a useful 
tactic employed by holy men to cement bonds with the local population which might in 
future be exploited to elicit popular support.566 The lesser clergy and registered poor 
were surely influenced the assertive holiness of their hierarchical betters, but they were 
also directly beholden to the Church. Their livelihoods relied on income (through wages 
or alms) directly distributed down the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and of course service to 
the Church exempted them from secular service. Not only were they safe from 
conscription or service in post-Roman levies, but in the late Empire the lesser orders 
such as the ostiarii (doorkeepers), and apparently even non-clerical church guardians, 
were exempted from compulsory public service.567  
The services which were expected from lesser clerics and matricularii could range from 
the dramatic to the everyday. The most typical tasks that might involve violence were 
quotidian duties involving custodial work and door-keeping. Churches often contained 
treasure in the form of valuables and relics and there seems to have been a fairly 
considerable risk of theft and consequently custodes and ostiarii were required to keep 
impure persons from profaning the Church. Presumably this involved them providing a 
visible deterrent, as well as some patrolling and observation, but when called upon these 
ecclesiastical ‘heavies’ performed duties as diverse as the killing of birds that disturbed 
services; to the timely slamming of Church doors so that a Duke was separated from his 
armed retinue and therefore in a weaker negotiating position.568 These were among the 
tasks lesser clerics and matricularii were expected to perform and therefore are depicted 
in a typically positive manner by our sources. Indeed, if the action was particularly 
                                                          
566 Although on occasion it seems that excessive clemency could alienate the populace; LH. 6. 8. 
567 CTh 16. 2. 24; 26. 
568 For the killing of birds LH, 4. 31; for slamming the doors on the Duke, LH, 6. 11. See Allen Jones, pp. 
235-6 for a description of these events and a thorough investigation of the roles of the lesser clerical 
orders. The custodians of the church at Trier were less successful in trying to deflect the attentions of a 
mob intent on lynching a despised tax collector. They were brushed aside and the mob stoned their victim 
to death. LH, 3. 36. 
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righteous it might even be described as miraculous. For example, when a sinful man 
reached into a tomb at the basilica of Saint Agricola and Vitalis in Bologna to snatch a 
relic, he was miraculously and severely crushed by the lid of the sarcophagus.569 Allen 
Jones supposes that the fossores who were guarding the Church might have given the 
miracle a helping hand.570  
However, the violent duties that lower-class persons performed on behalf of the Church 
were not always so mundane. For example, Gregory records a number of occasions 
where lesser clerics were hired as assassins. The archdeacon and a faction within the 
clergy at Lisieux were hostile to their Bishop Aetherius, and so they appealed to a lesser 
cleric to kill him with an axe in return for a reward. The axeman shadowed Aetherius 
for some time before he broke down and revealed the plot. Intrigues continued between 
the factions but it seems that Aetherius had been more diligently canvassing lay 
supporters in the city, because even after he fled the town under accusation of fornication 
the townsfolk rose up and beat the archdeacon and a fellow conspirator.571 Similarly, an 
ostiarius at the Church of St. Vincent in Paris was accused of taking a bribe to murder 
King Guntram and – interestingly – the accusation came from a fellow doorkeeper.572 
These comparable incidents demonstrate that the lesser clergy not only had a potentially 
violent role to play, but that they were sufficiently associated with violence to serve as 
assassins.573 Moreover, this ultra-violent task was apparently not just limited to in-house 
factionalism within particular ecclesiastical hierarchies, but even extended to high-
profile political murder. Gregory, who describes these salacious details of clerical 
                                                          
569 Gregory of Tours, Glory of the Martyrs, 43; Miracula et opera minora, ed. by B. Krusch, MGH SRM, 
1.2 (Hanover: Impenis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1885). Glory of the Martyrs, trans. by Raymond Van Dam 
(Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2004). 
570 Allen Jones, p. 234. 
571 LH, 6. 36. 
572 LH, 8. 10. 
573 The plotting and participation in murder at close quarters in the manner would have taken an unusual 
proficiency in violence, see Collins, pp. 430-440, and it is perhaps unsurprising that neither enterprise 
succeeded. Nevertheless, it is still worth stressing that clergymen were considered eligible for tasks of 
such inherent and intense violence. 
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misdeeds is unsurprisingly critical of the clergymen who took on such immoral and 
extremely violent occupations. 
We have already encountered an even more extraordinary account of lower-class 
espionage and assassination, though this time described by Gregory in favourable terms. 
As we have seen, in around the year 590 the Bishop of Le Puy was faced with a veritable 
siege by the Pseudo-Christ of Bourges and his force of credulous priests and rustics.574 
This was formidable opposition; Gregory describes the scene in martial language and 
numbers the followers of the Pseudo-Christ in the thousands.575 The unflappable Bishop, 
despite being faced with such numerous and hostile opposition, nevertheless relied on 
his retinue of potentially violent supporters. He sent out a number of viri strenui (strong 
men), under the guise of deserters, to get close to the Pseudo-Christ and, when they had 
done so, they drew their swords and cut him down. The millenarian horde, now deprived 
of its charismatic leader by the ecclesiastical hit-squad, swiftly dispersed and the Bishop 
retained his security. Moreover, this account and the previous examples of lesser clerics 
as assassins testifies to their potential proficiency as violent operators. These men were 
far from ‘military’, but some of them seem to have had a competence that suggests they 
were not amateurs either. 
In fact, there is evidence to show that the lesser clergy and sympathetic paupers were 
prepared to oppose secular authorities with more traditional and legitimate violent 
power. For example, in the aftermath of Guntram’s campaign against the usurper 
Gundovald the King declared that those who had not supplied troops to the levy would 
be subject to a fine in compensation. Ullo, the Count of Bourges, who had been one of 
the leaders of the campaign, attempted to impose this fine on a house of St. Martin within 
his territory. They had refused to provide men, so Ullo sent representatives to enforce 
                                                          
574 LH, 10. 25. 
575 Allen Jones, pp. 238-9. 
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the royal decree. These representatives were met by the agens (steward) of the house, 
who argued that it was not proper for a religious house to provide soldiers and refused 
to pay the fine. The leader of Ullo’s representatives entered the courtyard of the house 
to forcefully seize the payment, where he apparently collapsed in great pain, pleaded 
with the agens and his men for his well-being and was promptly thrown out the door. 
The rest of the Count’s representatives gathered up their stricken leader and left.576 
Gregory attributes this violence to the miraculous intervention of St. Martin but it seems 
more likely that the agens and his ostiarii were responsible, especially since the house 
clearly included individuals who were deemed capable of military service.  
A more aggressive example of resistance to secular authorities is found in a Novel of 
Valentinian III, given at Rome in 447, which records that certain clergymen had been 
prospecting after relics while girded with swords.577 These armaments were presumably 
a precaution against the dismayed relatives who attempted to defend the resting places 
of their kin in the manner that Sidonius rescued the tomb of his grandfather.578 The guilty 
clerics were to be harshly treated; they were stripped of their privileged ecclesiastical 
status, proscribed and exiled. But it seems that these violent clergymen might not accept 
their punishment, since the novel acknowledged the possibility of violent, rebellious 
resistance to justice.579 The possibility of resistance in such cases underlines both the 
violent potential of lower-class associates of the Church and the strength of the structures 
that tied them together, even in the face of reprisal by secular authorities with legitimate 
martial and judicial power.  
Finally, it is worth stressing that this violent action on behalf of the Church could 
manifest on a considerable scale. The custodial duties, assassinations and instances of 
                                                          
576 LH, 7. 42. 
577 N.Val 23. 
578 Sidonius Apollinaris, Letters, 3. 12 and above, pp. 211-12. 
579 N.Val 23.6.  
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resistance to secular authority described above generally seem to detail relatively small 
violent encounters, even if their political or social significance was more sizeable. 
However, a striking example of lower-class ecclesiastical violence on a larger scale, 
provided by Gregory, seems to meld the scale of the popular riots with the violent 
intensity of the duties performed by personnel who were more directly associated to the 
Church. In 585 King Guntram had sent a certain Claudius with orders to capture or kill 
Eberulf, who had been accused of assassinating King Chilperic, and who had 
subsequently taken refuge at the church of Saint Martin in Tours. Claudius gathered a 
force of three hundred men from the city of Châteaudun and travelled to Tours, where 
he swore by the relics of Martin that he meant to support Eberulf in his case. Eberulf 
accepted this, and they adjourned to drink together in the Church vestibule where he had 
been lodged. Having separated him from his retinue, Claudius and some of his men 
killed Eberulf, but even as they did so Eberulf managed to knife Claudius in the armpit. 
As Claudius staggered away Eberulf’s men realised the treachery and smashed the glass 
in the windows so that they could transfix him with spears. Meanwhile Claudius’ men 
opened the doors so that the rest of his men could enter the melee. It is worth stressing 
that this was an encounter of extreme violence – Gregory describes the severing of 
thumbs and the scattering of brains in gory detail – between the armed, military retinues 
of two secular aristocrats. The violence was such that even the Abbot – who seems to 
have been in charge whilst Gregory was absent from the city – was severely injured. As 
a result of this violence, a group of matricularii – those registered poor of the church 
who were entitled to alms – as well as other pauperers, armed themselves with sticks 
and stones and rushed to avenge the insult. The soldiers within the church were 
overwhelmed and beaten to death. This was a significant overturning of the odds. The 
retinues of Claudius and Eberulf might have already mauled one another or fled and it 
seems improbable that all three hundred of Claudius’ men were present. Nevertheless, 
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it must have taken a potent mix of economic incentives, loyalty and outrage over the 
desecration of their holy place to drive men armed with impromptu weapons into battle 
with genuinely martial opposition. Furthermore, immediate opposition was not the only 
disincentive; Claudius was sent directly by Guntram and Gregory notes that the King 
was furious when he heard how events transpired. The perpetrators themselves clearly 
suspected reprisals were possible since they fled swiftly into the night.580 
This slaughter in the church of Saint Martin demonstrates that the Church not only had 
its own connections with lower-class persons who might perform violent roles, but that 
these persons could even go toe-to-toe with experienced soldiers if the circumstances all 
aligned. However, it seems that this event was something of an exception. Gregory was 
very familiar with the potentially violent role of lesser clergy and matricularii and was 
often complimentary about it. Furthermore, he probably knew many of the individuals 
who violently avenged the desecration of the church personally – after all, it was his 
church. Yet although Gregory remarks that ‘the vengeance of the God was not slow to 
fall on those who defiled His holy house’, so he presumably believed that the slaughter 
of Claudius and Eberulf and their men was just, he was nevertheless horrified by the 
atrocity.581 Those who took part in the slaughter are described as ‘wretched’ and 
‘possessed by the devil’, so it would seem that Gregory disapproved of the actions of 
these matricularii, even if he took pleasure from the fate of their victims and 
sympathised with their motives.582 
 
 
                                                          
580 LH, 7. 29. 
581 LH, 7. 29, p. 412. 
582 inergumini ac diversi egeni; LH, 7. 29, p. 412. Libri Historiarum X, ed. by B. Krusch and W. Levison, 
MGH SRM, 1 (Hanover: Impenis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1951). 
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4.5. Interim Conclusion: Legitimated violence, social mobility and agency.  
Legitimacy of violence by supposedly non-violent persons has always been problematic. 
While we might be unsurprised that Ammianus – a good aristocratic pagan – 
disapproved of the mob violence associated with contested papal elections, it might be 
more surprising that Gregory had such a conflicted attitude toward righteous violence 
performed in the defence of his own Church. Sometimes, as in Gregory’s case, it seems 
that the sheer scale of violence might be the reason for commentators to hesitatingly 
ascribe legitimacy; certainly Gregory had no qualms about the killing of Chuppa’s pueri 
or the soldiers from Orleans/Blois who demanded a drink from the local man in 
Touraine. Of course, these episodes of violence did not occur within the Church, but the 
violent attacks on relic-hunters and military recruiters did, and these too Gregory 
perceived as uncomplicatedly just.  
We cannot establish such a detailed personal perception of violence for any other author, 
but the impression is that – even during the Roman Empire – perceptions of lower-class 
violence were always coloured by moral judgments. The corpus of late Roman law gives 
us an insight into the patterns of retaining and the apparent growth of the employment 
of supposedly non-violent lower-class persons in violent ways. Yet despite its relatively 
dispassionate tone, it is apparent that jurists were more concerned with the harbouring 
of ‘latrones’ than the use of normal armed field-guards or attendants. This is also 
reflected in the literary sources. Justified self-defence or violent service in the name of 
an aristocratic person who had a socially acceptable violent role was always likely to be 
perceived as legitimate, whether it was performed by slaves on Columella’s villa or the 
retainers of Ecdidius who broke through the Gothic siege lines.  
However, when lower-class retainers were employed for immoral reasons, it was subject 
to more criticism; Gregory and Salvian were quick to condemn the actions of Chuppa 
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and grasping aristocrats guilty of predatory patrocinium. Likewise, the use of armed 
retainers by de-legitimated or non-violent persons was bound to cause opprobrium. 
Political agency, social status and gender were significant factors in determining who 
had the right to use retainers and who did not. Although the examples of violence 
described in this chapter were performed by lower-class persons whose social role did 
not include violence per se, they still operated within legitimate society. As such their 
legitimacy as violent actors was often intrinsically linked to the violent legitimacy of 
their masters from higher up the social hierarchy. For Gregory, it was not problematic 
that Chuppa or Eberulf had armed bands except when they used them for evil, but 
Clothild – as a woman and a nun – was never likely to be perceived as legitimately 
violent. With this in mind, it might be surprising that the Church was such a significant 
utiliser of lower-class men of violence, but the evidence suggests that – in parallel with 
the secular social hierarchy – the Church had a need for strongmen. Legitimacy remained 
problematic, and excessive violence by belligerent churchmen or by matricularii was 
always likely to be criticised  even within Church structures, yet the basic violent 
function of lesser clergymen, attached poor or sympathetic mobs seems to have been 
thought no less problematic than the everyday violence performed by lower-class 
individuals in secular society. 
After all, whether in the service of secular and ecclesiastical honestiores, the typical 
roles for retainers/viri strenui was fairly humble. Both had treasures to guard, doors to 
keep and relations of power to enforce. Western aristocrats in the unsettled context of 
the late fourth and fifth centuries were clearly able to accumulate more legal rights to 
perform private violence and it seems that this led to a specialisation of violent roles. 
Presumably, on a regional or individual basis, the armed slaves and guard dogs that had 
always existed in the Empire, regardless of their legality, were gradually augmented by 
‘full-time’ bodyguards and retainers like the bucellarii and pueri we have encountered. 
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But, as the secular aristocrats seem to have gradually aggregated more violent specialists 
in Late Antiquity, it seems that the Church might have had similar preoccupations with 
bolstering its violent power. It is hard – since we lack equivalent evidence – to track a 
clear chronological progression, especially since the violent roles of ecclesiastical 
retainers never became explicit or institutionalised. But however it came about, we must 
recognise that the Church had significant access to violent personnel. Moreover, though 
these were typically ordinary members of the public who could be called upon in crisis, 
or attached ‘amateurs’ like the lesser clergy, some of them seem to have reached a 
significant competence in violence.  
As ever in the study of the lower classes in Late Antiquity, it is difficult to understand 
the impact that developments in relationships of power between powerful individuals 
and institutions and their retainers had on the poorer people themselves. This particular 
chapter is no exception. It has been characteristically difficult to discern exactly what 
the fine detail of the social networks of violence meant for the lower-class persons who 
performed their bloody occupations. Individual case studies typically lack the necessary 
detail, while any generalised conclusions must be tentative at best. Contemporary 
depictions of persons or actions as ‘legitimate’ or otherwise can provide insight, but 
rarely do they detail about the actual practice of retaining. Nevertheless, it is worth 
stressing some simple and (fairly) uncontentious observations which can hopefully be 
gleaned from this discussion.  
Firstly; the violence in late antique society was often performed by persons whose social 
role was not explicitly violent. Soldiers, judicial officials and other professionals 
certainly existed, but many people had reasons to want access to violent men. This 
demand for private violence was widespread; the desire might have been for protection, 
to defend political boundaries, to implement rebellion or to terrorize a neighbour or 
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social inferior. It is certain that even people of humilial status used their own social 
relationships to obtain violent assistance from friends, kin or dependents, but the 
evidence is scarce. We have more comprehensive information about the honestiorial 
employment of humiliores for violent functions and these apparently range from the 
everyday to the extraordinary.  
Secondly; the lower-class people that performed these violent tasks might have had 
agency. This was not always or necessarily the case; often they might have been under 
orders, or faced with simple self-preservation. But involuntary violent service was 
perhaps less typical. Slaves or dependents must have volunteered to perform violence in 
some cases, and perhaps demonstrated a proficiency or enthusiasm that suited them to 
similar tasks in future. From the particularly large slave of Apuleius’ grasping 
landowner, to the viri strenui hitmen of the Bishop of Le Puy we can see glimpses of 
people who specialised in this unofficial violence. Furthermore, in cases like the attack 
on Eberulf and Claudius by the Tours’ matricularii we can see violence that seems to be 
purely voluntary. These people were not forced into violence unwillingly but sought to 
gain from it.  
Which brings us to the final point, that; the lower-class people that performed these 
violent tasks might have been rewarded. Building on the assertion of a degree of lower-
class violent agency, we can discern evidence of an exchange of reward for services. 
This probably did not always take place, but the dangers of violent engagement do seem 
to have been appreciated by the beneficiaries of it. Rewards might have been a simple 
economic exchange, but a range of preferential treatments or options for social mobility 
(such as manumission) also seem to have existed, as in the case of Munderic who seems 
to have promised his rustic followers social reward in return for violent support. The 
Church, perhaps because of its rhetorical non-violence, seems to have been particularly 
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innovative in creating social bonds with men of (potential) violence. The lesser clergy 
and attached poor were institutionalised, whilst the urban poor were mollified with a 
potent mix of alms and spirituality which could, in times of strife, ensure violent support.   
These observations perhaps do not seem radical. Nor should they; as we have seen there 
is a deal of evidence for the violent employment of lower-class persons in the late 
antique West and from it we are able to glimpse some fragments of the social interactions 
which governed these relationships of violence. Nevertheless, studies of violence in 
antiquity rarely pay attention to violence outside the grand political scale. When social 
violence is acknowledged the actual processes governing it are rarely problematized. As 
we have seen, patrocinium is a great case study for this neglect. Much worthwhile 
discussion has taken place about the scale of predatory patrocinium and its effect on 
wealth inequality and patterns of land ownership. These are vital issues, with possible 
significance for the ‘End of the Roman Empire’. Nevertheless, it is worth thinking about 
what the issue meant for society at the immediate micro-level. Two landowning 
individuals stood to be enriched or impoverished by a case of predatory patrocinium, 
but the process itself likely entailed violent employment by a plethora of irregular men 
of violence (on both sides). They faced injury or death for participation in the conflict, 
but perhaps they volunteered or were encouraged to take part out of loyalty or the 
prospect of economic or social reward. 
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Chapter Five  
5. Riots: Community, Transgression and lower-class urban violence in Late 
Antiquity.  
Rioting is an inherently visible action. An essential aspect of the riot is the performance 
of collective action in a public space; the crowd – the embodiment of popular opinion – 
openly demonstrates its opposition to a rival individual, group, policy or event.583 The 
principle of strength in numbers is crucial in a well-executed riot. There have to be 
sufficient people to demonstrate sizable public support, to present a potentially violent 
countenance and to provide the demonstrators with security against arrest or retribution. 
Equally significant is the location of the riot. It must occur either as a spontaneous 
reaction to a transgression and therefore as a clear reaction to it, or in a public space 
where the voice of the crowd is more difficult for opposition or authorities to ignore.  
The necessity of numbers of people (from tens to thousands) and public space typically 
requires that the action occur in an urban environment. Late Antiquity is no different in 
this regard but, as is often the case, the study of rioting in this period is somewhat limited 
by the sources available. Where historians of the eighteenth century can make detailed 
enquiries into the histories of collective action on a micro-scale,584 classicists and 
medievalists are drawn, almost inexorably, toward major riots in major cities that formed 
the political and cultural heart of the Roman Empire and its successor states. Events in 
such locations could have a significant impact on the policy of the state or the Church 
and consequently they attracted greater attention from contemporary commentators.  
                                                          
583 It must be noted that the crowd, though it certainly embodies popular opinion, does not necessarily 
represent an overall, or majority opinion.  
584 For example, see the fascinating study on the town of Bathmen, with a population of around 400, in 
the rural eastern Netherlands by Wayne Te Brake, ‘Revolution and the Rural Community in the Eastern 
Netherlands’ in Class Conflict and Collective Action, eds. Tilly and Tilly (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1981), pp. 53-72. 
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However, this understandable historical bias toward big cities, especially provincial 
capitals, should not deceive us into believing that riots were exclusive to such illustrious 
settings. Small-scale riots, or analogous events of collective action or violence, certainly 
took place in provincial backwaters with populations that numbered only hundreds or 
less. Local events like these have left comparatively little evidence, but they should not 
be ignored as a consequence. Riots on any scale were a form of action, a demonstration 
of agency and an engagement in adversarial discourse by the common people, taken in 
defence of, or to (re)establish, the rights, morals or norms that were hugely significant 
to the participants. Because of this riots potentially afford us some significant insight 
into the preoccupations of the mass of people in antiquity whose voices are ordinarily 
inarticulate.585 Nevertheless, we remain at the mercy of the interests and prejudices of 
historical sources in the late antique West. Many authors offer frustratingly little detail 
about the causes of riots (when they describe them at all!) and there is even less specific 
description of the types of people who took to the streets, en masse, to give voice to their 
grievances. All too often their needs and desires, which risked punishment, injury or 
even death to the individual rioter, went unnoticed or were otherwise ignored in the 
construction of historical narratives by commentators who were typically pejorative, 
hostile or at best paternalistic.  
Yet despite this considerable hindrance, authors in antiquity did pay more attention to 
riots than other forms of lower-class violence. The visibility of riots was the crucial 
issue. They occurred in public spaces in order to make the grievances of the crowd 
noticeable. Whilst the personal or collective motivations of peasants in rebellion, or of 
brigands who rejected romanitas, could be ignored by the Roman elite, a mass of people 
in tumult in the town square was less easy to ignore. Moreover, the interests of the elites 
                                                          
585 Charles Tilly, ‘Introduction’ in Class Conflict and Collective Action, eds. Tilly and Tilly (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 1981), pp. 13-26. 
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who wrote down the sources of Late Antiquity and the rioters themselves were often 
either in accord or in direct opposition, which meant that they might attract the attention 
of literate classes. City prefects felt it necessary to respond to food riots conducted in 
direct criticism of their administration, whilst bishops perhaps felt obliged to explain the 
behaviour of their congregations, or deride the madness of heretical demonstrations. Of 
course, this relative interest must have made riots a prime vehicle for narrative 
propaganda, so authorial interest is as relevant as ever in the study of this topic. This is 
certainly a reason for caution, but these biases – where they can be identified – can 
themselves offer some insight into the discourses and hot topics of the day.  
 
5.1. Who Rioted?  
As we have mentioned, riots took place in an exclusively urban context. However, the 
label ‘urban’ should not be taken to imply that riots were limited to the streets of Rome 
or the hippodrome in Constantinople. They might equally occur in the muddy alleyways 
of provincial Gallic towns or on the doorsteps of Merovingian churches. Yet whatever 
the scale of the settlement, the urban context must necessarily have determined the 
composition of riotous gatherings. Peasants or carters from the rural hinterlands, traders 
from out of town or pilgrims to a holy place may have become involved in riots if they 
got caught up in the excitement or sympathised with the mission of the crowd. But even 
if a few outsiders were involved, the majority of the rioters were presumably residents 
of the settlement in which the riot took place. At least in larger towns and cities they 
were probably not employed on villas or grand estates, although independent farmers 
and vegetable croppers may well have existed on the urban fringe of cities. Instead, most 
rioters must have been employed in more typically urban occupations; in craft skills, 
manufacture, commerce, transport or service industries. If pejorative sources are to be 
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believed, the ‘indolent’ poor in receipt of state provisions were particular troublemakers, 
but we can be fairly sure that most rioters were urban dwellers. 
This assertion, although it can be made with relative confidence, must remain marginally 
speculative. We can rarely see with greater certainty that a particular class or category 
of people was involved in a specific disturbance. Authors typically limit descriptions of 
rioters and crowds to unclear designations like clamor, turba, multitudo, plebs or seditio. 
Because the accounts are typically hostile to outbreaks of popular violence – even when 
they sympathised with the grievances of the crowd – we should understand this 
terminology as part of a power discourse. Pejorative language, whether it was used 
consciously or not, denigrated the rioters, belittled their concerns and mocked their 
raucous, uncivilised attempts to influence the actions of policies of their social 
superiors.586 
Augustine’s description of a ‘positive’ riot in his own diocese attests to the hostility of 
the language of rioting. The arrival of the fabulously wealthy Pinianus and Melania the 
Younger had caused quite a stir in early fifth-century North Africa. Immediately after 
disembarking in 411 they began to sell their properties and distribute their wealth in the 
spirit of fervent Christian asceticism. The potential impact of this charity was enormous. 
Peter Brown calculates that a modest member of the curial class could have a revenue 
of some 50 solidi per year, the estates of the church of Hippo perhaps 1,000, whilst 
Pinianus perhaps gained some 120,000.587 More pertinently, much of this charitably 
donated wealth was to be used in ways that benefitted poor people and the Christian 
community, such as the manumission of slaves, the liberating of prisoners and the 
foundation of monasteries.588 The celebrity couple stayed a while at Thagaste – 
                                                          
586 Arnaldo Marcone, p. 358. 
587 Peter Brown, Through the Eye of a Needle, p. 325. 
588 Gerontius, Vita Graeca, 20-22, trans, Elizabeth A. Clark, The Life of Melania the Younger, (New 
York: Edwin Mellen, 1984), pp. 43-4. 
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apparently a poor town much in need of financial aid – before touring the coast in the 
company of Thagaste’s bishop, Alypius. When they arrived in Hippo they were met with 
great acclaim, but the atmosphere became more precarious once they were cramming 
inside the church with the raucous congregation. In the confined space, perhaps only 
120x60ft, the people began a frightening and persistent roar and demanded that Pinianus 
become a clergyman of Hippo. Alypius, as a representative of the rival city of Thagaste, 
did not dare step down from the raised floor of the apse for fear of violence.589  
Now Augustine, meaning to defend his congregation, claimed that their behaviour was 
resultant from an appreciation of Pinianus’ piety and not a desire to ‘retain among them 
a man of wealth who was known to despise money and to give it away freely’.590 
Whether we accept his protestations or not, we can see that he Augustine nevertheless 
employs the traditional pejorative descriptions of the crowd as roaring and horror-
inducing. If even the most positive depictions of riotous actions were still constructed 
from the pejorative terminology of the discourse of rioting, then we must acknowledge 
the problematic nature of these topoi. Indeed, all that we can do is understand the terms 
of riot as intended to depict the mob as very much lower class in the negative elite-
Roman consideration of their social inferiors; these were the inheritors of the seditious 
plebs of the Roman Republic recast in the discourse of the Empire.  
Despite the difficulties in the language of riots (none of the terminology is dispassionate 
or scientific), there are additional details added by some authors that offer valuable 
insight about the participants in particular riots. It is worth looking into this evidence 
because it might prove instructive about the more general characteristics of riots in Late 
Antiquity, as well as the specifics. Sometimes details about the participants can be 
                                                          
589 Horrendo et perseverantissimo clamoris fremitus. Augustine, Letter 126.1, Serge Lancel, Saint 
Augustine, trans. Antonia Nevill, ((London: SCM Press, 2002), pp. 240-44 and Peter Brown, Through 
the Eye of a Needle, p. 324.  
590 Augustine Letter 125. 2 and Peter Brown, Through the Eye of a Needle, p. 324. 
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inferred from context. This is most obvious in the event of religious disturbances. When 
rival congregations in schism rioted in confrontation, or when a Christian community 
rioted against the presence of heretics, Jews or pagans among them, then we can, of 
course, be confident that the rioters had their faith in common.   
In other cases, more specific details are recorded in the source material. As mentioned 
briefly before, the poor – often the indolent poor in particular – were implicated as the 
prime movers behind riots. The Theodosian Code provides indirect evidence for the 
belief that those who received provisions from the state were liable to cause trouble; in 
382 a law of Gratian and Valentinian II demanded that the prefect of Rome investigate 
the circumstances of mendicants in the city. Informants were encouraged to notify 
authorities if they believed beggars, or those not otherwise employed, were actually able-
bodied. If they were found to guilty of indolence, they were denied their freedom and 
became the perpetual colonus of the informant who exposed them.591 In the context of 
recent rioting in the capital, it seems likely that this ruthless policy was intended to 
remove socially maladjusted elements from a hotspot of unrest.592 Mendicants were 
typically in receipt of, or were indirectly reliant upon, food provisions distributed in the 
major cities in the Empire as a form of state largess.593 However, shortages in supply as 
                                                          
591 CTh 14. 18. 1. For connection to urban unrest, see Arnaldo Marcone, p. 359. 
592 Riots occurred in the city of Rome fairly regularly. A non-exhaustive list of known riots in that city 
should serve to demonstrate that regularity: 342, 357, 366, 381, 419 and 431. See below for further 
details on some of these events. 
593 There is some question in scholarly circles over the identity of recipients of state-provided bread and 
pork. Peter Brown, Poverty and Leadership in the Later Roman Empire, (Hanover: University Press of 
New England, 2002), pp. 4-6, in particular, has reminded us that many of those who received state 
largess were of higher status but who nevertheless possessed the tesserae, the tokens, which entitled 
them to identical state rations. Such persons were certainly wealthy enough that they did not rely on 
state welfare to survive. However, Brown still allows that many of those who received state largess were 
‘undoubtedly poor’, and probably dependent on state-provisioned nutrition. Furthermore, it must be 
remembered that the provision of free grain and other goods, even to relatively well-to-do citizens, 
would have had a knock-on effect on the market price of those products. It seems reasonable to assume 
that, in most circumstances, the distribution of foodstuffs through state largess would have diluted the 
demand on commercial supplies, and therefore have directly or indirectly benefitted the poor of the city. 
Erdkamp, The Grain Market in the Roman Empire: a Social, Political and Economic study, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 242-4. Additionally, this distribution must have had a significant 
impact on civic life throughout much of the Empire since even relatively minor towns received a 
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a result of crop failure or the manipulation of markets by profiteering distributors was a 
common cause of riot, both in Rome and other major cities.594 The famous Misopogon 
of Julian was written in response to resistance to his Julian’s efforts to regulate the food 
supply in Antioch, whose people had been beset by troubles and had staged a major riot 
some years previously in 354 when the governor of Syria was blamed for shortages.595 
In such circumstances we could suppose that mendicants, who were among the most 
economically vulnerable and were either directly or indirectly reliant on state-provided 
foodstuffs, were participant in disturbances that were motivated by economic shortages. 
But, in certain cases, we can also infer that they were active participants in riots that we 
might broadly categorise as ‘religious’ rather than ‘economic’; after all, beggars were 
increasingly reliant on the charity of the church rather than state distribution or 
aristocratic euergetism. As we have seen the people of Hippo were willing to riot and 
threaten a bishop to retain the charitable potential of Pinianus. On a far larger scale, we 
can discern similar material motives in the riot over episcopal succession in 
Constantinople in 342. After the death of Bishop Eusebius, the Arians and Niceans 
supported rival candidates and the sedition was so great that it claimed the life of a 
magister militum when the crowd, apparently arrayed as if for war, overcame the soldiers 
and dragged their general through the streets.596 The response of Emperor Constantius 
II to the unrest is revealing; not only did he attempt to settle the succession affair, but he 
punished the citizens by denying them about half of the corn ration they had been entitled 
to under Constantine. This was a major imposition; in 332 there were 80,000 recipients 
of free bread in the city, and the population likely increased in the intervening decade.597 
                                                          
considerable civic annona, like Pozzuoli which was granted 100,000 modii per year. Peter Brown, 
Poverty and Leadership, p. 32.  
594 Paul P. M. Erdkamp, ‘A Starving Mob has no respect. Urban Markets and Food Riots in the Roman 
World. 100 B.C – A.D. 400’, in The Transformation of Economic Life under the Roman Empire, ed. 
Lukas De Blois and John Rich, (Amsterdam: J. C. Geiben, 2002), pp. 93-115. 
595 Ammianus Marcellinus, 22. 14. Arnaldo Marcone, p. 329.  
596 Socrates Scholasticus, Historia Ecclesiastica, 2. 13, Sozomen, 3. 7. 
597 Arnaldo Marcone, p. 328. 
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By targeting the recipients of state largess, he not only punished economically dependent 
rioters, but also the Church that was surely faced with a much increased burden of 
independent charity. For our purposes, it indicates quite clearly that the lower classes of 
large metropolitan cities, especially those who were reliant on state provisions, were an 
active and troublesome group in urban unrest. 
As one might expect, these indications of the lower social and economic status of rioters 
are representative of imperial and provincial capitals. However, there is some evidence 
that the similar categories of people were generally the most active group in riotous 
activities regardless of the scale. We have already seen that the registered poor of Tours, 
the matricularii who received alms from the Church, were the most active defenders in 
the riot-like attack on the retinues of Claudius and Eberulf who desecrated the church in 
585.598 Furthermore, slaves and ‘good-for-nothing, if freeborn, youths’ were specifically 
identified as the perpetrators of a rebellious uprising in Bazas during a siege by 
Visigothic forces during 417.599 These hints, considered alongside the evidence we have 
seen for major cities, can be seen as a tentative confirmation of the topos of mob violence 
in late antique elite discourse. Consequently we can be relatively confident that people 
of lower-class status were active participants in rioting during this period. Furthermore, 
the case of Bazas is particularly revealing about the perceptions of the upper classes. In 
that episode, Paulinus of Pella describes the major danger as coming not from the 
besieging barbarians, but from within the city where the slaves and freeborn youth, in 
their fury, ‘had taken up arms for the particular slaughter of the nobles’.600 This explicit 
reference to class conflict is perhaps an indication of the hostile and adversarial 
                                                          
598 LH, 7. 29, and above, pp. 229-31. 
599 Paulinus of Pella, ‘Eucharisticus’, in From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader, pp. 167-168. 
600 Paulinus of Pella, ‘Eucharisticus’, in From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader, pp. 167-168. 
gravior multo circumfusa hostilitate factio servilis paucorum mixta furore insano iuvenum nequam  licet 
ingenuorum, armata in caedem specialem nobilitatis. ‘Eucharisticus’, in Ausonius Volume 2 (pp. 294-
531), trans. by H. G. E. White (London: Heinemann, 1931).  
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disposition of the upper classes when they perceived urban unrest, and this perception 
surely goes some way toward explaining the pejorative topoi of rioting. 
To complement this general depiction of riots as predominately composed of lower-class 
participants, there are occasional references to definite and more specific categories that 
were especially troublesome in particular riots. As we have seen, when matters of 
ecclesiastical policy were at stake or spiritual locations threatened, individuals within 
the church hierarchy, such as matricularii or the lesser clergy, were often active 
participants in violent unrest.601 The riots in Rome over the disputed Papal succession 
in 366 provide good evidence for specifically violent categories of personnel. 
Factionalism had already existed in the capital for some years because Pope Liberius 
had been briefly replaced by the Emperor for failing to support his policy against the 
troublesome patriarch of Alexandria. Liberius spent some years in exile while Felix 
occupied the Papal throne, until he was reconciled to the Emperor and allowed to return 
and displace the ‘Anti-Pope’. Felix pre-deceased Liberius, but when the latter died the 
factions seem to have split once again, with the followers of Felix championing Ursinus 
in opposition to Damasus, who found support among the erstwhile adherents of Liberius. 
Violence broke out between the two groups, resulting in prolonged and fierce battles in 
the streets of Rome. A document in the Collectio Avellana, written by a partisan follower 
of Ursinus, claims that Damasus paid gladiators and perjurers to take over the Lateran 
Basilica and detain rival priests. The populace sheltered the priests and moved them to 
the basilica of Liberius, which was occupied by the followers of Ursinus. Damasus then 
called up charioteers, gladiators, gravediggers and his clergy, armed with axes, swords 
and clubs, to besiege the basilica. They broke open the doors and roof, and rained tiles 
                                                          
601 For more on the involvement of churchmen in violence, see above, pp. 224-28. 
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down on the occupants before rushing in and killing 160 people and wounding many 
more. Apparently no member of the Damasus faction was killed.602  
This description of riot, in which the followers of Ursinus are supported by the general 
population, are never explicitly violent and are martyred by the mercenary adherents of 
the Damasus, is perhaps troublesome because of its bias. The lack of confrontation by 
the Ursinus faction and the scale of the atrocities committed by Damasus would seem 
liable for misrepresentation as propaganda. However, we are fortunate that we have an 
alternative and comparatively dispassionate account of the riots provided by the pagan 
Ammianus. His description confirms that the riots were ferocious, lasted several days, 
caused the well-meaning prefect of Rome to flee the capital and even confirms the 
massacre in the basilica of Liberius, even though he provides the figure of 137 dead.603 
This suggests that the account according to the letter of the Collectio Avellana can 
broadly be believed, although the Ursinus faction probably provided sterner opposition 
than suggested by the Collectio Avellana since the riots lasted days and caused severe 
disruption in the city. However, the scale of the violence in the Basilica of Liberius 
perhaps indicates that violent specialists – like charioteers and gladiators – did form the 
violent core of the Damasus faction in confrontations. These classes of people had a 
notoriously violent reputation but, as we have seen, gravediggers and clergymen also 
often performed violent roles in Late Antiquity.604  
Supporters with such proficiency in violence could make a significant difference in 
riotous engagements. According to the micro-sociological approach of Randall Collins, 
the actual performance of violence is irregular, inefficient and unglamorous. Violence 
                                                          
602 O. Guenther: Epistolae Imperatorum Pontificum Aliorum Inde ab a. CCCLXVII usque DLIII datae 
Avellana Quae Dicitur Collectio, CSEL vol. 35, (Prague,Vienna, and Leipzig 1895), pp. 1-4. Document 
1 in the Collectio which describes the violence between Damasus and Ursinus is translated by Aaron J. 
West at <http://www.fourthcentury.com/the-collectio-avellana/> Accessed July 2016. 
603 Ammianus, 27. 3. 
604 See above, pp. 224-28. 
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between rioters rarely takes the form of dense phalanx-like masses of people in 
organised confrontation. Rather the rioters and their opponents (whether they be other 
rioters, police or the army) are typically separated by 50-150 yards, and the space in 
between is largely reserved for a minority – usually only 1-5% of participants – of 
radicals, enthusiasts or specialists who typically fight disorganised running battles whilst 
feeding off the larger crowds for emotional support and refuge. Only when the violent 
specialists of one side have established dominance and victory in this crucial 
confrontation does the greater mass of the crowd engage. This does not necessarily 
occur, but is more probable if the victory of the violent specialists forces the opposition 
into flight. Once panicked, the once cohesive unit offers minimal resistance. Victims of 
the confrontation or of the crush of fleeing people are often left to the victors who are 
themselves stricken with what is described by Collins as forward-panic, a surge of 
released tension and violent excitement that often results in the atrocities that follow 
riots.605  
With this sociological insight, we can perhaps postulate that the a surplus of violent 
specialists among the followers of Damasus, as claimed by the Collectio Avellana, 
allowed them to gain the upper hand in open confrontation. The followers of Ursinus 
then perhaps fled to the friendly basilica of Liberius in desire of refuge, but where the 
crush of people in flight and the attacks by jubilant pursuers – themselves in forward-
panic – caused the aforementioned massacre. Moreover, this insight allows us to offer a 
more instructive analysis of the influence of specific groups within riots in Late 
Antiquity. The appearance of named categories as specifically violent can perhaps allow 
us to speculate that they formed the violent frontline in riotous encounters, as the 
charioteers, gladiators and clergy did in this instance. 
                                                          
605 Randall Collins, Violence: A Micro-Sociological Study, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2008), pp. 115-132. 
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It is perhaps because of a proliferation of violent specialists that another often identified 
category of rioters often seems to coincide with the most deadly riots. This category is, 
of course, the notorious chariot-racing factions; the partisans of the Blues and the 
Greens.606 Discussion of these gangs of supporters will not feature prominently in this 
study, largely because the most infamous riots of the chariot-factions occurred in the 
Greek speaking East. The most famous disturbance, the Nika Riot, apparently claimed 
the lives of more than 30,000 people who were trapped within the Hippodrome in 
Constantinople in 532 and massacred by the soldiers of Justinian.607 Riot on this scale 
could have a profound and immediate effect on the Empire and imperial policy. It is 
therefore unsurprising that ‘sports riots’, like the Nika Riot, have been subject to far 
more study than other forms of urban unrest.608  
Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that chariot-racing fans were mentioned in connection 
to many accounts of riotous behaviour and even, in the case of the riots over the 
succession of Damasus and Ursinus in 366, in riotous events that did not directly involve 
racing. Racing fans had a fearsome reputation. Procopius, for example, relates that the 
hard core of partisan fans wore clothes and hair in outlandish styles that mimicked 
Hunnic warriors so as to make their countenance more terrifying.609 Given this 
reputation for violence it seems plausible that partisan fans, and the charioteers 
                                                          
606 ‘Faction’ is not an unproblematic term in this context, but it will be retained here with the modern 
English meaning, rather than with specific reference to terminology used in the ancient world. For a 
thorough discussion of the problems of the term, and for the partisans of the Blues and Greens in 
general, see Alan Cameron, Circus Factions: Blues and Greens at Rome and Byzantium, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1976). 
607 Procopius, History of the Wars, 1. 24, trans. H.B. Dewing (New York: Macmillan, 1914), pp. 219-
230. Geoffrey Greatrex, ‘The Nika Riot: A Reappraisal’, The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 117 
(1997), pp. 60-86. 
608 Some of this has been somewhat indirect, through attention given to the traits and institutions of 
chariot-racing and support, but the Nika riot especially has received attention in its own right. See, for 
example, Geoffrey Greatrex, ‘The Nika Riot: A Reappraisal’, pp. 60-86. 
609 ‘First the rebels [the Blues] revolutionized the style of wearing their hair. For they had it cut 
differently from the rest of the Romans: not molesting the mustache or beard, which they allowed to 
keep on growing as long as it would, as the Persians do, but clipping the hair short on the front of the 
head down to the temples, and letting it hang down in great length and disorder in the back, as the 
Massageti do. This weird combination they called the Hun haircut. Procopius, Anecdota, 7. 8, trans. in 
Procopius: Secret History, trans. Richard Atwater, (New York: Covici Friede, 1927).  
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themselves, might have formed the violent core in disturbances like the riot in 
Thessalonica that so enraged Emperor Theodosius in 390. Prior to the riot a successful 
charioteer in the city seems to have made advances toward Botheric, the magister 
militum per Illyricum, at a drunken party. Botheric imprisoned the charioteer but when 
he refused to release him on race day the people of the city rioted and slew many of the 
garrison, including Botheric himself.610 In this case we are not specifically informed 
about the actions of racing fans or fellow charioteers in the disturbance, but it seems 
probable that they featured heavily. Perhaps violent specialists such as these were a 
common sight in late Roman riots; men intentionally courted or perhaps even hired, as 
the Collectio Avellana claims, by seditious factions to offer a spine of violent expertise 
to more popular disturbances. 
As previously stressed, the terminology of riots in antiquity can be problematic. 
However, based on these comparisons and analysis, we can derive a generalised image 
of the kinds of people that seem to have rioted in Late Antiquity. Ancient descriptions 
of riots are limited to a restrictive and pejorative discourse, but there does seem to be 
some consistency in reflecting a general trend: rioters were typically from among the 
humiliores. The urban poor in general seem to have caused their more illustrious fellow 
citizens some concern. There is a clear tendency in the discourse of riots to vilify the 
perpetrators and define them in opposition to the refined manners of the nobility. Among 
the mass of plebs there seem to have existed a few categories of people who were 
notoriously seditious. For example, the ‘indolent’ poor, who received rations from the 
state are described as particularly liable to revolt in response to shortage. Christian 
congregations, though not vilified in the same way, nevertheless seem to crop up with 
regularity as the focal point of urban unrest.  
                                                          
610 Sozomen, 7. 25. 
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Another level of magnification is offered by the identification of violent specialists who 
had disproportionate influence in riots. These specialists might have acted as ‘rabble 
rousers’ to whip up the crowd against particular opposition or to violent action rather 
than vocal demonstration. Other specialists seem to have taken centre stage in the 
violence itself, providing a core of competence that could turn a protest into a battle or 
a confrontation into a massacre. Some of these specialists might be considered outsiders, 
or even ‘professionals’ paid to influence or lead more spontaneous partisans, as in the 
case of Damasus’ use of gladiators and charioteers as told by the Collectio Avellana. But 
in most cases the specialists were not purely mercenary; it is not surprising that fans of 
chariot racing would demand the release of a charioteer on race-day. The gladiators and 
charioteers hired by Damasus might be assumed to be more dispassionate about Papal 
candidates, but one must remember that senatorial candidates could be powerful 
benefactors, whilst senior churchmen had the power to influence state policy; indeed 
Christian distaste for gaudy shows put charioteers and especially gladiators under 
significant pressure.611 It is possible that alliance with a senior cleric allowed them a 
favourable position from which to bargain about the continuance of their livelihoods. 
Meanwhile, the lesser clergy and matricularii, that also seems to have acted as violent 
specialists on behalf of the Church, were inextricably tied to ecclesiastical policy, 
through both ideological alignment and for their material requirements.  
Overall then, on the basis of the evidence we have seen, we can conclude that rioters 
were overwhelmingly poor people. Given the lack of political agency afforded to the 
lower classes in Late Antiquity this is perhaps unsurprising. Rioting was a potent tool 
for protest, demonstration or violent action against grievances for the humiliores, and 
one of the few open to them. It might seem simplistic to stress this point, but it is in fact 
                                                          
611 They were banned as early as 325 by Constantine (CTh 15. 12. 1) and as late as 469 (CJ 3. 12. 9). 
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integral to the understanding of rioting in the ancient world. The discourse of rioting is 
a problematic veil over the topic, and one that often makes analysis of particular riots 
troublesome. Only by acknowledging the existence and character of this discourse and 
building a notional framework of rioting can we hope to understand the processes of 
rioting; how they took place and, most crucially, why? 
 
5.2. Motivations for Rioting in Late Antiquity.  
The categorisation of riots is an awkward proposition. A popular article on riots, divides 
them into eight distinct types, based on motive and composition; such as food/bread, 
religious/sectarian, race or student.612 We have already attempted to offer some analysis 
of the general composition of riots in Late Antiquity and have determined that the 
humiliores were the overarching social contributors to urban unrest in that era. Having 
established this principle allows us to move onto the main issue. The primary 
significance of riots, in the context of understanding the lives, concerns and agency of 
common people, is in the motivation for them. If we can identify motivations, then we 
can likewise identify what contemporary issues were significant enough to raise the 
people to riotous and violent action in Late Antiquity.  
Unfortunately, the categories of riot mentioned above are in some ways unsatisfactory. 
Religious riots could occur in response to persecution or in order to persecute; they could 
be subject to the complexities of competition or influence in the higher echelons of the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy. They were not simply passionate – often murderous – 
demonstrations of faith, but complex phenomena conducted in public space; monks and 
ascetics might prove their devotion in the solitude of the desert, but religious rioters were 
                                                          
612<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riot> Accessed June 2016. 
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making a blatant and explicit statement through their actions. Moreover, as we have 
seen, the actions of ‘religious’ rioters can rarely be defined so narrowly. Damasus’ 
riotous specialists might have had significant financial incentives to riot if the 
accusations of the Collectio Avellana are to be believed.613 The tumultuous congregation 
in the church of Hippo almost certainly did when they tried to retain the super-wealthy 
Pinianus within their clergy, even if Augustine protested to the contrary.614 The strict 
distinction between religious and secular matters is one that is far less apparent to the 
historian of the pre-modern era. In Late Antiquity the Church performed a vital ‘secular’ 
function in providing for the material needs of people. Most obviously this came through 
the distribution of charity and alms, but also through employment, community 
organisation, leadership and the ability to negotiate with high ranking administrative or 
executive figures. When taxation was excessively burdensome in Merovingian cities it 
was not the comes that protested to royal officials, but the bishop. In some ways the 
clergy had taken on the mantle of late Republican tribunes in acting as representatives 
of the populous.615  
Secular riots – where religious motivations are not apparent – are not necessarily less 
complex. They too were intentionally public demonstrations and, again, they rarely 
continue to look simplistic once we begin to analyse them. This complexity is not 
particular to late antique riots. Perhaps the most influential development in the 
historiography of rioting is the concept of ‘moral economy’, developed by E. P. 
Thompson in his study of bread riots in eighteenth-century Britain. In conventional 
scholarship prior to Thompson these outbreaks of urban unrest had typically been 
understood according to the pejorative elite discourse of the time, which was no more 
                                                          
613 Collectio Avellana, 1. 7 and above, pp. 245-6. 
614 See above, pp. 240-41. 
615 Peter Brown, Poverty and Leadership for the developing civic roles of clerical personnel in the later 
Roman Empire.  
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sympathetic to rioters than were ancient authors.616 According to this discourse, riot was 
a simple, spasmodic reaction to shortage: food ran out so people got upset because of 
their hunger. If this hunger reached a threshold level the response of the people was to 
give riotous voice to their grievances. This ‘crass economic reductionism’ was rejected 
by Thompson, who argued that eighteenth-century crowd actions were a ‘highly 
complex form of direct action, disciplined and with clear objectives’ and that the ‘men 
and women in the crowd were informed by the belief that they were defending traditional 
rights and customs’.617 This was the moral economy that governed eighteenth-century 
bread riots. They were not spasmodic responses to hunger, but demonstrations against 
the contravention of societal norms by the authorities or commercial actors that had 
caused or allowed the shortages of food to occur.  
Thompson’s argument and conclusions were limited to bread riots in an industrialising 
England and the circumstances particular to that context. However, his intent was to 
demonstrate the common people had historical agency prior to the French Revolution 
(an intent shared by this study!).618 His critique of scholarship and his methodology 
provided an inspiration, and sometimes a framework, for others to problematise riots in 
other contexts. Paul Erdkamp, for example, has shown that with little alteration the 
concept of moral economy seems useful for the interpretation of food rioting in the 
                                                          
616 One could reasonably question whether many contemporary reactions to similar unrest in our own 
day is any more nuanced. Various newspapers in the United Kingdom, especially the ‘red-tops’ tended 
to interpret the riots that sprang up across London and the UK in 2011 as a result of a wave of 
criminality, rather than as a product of cuts to public services, unemployment, wealth inequality etc. 
Likewise, in the years between the Hillsborough disaster in 1989 and the publication of the inquest into 
the tragedy, the loss of 96 lives in Hillsborough football stadium in Sheffield was widely believed to 
have resulted from hooliganism, based on police reports. In 2016 the inquest demonstrated that the 
victims were, in fact, ‘unlawfully killed’. 116 of 164 police statements were ‘amended to remove or 
alter comments unfavourable to South Yorkshire police’. See <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/apr/26/hillsborough-inquests-jury-says-96-victims-were-unlawfully-killed> and 
<https://www.theguardian.com/football/2012/sep/12/hillsborough-disaster-report-panel-released-live> 
Both accessed June 2016.  
617 E. P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’ in Past & 
Present, 50. 1, (1971), 76-136. 
618 E. P. Thompson, p. 76. 
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metropolises of the Roman World.619 However, many of the secular riots we will come 
across in Late Antiquity seem to have little direct connection to food. The same can be 
said of religious riots, though it should be stressed that moral concerns over food supply 
and related economic issues might not be far from the surface in many late antique riots. 
Fortunately the central tenet of the moral economy thesis is quite versatile; the issue is 
that common people do not automatically riot at a threshold level of hunger, or as a result 
of general, simple pin-prick stimuli, but rather as a result of self-defined moral 
principles. 
Awareness of the complexity of motivations for riots in Late Antiquity may make the 
task of the historian more difficult, but this is only a good thing. It encourages a closer 
analysis of individual episodes of riot; we can see that some riots were immediate and 
reactionary, whilst others were eventual responses to prolonged unrest and multifaceted 
grievances. Through recognition of this complexity we can try to understand the 
common ground that links superficially dissimilar events and, hopefully, allow us to 
glean more insight from accounts that are often sparse or laconic.  
 
5.2.1. Secular Riots.  
To retain an emphasis on complexity and the individual motivations of various riots 
while maintaining a coherent thematic structure is a difficult task. The comfortable, 
clearly delineated categories of riot stated above do not offer sufficient flexibility.620 
Because of this, I will begin with a broad overview of riots that do not seem to have been 
motivated by religious issues, either in part or whole.621 This is a necessarily 
                                                          
619 Erdkamp, ‘A Starving Mob has no respect.’, pp. 111-115. 
620 See above p. 251 and <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riot> Accessed June 2016.  
621 Categorisation of ancient riots is acknowledged to be troublesome. Alan Cameron, admitting gross 
oversimplification, allows for four general categories: economic (mainly over food supply), political 
(usually demonstrations, occasionally violent over tax or unpopular officials), religious (at Church 
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exclusionary choice, but it will allow clear focus on the role of secular, especially socio-
economic, motivations in riots. However, this categorisation should not be taken as an 
argument in favour of a binary distinction between secular and religious riots. The intent 
is not to juxtapose or contrast these categories, but rather set a groundwork with which 
common factors in religious riots can be compared. This should hopefully allow us to 
reach a useful synthesis about the kinds of motivations that created urban unrest in Late 
Antiquity without having to establish a false dialectic that could inhibit understanding 
of the complexity of reasons to riot.  
Of particular interest to this study is what motivated common people to riot in Antiquity, 
because these motives can tell us about the issues that the common people found 
important enough to demonstrate their officially restricted agency. Riots, like all other 
forms of violence, provide only a skewed image. If a citizen of Rome rioted over want 
of bread, that does not tell us anything more than that there was disquiet over the 
abundance of bread. It does not tell us about illness, spirituality, fun, fear, production, 
employment or any of the other myriad factors that affected individuals and 
communities. But at least it is better than nothing. That fragment of information about 
the wants and needs of common people at that specific place and time is valuable – 
because of its scarcity if nothing else! A detailed and complex approach to riots will 
hopefully allow us to combine some of these fragments into a more cohesive whole 
which, in turn, could allow us a better understanding of late antique life in general, and 
in particular the relations of common people to structures of authority and their potential 
agency to influence or dispute that authority. 
 
                                                          
councils and episcopal elections) and ‘what would nowadays be called just hooliganism’. Cameron, 
Circus Factions: The Blues and Greens at Rome and Byzantium, p. 271. These delineations are 
reasonable enough, but for our purposes the overlap between even such broad categories seems to 
obscure rather than enlighten the problem.    
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5.2.1.1. Commodity Shortage and Moral Economy.  
With the issue of complexity in mind, it seems sensible to begin with an assessment of 
the moral economy in riots that occurred as a result of troubles in food supply in Late 
Antiquity. As mentioned, Erdkamp has offered a convincing argument in favour of the 
validity of Thompson’s thesis for understanding riot in the ancient world from 100 B.C. 
– 400 A.D.622 Consequently there is no need for a restatement of the case at length. 
Nevertheless, it is worth going over various outbreaks again in order to establish a 
thorough depiction of late antique riots, since a couple of significant ‘food’ riots 
occurred in Rome during the fourth and fifth centuries.   
The city of Rome was, of course, exceptional. It was the largest city in the Empire and, 
as with most of the great cities, it received a significant proportion of its food via external 
grain supply transported in from the provinces. This external grain supply was common 
to various cities, but Rome was especially reliant because of its size and geographic 
position, and consequently the state was particularly involved in food supply at Rome 
and also at Constantinople (although transport was still performed by private individuals 
and corporations).623 All pre-modern cities were reliant on their immediate agricultural 
hinterland for food supply but Latium, though fertile, did not produce the surpluses that 
the famously fecund regions around other metropolises such as Antioch, Carthage and 
Alexandria could boast.624 Therefore Rome was particularly reliant on imported food. 
Much of this grain was distributed free of charge to certain registered citizens of the 
capital. Erdkamp makes the reasonable assumption that around 200,000 citizens were 
                                                          
622 Erdkamp, ‘A Starving Mob has no respect.’ 
623 Glen Bowersock, Late Antiquity: A Guide to the Postclassical World, ed. by Glen Bowersock, Peter 
Brown, Oleg Grabar (London: Belknap Press, 1999), pp. 301-2. 
624 Erdkamp, The Grain Market in the Roman Empire, p. 276. 
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eligible and that their supply was sufficient to feed an additional 100-200,000 
inhabitants, totalling over a third of the city’s population.625  
In 359 the cargo ships travelling from the East were hindered by storms and strong 
winds, which slowed their progress and made it difficult for them to enter harbour. The 
people of the city, who, according to Ammianus, considered famine the worst of all 
disasters began to continually threaten the city Prefect Tertullus with violence. Several 
riots seem to have occurred and Tertullus, fearing for his life, was forced to appear 
before the hostile mob with his two sons and plead with them for clemency. The mob 
was placated by the show of humility and soon the seas calmed and the warehouses were 
refilled.626  
This event was in no way out of the ordinary in fourth-century Rome. In fact, Ammianus 
describes the tenure of Apronian as Prefect as remarkable because it was not troubled 
by riot; a success he attributes to Apronian’s provision of a ‘constant abundance of 
commodities.’627 However this particular episode is unusual for a number of reasons. 
Ammianus is critical of the rioters because their actions were unreasonable; Tertullus 
was not hoarding or profiteering from the shortage but was simply a victim of fate. 
Tertullus himself recognised this and relied of the natural inclination of the mob to be 
compassionate – as Ammianus puts it – to recognise his lack of guilt.628 
There could hardly be a finer example of ‘moral economy’ in rioting. This was clearly 
not the ravaging of a starving crowd, but a conditional relationship. A certain validity is 
                                                          
625 These are generalised figures, but they are likely to be at least illustrative of the situation in Late 
Antiquity because the city had 120,000 registered inhabitants who received state supplied pork 
provisions in 419; Erdkamp, The Grain Market, p. 242. 
626 Ammianus, 19. 10. 
627 Ammianus, 26. 3. 
628 Qua miseratione vulgus ad clementia suapte natura proclive lenitum conticuit aequanimiter venturam 
operiens sortem. Ammianus, 19. 10; Ammianus Marcellinus: Roman History, Volumes I-III, trans. by J. 
C. Rolfe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939). 
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recognised, both in the account of Ammianus and the actions of Tertullus, in riots that 
opposed injustice and avarice. The project of the mob was not simply to obtain 
sustenance by any means, but to impose justice on those whose actions were perceived 
as immoral. Tertullus relied on this moral motivation for riot and was rewarded; he was 
delivered from certain death, and the people calmly awaited their fate having understood 
that Tertullus was not to blame for the shortage, but was as much a victim of it as they 
were.     
This action is also a clear demonstration of the agency of the people of Rome. 
Ammianus, as we have seen, was certainly not sympathetic to the plebs, and Tertullus, 
it seems, was left with little other option than humility.629 Shortage of food, or the fear 
of shortage, could mobilise large numbers of people. As we have seen, over a third of 
the city seems to have received free food from the state. Any failure in the dole would 
directly affect many thousands of people, and indirectly harm many others who would 
face greater demand for food at commercial markets, thus driving up demand and prices. 
It was recognised that certain individuals might seek to profiteer from these prices by 
engineering shortages to heighten profit. Members of the upper class, like Ammianus 
and Tertullus certainly disapproved of the methods of common people, and feared and 
hated the spectre of mob violence, but they recognised that there was a validity to their 
opposition to avarice. The people of Rome see to have recognised both this grudging 
admission of validity and the power of violence, threatened or enacted, to improve their 
lives.  
Grain was not the only commodity provided by the late Roman state. It was certainly 
the most venerable of publically-provided commodities since state acquisition of grain 
began in Rome as early as the third-century BC. However, over the centuries, olive oil, 
                                                          
629 For Ammianus’ view of the lower classes in general, see Ammianus, 28. 1. 15. and above, p. 76 
n.166.  
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pork and wine were included in the public dole.630 It is significant that wine shortages 
were also among the causes of riot in Late Antiquity. Ammianus’s description of a 
‘wine’ riot at Rome in 367 seems to envisage similar patterns to the bread riot of 359. 
The Prefect Symmachus inherited his position from Apronian and, according to 
Ammianus, continued to provide plenty and prosperity in the city. However, the people 
were caught up in a rumour that claimed Symmachus would rather use wine to quench 
his lime-kilns than sell it at the reduced price they hoped for. The mob were enraged by 
this and torched Symmachus’ residence. 631 Once again it seems that the perception of 
injustice was the motivation to spark significant unrest. Ammianus makes clear that the 
city was prosperous and Symmachus innocent. He is hardly unbiased, but if this can be 
believed then it seems that it was not true shortage, but perceptions of manipulation that 
prompted popular violence. In any case, people do not starve from a lack of wine. It was 
a hugely important supplement to both lifestyle and diet in the Roman Empire, but riots 
over perceived wine shortage were not an existential threat like the prospect of famine. 
Once again, it seems clear that riots in the ancient world were not acts of desperation, 
but rather forms of violent collective action intended to prevent or punish the actions of 
authority figures that the community felt were unjust.  
 
5.2.1.2. Riot and Relations with Authority.  
It has been supposed that Roman citizens in the post-Republican era altered their tactics 
from riot to demonstration, because the concentration of power under a single autocratic 
ruler rendered the blunt tool of violence obsolete. Instead, demonstrations at public 
                                                          
630 Erdkamp, The Grain Market, p. 256. 
631 Ammianus, 27. 3. It is worth noting that this threat on the part of Symmachus, to use wine to quench 
his lime-kilns, was not the throwaway comment it might appear. Wine, along with lime, was a 
component in the production of waterproof cements used to line pools and other watertight 
constructions. J. F. Matthews, ‘Peter Valvomeres, Re-Arrested’ Homo Viator. Classical Essays for John 
Bramble, (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1987) 277-284, p. 280. 
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events became common where the crowd could shout their grievances to the emperor. 
Demonstrations like these were certainly a valuable tool.632  However, in Late Antiquity 
the Emperors were more rarely at their capitals and the lesser person of the Prefect 
became the object of the people’s attentions during shortages. However, the Emperor 
was not immune to the actions of rioters motivated by grain shortage. In 431 in 
Constantinople, which like Rome received considerable state grain supply, the Emperor 
Theodosius II was personally pelted with stones by the mob when he was ceremoniously 
processing to a public granary, because he had failed to keep it full.633  
As we have seen, riots were a tool in the repertoire of common people in influencing the 
authorities who ruled over them. Riot was a sign of displeasure and a marker of injustice 
at shortages of commodities. Emperors were aware of the power of urban unrest and 
were careful to try to cultivate positive relationships with the urban masses. As early as 
AD 6 Augustus responded to food shortage by doubling the rations delivered to 
recipients of the dole and limiting the sale of grain to personal use so that profiteering 
merchants could not stockpile corn to drive up prices.634 Such policies occurred regularly 
throughout imperial history; Diocletian, Constantine and Julian all famously attempted 
to limit the dangers of shortage and improve relations with the common people by fixing 
prices or expanding the dole.635 But the dole could also employed as a stick with which 
the state could punish unruly behaviour; as we have seen Constantius II slashed the corn 
dole in half after prolonged riots between Nicene and Arian congregations had cost the 
lives of numerous soldiers and a prominent general who sent in to restore order. At least 
80,000 residents received the corn dole in Constantinople, and these rations presumably 
                                                          
632 Peter Garnsey, Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World. Responses to Risk and Crisis, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 241.  
633 Marcellinus Comes, Chronicon, entry 431, in MGH AA 9, p. 78. 
634 Erdkamp, The Grain Supply, p. 250. 
635 Julian, for example, before penning the Misopogon to chastise the Antiochenes, had provided 
420,000 modii (3000 tons) of grain for the relief of famine in the city. Peter Brown, Poverty and 
Leadership, p. 32. 
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provided for a total of 100-160,000. 636 If Constantius II could deprive that proportion of 
the population, and many others by increasing the burden on private market supply, 
without significant repercussion, then we must assume that the urban poor of 
Constantinople were either extraordinarily well fed, or that ‘food’ riots resulted from the 
moral economy rather than simple hunger stimulus.  
Severe and successful though the draconian punishment meted out by Constantius II 
might have been, the tactic was not often employed. Emperors and high ranking officials 
were all too aware of the potential destabilising threat that commodity shortage could 
induce and they were presumably unwilling to exacerbate the issue.637 367 was not the 
first year that bore witness to a ‘wine riot’ in fourth-century Rome. In 354 the Prefect 
Orfitus was afflicted by riots over wine shortage as was his successor, Leontius, in the 
following year. Leontius attempted to cool the rioter’s tempers with a mix of recognition 
and punitive measures. He was carried in his carriage into the heart of the mob even 
though his escort abandoned him. According to Ammianus he stolidly endured the 
admonishments of the crowd until he recognised a towering ringleader of the riot named 
Peter Valvomeres. This man was flogged and sent into exile, while the rest of the people 
quietly dispersed.638 Ammianus represents this as an act of supreme bravery, but it seems 
that Prefects like Leontius and Tertullus may have routinely exposed themselves to 
rioters in order to hear their grievances; in this way they could convert violent riot into 
a vocal demonstration. It allowed the crowd to be heard and to see that they were being 
heard. Ammianus relates that Leontius had formerly been a thorough and impartial 
judge, but liable to condemn too severely those who impugned his authority. It seems 
                                                          
636 Arnaldo Marcone, p. 328, following the approximations of Erkamp, The Grain Supply, p. 242. 
637 For example CTh 9. 4. 1, dated to 391 and promulgated by Theodosius, Arcadius and Honorius, 
proclaims leniency toward anyone who uttered maledictions against the Emperor including complaints 
about hard times. Complaining was a serious offense; it impugned the Emperor’s position which was 
closely linked with notions of divinity. Criticism was therefore not a dissimilar crime to sacrilege. 
Leniency in such cases was presumably preferred to a hard-line approach that could induce sedition.   
638 Ammianus, 14. 6 and 15. 7.  
 262 
 
probable that the flogging of a ringleader was a measure that allowed both parties to 
save face; Leontius heard the people’s concerns over the wine ration, but was 
nevertheless able to demonstrate his power.639  
Rioting was a formidable tactic for influencing or even punishing authorities that did not 
abide with the norms expected by the community. The moral economy argument of 
Thompson and Erdkamp seems to be a convincing way of understanding this 
phenomenon; the Roman crowd did not react to hunger with irrational spasmodic 
violence, but rather responded to the violation of expected obligations and morality 
through riots that were intended not to destroy, but to achieve redress.640 Significantly 
however, we need not limit this central facet of Thompson’s thesis to issues of 
commodity supply alone. The riots that Leontius responded to were not just resultant 
from wine shortage. Indeed these riots, though Ammianus attributes their motivation to 
shortage, were part of a prolonged escalation of violence that had stemmed from the 
arrest of a charioteer named Philoromus who was a particular favourite of the crowd. He 
was apprehended in public and the mob immediately pursued and attacked Leontius and 
his guardsmen who responded with violence and exiled a few ringleaders.641 A few days 
later when a new disturbance broke out over wine shortage, Ammianus explains that the 
                                                          
639 Erich Auerbach, in his famous chapter on ‘The Arrest of Peter Valvomeres’ in Mimesis, was rather 
harsh in his judgement of Ammianus when claimed that the account showed ‘no objectively rational 
relationship whatever between the authorities and the rebels’. Erich Auerbach, Edward W. Said, 
Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2013), p. 52. Based on the various interactions between authorities and rioters that take place in the Res 
Gestae, Ammianus may have been a rather shrewder observer of politics between the crowd and the 
authorities than Auerbach allowed. 
640 E.P. Thompson, p. 136. 
641 The punishment of ringleaders was a symbolic policy intended to discourage further disturbances. It 
commonplace in the discourse of elites that the crowd was ignorant, and its actions easily malleable. The 
prosecution of ringleaders cut the proverbial head off the snake, but allowed leniency for the rest of the 
gullible body. The manipulation of the mob by subversive characters was established both in classical 
history and politics by famous demagogues such as populist republican rivals Clodius and Milo (the 
former was killed in the street by the gangs of the latter), but also in Christian teaching, such as the 
manipulation of the crowd to plea for the freedom of Barabbas rather than Jesus. It was also 
acknowledged that such nefarious plotters from throughout the social spectrum. Humilial agitators like 
these might be flogged or exiled. CTh 9. 33. 1 ordered that any honestiores who tried to assemble the 
plebs or defend the mob against the reactions of the state would be punished with a heavy fine.  
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people were still seething from the previous incident.642 So when the troubles were 
renewed, the challenge to Leontius – which he personally and publically acknowledged 
– was not just over the morality of commodity supply, but his arrest of a beloved 
sportsman.  
Charioteers enjoyed close relations with the inhabitants of Roman cities, and especially 
with the more riotous elements, if our sources can be believed.643 Ammianus claims that 
the ‘lowest and poorest class’ spent their nights in bars and at the theatre, where they 
engaged in gambling and drunken yet detailed quarrels over the relative merits and 
demerits of horses and drivers, that extended until dawn. His language when describing 
the ‘innumerable crowds of plebeians’ (plebem innumerem) who waited in impatient 
excitement for the results of a race echoes the discourse on riots.644 This indicates both 
the strength of attachment of the people to their pastime, and also the similarity between 
an exited crowd and a violent one. But as we have seen, the relation between fans and 
drivers was not simply that of spectator to celebrity. Charioteers and other showmen like 
actors and gladiators could operate as spokesmen, leaders or violent champions of the 
crowd; it was partly because of such connections and roles that showmen, like 
charioteers, often excited the hatred of the elites in Roman society.645 When Philoromus 
was arrested he was in the crowd, with his people. The action was a public attack on the 
mob by denying them a favourite and perhaps a leader, probably more akin to the arrest 
of a representative than of the intangible, television celebrities familiar to modern 
society.  
                                                          
642 Ammianus 15. 7. 
643 For more on charioteers and the relationship to violence, see above pp. 208-9 n.522 and pp. 246-50. 
644 Ammianus 14. 6.  
645 Students were also among the groups tarnished with a reputation for associating with criminals and 
for carousing in a manner that could incite violence. The state imposed heavy restrictions on their 
behaviour in an effort to thwart their destabilising influence. CTh 14 .9. 1.  
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This should not be taken as a denial of their sporting role; charioteers achieved their 
popular status through their participation and proficiency at racing. But that was not the 
limit of their connection with the people. They certainly were closely engaged with the 
crowd, especially during riots where they seem to have operated as ringleaders and even 
violent specialists.646 But their special sporting status made punishment of charioteers a 
tricky issue for authorities. Ringleaders, like the imposing Peter Valvomeres, could be 
exiled with comparative simplicity. The crowd might dispute or resent the action, but 
the Prefect had a duty to maintain peace and law. However, the city also had an 
obligation to hold public entertainments, with chariot racing as the main event. An exiled 
plebeian might be forgotten in time, but the failure to provide satisfactory games could 
be perceived as deviation from expected norms in the same way as a shortage of other 
commodities, like wine and grain. We do not know if Botheric, magister militum per 
Illyricum, faced troubles when he imprisoned a favoured charioteer after disturbances at 
a drunken party in Thessalonica in 390. But we know that there were serious riots when 
the charioteer was not released to participate in the scheduled games; Botheric and much 
of the garrison were killed by the riotous citizens.647 This example provides a further 
layer of complexity to the riots of Leontius’ tenure. When the Prefect first arrested 
Philoromus, he was not only arresting a favoured charioteer, but perhaps a leader and 
representative of the people. Not only that, but through the arrest of a sportsman, he may 
have been contravening his obligation as a prominent administrator to provide games. 
Moreover, his action and the belligerent approach of his guards toward the crowd seem 
to have stirred up already extant grievances over the moral economy of wine supply. 
Treading the line between authority and popularity was obviously a complex task in the 
major cities of the Empire. It is perhaps not surprising that Ammianus, even though he 
                                                          
646 See above, pp. 208-9 n.522 and pp. 246-50.  
647 Sozomen, 7. 25 and above, p. 249.  
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is typically hostile and disparaging about the common people, was more impressed by 
the conciliatory policy of Tertullus than the bullish approach of Leontius.648  
It is important to recognise that the mob might hold authorities responsible for a number 
of injustices or failures to fulfil obligations. Food riots and those conducted over 
disruption of entertainment have elicited a degree of scholarly interest, but to properly 
illustrate the agency and grievances of the late Roman people it is important to not limit 
discussion to those discrete categories. For example, the Prefect Lampridius, 
Symmachus’ successor, provoked the fury of the people of Rome by procuring the 
materials necessary to embark on an extravagant new building project without paying 
for them. His tenure endured frequent riots because of this injustice and his house (like 
that of his predecessor) was almost torched during the most severe episode of unrest.649 
Lampridius was, in this case, hated for the injustice he provoked. In this sense we can 
assume the crowd was provoked in much the same way as when Leontius arrested their 
favourite.650 Furthermore it is plausible that the unfair exactions by Lampridius 
catalysed underlying dissent in much the same way that Leontius arrest exacerbated 
discontent over wine supply. In any case, perceptions of injustice could provide a 
powerful motivation to unrest.  
The main participants in these episodes of riot are the poorer elements of the urban 
population – the plebs – and especially those ‘indolent’ members who relied on state 
provisions. Charioteers and similar persons employed in distasteful professions, 
especially in entertainment, were also implicated. However, as we have seen, the elite 
discourse on unrest and riot employed pejorative terminology in a manner that was 
                                                          
648 See above, pp. 257-8, pp. 260-1.  
649 Ammianus, 27. 3. 
650 Ammianus does not record the reason for the arrest, but his recognition of Leontius’ severe 
reputation hints that the punishment might not have fit the crime.  
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intended to denigrate.651 This does not mean that such people were not the main 
participants in rioting, but it is worthwhile noting that similar grievances caused unrest 
among other groups. For example, the corporati (members of Imperial guilds) might 
intimidate or employ violence akin to rioting in order to protect their interests against 
private competitors who sought to undercut them.652 This was performed either directly 
against the competitors or the authorities who were taken to be responsible. In either 
case, the guildsmen clearly felt that their interests were not being observed or protected 
and reacted in a way that was not too dissimilar from the plebs that were denied their 
traditional rights to commodities, entertainment or fair prices. 
Whatever the individual causes and participants in secular riots in Late Antiquity, the 
evidence of these relationships between the urban crowd and city authorities is more 
abundant for the major cities and capitals of the Empire. These attracted more attention, 
and unrest in such locations could have consequences on a larger scale than those in 
smaller provincial settlements. However, it is plausible that similar obligations and 
responsibilities were expected of the authorities in minor cities. These presumably 
differed according to the specific circumstances; for example, minor cities were 
typically not reliant on external food supply, nor were their populations supported by 
state provided dole. However, if supply failed the local authorities might still be held 
responsible. In the first-century AD the citizens of Aspendos in southern Asia Minor 
attempted to burn their magistrate for failing to prevent the stockpiling of grain during 
a shortage. Some decades later in Prusa, the leading local landowner Dio Chrysostom 
was threatened with burning or stoning for hoarding grain and he had to employ all his 
oratorical skill in order to convince them of his innocence.653 This reasoning with the 
                                                          
651 See above, pp. 239-40. 
652 Arnaldo Marcone, p. 322. 
653 Erdkamp, ‘A Starving Mob has no respect.’, pp. 104-5. A similar disturbance upset the town of 
Favianis in fifth-century Noricum, but the guilty party – a widow named Procula who had stockpiled 
grain – was saved from unrest by the intervention of St. Severinus. Eugippius, Vita Severini, 3. 
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people recalls the conciliatory actions of Tertullus when faced with similar threats three 
centuries later in the Capital. Evidence for similar concern over obligations of supply in 
smaller cities or towns is less clear, but certain events imply that authorities could still 
be held responsible for shortage. For example, it is plausible that one of the causes for 
the unrest at Bazas in 417 was a shortage of food or water in the context of the ongoing 
Visigothic siege. If the poor perceived that they were being denied a fair share of 
supplies then they might have targeted social superiors who they presumed were 
stockpiling or hiding the victuals for personal use or to profiteer. This might explain why 
they chose to take up arms ‘for the particular slaughter of the nobles’.654 
Similar failures to assuage the problems of famine and perhaps plague seem to have 
motivated the supporters of the Pseudo-Christ of Bourges who championed a 
considerable insurrection in the southern districts of Merovingian Gaul in the late sixth 
century. They certainly targeted the wealthy, who they perhaps blamed for shortages or 
profiteering that accompanied the famine. They might have also targeted the Bishop of 
Le Puy for similar reasons; since the ecclesiastical hierarchy had taken on many of the 
economic and administrative roles of the Roman bureaucracy they might have a legal 
obligation to provide.655 Moreover, the Bishops was supposed to provide both pastoral 
care for the needy and spiritual guidance to assuage the anger of God. In a context of 
war, famine and plague it is perhaps not surprising that the episcopate was blamed for 
                                                          
654 Paulinus of Pella, ‘Eucharisticus’, in From Roman to Merovingian Gaul: A Reader, pp. 167-168. 
gravior multo circumfusa hostilitate factio servilis paucorum mixta furore insano iuvenum nequam  licet 
ingenuorum, armata in caedem specialem nobilitatis. ‘Eucharisticus’, in Ausonius Volume 2 (pp. 294-
531), trans. by H. G. E. White (London: Heinemann, 1931). 
655 The subject of the secular authority of Merovingian and Early Medieval bishops is a complicated 
issue, and not one that can be investigated to any depth in this study. However, it is perhaps worth 
noting that there seems to be no standard pattern of episcopal authority. In dioceses where there was a 
strong secular leadership, such as an influential comes then the bishop’s authority may have been 
weaker than in another see where there was a comparative vacuum of lay power. The classic study of 
episcopal power is Martin Heinzelmann, Bischofsherrschaft in Gallien: Zur Continuität römischer 
Führungsschichten vom 4. bis zum 7. Jahrhundert: soziale, prosopographische und bildungs-
geschichtliche Aspecte (Zurich and Munich: Artemis, 1976). See also Allen Jones, pp. 114-128. 
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not fulfilling its obligations.656 These examples do not show such definite evidence of 
reaction to injustices in commodity supply as those that derive from major cities, but do 
seem to suggest that the same broad trends in moral economy governed motivations for 
rioting in settlements of all sizes.  
Furthermore, it seems that the people of post-Roman Gaul could be roused to riot by 
perceptions of injustice in much the same way that their Imperial predecessors were. 
Gregory of Tours describes several tax riots that suggest the urban crowd could be just 
as volatile in the sixth century as they were in the fourth. On the death of Theudebert in 
c.547 his tax collector Parthenius was forced to flee from Trier where he had exacted 
taxes from the Franks. They considered such behaviour an injustice and desired 
vengeance now that the King was dead. Parthenius sought the support of two bishops at 
the royal court and returned to Trier to try to reconcile with the mob, but failed and the 
bishops attempted to hide him in a church. The mob rushed in, overwhelmed the 
custodes, dragged Parthenius from the chest in which he had hidden and stoned him to 
death.657 Similar circumstances seem to have caused the downfall of Audo who, 
according to Gregory, did much evil during the lifetime of King Chilperic as an 
accomplice of Fredegund and then exacted taxes from free Franks during the reign of 
King Childebert. In 585 he was in Paris with Fredegund when the Franks were again 
offered an opportunity for vengeance against a hated administrator because of the death 
of a royal patron. The Franks stripped and despoiled Audo, took all his belongings, 
burned his house and would have killed him had he not sought refuge in the cathedral.658 
A further riot is described by Gregory as response to new and punitive taxes introduced 
by Chilperic to the citizens of Limoges. The people assembled at an arranged date where 
they decided to kill Mark, the tax-collector tasked with collecting the new taxes. The 
                                                          
656LH, 10. 25 and above pp. 99-101. 
657 LH, 3. 36.  
658 LH, 7. 15.  
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mob gathered and though they were thwarted in their attempts to kill Mark by the 
intervention of the Bishop, they still seized the books and records of taxes and burnt 
them.659  
These various Merovingian riots show various similar characteristics of motivation in 
common with the Roman examples we have already seen, despite the numerous and 
significant differences between the participants. The rioters in Merovingian Gaul, at 
least in the cases in c.547 and 585, were free Franks, whose position is society was 
probably relatively privileged in comparison to certain mendicant or deprived rioters we 
have seen in some late Roman riots.660 But whilst the trigger for riot was the injustice of 
taxation rather than unjustified arrests or the seizure of goods without payment, the 
response to injustice remained the same. Public rejection of the policy was demonstrated 
and violent attacks were made against the administrators who were guilty of the 
injustice; their person and properties were targeted as the houses of Symmachus and 
Lampridius were in the 360s. Attempts to burn, lynch or stone the offending authorities 
were very public demonstrations of their betrayal of commonly held norms, and this 
public retribution was displayed by riotous crowds both before and after the official end 
of the Western Empire. Moreover, we can discern that the riots were not spontaneous, 
spasmodic responses to taxation, but calculated and planned. This seems to have been 
as true in the later Roman and post-Roman West as it was in the eighteenth-century 
bread riots that were the subject of Thompson’s study. The people of Trier and Paris 
waited on the opportunity afforded by a royal death to attack senior officials, whilst the 
citizens of Limoges held a public assembly to determine their course of action in the 
faces of new and unjust demand upon them. Riot was the decision, but such a 
                                                          
659 LH, 5, 28. For more detail on taxation in the Merovingian kingdoms in the sixth century see I. N. 
Wood, The Merovingian kingdoms 450-751, (London: Longman, 1994), pp. 61-3.  
660 Halsall, Settlement and social organization: the Merovingian region of Metz, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 30-1. 
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demonstration of agency was not taken lightly. Sedition and violence against a royal 
official was a serious matter and even though they failed to kill Mark, Chilperic inflicted 
terrible punishments of torture and death on the people of Limoges.661 Such punishment 
was among the harshest delivered to rioters in Late Antiquity. But although the people 
of Limoges might not have anticipated the degree of Chilperic’s anger, they knew – as 
did all rioters in our period – that their violent actions could provoke an even more 
violent response from the state.  
Interestingly, the responses of authorities in these Merovingian examples of sixth-
century riots also show certain similarities to the Roman precedents. Parthenius, like 
Tertullus, Leontius and Dio Chrysostom attempted to confront and placate the crowd 
but, unlike the Romans, failed to do so.662 This suggests that the officials recognised a 
certain validity in the prerogative of the crowd to collectively voice their grievances. By 
appearing before the mob Parthenius presumably meant to demonstrate a recognition of 
those grievances; the two Bishops he brought perhaps were intended to mollify the anger 
in the way that Tertullus used his two sons.663 It is perhaps this complex relationship 
between the urban population and authority that encouraged the people of Limoges to 
riot. They seem to have assumed that riot was sufficient demonstration of agency to 
                                                          
661 It is interesting that Chilperic seems to have believed that clerics were guilty of agitating for violence 
and the rejection of taxes. Gregory claims that this suspicion was unfounded, but Chilperic was 
sufficiently convinced to stake clergymen to the ground and submit them to torture. Bishops in 
Merovingian Gaul could certainly be vocal in opposition to unjust exaction in their dioceses. Given 
clerical obligations to caring for the flock, it is perhaps reasonable to believe Chilperic was correct to 
some extent and that the churchmen had been vocal about the rights of their congregations. For example 
LH, 4. 2. See I. N. Wood, The Merovingian kingdoms, p. 63 for ecclesiastical hostility to tax in sixth-
century Gaul. 
662 This fear of popular displeasure was perhaps not limited just to officials. King Guntram, along with 
his brothers Sigibert and Chilperic had been banned from entering Paris without the consent of his 
brothers and in the 580s both Sigibert and Chilperic had died soon after breaching the agreement. 
Guntram believed they had been assassinated and was therefore terrified when he too entered the city in 
584 so he made an impassioned plea to the citizens of the Paris to do him no harm and set about 
providing for the poor and undoing Chilperic’s injustices in order to gain their favour. LH, 7. 6, 7, 8.   
663 Goffart, ‘Old and New in Merovingian Taxation’ in Rome’s Fall and After, (London: Hambleton, 
1989), p. 220, supposes that Parthenius and Audo might have been subjecting the Franks to taxes due 
from Roman estates which they had come to own. If so Parthenius might have attempted to explain his 
lack of guilt to the mob during their confrontation in the manner of Tertullus during the confrontation.  
 271 
 
force at least a limited conciliation (such as that allowed by the policies of Leontius). 
The admittedly biased rhetoric of Gregory suggests that they would not have decided in 
favour of riot if they had been more familiar with Chilperic’s mood.664 In general 
however, the discourse employed by Gregory to describe the riots is in accordance with 
Imperial tradition: the crowd gathers in a multitudo for the purposes of seditionem.665 
The similarity of modes of interaction between the elite who were directly involved with 
dealing with the crowd and those who described it implies a strong degree of continuity 
about the relationship between the people and those that ruled them.666     
Taxes were not the only secular concerns that were severe enough to provoke unrest in 
Merovingian Gaul. Another event, again described as a sedition (seditionem) by a vulgar 
mob (insurgente vulgo), was in fact conducted by the community to impose justice rather 
than to oppose injustice. A hermit in the vicinity of Angoulême called Eparchius was 
famed for his merciful freeing of prisoners, and he had considerable sway over the local 
judges and count. However, the incessant rejection of legal procedure became too much 
for the people of the city when the count was encouraged to release a particularly heinous 
                                                          
664 Gregory is generally a hostile source toward Chilperic, even going so far as to describe him as a 
latter-day Nero or Herod. However there is reason to believe that Gregory exaggerated his hostility. See 
Halsall, ‘Nero and Herod? The Death of Chilperic and Gregory’s Writings of History’ in K. Mitchell 
and I. N. Wood, The World of Gregory of Tours, (Leiden: Brill, 2002), pp. 337-50 and I.N. Wood ‘The 
Secret Histories of Gregory of Tours’. In: Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, 71. 2, (1993), 253-70 
for the details about this bias and Gregory’s subtle uses of his history in general. Michael Burrows, 
‘Gregory of Tours, Political Criticism and Lower-Class Violence’ in Mirabilia, 18. 1, (2014), 32-44. 
665 See above, p. 240. This seems to contrast to the terminology of banditry, which seems to have altered 
significantly during the course of Late Antiquity. See above, section 3.5.  
666 It has been supposed that the Franks were peculiar in their riotousness, and that their response to 
injustice differed. Halsall, for example, proposes that ‘Their anger took the form of righteous 
indignation whereas southern, Roman tax riots were based on injustice or breach of a specific previously 
granted immunity’ (Settlement and social organization, pp. 30-1). Certainly they were liable to resent 
taxation (inherently) more than the Gallo-Roman citizens of Gaul, as their service to the state was often 
delivered through military service rather than tax. However, this difference is no indication of peculiar 
belligerence or rebelliousness on behalf of the Franks. Rather it was simply that that community felt that 
they had been dealt an injustice because they did not usually pay taxes. I see no reason why this should 
be understood differently to the sense of injustice felt by the Gallo-Roman citizens of sixth-century 
Limoges at excessive taxation, or that perceived by rioters across the late antique world. Expectations 
differed according to time, place and the norms of a particular community. It is reasonable to suppose 
that urban ‘Franks’ had slightly different norms regarding taxation that their ‘Roman’ neighbours in 
sixth-century Gaul. But the response to those authorities who contravened those norms sufficiently 
seems to have been fairly consistent.  
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criminal. The mob gathered and verbally questioned the credibility of his political 
authority. Under this pressure he submitted and the prisoner was hanged.667 Once again, 
in this episode, we see that the people could employ collective action to influence the 
decisions of authorities which the crowd perceived to be failing in their obligations. The 
accused was known as a thief guilty of multiple offences and was believed to be a robber 
and murderer as well. He had committed the injustices, the secular authorities whose job 
it was to carry out punishments were failing due to the influence of Eparchius.668 The 
mob protested, threatening not only immediate violence, but a general breakdown in law 
as a result of the Count’s leniency. The Count, faced with such massed opposition, 
bowed to popular opinion. When Eparchius arrived on the scene the Count was forced 
to explain himself; ‘the mob held a demonstration and I could not do what you asked, 
for I had a riot on my hands’.669  
The Count had to deal with a problem that was a potential difficulty for many, perhaps 
all, urban authorities throughout Late Antiquity. When the authorities failed to meet the 
expectations of the crowd disquiet was fostered. If these dissatisfactions were 
sufficiently extreme, gradually increased over time, or if opportunity was provided by 
political instability, they could swiftly develop into violent riots. This broad conclusion 
seems to be as true, as far as we can tell from the incomplete distribution of sources, for 
many secular disturbances between the fourth and sixth centuries in the provinces (or 
former provinces) of the Western Empire. A range of secular motivations could provoke 
riot; not just food shortages, but also a failure to provide commodities in general, or to 
                                                          
667 LH, 6. 8. 
668 The man was eventually saved by a miraculous collapse of the gallows. It is worth mentioning that 
Capitulary I, LXXV and Cap. III, LXLV and LXLVI in the Lex Salica legislate against the removal of 
criminals from the gallows before their death. The hermit and the count seem to be breaking the law, not 
just the desires of the community. Katherine Fischer Drew, The Laws of the Salian Franks, 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), p. 135 and 143. 
669 insurgente vulgo, aliud facere non potui, timens super me seditionem moveri. LH, 6. 8, pp. 338-9; Libri 
Historiarum X, ed. by B. Krusch and W. Levison, MGH SRM, 1 (Hanover: Impenis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 
1951). 
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live up to other obligations such as the provision of games or justice. Furthermore, 
injustices on the part of authorities, as perceived by the community, could also add to 
the rumbling grievances or spark an episode of unrest. Our sources are rarely concerned 
to offer a deep analysis of the motivations of common people for what they understood 
as law-breaking, criminal violence. But even despite this we can perceive a complexity 
to riots; failure to fulfil obligations and injustices could overlap and fuel the fires of 
discontent in tandem. Moreover, discontent was rarely enacted through immediate 
spontaneous reaction, but rather the discontented planned their actions with care, and 
even waited for suitable opportunities to voice discontent. The authorities, whether 
Emperors, Kings, Bishops, provincial Counts or metropolitan Prefects, must have been 
conscious of this check on their authority in the cities they ran; a lack of representation 
in Late Antiquity typically denied the common people the ability to make new policies, 
but they clearly enjoyed a formidable degree of agency if the felt the authorities were 
transgressing popular norms. 
 
5.2.1.3. Secular Riots and the ‘Outsider’.  
As far as can be discerned, riots directed at injustices by legitimate authorities were the 
most common form of motivation for secular riots in Late Antiquity. However, it must 
be stressed that other motivations existed for a number of riots, perhaps most notably in 
the reaction to outsiders. These often took the form of hostile reactions to outsiders 
whose presence within the city was considered potentially threatening, or whose actions 
were perceived as transgressive.670 The most common form of these riots against 
                                                          
670 Riot, or popular unrest, in response to attack by political enemies seems to have been relatively rare. 
Citizens certainly took up arms to help garrison troops to defend their walls, but occupying armies do 
not seem to have typically encountered unrest in the immediate aftermath of the capture of a settlement. 
However, such reactions may have been considered possible; the Gothic army fighting against Mundus 
in the early stages of Justinian’s Gothic War were apparently unwilling to garrison the town of Salones 
in Dalmatia for fear of its hostile inhabitants. Procopius, Wars, 5. 7.  
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outsiders seems to have been in the reactions of urban dwellers against barbarians. For 
example, the chief magistrate of Adrianople roused the mob to attack a number of Goths 
who were in Roman service, but who he blamed for the destruction of properties around 
the city in the aftermath of the Visigothic revolt. The Goths had petitioned the magistrate 
for supplies and instead were faced with a hostile crowd, composed of the poor of the 
city and workers at the Imperial arms factory, who hurled stones and abuse at them.671 
A number of similar events took place in fourth and fifth centuries. The people of 
Constantinople famously rioted against the excesses of the barbarian garrison 
commanded by Gainas in 400 and, apparently, drove seven thousand of them to seek 
sanctuary in a church where they were burned to death.672 On a far smaller scale in late 
fifth-century Noricum the townspeople of Comagenis took the opportunity of the 
confusion caused by an earthquake to riot against their barbarian garrison and drive them 
out.673  
Sixth-century parallels are not exact, but the same hostility to foreign soldiers can be 
detected. As we have seen, the people of the city and district of Tours reacted 
aggressively to the depredations caused by Guntram’s soldiers when they tried to 
apprehend Eberulf from sanctuary in the Church of St. Martin, and when militiamen 
tried to seize a drink from a local resident.674 It is hard to know if these men might have 
been perceived as ‘external barbarians’ in the same way that the citizens of Comagenis 
or Constantinople might have understood their garrisons. But whether they were 
considered ‘foreign’ or not, they were nevertheless external. Moreover, the cities of 
Merovingian Gaul often seem to have had oppositional relationships with each other. In 
this case, the offending soldiers – mainly from Châteaudun – commanded by Claudius 
                                                          
671 Ammianus Marcellinus, 31. 6. 
672 Zosimus, 5. 19. 
673 Eugippius, Vita Severini, 2. 
674 LH, 7. 21, 7. 29, and above, pp. 216-7 and pp. 230-31. 
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who desecrated the church at Tours were already probably hostile to the new Count of 
Tours, Willachar, with whom they had recently warred.675 The presence of external or 
barbarian soldiers who were perceived as hostile could clearly be a provocation to the 
community; apparently throughout the period of Late Antiquity suspicious or negative 
perceptions of outsiders could motivate riotous conflict.  
However, the violence does not necessarily seem to have been directed against 
barbarians in an irrational, or particularly prejudiced way. In all these cases the outsider 
soldiers, though perceived as hostile, were nevertheless under orders from or 
representatives of the state or governing authority. When they caused trouble the 
authorities could be called into question; violence against representatives of authority 
was implicitly a critique of policy.676 Moreover, the ‘barbarian/external soldiers who 
caused riotous reaction from the community typically seem to have been guilty of 
transgressing social norms in the manner that could provoke the ire of the crowd 
regardless of ethnicity. Gainas, for example, was rumoured to have planned to steal the 
wealth of the silversmiths in order to fund his political machinations.677 Illegal 
expropriation like this was sufficient cause for the people of Rome to riot against 
Lampridius; it may have been no less influential in provoking riot against Gainas.678 
Gainas was not only a barbarian, but also an authority figure in the Roman system.679 In 
like manner, the riot in Thessalonica which culminated in the massacre of the barbarian 
                                                          
675 LH, 7. 13. 
676 Gregory of Tours seems to use popular reaction to the bad behaviour of soldiers in for political 
critique in his Histories. Guntram was his King so overt criticism was not a safe option for Gregory; 
instead he chose to focus on a serious of episodes of popular violence against the martial representatives 
of the King to covertly highlight his failings – as a ruler – to control the excesses of his men. Michael 
Burrows, pp. 32-44. 
677 John of Antioch, Fragmenta, p. 393, Socrates, Ecclesiastical History, pp. 308-309; Sozomen, 
Ecclesiastical History, p. 368. 
678 Ammianus, 27. 3 and see above, p. 265.  
679 Cameron has stressed that claims of ‘anti-barbarian’ or ‘nationalist’ factions or parties within 
Constantinople are inaccurate. Accordingly, Gainas and the reaction to his machinations should be 
understood along the lines of relations between Romans and generals, rather than in terms of 
‘anachronistic party labels’. A. Cameron and J. Long, Barbarians and Politics at the Court of Arcadius 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 335.  
 276 
 
general Botheric and his soldiers in 390 seems to have been provoked by the 
imprisonment of a favoured charioteer (as we have seen). But if Botheric and his men 
rode roughshod over community norms, it seems plausible that their perceived barbarity 
might have a contributory factor to the tensions in the city.  
Complexity, as has been stressed, should not be underestimated in the study of riots. 
Violent reactions from the urban population were rarely simple and reactionary. The 
outsider status of soldiery could surely provoke hostility from the crowd, but externality 
was not necessarily the deciding issue. In the late sixth-century Gaul Guntram’s 
campaign to annexe Visigothic Septimania collapsed outside Carcassonne, having 
ravaged its way to the city through Visigoth territory. Gregory notes that the brutality of 
the invasion was unusual and provoked a significant backlash. The Burgundian army 
seems to have been ruthlessly pursued during its retreat by both the Goths and the 
citizens of Toulouse who were roused to violence by the outrages of Guntram’s men. 
We can assume that the ‘outsider’ status of the Burgundian soldiery was a contributory 
factor in provoking the common people to violence (although not technically riot) in this 
case. However, it seems probable that the behaviour of the troops was also a factor. A 
contingent of Guntram’s force from Clermont under Duke Nicetius appears to have lost 
discipline during this retreat, looting and pillaging into Frankish territory, even stealing 
the silver from the Churches on the highway to Clermont. In response ‘many were killed 
by the locals who rose against them.’ This latter example of violence is clearly not 
committed against outsiders; it was mounted by the people of Auvergne in seditionibus 
against their dux.680 It seems that local people were liable to attack soldiers, if they were 
vulnerable and considered dangerous, in order to preserve their property from looting. 
                                                          
680 plerique in seditionibus interempti sunt. LH, 8. 30, pp. 459-462;  Libri Historiarum X, ed. by B. Krusch 
and W. Levison, MGH SRM, 1 (Hanover: Impenis Bibliopolii Hahniani, 1951). 
 
 277 
 
This seems to have been little less likely in notionally ‘friendly’ territory than in ‘hostile’ 
regions if the behaviour of the soldiers transgressed local norms. 
What mattered was behaviour. If outsiders were perceived to act in an outrageous way 
then they might provoke riots. As far as we can see, the expectations and reactions to 
bad behaviour in outsiders were broadly similar to that of authorities in general. As we 
have seen, the expropriations of Gainas may have influenced popular opinion against his 
policies in much the same way as it did with Prefect Lampidius.681 More certainly, it is 
quite evident that Duke Nicetus was capable of provoking significant unrest in both 
Septimania and the Auvergne. In one he was an outsider, in the other he was the leading 
local authority. The people in both territories rose up against him and slaughtered his 
foraging parties both during the retreat through first Gothic and then friendly Frankish 
lands.682 Another parallel reaction can be glimpsed in the technique of waiting for 
opportunity to riot. In fifth-century Comagenis the people waited for an earthquake to 
oust their garrison. Similarly, the in sixth century, the citizens of Paris and Trier likewise 
bided their time, and only rioted against hated local officials once their influence was 
undercut by a royal death.683 It is difficult to offer any concrete evidence about the 
thoughts and perceptions of common people in Late Antiquity, but as far as we can 
discern here, outsider status was a contributory factor to popular unrest, but it was not 
necessarily the dominant factor in such occasions.  
‘Otherness’ was apparently not usually a cause for secular pogroms in Late Antiquity. 
Instead it seems to have fallen to the rhetoric of influential figures in the rousing of riot 
to use complex and interrelated factors, encompassing injustice, obligation and 
otherness, to stoke tensions into flame. Augustine might provide an example of such 
                                                          
681 Ammianus, 27. 3 and see above, pp. 264-5 and p. 275. 
682 LH, 8. 30. 
683 LH, 3. 36, LH, 7. 15 and see above, pp. 268-9. 
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rhetoric. In a letter to Alypius, Bishop of the neighbouring city of Thagaste, he describes 
the depredations suffered by the people of the city and hinterland of Hippo at the hands 
of slave-dealers (mangones). These individuals were making a mockery of the Roman 
system of voluntary slavery, which legally bound a person to servitude for a set period, 
by ravaging isolated regions and carrying off victims involuntarily. These were sold in 
overseas provinces where they would be regarded as true slaves, not free people 
temporarily in servitude. The slavers were armed, and their operations were likened to 
barbarian raids, but Augustine considered them far worse; the Church routinely 
ransomed captives from barbarians but the illegally enslaved could not easily be returned 
from overseas. These greedy and barbaric criminals, Augustine stresses, hailed from 
Galatia, a province in the central highlands of Anatolia.684  
Augustine’s project was to reform the laws by which the Galatians could be prosecuted. 
He claimed that the existing law, which involved physical punishment, was too 
draconian and discouraged prosecution. Instead he proposed heavy fines that would 
allow administrators more freedom to sentence and likewise discourage the enterprising 
slavers. In order to emphasise the necessity of the legal change, he stressed the barbarity, 
and otherness, of the Galatians.685 The intent was to shock the authorities into action. 
This potent anti-Galatian rhetoric was probably also employed by the citizens of Hippo 
who took matters into their own hands. Augustine recounts that four months before 
penning the letter, the Galatians had gathered many victims from the hinterland of Hippo 
and especially Numidia in the dockyards of the city ready for deportation. A good 
Christian brought news of this to the church and so the congregation (though not 
Augustine, who was absent during the unrest) broke into the prison and boarded the ship 
                                                          
684 Augustine, Letter 10*. 
685 Galatia, like neighbouring Isauria, had a reputation for barbarity despite being a long-established 
Imperial province. Jerome claims that the Galatians, who supposedly derived from Celtic peoples who 
had settled in Anatolia hundreds of years previously, still spoke the same language as the people of Trier 
in the late fourth century. Jerome, Comentarii in Epistolam ad Galatos, 2. 3. 
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of the Galatian slavers and freed 120 people.686 The leaders of this action, and any other 
episodes of resistance against outsiders, may have employed the rhetoric of Augustine 
in order to rouse their fellows to riot.      
This seems to be the function of anti-‘Other’ discourse in late antique riots. That the 
Galatians were Galatians was not the root of the grievance; they were hated for their 
enslaving of free, and often Christian, Romans. But emphasising perceptions of their 
barbarity was a tool for encouraging action to redress their immoral behaviour. 
Augustine’s petition to alter the law and change judicial policy may also reveal a hint of 
tension toward authorities in this unrest. Failings to maintain law and order also caused 
the people of Angoulême to confront their Count and question his authority.687 It is 
possible that Augustine feared a similar disturbance in Hippo; he certainly felt the need 
to reassure Alypius that he was absent during the unrest. In any case, it seems probable 
that anti-Galatian feeling was not unproblematic bigotry.  
Differing ethnicities could clearly complicate matters, and hostile parties could make 
use of differences in appearance, language or creed (many barbarians were Arian688) to 
stoke tensions. But we should not see ethnicity or otherness as a standalone, 
uncomplicated motivation for riot. Outsiders were no more likely to induce ‘irrational 
spasmodic’ violence than food shortages. Citizens of Roman and post-Roman cities, 
especially those in metropolises or in the border regions were well used to seeing ethnic 
differences, especially in garrison troops. Even before the large scale employment of 
Goths and other barbarians within the imperial armies in the fourth century, the Empire 
had used external barbarians – such as Franks serving under their own commanders – or 
                                                          
686 Augustine, Letter 10*. 
687 LH, 6. 8. and above, pp. 271-2.  
688 Creed may have been a factor in the uprising against Gainas. The barbarians were certainly 
denounced most severely in contemporary ecclesiastical sources written by Socrates, Sozomen and John 
of Antioch. They also sought refuge in a Nicene church. This may have been a conscious choice to 
discourage the Catholic mob from assaulting their sanctuary. If so, it did not succeed. Zosimus, 5. 19. 
See above p. 275. 
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imperial soldiers from distant lands.689 Syrians, Egyptians or Galatians were surely little 
less foreign to Western fellow Romans than notionally ‘barbarian’ Goths. Interactions 
between locals and outsiders could be a source of tension, or could exacerbate the 
existing unrest. But such differences do not seem to have caused violent urban unrest on 
their own; moral expectations – in Thompson’s terms – seem to have been the key factor 
in causing secular riots. 
 
5.2.2. Religious Riots in Late Antiquity.  
It is the supposition of this study that these common trends in motivations for secular 
riots – moral transgressions, failure to fulfil obligations and injustices – might often be 
found in religious riots as well. If so, it seems likely that the interactions between the 
riotous crowd and authorities, both secular and ecclesiastical, would also share 
characteristics. Studies of religious violence in Late Antiquity have paid a great deal of 
attention to the doctrine of the church toward violence, the reaction of the church 
hierarchy to that violence and the theological stumbling blocks that could give rise to 
sectarian conflict. These issues will not be under investigation here; no more than the 
legal technicalities or the historiography of ethnicity were in preceding sections. This is 
not the place to be investigating theological differences. As before, the focus will be on 
the crowd. Religious motivations to riot were no less urgent or meaningful to the people 
of Late Antiquity than secular ones. Religious immorality and transgression could not 
only have a temporal impact, but an everlasting one. However, this significance should 
not suggest a necessary pre-eminence of religious motivation either. Rather, it seems 
                                                          
689 The same can presumably be said of Franks, Goths or Burgundians living alongside Romans in the 
late fifth and sixth-century successor states in the former western provinces of the Empire. 
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reasonable to assert that the factors involved in the inciting of a religious riot in the late 
antique West were as complex and interrelated as any other.690  
The thematic thread of this investigation into religiously motivated riots will be the 
notion of transgression. The purpose of this is to make for a more consistent theme with 
secular riots, so that we can try to identify common practices and patterns. Transgression 
of community norms was a powerful motivator for lower-class urban violence in Late 
Antiquity. As we have seen, the failure of authorities to observe the norms of behaviour, 
whether by failing to supply food or wine, to deliver games or by the imposition of unfair 
taxation could be perceived as transgressive, according to the specific norms and 
practices of the community in question. In this following section, we will attempt to 
discover what spiritual actions or practices were seen as transgressive, both by 
individuals who were from outside and inside the community. In the case of outsiders, 
sheer abnormality might have provoked hostility, but how and why remains intriguing. 
For insiders, the most important factor to understand is how the transgressive action that 
provoked riot came to be seen as a transgression. Insiders were, by definition, within 
and known to their community, and it is important to investigate the context for these 
events so that we can understand how behaviour that had been accepted came to provoke 
violence. 
 
                                                          
690 It is worth reiterating the word ‘west’ in this sentence. The history of religious riots, and violence in 
general, was more tumultuous and has been better studied in the eastern provinces and what became the 
Byzantine Empire. This is not surprising. The riots and violence that accompanied episcopal councils 
and the various heresies and schisms that afflicted the Eastern Church dwarf the disturbances that 
occurred further west. These riots and episodes of unrest shall not much feature here however, due to the 
geographic restrictions of this study. Fascinating investigations and ample bibliographies for religious 
violence in the East can be found in: P. Bell, Social Conflict in the Age of Justinian: its nature, 
management and mediation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), M. Gaddis, There is no crime for 
those who have Christ: religious violence in the Christian Roman Empire, (London: University of 
California Press, 2005) and Ari Bryen, Violence in Roman Egypt: A Study in Legal Interpretation, 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), and many other works.   
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5.2.2.1. Riots against Spiritually Transgressive ‘Outsiders’.  
As we have seen, communities in the late antique West could respond to the violation of 
community norms with violence. Common values determined both perceptions of 
normality and responses to it, both in religious and secular behaviours. It is important to 
stress, however, that it seems that deviance alone from community-defined normality 
was not usually reason enough to motivate rioting. As with secular riots relating to 
outsiders and barbarians, the mere existence of differing persons or behaviour does not 
seem to have caused religious unrest in typical circumstances. Rather, it was the 
perception that a community’s spiritual norms were threatened, or that behaviours were 
antagonistic to the community, that seemingly prompted a violent response from the 
crowd.  
The arrival of outsiders whose religious activity was perceived as hostile seems to have 
been a motivating factor in religious riots in Late Antiquity. The most obvious examples 
of overtly hostile behaviour by outsiders towards spiritual communities derive from 
hagiographies. A number of episodes of violence, or threatened violence, derive from 
the activities of holy men who sought to proselytize and defy the traditions of pagans. 
Gaul seems to have been the heartland of activity for vigorous idol-smashing ascetics 
and ecclesiastics in the fourth, fifth and sixth centuries.691 Not surprisingly, the 
                                                          
691 The caveat that must be admitted with the following examples of violence against St. Martin and 
other Christian holy men is that their categorisation as ‘riots’ is slightly dubious. They mainly occurred 
in villages, and the rustic topos, insisted upon by hagiographers to portray the opposition toward the 
Saint as credulous, (see Van Dam, ‘Introduction’ in Glory of the Confessors, (76), trans. Raymond Van 
Dam, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2004), p. xix for more detail on this use of ‘rustic’), 
implies a countryside location. However, the crowds that gathered, described as multitudes and 
apparently numbering into hundreds of participants, suggests that sizeable numbers gathered. Likewise, 
the spiritual locations and public demonstrations of power and agency by holy men and crowd alike 
suggests that these events can be treated in a manner akin to more properly urban unrest, even if the 
surroundings were not particularly densely populated. It is also worth mentioning that the unrest that 
accompanied some episodes of idol-smashing may well be fictional, and we should be increasingly 
dubious based on region and chronology. Despite these doubts, it is still worthwhile to look at these 
examples for their portrayal of violence and how this might have reflected genuine community values or 
lower-class agency. See Yitzhak Hen, ‘Paganism and Superstitions in the time of Gregory of Tours: Une 
question mal posée!’ in K. Mitchell and I. N. Wood, The World of Gregory of Tours, (Leiden: Brill, 
2002), pp. 229-40.   
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communities whose religious traditions were being attacked seem to have responded 
with unrest and even violence. St Martin came under attack in numerous villages from 
the local rustics when he attempted to destroy their temples or fell sacred trees. At one 
village, the inhabitants allowed him to destroy a temple but were roused when the saint 
began to fell a sacred tree and attempted to lure Martin into being crushed by it.692 At 
another village, named Leprosum, he was driven back by the multitude and received 
injuries from them.693 His biographer, Sulpicius Severus, suggests such violence was a 
common response to Martin’s activities; in a village of the Aedui; ‘When Martin was 
there overthrowing a temple, a multitude of rustic heathen rushed upon him in a frenzy 
of rage’, but Martin was saved from a sword blow by God. Sulpicius likens this miracle 
to another instance where he was saved from a knife-wielding man who sought 
vengeance for his destroyed idols.694 The hagiographies of Gregory of Tours provide 
details for similar events throughout late antique Gaul: in Autun, in either in the mid-
fourth or, possibly, in the early fifth century, Bishop Simplicius riled a ‘huge horde’ of 
pagans (exceeding four hundred in number) by felling their sacred statue of Berecynthia, 
though he was delivered from violence when the statue failed to right itself of its own 
accord and the pagans acclaimed the bishop.695 In the 430s, the youthful future abbots 
Lupicinus and Romanus were attacked with stones by locals ‘acting under demonic 
inspiration’, as they tried to found a religious community in the Jura Mountains.696 In c. 
520, the deacon Gallus, later Bishop of Clermont, whilst in the service of King Theuderic 
I destroyed the traditional place of worship of the pagan inhabitants of Cologne with fire 
                                                          
692 Sulpicius Severus, Vita Martini, 13. 
693 Sulpicius Severus, Vita Martini, 14. 
694 Sulpicius Severus, Vita Martini, 15, trans. Alexander Roberts (1894). 
695 Gregory of Tours, Glory of the Confessors, 76, trans. Raymond Van Dam, (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 2004), p. 56. Henceforth cited as GC. 
696 Gregory of Tours, Life of the Fathers, (1. 1-2), trans. Edward James (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 1991), pp.4-5. Henceforth cited as VP. There are discrepancies between the lives of these abbots 
as portrayed by Gregory and by their official hagiography, the Vita Patrum Jurensium, written by a 
monk at one of their Jura monasteries probably c. 510-20, but this story is accounted for in both lives. 
VP. 1. 1, p. 3n1. 
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and was pursued by them, ‘their swords in their hands’ so that he had to seek refuge in 
the king’s house and the intercession of Theuderic himself to calm their anger.697  
The indication from these examples is that communities were willing to violently oppose 
the violation of their spiritual traditions.698 Lone clerics, or those traveling with just a 
few companions were – unsurprisingly – particularly vulnerable targets.699 As we have 
seen, achieving asymmetry in confrontation was a significant factor in crossing the 
boundary from angry protest to violent riot.700 In such circumstances these clerics almost 
certainly ceded immediate violent supremacy to the communities whose hostility they 
provoked. However, we should not imagine that such acts of violence were taken 
incautiously, or with the belief that retribution might not follow. Martin returned to the 
village of the Aedui with two spear wielding angels to destroy the temple; Jeremy Knight 
notes that the description might as easily depict Roman soldiers.701 In any case, the saint 
certainly had the ear of the Emperor Magnus Maximus during the years of his 
usurpation.702 Similarly the deacon Gallus could call on the sympathetic authority of 
Theuderic to defend him from the wrath of the outraged inhabitants of Cologne. Riotous 
violence, even against isolated outsiders, was not undertaken without careful 
consideration of reprisals. Furthermore, the depiction of the idol-smashing clerics 
emphasises their physical vulnerability to confrontation in order to spotlight the triumph 
                                                          
697 VP. 6. 2, p. 34. 
698 There has to be a certain doubt regarding the details of violence, since violent opposition to the 
activities of a holy man could be used by the hagiographer to emphasise the Saint’s commitment to God 
and the mission. However rejecting the accounts of hagiographers on that basis is foolish; we will never 
know for sure how the villagers perceived the arrival of an idol-smashing outsider, but the 
hagiographical accounts indicate how a response that was perceived to be plausible in Late Antiquity. 
Moreover, the violent, riotous reaction to the transgression of communal norms as depicted by the 
hagiographers seems plausible given the equivalent reactions to transgression that provoked secular 
riots. 
699 Companions are rarely accounted for in these examples of violence against holy men, but it seems 
likely that Martin and others would have been accompanied by followers. The destruction of temples 
and similar acts of desecration likewise indicates the presence of physical assistance.  
700 Randall Collins, pp. 115-132 and pp. 233-4.  
701 J. Knight, The end of antiquity: archaeology, society and religion AD 235-700 (Stroud: Tempus, 
2007), p. 118. 
702 Timothy David Barnes, Early Christian Hagiography and Roman History, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2010), p. 228-232 
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of God’s representative over temporal opposition. Given the rhetoric of these accounts, 
it is difficult to be certain of detail, but we can be sure that the odds were not so stacked 
again holy men as their hagiographers would have us believe.  
Violence against outsiders who transgressed communal norms was rarely simple 
reactionary response. Communities were probably well informed about the secular and 
ecclesiastical power or influence that holy men could wield, yet they were nevertheless 
unwilling to allow certain deviant behaviours. In Spain, during the reign of Leovigild, a 
Nicene ascetic named Nanctus came from Africa and found favour with the King despite 
his Arianism. He was given a certain amount of land in reward for his prayers and holy 
lifestyle. According to his hagiographer, the rustic locals were appalled at their new 
master, whose clothes were ragged and hair uncut. They believed it was better to die 
than serve under such a man and so ambushed him while he was out grazing his sheep 
and broke his neck. Soon after they were arrested by royal agents and later tormented 
and killed by demons.703 The indication from the Lives of the Fathers of Mérida is that 
these people found the extremes of abnormality practised by Nanctus intolerable and 
were willing to risk death as a result of the enactment of their violent agency. They 
planned their violent actions and put them into effect in a conscious manner. Likewise, 
the villagers in fourth-century Gaul might allow Martin to smash a temple but not fell a 
sacred tree, whilst the crowd at Autun awaited the reaction of the divine to the actions 
of Simplicius before resorting to violence.704 These accounts of violence against ascetic 
holy men are highly stylized, and the confrontations and adversarial disparity are likely 
to fictionalised. We cannot be sure that they closely represent the actions of the villagers 
in question, but the depiction itself may be as significant. Riotous response was not 
                                                          
703 Paul the Deacon, ‘Lives of the Fathers of Merida’ in Lives of the Visigothic Fathers, trans. A. T. 
Fear, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1997), p. 56-7.  
704 See above, pp. 282-3. It is possible that the rioters in these episodes even knew their legal rights. 
Despite the support Martin seems to have had from certain legitimate authorities, the destruction of 
pagan temples in country districts seems to have been considered seditious up until 399; CTh 16. 10. 16.  
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automatic in these episodes, no more than the people of Late Antiquity were automatons. 
Violent reaction was conditional; for the hagiographer who recorded these events the 
behaviours of rustics toward perceived transgressors and their perceptions of authorities 
were given consideration, just as they were in the conditional, confrontation and 
sometimes violent exchanges between the Roman mob and their Prefect recorded by 
Ammianus. The reasoned morality behind these episodes of violence against irreligious 
outsiders is striking. The episodes are not just attacks on despised foreigners, but 
complex assessments of behaviour and assertions of agency against, at least in some 
cases, prominent representatives of authority. Indeed, the authority might not just be 
temporal; holy men attempted their (potential) outrages as a demonstration of spiritual 
truth and communities seem to have cautiously assessed their divine favour. Riot might 
bring soldiers to the village, or the risk the ire of Emperor or King; but it could also risk 
divine retribution if the wrong decisions were made. 
Nevertheless, violence against spiritually hostile outsiders was not, of course, a 
necessarily anti-authoritarian statement. Indeed violence was often performed in 
accordance with the desires of local authorities, as in Emerita, where Priscillian and his 
followers were attacked by a mob and kicked out of the city by a mob organised by 
Hydatius, the ‘orthodox’ bishop of the city.705 The norms of the community were 
determined by the community, but were subject to influences, such as the desires of the 
elite figure like Bishop Hydatius, or the advances of a new religion, as in Autun where 
the crowd were apparently convinced of the power of Christianity through the actions 
of Simplicius. The authorities within or ruling over these communities typically shared 
the same broad set of values as the common people. When their hostilities towards 
                                                          
705 Priscillian of Avila, ‘Tractate II: Priscillian’s Book to Bishop Damasus’ in Priscillain of Avila: The 
Complete Works ed. and trans. Marco Conti, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 76-77 and, 
for more detail, see Virginia Burrus, The making of a Heretic: gender, authority and the priscillianist 
controversy, (Berkeley: University of California, 1995), pp. 50-4.  
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outsiders were held in common the same threat of temporal punishment did not have to 
be psychologically overcome before violence was performed. However, it is important 
to recognise that the outsider was still seen as a transgressor. As we have seen, outsiders 
were not likely to trigger urban unrest unless their behaviour – whether religious or 
secular – was considered unacceptable. If moral or normative boundaries were 
overstepped however, urban communities in the late antique West clearly had a certain 
degree of agency to violently redress the situation, whether the authorities were 
sympathetic, disinterested or indeed hostile to that response. 
 
5.2.2.2. Religious Violence within the Community.  
However, riotous violence against religious transgressors did not occur solely as a result 
of the arrival of outsiders whose practices were unknown or perceived as deviant. 
Religious violence also occurred within communities which could be split by faith, 
theology or ecclesiastical factions. In such cases it is imperative to understand the 
changes in communal perceptions of normality that caused religious riot. It was not 
unusual for individuals of different faiths or creeds to co-exist within the same 
communities in Late Antiquity. On the whole, interactions between them must have been 
peaceful, probably even friendly, for those communities to be maintained. In order for 
riots to occur against members of a shared community, changes in perception or 
behaviour were required. Either the actions of victims must have changed and provoked 
new hostility, or (and more likely) the perceptions of what constituted transgressive 
behaviour changed on the part of the rioters. How did these changes come about, and 
what can it tell us about patterns of violence and the lives of common people in Late 
Antiquity? The following sections will try to investigate these issues. 
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 As we have seen, disputed papal succession, as in the Damasus versus Ursinus papal 
succession in Rome, could lead to the development of violently competitive 
supporters.706 Similar tensions in ecclesiastical politics could be a potent motivating 
factor in religious riots. After the death of Nicetius of Lyons in 573 the clergy were 
divided between those loyal to the policies of dead bishop and those who sided with his 
successor Priscus. Equivalent factionalism within the clergy is not uncommon in 
Gregory’s narrative, however this instance was particularly severe; he records that a 
priest of Priscus’s faction was confronted one evening by the spectre of the dead Nicetius 
who reprimanded him and repeatedly punched him in the throat so that he died the next 
day.707 Soon after a riot broke out between the factions during which stones and 
firebrands were thrown and one man killed another, only to be hunted down by the 
victim’s brother several days later. The brother was then imprisoned, but prayed to 
Nicetius and was released.708 It seems reasonable to speculate, as Allen Jones has, that 
the beating was delivered by partisans of Nicetius and that the release was an effort to 
assuage tension within the city.709 It is important to emphasise the significance of this. 
In the cases of spiritually motivated riot against outsiders the anger of the mob is directed 
toward an individual wrong-doer (sometimes along with their companions), whose 
otherness might be emphasised as a result of their origins, impiety or hostility toward 
local norms. However, in this case, as with other violence in ecclesiastical factionalism, 
the rioters had to ostracise their own neighbours and kin, rather than a more emotionally 
distant individual. This surely testifies to the continued importance of communal 
sanctity in the late antique West.  
                                                          
706 See above, pp. 245-8. 
707 For factionalism in the Merovingian Church see, for example, LH, 6. 11, 22, 36 and VP, 4. 4. 
708 LH, 4. 36.  
709 Allen Jones, pp. 194-6. 
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The development of violent conflict within Church politics was not the only motivator 
for intra-communal violence and, as we have seen, late antique communities did not 
conceive of notions of what behaviours were unacceptably transgressive in a vacuum. 
Changes in religious or political circumstances could radically alter perceptions of 
acceptability within the community. For example, in the aftermath of the execution of 
Priscillian in c.385 tensions were clearly heightened against the followers who still 
retained beliefs which had been so forcefully disavowed by authority. In Bordeaux, a 
noblewoman named Urbica, perhaps Pomponia Urbica who is otherwise known to have 
been married to Julius Censor and related through this marriage to Ausonius, was stoned 
to death by a ‘seditious’ and ‘vulgar’ mob on account of her impiety.710 It seems likely 
that Urbica had lived among the citizens of Bordeaux for years prior to the validation of 
violent methods against heretics by the execution of Priscillian, but it was only in the 
post-execution context that the crowd felt either the need or the opportunity to follow 
the extreme Imperial precedent by violently scourging impiety from the community. 
Motivation and opportunity likely worked in tandem. The invasion of Gaul by Attila’s 
Huns in 451 seems to have provided the citizens of Paris with a similar chance and 
reason to persecute Genovefa. Certain grievances towards her already seem to have 
existed prior to the invasion, but when she persuaded the people not to flee the city with 
their goods because she was convinced God would save the city, the crowd, in panic, 
believed that she was a false prophet and had mislead them into ruin. Only the 
intercession from a respected clergyman of Auxerre saved her from being stoned to 
death.711 Though the details of these two riots vary hugely they reveal the effects of 
                                                          
710 Prosper, ‘Chronicon, 1187’ in ‘Chronica Minora I’ in MGH AA 11, p. 462 and see Virginia Burrus, 
p. 82. See also H. Chadwick, Priscillian of Avila: the occult and the charismatic in the early Church 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).  
711 ‘The Life of Saint Genofeva’, as translated in Sainted Women of the Dark Ages, ed. and trans. J. A. 
McNamara, J. E. Halborg and E. Gordon Whatley, (London: Duke University Press, 1992), p. 23. The 
editors produced the translation from the edition in Acta Sanctorum, January 3, 137-53, on the grounds 
that this is held to be the oldest and lacks many of the flaws that existed in the version used by Krusch 
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political context on the motivation to riot. It is not clear how deeply the grievances 
towards these women were felt prior to the hardening of anti-Priscillianist sentiment or 
the Hunnic invasion, but the important issue for our purposes, in this study, is that both 
of them lived in the communities prior to those events. Prior to these changes in 
circumstance (in one instance, changing perception of heresy, in the other an invasion) 
they had been accepted. However, in the context of heightened tension, the thresholds 
of acceptable behaviour shifted; fears about the effect of irreligiousness on the 
community reached a new level and previously tolerable behaviour came to be 
considered transgressive, even from fellow members of the community.  
Similar changes seem to have affected the perception of Jewish persons or groups within 
wider Christian communities in the late antique West. In Minorca, famously, the arrival 
of relics of St. Stephen from the holy land in 418 seems to have encouraged Christians 
and in particular the Bishop on the island, Severus, to begin the forcible conversion of 
the Jews. Violence seems to have been employed by the Christians who burned down 
the synagogue, although riot does not explicitly feature in the account of Severus.712 In 
any case, the changes in perception caused a Jewish community on the island, totalling 
540 in 418, that had existed alongside Christians neighbours for years, to be converted 
in only eight days.713 Clearer evidence of anti-Jewish riot in the aftermath of policy 
change is evident in Merovingian Gaul, where the conversion of Jews was an 
increasingly significant episcopal and even royal policy.714 In Clermont in 576 Bishop 
Avitus attempted to put this policy into practice. Some Jews converted, but a riot was 
                                                          
for ‘Vita Genovefae virginis Parisiensis’ in Passiones vitaeque sanctorum aevi Merovingici et 
antiquiorum aliquot, MGH SRM, 3 (Hannover: Hahn, 1896).  
712 The destruction of a synagogue was legally considered a seditious offence, whilst violence against 
Jews incurred the usual penalties, so it is possible that Severus downplayed any violence in the 
‘miraculous’ conversion of Minorca’s Jews. CTh 16. 8. 9; 12; 14; 20; 21; 25; 27. 
713 Severus of Minorca, Letter on the Conversion of the Jews, ed. and trans. Scott Bradbury, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996). 
714 Brian Brennan, ‘The Conversion of the Jews in A.D. 576’, The Journal of Theological Studies, 36. 2, 
(1985), 321-337 (p. 322). See also the important study of Walter Goffart, ‘The Conversions of Avitus of 
Clermont and similar passages in Gregory of Tours’ in Rome’s Fall and After, pp. 293-317. 
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sparked when an unnamed Jewish man poured rancid oil onto the head of a convert 
during his baptismal procession, which coincided with the Easter celebrations, and also 
with the celebration of Passover.715 This apparent slight prompted an aggressive reaction 
from the crowd who were only prevented from stoning the offender through the 
intercession of the Bishop.716 Soon after the crowd burned down the synagogue and the 
Bishop offered the remaining Jews the choice of conversion or leaving the city. Avitus 
did not demand conversion as such, but insisted that the city should be as one flock under 
his guidance as shepherd. Once again, episcopal policy, resulted in a shifting of the 
boundaries of transgression.717 According to Gregory over five hundred Jews were 
converted in Clermont, whilst the rest left for Marseilles.718 However, it is also 
interesting to notice that as well as changes in policy dictated by religious authority, the 
co-incidence of major festivals for both Jews and Christians may have stoked tensions 
to unusual levels. As Goffart has noticed, the incidences of violence and conversion that 
remain in the historical accounts of interactions between Christians and Jews in Late 
Antiquity grab the attention of the reader, and allow us to overlook the normalcy of day-
to-day interactions within the community. The typical state of being was coexistence.719 
These examples allow us to understand, however, that in the context of change – in this 
case from religious and secular authorities – what was once usual came to be seen as 
transgressive. Perhaps, in the peculiar context of overlap between Passover and Easter, 
                                                          
715 Easter was particularly emotionally charged festival for relations between Christians and Jews in 
Merovingian Gaul; Brennan, p. 327. See Elliot Horowitz, Reckless Rites: Purim and the legacy of 
Jewish Violence (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 151-2 for the effect of the co-
incidence of Passover and Easter. 
716 Note that the Jewish community likewise held perceptions of what was perceived to be transgressive; 
the lack of faith of the convert was punished with hostility and public embarrassment, even in the face 
of the tension whipped up by the conversion rhetoric of Bishop Avitus. Indeed, in the version of events 
described by Venantius Fortunatus, the reaction of the Jewish community was quite belligerent; they 
gathered together in a rebellious crowd and locked themselves away in a house. Brennan, p. 330. 
717 Previously Jews seem to have been welcome and integrated in Clermont; in the fifth-century Bishop 
Sidonius Apollinaris took a tolerant approach and it seems that this was continued by Avitus’s episcopal 
rivals, Cautinus and Eufrasius, who seem to have espoused a less hard-line policy; Brennan, p. 324. 
718 LH, 9. 11. 
719 Goffart, ‘The Conversions of Avitus of Clermont and similar passages in Gregory of Tours’, pp. 316-
17. 
 292 
 
the zeal for spiritual normality became particularly intense. In these unhappy 
circumstances, people who had been neighbours came to inflict violence upon one 
another.  
 
5.2.2.3. Outsiders, Insiders and Shifting Perceptions of Transgression.  
Interestingly however, an example of riot in Marseilles shortly afterward demonstrates 
that spiritual divisions, even in the context of heightened religious tensions, did not 
override other potential transgressions that could provoke a violent reaction from the 
community. Chiperic had considerable zeal for proselytization, indeed he ordered the 
conversion of all Jews in his Kingdom, and took a certain convert named Phatyr as his 
godson. This Phatyr took exception to a Jewish citizen of Marseilles, named Priscus, 
who resisted pressure to convert, even though the King had had him imprisoned. Priscus 
managed to bribe his way out of jail and was headed for the synagogue along with some 
companions when he was accosted by Phatyr along with his servants. Phatyr cut 
Priscus’s throat with a sword and killed the rest of his companions before seeking 
sanctuary in the Church. However panic arose between the murderers who began to 
attack one another. Several were killed and the victor fled the bloodied sanctuary, only 
to find the outraged mob assembled outside the Church; the transgressor had fled into 
the arms of the crowd and was killed.720 This episode serves as an important 
counterbalance to the previous examples of shifting perceptions of transgression; Priscus 
and his companions may well have been seen as deviant in the context of royal and 
episcopal pressure to convert in late sixth-century Gaul, but murder followed by the 
desecration of sanctuary remained a much more significant motivation to riot. Violence 
against members of the community, even if they were somewhat peripheral, as Priscus 
                                                          
720 LH, 6. 17. 
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seems to have been, was a potent provocation to the community. It was significant 
enough that they were willing to risk royal displeasure through collective violence 
against Chilperic’s own godson.721 This is deeply significant, as it underlines the 
complexity of community and notions of transgression in Late Antiquity. From the 
outset of this chapter, and indeed this thesis, we have sought to stress that lower-class 
people in Late Antiquity were not mere passive recipients of violence, and that violence 
on their part can inform us about their perceptions and experience of life. In the previous 
section, we saw that contextual changes in community could cause friction and violence 
between neighbours whose differing spiritual behaviours had not been seen as 
transgressive (or at least transgressive enough to provoke riot) up until that point. In this 
example, we can see that despite the official policy from the realm’s authorities, 
Christian members of a community were willing to riot against the transgressive actions 
of a Christian against a Jewish neighbour in the community. This seems to give us an 
important measure of both what was considered normal and transgressive. It is as simple 
point, but worth stressing: in this case the violence of the convert Phatyr was considered 
transgressive by the (largely Christian), despite the fact that his violence was aimed at a 
Jew who was unwilling to convert. In order to punish the transgression, the community 
were willing to violently riot and murder a favoured godson of the King.   
Not only was the crowd willing to sail against the winds of official policy, but on 
occasion their sympathies could swing with the vicissitudes of immediate situational 
context. In the summer of 419 an enthusiastic orthodox catholic priest called Fronto took 
it upon himself to root out heresy in the province of Tarraconensis by pretending to be 
                                                          
721 This is a stark contrast to the anti-Jewish riots at Clermont: those were perhaps even lawful (late 
Roman law codes continued to have relevance in Merovingian Gaul and CTh 16. 8. 1 demanded death 
by fire for Jews who attacked converts) whilst the citizens of Marseilles directly contravened royal 
policy with riot. Chilperic did in fact pardon the murders of the servants because Phatyr escaped, but 
such a reaction was not assured. The citizens of Limoges would find out the consequences when 
Chilperic reacted badly to news of urban riots. LH, 5, 28, see above, p. 269-70, n.661. 
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a heretic. He managed to ingratiate himself with a woman of senatorial rank who 
informed him that her priest, named Severus, had been traveling with three suspicious 
books which had since been stolen by barbarians and delivered to the local Bishop, 
Sagittius. Armed with this information, Fronto accused Severus of heresy before the 
episcopal court of Bishop Titianus; the metropolitan in Tarraco. However by that time 
the books in question had been passed around among several bishops including Titianus 
himself, and Syagrius of Osca – Severus’s direct superior – and ended up back in 
Severus’s possession. Knowing that Fronto lacked this crucial evidence he refuted the 
claims and, relying on local support, denounced his accuser. Given that the bishops of 
the court had themselves been implicated in the return of evidence to the accused, it is 
unsurprising that the people of the towns they represented turned on Fronto, who, fearing 
murder, sought sanctuary in the church of the city.  To make matters worse, Severus 
summoned his relative Asterius, who was the senior military official in all of Spain, to 
come and make sure that the family name was not sullied.722 Faced with overwhelming 
opposition from the local authorities, all of whom had strong ties of patronage with the 
people of the Tarraco, Fronto was violently abused, both verbally and physically, by the 
crowd. Stones were hurled at him and the mob pleaded with the assembled bishops to 
allow summary justice in the form of lynching. Fronto was only able to appease them 
with promises that he would meekly submit to death by stoning if he was found guilty.  
However, it is important to highlight here that the reputation of the community was the 
major concern for the rioters, not any personal vendetta. When a henchman of Asterius 
attempted to drag Fronto from his sanctuary the people intervened and drove the man 
from the city with fatal wounds. Clearly they valued the sacred boundaries of the church 
more highly than retribution against a fugitive who they had already deemed guilty and, 
                                                          
722 For Asterius’ career, including this affair, see Kulikowski, ‘The career of the comes Hispaniarum 
Asterius’ in Phoenix, 54 (2000) 123–141. 
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furthermore, were willing to risk the displeasure of the most powerful general in the area 
in order to maintain that sanctity.  
Nor indeed was the condemnatory opinion of the mob immutable; Fronto was 
fortuitously saved by the intervention of Bishop Syagrius who confirmed the existence 
of the books and provided excerpts from them as evidence. Fronto seized this 
opportunity and read aloud from these texts, so that the crowd instead attacked Severus 
and one of the implicated episcopal judges. In doing so they rejected their ties to 
neighbouring cities and the bonds of patronage that surely linked them with the powerful 
senatorial kin of Severus, Asterius and the Bishops.723 Clearly the application of justice 
and the maintenance of orthodoxy – however they defined this – was of paramount 
significance to the people of Tarraco. Their anger at perceived transgression at first 
coincided with the direction of the local authorities, though they were nevertheless 
unwilling to allow the desecration of sanctuary. But when new evidence emerged their 
perceptions of transgression shifted in accordance and the authorities became the target 
of popular hostility. 
 
5.3. Interim Conclusion: Rioting and Lower-Class Agency in Late Antiquity.  
As these last two episodes of riot demonstrate, the division of late antique rioting into 
categories of religious and secular may be helpful from an analytical perspective, but 
such divisions will rarely be entirely satisfactory. In the course of these disturbances 
secular transgressions, such as perjury and murder were committed, but in a religious 
                                                          
723 This whole affair is described in a letter of Consentius to Augustine; Augustine, Letter 11* in 
Augustine, Letters, Volume 6, Letters 1*-29*, trans. Sister Wilfrid Parsons, (Washington D. C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1989), pp. 81-98. For a meticulous scholarly appraisal of the 
events in that letter, see Kulikowski ‘Fronto, the bishops and the crowd: episcopal justice and communal 
violence in fifth-century Tarraconensis’ in Early Medieval Europe, 11 (2002) 295–320. See also García 
Moreno, “Élites e iglesia hispanas en la transición del imperio romano al reino visigodo,” in J.M. 
Candau, ed., La conversión de Roma. Cristianismo y paganismo. (Ediciones Clasicas: Madrid, 1991), 
pp. 223–257. 
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context. Religious sanctuary was defiled, but was this a legal offence or a spiritual 
outrage? How should they be categorised? The answer is, perhaps, to avoid strict 
discrimination between the spheres in our minds, even if we maintain a distinction for 
analytical purposes. Common people in Late Antiquity would have rarely drawn 
definitive distinctions between the religious and the secular, so perhaps we should avoid 
rigid distinctions too. The purpose of this chapter has been to attempt to define the issues 
that were important enough to the crowd to induce violent opposition in the form of riot. 
Across broad categories, that might be considered economic, political, social, sporting 
and religious, it seems that riot was a form of violent agency exercised by the common 
people against transgression.  
These transgressions were not set in stone; they were subject to immediate circumstances 
and the cultural climate. Nor did transgressors fall into neat categories; riot was not 
inherently a hostile response to authorities nor the unfamiliar behaviours of outsiders, 
although it could be both. It could also defend outsiders, or be directed by authorities. 
However, it is important to stress that, however subject to influence the moral boundaries 
of the common people were, that they seem to have self-defined the limits at which 
transgression would provoke protest or violence. In this sense riot was a demonstration 
of agency; it was not the only form by which the lower classes could redress their 
grievances, but it was a potent tool that could be made use of to defend or improve the 
lives, beliefs or traditions of the common people.  
Toward the outset of this chapter, we extended the premise of Thompson’s Moral 
Economy thesis to help explain how and why people rioted over commodity shortages 
in Late Antiquity. Then, as in the eighteenth-century, which was the subject of 
Thompson’s enquiry, it seems clear that riot was not an automatic response to a stimulus. 
People did not riot as a last violent protest before malnutrition robbed them of remaining 
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energy; rather riot was a response to moral failing by which the community perceived 
that it had been let down or betrayed. Riot, therefore, formed an aspect of the discourse 
between the lower classes and authority.  
Interestingly, on the basis of the riots investigated in the course of this chapter, it seems 
that the basic thesis of Thompson’s argument is applicable more generally across late 
antique rioting regardless of motivation. It seems that rioting was never simply an 
automatic response. When riots were underway, they could be curtailed by authorities 
who engaged with them. The motivations for riot could smoulder until a perceived 
weakness on the part of authorities afforded the people the opportunity to voice or 
enforce their grievances. Long-term neighbours whose actions were not perceived as 
transgressive might quickly become subject to riotous violence as a result of changes in 
circumstances. Rather than an instinctive or unthinking response to stimuli, rioting 
represents a method by which lower-class people could make their voices heard, and 
through which their problems might be relieved. The motivations for riots therefore, tell 
us a great deal about the values and preoccupations of common people in Late Antiquity. 
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Conclusion.   
In an attempt to follow the thematic thread of lower-class violence in the late antique 
West this study has run its course across a wide range of material. We have seen 
Emperors, Kings, Popes, Bishops, aristocrats, landowners, soldiers, farmers, shepherds, 
slaves, charioteers, custodians, lime-burners, postmen, cattle-rustlers, bandits, rebels, 
bucellarii, Bacaudae, assassins, Romans, Armoricans, Isaurians, Nori, barbarians, 
Goths, Iuthungi, scamarae, Nicene Christians, Priscillianists, Arians, pagans and Jews, 
and tried to highlight and understand the violent interactions between these various 
groups. These interactions have been studied across half a continent, across climatic, 
geographic and political boundaries and over the course of three centuries. However this 
study, like the above list, cannot claim to be exhaustive. As stated at the outset, this 
project was and is not intended to identify and describe every incident of lower-class 
violence in the late antique West. Far from it. Instead, I hope to have traced this thread 
through a number of case studies arranged into categories for the purposes of structure. 
It is hoped that these categories, each being one of the five chapters of the thesis, could 
each stand in relative isolation, although it is accepted that chapters one, two and three 
are more mutually reliant.  
However, because of this categorisation, and because of the sheer diversity of the subject 
material, it is important to stress some of the common themes for which I have drawn 
this material together. Each chapter is furnished with its own conclusion, or concluding 
remarks. The purpose of this section is to provide some level of synthesis by drawing 
together the strands of the argument from each chapter. It is not a review of the material 
covered, but instead it is intended to highlight common themes and attempt some 
cautious generalisations about violence and the lives of common people in Late 
Antiquity, and its importance to the wider topic. 
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i. Who was violent, and how?  
At the outset of this investigation, it was stressed that the lower classes of late antique 
society were extremely varied and heterogeneous, and that we should not suppose any 
notion of class-consciousness. This remains true, and if anything the multitude of groups 
which have been seen to have got caught up in lower-class violence testifies to that very 
diversity. We have proposed that endemic bandits, as far as can be discerned, were from 
the economic and geographic margins of the ancient world, such as the uplands or 
wetlands, and were typically pastoralists. However, if such groups seem to have 
provided a baseline of latrocinium, at least in some regions, at other times bandits were 
created by political or social context, rather than born into traditions of brigandage. At 
such times, the origins of bandits were far more diverse, and we can discern that lower-
class individuals from various backgrounds, especially farmers, fugitives from 
hereditary occupations, slaves and deserters, came to swell the ranks of epidemic 
brigandage and the Bacaudae. Rioters and retainers were likewise typically the poor, but 
in both cases we can see that certain categories of people gained a reputation for 
proficiency. Shepherds, bandits and deserters were all favoured by powerful patrons for 
work as retainers because they often brought violent expertise into the role. For similar 
reasons, charioteers, gladiators and perhaps, intriguingly, members of the lesser clergy 
could be found at the forefront of riots for similar reasons.  
This is revealing about the practice of violence in Late Antiquity; experience and 
reputation were clearly valued. It seems that endemic bandits sought the experience of 
tradition, such as elders who had known generations of raiding. Such endemic expertise 
in brigandage could also provide a core around which prospective epidemic bandits 
could coalesce, as in the case of the third-century Bacaudae, where it seems that farmers 
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might have made use of the knowledge and practices of shepherd/bandits. Likewise in 
the fifth century, fugitives may have made for Armorica because it was known to be a 
place where bandits could find refuge and occupation. Similarly deserters and even 
military veterans were feared for the disruption that they might cause. This fear made 
them targets, and they were often subject to harsh punishments along with their infamous 
reputations.  
Yet good fighters could usually find employment; the Isaurians and bandits might have 
had poor reputations, but it made them worthy employees if violence was expected. 
Charioteers and gladiators might have been considered drunken and loutish, but that 
made them ideal as a violent experts in a riot over disputed Papal election.724 
Intriguingly, this respect for reputation and emphasis on experienced fighters seems to 
exist regardless of social class, and perhaps even of motivation. Wealthy patrons, rebel 
Bacaudae, petty bandits, custodians, bodyguards, and rioters all wanted to survive and 
have men of violence on their side.  
 
ii. Lower-class violence and Authority.  
Complexity has been another common trait across this investigation. It might have been 
assumed that lower-class violence necessarily implied conflict between classes. 
Sometimes this was the case. The Pseudo-Christ of Bourges seems to have robbed the 
rich to give to the poor, whilst rioters in Bazas took advantage of a barbarian siege to 
attempt a slaughter of the nobility.725 Many bandits, and the Bacaudae in particular, seem 
to have been very hostile toward Roman authority, whilst various riots were directed 
against transgressions by authority figures. However, just because such motivations 
                                                          
724 See above, pp. 65-7 for bandits and Isaurians and for charioteers and gladiators see p. 208 and n.522, 
pp. 245-9, pp. 262-4.  
725 See above, pp. 99-101 for the Pseudo-Christ and p. 244 for the riot at Bazas.  
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inspired violence does not mean that those motivations were uniform. As we have seen, 
that categorisation of a bandit was very much open to interpretation; one man’s bandit 
could easily be another man’s retainer!  
Grievance against oppression by authority was just one of many motivations for lower-
class people to take up violence. Some might have desired social improvement through 
work as a bodyguard to a patron, some might have felt loyalty to a church, shrine, or to 
the norms and cohesiveness of the community itself. It is important to remember that 
when we observe social conflict in Late Antiquity, it is likely that there were lower-class 
individuals engaged in violence on both sides. Retainers may have defended aristocrats 
from Bacaudae whilst bandits in the employ of one aristocrat may have meted out 
‘justice’ to those in the employ of his landowning neighbour. Consequently, we should 
not think of relations with authorities in necessarily simple terms; lower-class people 
could be the opponents, employees, slaves or allies of authority figures. They could also 
use their violent roles to negotiate a better position in society, perhaps by patronage, by 
intimidation or by force.  
 
iii. Lower-class violence and the Community.    
Violence, at least in the forms that we have seen it in this study, was typically a frantic 
and dangerous business; on this basis it might be assumed that it tended to alienate the 
community. This was often, perhaps even typically, the case. The impoverished, 
violated, mutilated and murdered victims surely bred a great deal of contempt and 
hostility toward lower-class violence; we should remember the striking scene in 
Apuleius in which a rich man attempted to steal property from his neighbour, with both 
sides employing what we would call lower-class retainers. Several of the combatants 
were killed brutally, including the rich neighbour, with one man even ripped apart by 
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hounds. Families were wiped out and the poor neighbour killed himself rather than face 
the sorrow and recrimination of the violence.726 The scene itself is fictional, but its real 
life equivalents were surely equally tragic.   
However, it is important to stress that this too was not uncomplicated. We have seen, for 
example, that endemic bandits were closely reliant on their communities, suggesting that 
Hobsbawm’s theory of social banditry might be applicable and indeed a fairly common 
phenomenon in Late Antiquity. Bandits were rarely self-sufficient, and the community 
provided vital support for their activities. This was recognised by the state, which 
perceived this reliance and focused upon it as the integral policy of their techniques of 
anti-banditry. Even epidemic bandits often seem to have tried to return to friendly 
territory, where they either had kin and connections to facilitate their banditry, or to a 
region – such as Armorica or the Apennines – where they might find sympathy or 
fellowship. Even more striking is the relationship between rioters and their community. 
Following E. P. Thompson’s moral economy thesis, we have seen that a major, perhaps 
defining, feature of late antique riots is the perception of transgression of norms as 
defined by the community. These were subject to change and influence, and were 
certainly not held uniformly, but the transgression of communal morality was the cause 
of many an instance of urban unrest. In light of this, we should be cautious about 
assumptions of antagonism. Lower-class people who behaved violently could not fall 
back on their legal rights or friends in high places to defend them; they needed support. 
This might have come from their bandit gang or from an aristocratic employer, but it 
might often have come from the community itself, which sometimes tolerated, 
encouraged or defended those violent acts.  
 
                                                          
726 Apuleius, 9. 35-8 and see above, pp. 203-4.  
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iv. Lower-Class Violence and its impact on the End of the Western Roman 
Empire.  
Way back in the introduction it was noted that ‘popular uprisings...come a very long way 
down any list’ of causes of the End of the Western Empire.727 This remains true, but any 
belittling attitude toward the violent agency of that populace is now, I hope, due a little 
reconsideration. Banditry, regardless of its form, hindered communication and 
commerce as travellers and merchants presented prime targets. This might have been of 
minimal consequence in times of general peace, but when the Empire was struggling to 
respond to crises, it might have had a serious impact given the apparent ubiquity of 
banditry. Epidemic bandits, in particular, may have had a fairly severe impact on the 
economic output of a region, as in Southern Italy where Cassiodorus had to plead with 
the people to put down their pikes and leave the fighting to the Ostrogoths.728 Of possibly 
even greater importance was the impact of banditry on manpower. Bandits, and the 
Bacaudae especially, proved to be a potent draw for dissatisfied elements of Roman 
society in the late fourth and early fifth centuries. Deserters from the army, in particular, 
went directly from being servants of the Emperors to enemies of the state when they 
became bandits. It is impossible to empirically calculate the scale of epidemic 
brigandage at this time, but it was clearly significant. The problem was so severe that 
the state ceded its traditional and long held monopoly of violence in order to legitimise 
private, vigilante violence for the purpose of anti-banditry. The legitimacy of private 
citizens who fought barbarians and usurpers on behalf of the state was dubious. That 
those citizens who fought bandits were enfranchised to do so must indicate the severity 
of banditry. More direct evidence of the scale of epidemic brigandage can be found in 
the activities of the Bacaudae; these rebels necessitated Diocletian’s decision to appoint 
                                                          
727 Ward-Perkins, The fall of Rome, p. 176, and see above, Introduction, ii, pp. 14-5. 
728 Cassiodorus, Variae, 12. 5 and above, pp. 120-22.  
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a co-Emperor in the third century to deal with them, whilst in the fifth century they 
demanded the attentions of the generals Aetius, Litorius, Merobaudes and Asterius along 
with federate Alans, Huns and Goths. Indeed, it even seems that the Bacaudae were 
powerful enough to have organised alliances, or diplomatic relations of some kind, with 
the Sueves and Huns. The Bacaudae, and epidemic bandits in general, did not bring 
down the Empire, but they were a serious thorn in the side of generals in the Western 
Empire during the critical decades from the 390s-440s. 
Also significant, and directly related, must be the increasingly popular practice of 
retaining in Late Antiquity. Bandits provided recruits for such retinues, whilst the 
prevalence of banditry provided both a need for retinues to exist and a degree of legal 
justification for their existence. Armed retainers, likewise, did not bring down the 
Empire, but the concentration of violent power in private hands may have been part of 
a trend that undermined the ability of the state either to operate a publicly funded army, 
or effectively draw taxes from its citizens. As stated, it is not the intent of this study to 
argue that lower-class violence was of primary or even major importance, relative to 
other factors, in the end of Roman administration in the Western provinces. However, it 
seems clear that it had some considerable and damaging effect on the ability of the 
Roman state to endure other more serious issues, and is therefore worthy of some notice. 
 
v. The End of the Western Roman Empire and its impact on Lower-Class 
Violence: Violence and quality of life during the Transformation of the 
Roman World.  
How did ordinary people experience the end of Roman administration in the provinces 
of the Western Empire, and how did it affect their quality of life? As we have seen, 
differing interpretations can be offered; some might propose that economic and 
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commercial decline brought a halt to the access to material goods that had been freely 
available under Rome, but others might argue that the easing of tax burdens and 
widespread hereditary employment may have qualitatively eased the burden felt by 
common people.729 Lower-class violence is a measure of extreme situations, and it is 
consequently of little use in trying to make generalisations about whether the post-
Roman period was a relative ‘golden’ or ‘dark’ age in comparison to life under Roman 
rule. It is likely that it was both, based on time, place and individuality.  
It is also hard to speculate about whether lower-class violence was more or less common 
under the Empire or after the notional end of Roman rule in c.476. We might suppose, 
for example, that the decline of the great urban centres of population in Late Antiquity 
would have caused a consequent decline in rioting. These major cities with large 
populations were directly supported by the state and relied, to a greater or lesser degree, 
on its administrative institutions to maintain large populations that were beyond the 
capacity of the local hinterland to supply. We can see that in the late Roman period 
failures to provide supplies was seen as transgressive by those populations, and 
significant rioting took place. But as the populations declined it seems that local supply 
was more likely to prove sufficient victuals to satisfy demand and that, therefore, this 
major motivation for late Roman rioting was alleviated. Yet whilst it is true that this 
motivation for riots seems to diminish in significance, it is far from clear that rioting was 
less common. In Gaul, at the time of Gregory of Tours, religious and judicial 
transgressions, along with taxation, seem to have become more pressing issues. How do 
we understand this? Can we make general observations about the motivation for riots in 
Late Antiquity, or just contrast the motivations for rioting in Austrasian Clermont and 
Imperial Rome? Or perhaps the particular interests and biases of our sources, like sixth-
                                                          
729 See above, Introduction, i, pp. 12-4 and n.7. 
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century Bishop Gregory and fourth-century, pagan, ex-soldier Ammianus Marcellinus, 
simply distort our understanding irreparably?  
Patterns in late antique retaining are hardly less difficult to discern. Under the Roman 
Empire the notional state monopoly on violence necessitated small-scale retaining; the 
army could not be everywhere, so aristocrats and the wealthy felt it necessary to keep 
bodyguards and armed retainers for protection and to enforce their desires, but these 
retinues had to be subtle enough to not incur the wrath of authorities. In the post-Roman 
West, legitimacy to act violently was less closely guarded by authorities, so perhaps 
there were more opportunities for lower-class people to engage in de facto or de jure 
legitimate violence because of fewer restrictions? This may have been the case in some 
instances, but elsewhere economic decline may have severely restricted the capacity for 
the wealthy to patronise armed retinues. Furthermore, the wider legitimacy for violence 
may well have swiftly evolved, so that violent social roles became closely tied to martial 
aristocracies whose role as bellatores came to contrast with the role of the lower classes, 
whose place was to work.730 
As for banditry, it seems very difficult to propose that it either became more or less 
common over the course of Late Antiquity. Certainly the gradual breakdown in pan-
Imperial commerce may have had a significant impact on the upland communities of the 
Western Empire who herded livestock to supply the demand for cheese, meat, wool and 
leather. If these communities fell into decline, then the endemic banditry with which 
they were associated might have declined along with it, but conversely it might have 
encouraged diversification into raiding to fulfil shortfalls. Likewise, the breaking of the 
Roman state monopoly on violence may have given bandits more freedom to raid, but it 
may have afforded private citizens greater freedom to eliminate bandits in their district. 
                                                          
730 Halsall, ‘Introduction’, p. 5 and above, pp. 20-1. 
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We can be fairly certain that there was a relative peak in epidemic banditry during the 
period of 390-440, but we cannot say that either endemic or epidemic banditry was 
empirically more or less common in c.370 than in c.570.  
However, on the subject of banditry, we can be reasonably sure that perceptions of the 
process changed during this same period. Earlier in the Roman Empire, bandits and 
external barbarians were juxtaposed as distinct categories of enemies of Rome. By the 
late Empire it seems that these categories were increasingly difficult to distinguish as 
barbarians became internal, and as internal ‘peoples’, like the Isaurians and perhaps 
Armoricans, came to be perceived as barbarous. Terms such as Bacaudae, scamarae, 
and vargi may have been linguistic solutions to the problems of categorisation of 
barbarians and bandits in the late antique mind, with the eventual result that the term 
latro seems to have lost some of its specific meaning.731      
All told, it is likely that we will never be able to make reasoned generalisations about 
the prevalence of lower-class violence in late Roman and Early Medieval societies, 
although convincing arguments might yet be made, especially at a more regional level. 
Fortunately, it is not the purpose of this thesis to try to claim that life was objectively 
better or worse for the inhabitants of the Roman or post-Roman West based on trends in 
lower-class violence. What we can say is that all these basic categories of violence seem 
to have prevailed throughout the period. In the case of epidemic banditry (including the 
revolts of the Bacaudae), we can seem to discern a peak in activity during the late fourth 
and early fifth centuries that probably is reflective of particular disruption, and perhaps 
also of opportunity for lower-class violence during those years. However, it also seems 
clear that epidemic banditry, on a lesser scale, afflicted Italy and Gaul both in the 360s 
and still in the 530s and 590s respectively. Trends are less easy to discern in the other 
                                                          
731 By contrast, the terminology of rioting seems consistent throughout the period. See above, p. 240 and 
271.  
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categories of lower-class violence, but they nevertheless are still visible at both ends of 
the loose period covered here, id est c.370-c.570.  
Tentatively then, we can propose that the continuity in forms of lower-class violence 
might indicate that similar stimuli and motivations existed and that these were therefore 
likewise continuous in some sense. So, whilst it seems that, for example, a failure of 
state officials to fulfil their obligations to provide food might have been less a cause for 
riot in the sixth century than in the fourth, it does seem that transgression in other forms, 
such as excessive taxation or a lack of proper spiritual conformity, still prompted a 
broadly similar violent response. Administrations may have changed, but lower-class 
people seem to have retained a similar capacity to express their agency through violence. 
This should not be taken as evidence of monolithic or complete continuity. The evidence 
is far too patchy and far too diverse in character to even hint at such a conclusion. 
However, there must have been significant elements of continuity, at least in some areas, 
since catastrophic collapse or complete changes in society would likely have resulted in 
more discernible changes in the patterns of lower-class violence.  
Ultimately, this evidence of continuity might simply suggest that life was often really 
difficult for lower-class people in Late Antiquity. Violence was an inherently dangerous 
practice, and the lower status and traditionally non-violent social role of common people 
left them even more vulnerable to its vicissitudes. The decision to behave violently can 
rarely have been taken lightly. And yet, throughout the period people still fled hardships 
and oppression to live as bandits, still publically aired their grievances against the 
representatives of authority, and still took up hazardous careers in violence for the hope 
of improving their lives. Most slaves, most peasants and most workers may have had no 
option but to passively accept their fates, and remain on the receiving end of violence. 
However, even if life could be intolerably hard for lower-class people in the late antique 
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West, it is absolutely clear that they had some degree of agency. This remains the central 
point of this thesis. Poor people in Late Antiquity were not uniformly the victims of their 
circumstances in the manner of Phaedrus’s Ass.732 Nor did they necessarily accept new 
burdens or injustices with resignation. Rather, they were evidently mindful of their 
condition and quality of life and were, on occasion, able to do something about it.  
  
                                                          
732 For the fable of Phaedrus’ Ass and its implications, see above, pp. 9-11 and also, p. 198.  
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